THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

RIVERSIDE 


A    HISTORY    OF    AMERICAN 
POLITICAL  THEORIES 


•J^^C^o 


A    HISTORY 

OF 


''AMERICAN    POLITICAL 
THEORIES 


t^  BY 

C:  EDWARD    MERRIAM,  A.M.,  Ph.D. 

Ill 

ASSOCIATE   IN    POLITICAL   SCIENCE 
THE   UNIVERSITY   OF    CHICAGO 


THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

LONDON:  MACMILLAN  AND  CO.,  Ltd. 
1920 

Aii  rights  reserved 


J/- 


Copyright,  1903, 

By  the  macmillan  company. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  February,  1903. 


NorfaoDB  ^tras 

J.  8.  Cashing  &  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 

Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


2^0 

PROFESSOR  WILLIAM    ARCHIBALD   DUNNING 

MY  TEACHER  AND   GUIDE  IN  THE  STUDY 

OF  POLITICAL  THEORIES 

THIS  VOLUME   IS  GRATEFULLY  DEDICATED 


PREFACE 

The  development  of  American  political  theories 
has  received  surprisingly  little  attention  from  stu- 
dents of  American  history.  Even  the  political 
ideas  of  the  Revolutionary  fathers  and  the  tenets 
of  such  important  schools  as  those  represented  by 
Jefferson  and  Adams  have  not  been  carefully  ana- 
lyzed or  put  in  their  proper  perspective.  The 
pohtical  theory  of  the  controversies  over  slavery 
and  the  nature  of  the  Union  has  generally  been 
presented  from  the  partisan  point  of  view,  while 
recent  tendencies  in  political  thought  have  received 
no  adequate  notice. 

In  explanation  of  this  fact,  it  might  be  said  that 
until  very  recent  times  but  little  interest  has  been 
manifested  in  systematic  politics.  But  while  it  is 
true  that  Americans  have  never  developed  systems 
of  politics  after  the  philosophic  fashion  of  the 
Germans,  there  has  been  no  dearth  of  political 
theory  from  the  days  of  the  Puritans  to  the  present 
time.  Seldom  worked  out  by  political  scientists 
or  philosophers,  American  political  ideas  have 
generally  taken  shape  in  connection  with  some 
great  question  of  national  policy  which  has  seemed 


Viii  PREFACE 

to  require  a  broad  theoretical  basis  for  either  con^ 
demnation  or  approval.  Conspicuous  examples 
of  this  are  found  in  the  discussion  over  the  Revo- 
lution, over  slavery  and  secession.  These  political 
theories  have  played  an  important  part  in  our 
national  life,  and  are  closely  woven  into  the  fabric 
of  American  history.  Of  particular  significance 
are  they  in  view  of  the  fact  that  they  represent 
the  philosophy  under  which  has  been  developed 
the  mightiest  democracy  of  modern  times,  or  of 
any  time. 

It  is,  then,  the  purpose  of  this  work  to  present 
a  description  and  analysis  of  the  characteristic 
types  of  political  theory  that  have  from  time  to 
time  been  dominant  in  American  political  life. 
An  effort  has  been  made  throughout  to  discuss 
these  theories  in  their  relation  to  the  peculiar  con- 
ditions under  which  they  were  developed,  and  to 
keep  in  sight  the  intimate  connection  between  the 
philosophy  and  the  facts  that  condition  it.  Like 
all  other  poHtical  theory,  American  political  ideas 
are  of  little  importance  aside  from  the  great  his- 
torical movements  of  which  they  are  an  organic 
part. 

In  the  preparation  of  this  volume,  use  has  been 
made  of  several  articles  already  published  else- 
where. "  Paine's  Political  Theory "  appeared  in 
The  Political  Science  Quarterly  for  September, 
1899,  and  "The  Political  Theory  of  Jefferson" 
in   the   same   magazine   for  March,   1902.     "The 


PREFACE  ix 

Political  Theory  of  Calhoun "  was  printed  in  The 
American  Journal  of  Sociology  ior  Mdij,  1902;  and 
the  chapter  on  pohtical  theory  in  relation  to  the 
nature  of  the  Union  is  an  expansion  of  Chapter 
IX  in  my  monograph  on  "  The  History  of  the 
Theory  of  Sovereignty  since  Rousseau  "  (in  Co- 
lumbia University  Series  in  History,  Economics, 
and  PubHc  Law,  Vol.  XH,  No.  4,  1900). 

This  study  is  the  outgrowth  of  investigations 
begun  in  the  Seminar  on  American  Political  Phi- 
losophy given  by  Professor  Dunning  in  Columbia 
University,  1896-1897;  and  the  writer  wishes  to 
acknowledge  his  deep  sense  of  obUgation  for  the 
inspiration  then  given  and  for  subsequent  encour- 
agement and  assistance  in  the  prosecution  of  this 
work.  Acknowledgment  is  also  due  to  Professor 
Judson,  Professor  Jameson,  and  Professor  Freund 
of  The  University  of  Chicago,  to  Professor  Hart  of 
Harvard,  Professor  Willoughby  of  Johns  Hopkins, 
Professor  Macdonald  of  Brown,  and  others  who 
have  kindly  read  parts  of  the  manuscript  and 
offered  invaluable  suggestions. 

September,  1902. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER   I 
The  Political  Theory  of  the  Colonial  Period 

PAGB 

1.  Introductory  considerations I 

2.  Basis  of  the  Puritan  System 2 

3.  Theocratic  elements  in  Puritanism  ...        5 

4.  The  theory  of  the  relation  between  church  and  state        7 

15 
23 
26 
27 
32 
36 


5.  Democratic  elements  in  Puritanism 

6.  Puritan  idea  of  liberty  and  equality 

7.  Conclusion  as  to  the  Puritans 

8.  Political  ideas  of  the  Quakers 

9.  The  rise  of  democratic  sentiment  in  the  colonies 
10.  Summary 


CHAPTER   H 

The  Political  Theory  of  the  Revolutionary 
Period 

1 .  Introduction  —  Sources  of  information  —  Historical 

considerations  —  Constitutional  theory         .         .       38 

2.  Fundamental  principles  of  the  Revolution  —  Natural 

rights  —  The  social  contract  —  Popular  sover- 
eignty—  The  right  of  revolution  —  The  purpose 
of  government     .......       46 

3.  Typical  Loyalist  theory 63 

4.  Constructive  theory  of  the  Patriots  : 

Monarchy   and   aristocracy  —  Doctrine   of  dele- 
gated powers  and  its  application  ...       69 
(i)    Weak   government;    (2)    Separation    of 
powers ;  (3)  Short  term  of  office        .         .       ^^ 


xu 


CONTENTS 


Theory  and  practice  as  to  suffrage 

Qualifications  for  office 

Church  and  state 
Source  of  Patriot  ideas    . 
Conclusions    ..... 


PACTB 
84 
85 

86 
88 
94 


CHAPTER   III 

The  Reactionary  Movement 


I. 

Historical  considerations         .... 

.      96 

2. 

The  Constitutional  Convention  and  the  Constitution      99 

3- 

The  theory  of  the  Federalist : 

General  considerations         .... 

.     100 

Democracy  and  territorial  area    . 

.     103 

Forms  of  government           .... 

=     106 

The  division  of  governmental  powers  . 

.     107 

The  legislature  —  The  executive  —  The  ji 

idi- 

ciary 

.    109 

Guaranties  of  liberty 

.    116 

Conclusions         ...... 

.    119 

4- 

The  theory  of  John  Adams : 

Distrust  of  democracy         .... 

.    125 

Theory  of  aristocracy ..... 

•    130 

Balance  of  powers 

.    137 

5- 

Summary 

CHAPTER   IV 
The  Jeffersootan  Democracy 

.    141 

I. 

Characteristics  of  the  radical  movement . 

.    143 

2. 
3- 

Jefferson  and  natural  rights     .... 
Means  of  perpetuating  the  social  contract : 

.    147 

(i)  Revolution  ...... 

.    149 

(2)  Periodical  revision  of  constitutions 

.    150 

CONTENTS  Xlll 


4.  Attitude  toward  monarchy 

5.  Attitude  toward  aristocracy     . 

6.  Analysis  of  J effersonian  democracy 

7.  Comparison  between  Adams  and  Jefferson 

8.  Sources  of  JeiTerson's  theory  . 

9.  Conclusions    ...... 

10.  Summary  of  the  epoch   .... 

CHAPTER  V 
The  Jacksonian  Democracy 

1.  Introductory  considerations    . 

2.  The  development  of  the  executive  power 

In  the  national  government 

In  the  states 

3.  The  spoils  system  and  rotation  in  office  . 

4.  Abolition  of  property  qualifications  for  office-holding 

and  suffrage 

5.  Religious  liberty 

6.  Democratization  of  the  judiciary 

7.  Summary  of  political  changes 

8.  Reactionary  tendencies  in  political  theory 


153 

154 

161 
167 
171 
173 


176 

178 
178 
183 


188 

193 
197 

199 

200 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  Political  Theory  of  the  Slavery 
Controversy 

Introduction 203 

The  Anti-slavery  Theory 

1.  The  theory  of  the  radical  abolitionists    .        .        .  206 

2.  The  philosophic  argument 217 

3.  Lincoln's  argument 221 

4.  Conclusion     .         .        .        .     i   .        .        .         .  226 


xiv  CONTENTS 

The  Pro-slavery  Argument 

FAGB 

1.  Introduction 227 

2.  Theory  of  inequality       ......  229 

3.  Theory  of  natural  rights 231 

4.  Concept  of  liberty 234 

5.  Relation  between  superior  and  inferior  races  .         .  236 

6.  Slavery  and  democracy  ......  240 

7.  Conclusions    ........  246 

General  conclusions  on  the  slavery  controversy      .        .  248 

CHAPTER   VII 

Political  Theory  in  Relation  to  the  Nature 

OF  THE  Union 

Introduction 252 

1.  The  compromise  theory 253 

At  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  .  257 

Down  to  1830 258 

Madison's  theory  of  the  genesis  of  the  Union       .  259 

2.  The  state-sovereignty  theory 265 

Tucker's  contract  theory 266 

Calhoun's  theory  of  nullification  ....  268 

The  theory  of  secession 278 

3.  The  Nationalist  theory 284 

Webster's  theory 284 

The  later  Nationalists  .....  290 

Burgess's  theory 299 

4.  Summary  of  the  arguments 302 

CHAPTER  VIII 
Recent  Tendencies 

1 .  General  characteristics  of  recent  theory  .         .        .  305 

2.  Attitude  toward  the  contract  theory         .         .         .  307 


CONTENTS  X\ 

FACE 

3.  Natural  rights 309 

4.  Civil  liberty 311 

5.  Functions  of  the  state 315 

6.  The  separation  of  governmental  powers  .        .         .  322 

7.  Distinction  between  state  and  government      .         .  325 

8.  Modern  democracy         ......  327 

9.  Sociological  contributions 329 

10.   Conclusions 331 


CHAPTER  IX 
Conclusion 334 


A   HISTORY   OF   AMERICAN 
POLITICAL   THEORIES 

CHAPTER   I 

THE    POLITICAL   THEORY    OF   THE   COLONISTS 

A  STUDY  of  American  political  theories  may 
appropriately  begin  with  an  examination  of  the 
ideas  of  the  colonists  who  laid  the  foundations 
upon  which  the  national  structure  now  rests.  In 
view  of  the  fact  that  the  Puritan  ideals,  political 
and  moral,  have  been  so  potent  a  force  in  the 
development  of  American  national  characteristics, 
attention  will  first  be  directed  to  the  Puritan 
political  tenets. 

Puritanism  was  primarily  a  religious  and  not  a 
political  movement.^  Its  central  doctrine  was  that 
the  spiritual  element  in  worship  is  of  far  greater 
importance   than   the    ceremonial    element.      The 

^  A  complete  discussion  of  the  Puritan  theory  is  given  by  H.  L. 
Osgood  in  the  Political  Science  Quarterly,  Vol.  VI,  "  The  Political 
Ideas  of  the  Puritans."  See  also  The  Rise  of  Democracy  in  Old 
and  New  England,  by  Charles  Borgeaud;  G.  E.  Ellis's  Puritan 
Age  in  Massachusetts ;  and  the  standard  histories  of  this  period: 
in  particular,  Doyle's  Puritan  Colonies  and  J.  G.  Palfrey's  History 
of  New  England, 

B  I 


2  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

Puritans  condemned  a  ritualistic  service  as  not 
only  unnecessary  and  superfluous,  but  positively 
injurious  and  sinful;  and  they  demanded  a  style 
of  worship  from  which  the  ceremonial  features 
were  as  nearly  as  possible  eliminated.  The 
Anglican  Church  they  bitterly  denounced  for  its 
failure  to  carry  through  the  desired  reforms,  and 
its  retention  of  so  many  of  the  features  of  the 
Roman  worship.  Theologically,  Puritanism  was 
closely  allied  to  Calvinism,  and  it  resembled  Calvin's 
system  on  the  political  side  also.  In  common  with 
the  other  adherents  of  the  Reformation,  the  Puri- 
tans denied  the  binding  force  of  Church  tradition, 
precedent,  and  law,  asserting  that  the  Scriptures  are 
the  only  authoritative  guide  of  human  conduct.  In 
a  study  of  Puritan  politics  it  is  essential,  therefore, 
to  remember  that  the  spirit  and  purpose  of  the  / 
Puritans'  movement  was  only  incidentally  political. 
Their  aim  was  to  found  a  spiritual,  not  a  political, 
organization  —  a  church  rather  than  a  state.  They 
were  interested  above  all  things  in  the  true  wor- 
ship of  God,  which  meant  to  them,  of  course,  the 
Puritan  style  of  worship. 

It  is  important  to  observe  at  the  outset  the  basis 
upon  which  the  Puritans  rested  their  common- 
wealth. Having  rejected  the  authority  of  the  Church 
and  ecclesiastical  law  and  precedent,  they  relied 
solely  upon  the  Scriptures  as  a  guide  for  all  con- 
duct, public  as  well  as  private,  and  considered  the 
Bible  as  the  only  proper  foundation  upon  which 


POLITICAL    THEORY   OF   THE    COLONISTS        3 

either  a  state  or  a  church  could  rest.  They  a*"' 
tempted  to  deduce  from  the  Old  and  New  Testa 
merits  their  whole  system  of  public  law,  finding  in 
these  writings,  expressly  or  by  implication,  authority 
for  the  government  as  organized  and  administered. 
As  their  theology  and  their  form  of  church  govern- 
ment rested  upon  a  scriptural  basis,  so  must  their 
political  theory  and  their  state  have  the  same  foun- 
dation. This  idea  was  well  stated  by  John  Eliot 
in  his  work  on  The  C/wistian  Commonwealth ;  or, 
The  Civil  Policy  of  the  Rising  Kingdom,  of  Jesus 
Christ}  when  he  said  that  "  there  is  undoubtedly  a 
form  of  Civil  Government,  instituted  by  God  him- 
self in  the  holy  Scriptures,  whereby  any  Nation 
may  enjoy  all  the  ends  and  effects  of  Government 
in  the  best  manner,  were  they  but  perswaded  to 
make  trial  of  it.  We  should  derogate  from  the 
sufficiency  and  perfection  of  the  Scriptures,  if  we 
should  deny  it."  In  the  establishment  of  New 
Haven  Colony,  one  of  the  questions  submitted  to 
those  participating  was,  "  Whether  the  Scriptures 
doe  holde  forth  a  perfect  rule  for  the  direction  and 
government  of  all  men  in  all  duties  which  they  are 
to  perform  to  God  and  men,  as  well  in  the  govern- 
ment of  families  and  in  the  Commonwealth,  as  in 
the  matters  of  Church  .<'  "  ^ ;  and  to  this  all  assented. 
This  idea  runs  through  the  Puritan  thought  of  that 
time.     They  devoutly  believed  that  somewhere  in 

^  Mass,  Historical  Society  Collections,  Third  Series,  Vol.  9,  p.  134. 
2  New  Haven  Records,  I,  12  (1639). 


4  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

the  Scriptures  there  must  be  a  rule  of  public  as 
well  as  of  private  conduct,  and  they  further  believed 
that  they  had  discovered  and  were  applying  this 
rule  in  the  development  of  their  political  institu- 
tions. The  particular  part  of  the  Bible  upon 
which  they  relied  for  this  purpose  was  the  Old 
Testament,  with  its  frequent  references  to  the 
political  experiences  of  the  Children  of  Israel. 
This  was  a  rich  mine  of  precedent,  to  which  the 
Puritans  frequently  resorted  when  in  need  of  such 
support  to  justify  their  conduct.^ 

It  is  not  to  be  assumed,  however,  that  the  Puri- 
tans really  constructed  their  entire  political  system 
from  an  interpretation  of  the  Scriptures.^  They 
brought  with  them  to  the  New  World  the  EngHsh 
common  law,  English  political  precedent  and 
tradition  of  centuries'  growth.  This  was  beyond 
question  the  real  basis  of  their  system,  and  the 
additions  to  this  from  interpretation  of  the  Scrip- 
tures were  less  important  than  the  Puritans  them- 
selves thought.  It  would  be  near  the  truth  to 
say  that  they  did  not  begin  with  the  Scriptures 
and  build  up  a  complete  system,  but  that  they 
attempted  to  justify  a  system  already  in  existence 

1  For  example,  Cotton  said  that  no  instance  could  be  given  "  of 
any  capital  Law  of  Moses,  but  is  of  moral  (that  is  of  general  and 
perpetual)  equity,  in  all  Nations,  in  all  Ages.  Capitalia  Mosis 
politica  sunt  aeterna,"     The  Bloudy  Tenent,  Chap.  LIII. 

2  O.  S.  Straus,  in  the  Origin  of  the  Republican  Form  of  Govern- 
ment in  the  United  States  of  America,  maintains  this  proposition. 


POLITICAL    THEORY  OF  THE    COLONISTS        5 

by  finding  for  it  a  scriptural  basis.  In  the  general 
tendency  to  test  all  things  by  Scripture,  it  was 
only  natural  that  the  state  should  be  subjected  to 
the  same  treatment,  and  that  an  attempt  should 
be  made  to  find  a  scriptural  model  for  political 
institutions. 

The  system  of  government  adopted  by  the  Puri- 
tans was  what  might  perhaps  be  called  theocratic 
in  character.  The  most  cursory  view  could  not  fail 
to  reveal  the  predominant  position  of  the  clergy. 
From  the  beginning,  the  life  of  New  England  was 
largely  under  the  influence  of  the  ministers.  In 
many  cases  men  of  marked  learning  and  sagacity, 
whose  Puritan  morals  and  theology  did  not  conflict 
with  shrewd  worldly  wisdom,  they  dominated  the 
political  as  well  as  the  intellectual  and  religious  life 
of  the  community.  They  were  consulted  upon  all 
matters  of  public  policy,  such  as  Indian  affairs  or 
relations  with  the  mother  country  ;  they  frequently 
preached  political  sermons  bearing  directly  on 
pubhc  questions ;  there  was  never,  perhaps,  a 
body  of  clergy  that  exercised  greater  influence 
on  affairs  of  state  than  did  these  New  England 
leaders.  Especially  in  Massachusetts  Bay,  they 
established  an  ecclesiastico-political  regime,  recall- 
ing in  many  of  its  features  the  Geneva  system  of 
John  Calvin.  In  two  of  the  colonies  member- 
ship in  some  approved  church  was  essential  to  full 
citizenship.  Only  those  who  were  church  members 
could   become  "  freemen "  in  Massachusetts  Bay 


6  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

and  in  New  Haven,  and  it  is  not  likely  that  other 
than  church  members  were  actually  received  in 
Plymouth  and  Connecticut.  As  late  as  1660  the 
General  Court  of  Massachusetts  Bay  resolved  that 
no  person  could  become  a  "  freeman  "  who  was  not 
in  full  communion  with  some  orthodox  church. 
The  exclusive  character  of  the  Massachusetts  Bay 
system  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  down  to  1674 
only  2527  were  admitted  as  freemen,  one-fifth  of 
the  total  number  of  adult  males.^  Of  the  other 
features  in  the  theocratic  regime  it  is  not  necessary 
to  speak  at  length.  The  Sabbath  Laws,  taxation 
for  purposes  of  church  support,  compulsory  attend- 
ance on  church  services,  the  anti-heresy  acts,  — 
all  were  part  of  the  general  system  in  which  the 
civil  power  was  invoked  to  stimulate  the  religious 
sentiment  and  practice  of  the  community.  The 
same  tendency  is  also  shown  by  the  attitude  of  the 
Puritans  toward  adherents  of  other  religions.  In 
the  controversy  with  Roger  Williams,  with  the 
Antinomians,  with  the  Quakers  and  the  Baptists, 
a  determination  was  manifested  to  preserve  the 
Puritan  type  of  religion  by  force  if  necessary. 
Liberal  use  was  made  of  fines,  imprisonment,  dis- 
franchisement and  banishment  as  means  of  grace 
for  the  spiritually  perverse.  The  Puritans  them- 
selves were  dissenters  from  dissenters,  but  they  did 
not  intend  that  the  process  of  dissent  should  be 
carried  farther. 

1  G.  E.  Ellis,  Puritati  Age,  p.  203. 


POLITICAL    THEORY   OF  THE    COLONISTS        7 

Their  theory  of  the  relation  between  church  and 
state  was  clearly  brought  out  in  the  famous  con- 
troversy between  Roger  Williams  and  John  Cotton, 
the  spokesman  for  the  Massachusetts  theocracy.^ 
An  examination  of  this  controversy  may  seem 
somewhat  remote  from  the  field  of  political  theory, 
but  only  through  such  an  inquiry  is  it  possible 
to  arrive  at  a  satisfactory  understanding  of  the 
political  ideas  of  the  Puritan.  The  gist  of  the 
Williams-Cotton  debate  is  found  in  three  pam- 
phlets occasioned  by  the  banishment  of  Williams. 
These  were,  The  Bloiidy  Tcnent  of  Pcrseaition  for 
Cmise  of  Conscience  (1644),  by  Williams;  The 
Bloiidy  Tenent  washed,  and  made  white  in  the 
Blond  of  the  Lambe  (1647),  by  Cotton;  The 
Bloudy  Tenent  yet  more  Bloudy  (1652),  by 
Williams.^ 

Two  of  the  most  significant  topics  discussed  may 
be  considered  here  :  first,  the  nature  of  the  church 
and  the  state ;  second,  the  extent  of  the  civil  power 
in  religious  affairs.  First,  then,  the  theory  as  to 
the  nature  of  the  church  gives  the  key  to  the  under- 
standing of  the  entire  dispute.  Williams's  conten- 
tion was  that  the  state  is  distinct  from,  and  may 

^  See  Doyle,  Puritan  Colonies,  Vol.  I,  Chap.  IV,  for  an  account 
of  this  affair. 

2  See  also  the  Cambridge  Platform  of  1648,  Chap.  16.  This  was 
a  statement  of  church  doctrine  made  by  a  synod  representing  the 
four  New  England  colonies.  See  also  Cotton  Mather,  Magnalia, 
Vol.  II,  Book  5. 


8  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

exist  without,  the  church,  as,  for  example,  among 
heathen  people.  "  The  church,"  said  Williams, 
"is  like  unto  a  corporation,  society,  or  company 
of  East  India  or  Turkie  merchants,  or  any  other 
societie  or  companie  in  London,  whichmay. . .  wholly 
breake  up  and  dissolve  into  pieces  and  nothing,  and 
yet  the  peace  of  the  citie  not  be  in  the  least  meas- 
ure impaired  or  disturbed."  ^  This  is  true,  be- 
cause the  "essence"  of  the  church  and  the  state 
is  different,  and  consequently  the  religion  may  be 
radically  changed,  while  the  government  of  the 
city  or  state  remains  unchanged ;  or  the  govern- 
ment may  be  altered  without  affecting  the  char- 
acter of  the  religion.  Ephesus  may  cease  to 
worship  Diana,  and  still  be  Ephesus ;  or  it  may 
happen  that  there  are  different  reHgions  in  the 
same  city,  the  aim  of  all  these  religions  being  dis- 
tinct from  that  of  the  state. 

Cotton,  for  his  part,  agreed  that  the  church  is  a 
separate  society,  distinct  from  the  state;  but  held 
that  the  church  is  the  chief  society  in  the  state, 
and  that  the  growth  and  welfare  of  the  state  are 
dependent  on  the  purity  of  the  church.  The  church, 
although  not  the  "  essence  "  of  the  state,  neverthe- 
less "  pertains  to  the  integrity  of  the  city  " ;  it  is 
among  the  "  conservant  causes  "  of  the  state,  and 
cannot  be  broken  up  without  affecting  profoundly 
the  welfare  of  the  body  politic.^     Cotton  conceded 

1  The  Bloudy  Tenent,  Chap.  VI. 

2  Bloudy  Tenent  washed  and  made  white.  Chap.  VI. 


POLITICAL    THEORY  OF  THE    COLONISTS        9 

that  there  are  historical  examples  of  states  which 
have  flourished  under  heathendom ;  but  he  de- 
clared that  after  the  true  church  is  once  intro- 
duced, then  this  true  worship  must  be  protected 
by  the  state. 

The  crucial  question  in  the  controversy  was 
that  concerning  the  proper  extent  of  the  power 
of  the  civil  magistrate  in  religious  matters. 
Williams  held  that  the  true  church  is  spiritual 
in  nature,  and,  as  such,  has  no  need  of  the 
support  of  the  civil  magistrate  in  order  to 
maintain  its  proper  position.  It  does  not  re- 
quire worldly  means  of  defence,  but  should 
use  only  the  spiritual  weapons,  such  as  "the 
breastplate  of  righteousness,"  "the  helmet  of 
salvation,"  "the  sword  of  the  spirit."^  Civil 
magistrates  had  never  been  made  defenders  of 
the  faith  in  the  Scriptures,  and  the  omission 
shows  that  there  had  been  no  intent  to  confer 
such  authority  on  them.  The  civil  officers  should 
not  proceed  to  organize  churches  ;  they  should  not 
inflict  punishment  on  those  adjudged  heretics,  or 
impose  civil  penalties  or  disabilities  for  any  reli- 
gious reason.  Williams  contended  that  if  civil 
magistrates  had  rightful  power  in  spiritual  affairs, 
then  even  in  a  barbarous  Indian  tribe  rightful  juris- 
diction over  the  church  of  Christ  would  be  vested 
in  the  Indian  civil  authorities,  and  the  Christian 
religion  would  be  entirely  at  the  mercy  of  rulers 

*  The  Bloiidy  Tcnent  of  Persecution,  Chap.  XLV, 


lO  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

with  pagan  consciences.^  It  is  clearly  evident,  then, 
that  Williams's  view  of  the  state  was  decidedly 
secular  in  character.  He  limited  its  activity  in 
religious  affairs  to  "what  were  called  at  that  time 
"breaches  of  the  second  table." ^  Transgression 
of  any  of  the  last  six  commandments  might  be 
punished  by  the  state,  but  over  violations  of  the 
commandments  in  the  first  table  they  should  have 
no  jurisdiction.  "Scandalous  (offence)  against 
parents,"  he  said,  "against  magistrates  in  the 
fifth  command,  and  so  against  the  life,  chastity, 
goods,  or  good  name  in  the  rest,  is  properly  trans- 
gression  against  the  civil  state  and  common  weal, 
or  the  worldly  state  of  men."^  Such  offences  the 
government  may  rightfully  punish,  but  those  crimes 
which  concern  the  relations  of  man  to  God  it  should 
not  attempt  to  suppress.  They  are  spiritual  in 
nature,  and  civil  penalties  cannot  properly  affect 
them.  On  this  ground  Williams  denounced  in  vig- 
orous terms  the  treatment  to  which  he  and  others 
had  been  subjected  as  wholly  unwarranted  and 
unjustifiable. 

Cotton  replied  to  these  arguments  that  "  it  is  a 
carnal  and  worldly,  and,  indeed,  an  ungodly  imagi- 
nation, to  confine  the  magistrate's  charge  to  the 
bodies  and  goods  of  the  subjects,  and  to  exclude 

^  The  Bloudy  Teneni  of  Persecution,  Chap.  XCII. 

"^  The  first  four  commandments,  covering  the  duties  of  man  to 
God,  were  called  the  "  first  table  " ;  the  last  six,  covering  the  rela- 
tions of  men  to  each  other,  constituted  the  "second  table." 

8  Ibid.  Chap.  LVI. 


POLITICAL    THEORY  OF  THE   COLONISTS       U 

them  from  the  care  of  their  soules."  ^  He  main- 
tained that  it  is  the  evident  duty  of  the  magis- 
trates to  use  all  available  means  to  prevent  the 
pollution  and  corruption  of  the  church,  and  to 
strive  in  every  way  to  preserve  its  purity.^  He 
even  attempted  to  show  that  laws  about  religion 
are,  strictly  speaking,  civil  laws.  "  Whatsoever 
concerneth  the  good  of  the  city  and  the  propuls- 
ing  of  the  contrary,"  is  a  civil  law,  said  he.  "  Now 
rehgion  is  the  best  good  of  the  city,  and  therefore 
laws  about  religion  are  truly  called  civil  lawes."  ^ 
But  Cotton's  reasoning  would  have  been  inade- 
quate and  ineffective  from  the  Puritan  point  of 
view,  unless  supported  by  scriptural  authority. 
Unable  to  find  any  express  warrant  in  the  New 
Testament,  Cotton  met  the  difficulty  by  showing 
that  there  was  not  authority  in  that  part  of  the 
Bible,  even  for  the  punishment  of  such  crimes  as 
adultery  and  murder,  and  that  consequently  it 
must  be  assumed  that  a  rule  of  action  is  else- 
where contained  in  the  Scriptures.  Such  author- 
ity is  found  in  the  "  Laws  of  Moses  and  the 
Prophets  who  have  expounded  them  in  the  Old 
Testament."^  He  maintained  that  all  the  capital 
laws  of  the  Mosaic  Code  are  of  universal  vahdity, 
and  that  whatever  the  kings  of  Israel  inflicted  on 
transgressors  of  either  the  first  or  the  second  table, 

^  The  Bloudy  Tetient  washed  and  made  white,  Chap.  XXXIII. 
2  Ibid.  Chap.  XXXV.  s  Ibid.  Chap.  LXVII. 

*  Ibid.  Chap.  LXXIII. 


12  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

was  a  pattern  and  example  to  Christian  magis 
trates.^  Thus  basing  himself  on  the  Mosaic 
Law,  Cotton  found  abundant  sanction  for  any 
measures  required  to  preserve  the  peace  and 
purity  of  the  church.  Such  phrases  as,  "Thou 
shalt  surely  kill  him  .  .  .  because  he  hath  sought 
to  thrust  thee  away  from  the  Lord  thy  God," 
seemed  to  him  to  justify  almost  any  means  that 
might  be  used. 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  Cotton  was  a  thorough 
believer  in  the  doctrine  that  it  is  the  right  and  duty 
of  the  magistrates  to  punish  transgressions  against 
the  commandments  contained  in  either  of  the 
"tables."  In  addition  to  the  offences  specified  by 
Williams,  Cotton  included  many  others.  He 
declared  that  one  who  holds  an  "  erroneous  doctrine 
or  practise  "  is  a  violator  of  the  civil  law ;  "  he  who 
refuseth  to  subject  his  spirit  to  the  spirit  of  the 
Prophets  in  a  holy  Church  of  Christ"  comes  under 
the  same  category.  Even  such  offences  as  the 
"  censorious  reproach  "  of  one  who  rebukes  our 
spiritual  error,  or  "  rejecting  communion  "  before 
one  is  convicted,  may  be  looked  upon  as  a  disturb- 
ance of  the  peace  and  hence  as  falling  under  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  civil  magistrates.^  In  short. 
Cotton's  theory  was  that  the  state  should  guarantee 
the  observance  of  church  law  and  ceremony,  just 
as  if  they  were  its  own  enactment,  and  that  to 
accomplish  this  purpose  any  exercise  of  force 
1  Ibid.  Chap.  XXXV.  2  z^/,/.  chap.  VII. 


POLITICAL    THEORY  OF   THE    COLONISTS       13 

would  be  perfectly  justifiable.  As  he  phrased  it 
on  one  occasion,  "  legall  terrours  are  ordinary 
meanes  blessed  of  God  to  prepare  hard  and  stout 
hearts  to  conversion."  ^ 

He  was  far  from  admitting,  however,  that  he 
"ustified  persecution  "  for  cause  of  conscience," 
as  Williams  alleged.  On  the  contrary,  he  declared 
that  the  conscience  is  sacred  and  inviolable  and  not 
to  be  disturbed,  whether  it  be  conscience  "  rightly 
informed  "  or  "  conscience  misinformed."  ^  A  sig- 
nificant exception  was  made,  however,  in  case 
"  it  may  appear  that  the  erroneous  party  suffereth 
not  for  his  conscience,  but  for  his  sinning  against 
his  conscience."  ^  In  other  words,  individuals  are 
not  punished  because  they  follow  conscience,  but 
because  they  refuse  to  obey  its  dictates ;  not  be- 
cause they  are  blind,  but  because  they  wilfully  shut 
their  eyes.  Of  the  same  character  is  the  argument 
that  "  to  persecute  is  to  punish  an  Innocent ;  but 
a  heretic  is  a  culpable  and  damnable  person."  * 
Cotton  realized  that  the  action  of  the  magistrates 
might  result  in  the  production  of  hypocrites;  but 
"  better  tolerate  Hypocrites  and  Tares  than  Bryars 
andThornes."^  Or  as  elsewhere  expressed :  "Better 
a  dead  soule  be  dead  in  body,  as  well  as  in  Spirit, 
than  to  live  and  be  lively  in  the  flesh."  ^  Based 
on  like  logic  was  the  argument  that  in  reality  men 
are  never  compelled  to  worship,  for,  "  though  teach- 

1  Ibid.  Chap.  IX.         2  73,^.  Chap.  X.  ^  ji,id. 

*  Hid.  Chap.  LXV.     «  Hid.  Chap.  XXXIX.     s  /^^v.  Chap.  XL 


14  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

ing  and  being  taught  in  a  Church  estate  be  Church 
worship,  yet  it  is  not  a  Church  worship  but  to  such 
as  are  in  a  Church  estate."  ^ 

Such  was  the  character  of  Cotton's  theory,  and 
it  was  typical  of  Puritanism  in  the  early  days  of 
settlement  in  America.  It  was  the  theory  of  men 
to  whom  the  preservation  of  the  Puritan  rehgion 
was  an  object  of  paramount  importance  —  an  end 
for  which  they  had  already  given  up  much  and 
for  which  they  were  ready  to  sacrifice  still  more. 
They  were  thoroughly  convinced  that  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  state  to  uphold  and  support  the  church 
at  every  possible  point,  and  they  acted  on  this 
conviction.^  In  so  doing  they  were  neither  in 
advance  of  nor  behind  the  theory  and  practice  of 
their  time,  but  simply  followed  the  custom  of  all 
the  states  of  that  day.  From  one  point  of  view  it 
may  seem  strange  that  the  Puritans,  fleeing  from 
persecution  in  England,  should  prove  so  ready  to 
persecute  in  turn  those  who  dissented  from  Puri- 
tanism. What  the  Puritans  objected  to,  however, 
was  not  the  use  of  force  to  maintain  a  religion,  but 

1  Ibid.  Chap.  LXX. 

2  In  the  Massachusetts  Body  of  Liberties  it  was  declared  that 
"  Civill  Aulhoritie  hath  power  and  hbertie  to  see  the  peace,  ordi- 
nances and  Rules  of  Christ  observed  in  every  church,  according  to 
his  word,  so  it  be  done  in  a  Civill  and  not  in  an  Ecclesiastical  way." 
Sec.  58.  The  converse  right  was  not  given  to  the  church,  however. 
It  was  provided  that,  "  No  church  censure  shall  degrade  or  depose 
any  man  from  any  Civill  dignitie,  office  or  Authoritie  he  shall  have 
in  the  Commonwealth."     Sec.  60. 


POLITICAL    THEORY  OF   THE    COLONISTS       15 

the  use  of  force  to  support  any  other  than  the  true 
religion.  Regarding  their  own  form  of  worship 
as  the  true  one,  they  considered  it  perfectly  just  to 
call  on  the  civil  power  to  preserve  it,  even  by  force 
if  necessary. 

Having  considered  the  Puritan  theory  of  the 
relation  between  church  and  state,  we  now  turn 
to  an  inquiry  into  the  question  how  far  Purl- 1 
tanism  was  democratic.  It  would  be  wide  of 
the  truth  to  assert  that  at  the  beginning  there 
was  any  general  enthusiasm  for  democracy 
as  such.  John  Cotton  on  one  occasion  (1644) 
denounced  democracy  as  "  the  meanest  and  worst 
of  all  forms  of  government,"  and  on  another 
occasion  openly  indorsed  theocracy.^  A  propo- 
sition for  the  establishment  of  an  aristocracy 
was  made  to  Massachusetts  Bay  in  1634,  and 
was  rejected  only  because  it  involved  the  aban- 
donment of  the  church-membership  requirement 
for  suffrage.  "  Two  distinct  ranks,  we  willingly 
acknowledge  from  the  light  of  nature  and  scrip- 
ture," they  said,  "  the  one  of  them  called  Princes 
or  Nobles  or  Elders  (amongst  whom  the  gentle- 
men have  their  place) ;  the  other  the  people. 
Hereditary  dignity  or  honors,  we  willingly  allow  to 
the  former,  unless  by  the  scandalous  and  base  con- 

^  Letter  of  Cotton  to  Lord  Say  and  Seal,  1636,  in  Appendix  to 
Hutchinson's  History  of  the  Colony  of  Massachusetts  Bay,  Vol.  I. 
The  Scriptures,  he  said,  establish  "theocracy  as  the  best  form  of 
government  in  the  commonwealth,  as  well  as  in  the  church.'  Tg.  498. 


l6  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

versation  of  any  of  them,  they  become  degenerate."  ^ 
It  is  also  notable  that  only  a  part  of  the  inhabitants 
of  the  colonies  were  made  "  freemen  "  ;  in  the  case 
of  Massachusetts,  only  about  one-fifth.  "  Inhabit- 
ants "  and  '*  freemen  "  were  sharply  distinguished 
and  were  accorded  different  degrees  of  poUtical 
privilege.  All  of  these  features  were  undemo- 
cratic. 

Other  parts  of  the  Puritan  system  show  more 
democratic  tendencies.  Among  these  was  the 
emphasis  on  local  self-government,  finding  expres- 
sion in  the  town-government  which  has  played  so 
conspicuous  a  part  in  American  constitutional  de- 
velopment. Furthermore,  careful  provision  for 
adequate  protection  of  civil  rights  was  made  by  the 
colonies  in  such  notable  instruments  as  the  Body 
of  Liberties  in  Massachusetts  Bay  (164 1)  and  the 
Fundamental  Orders  of  Connecticut  (1639).  These 
were  largely,  however,  the  guaranty  of  the  ordinary 
rights  of  Englishmen,  and  consequently  cannot  be 
regarded  as  exclusively  Puritan  in  character. 

A  democratic  tendency  is  seen  in  the  method 
adopted  in  the  formation  of  new  communities  by 
the  Puritans.  The  use  of  the  contract  as  a  basis 
for  the  establishment  of  a  "  body  politic  "  was  a 
widespread  practice  in  the  New  England  colonies. 

^  Ibid,  I,  490  ff.  This  was  somewhat  qualified  by  the  state- 
ment that,  "  Hereditary  honors  both  nature  and  scripture  doth 
acknowledge  {Eccl.  xix.  17),  but  hereditary  authority  and  power 
standeth  only  by  the  civil  laws  of  some  commonwealths,"  Ibid. 
493- 


POLITICAL    THEORY  OF  THE    COLONISTS       ly 

The  first  of  these  was  the  famous  Mayflower  cov- 
enant of  1620.  Here  it  was  declared  that  the 
undersigned,  "  Do  by  these  Presents  solemnly  and 
mutually,  in  the  Presence  of  God  and  one  another, 
covenant  and  combine  ourselves  into  a  civil  Body 
Politick,  for  our  better  Ordering  and  Preservation, 
and  Furtherance  of  the  Ends  foresaid ;  and  by 
Virtue  hereof  do  enact,  constitute  and  frame,  such 
just  and  equal  Laws,  Ordinances,  Acts,  Constitu- 
tions, and  Officers  from  time  to  time,  as  shall  be 
thought  most  meet  and  convenient  for  the  general 
Good  of  the  Colony ;  unto  which  we  promise  all 
due  Submission  and  Obedience."  ^ 

Another  illustration  of  the  same  principle  is 
afforded  by  the  example  of  Connecticut  in  the 
adoption  of  the  "  Fundamental  Orders."  In  this 
agreement  it  was  stated  that:  "We,  the  Inhabit- 
ants and  Residents  of  Windsor,  Hartford,  and 
Wethersfield  .  .  .  doe  associate  and  conjoyne  our- 
selves to  be  as  one  Publick  State  or  Common- 
wealth and  doe,  for  ourselves  and  our  successors 
and  such  as  shall  be  adjoyned  to  us  att  any  time 
hereafter,  enter  into  Combination  and  Confedera- 
tion together  to  mayntayne  and  presearve  the  lib- 
erty and  purity  of  the  gospel  of  our  Lord  Jesus, 
which  we  now  profess,  as  also  the  discipline  of  the 
Churches,  which  according   to   the   truth   of   the 

1  Poore,   Comtiiutions  and  Charters,  I,  93 1.     But  they  did  not 
profess  political  independence.    "  We  =  .  .  the  Loyal  Subjects  of 
our  dread  Sovereign  Lord,  King  James,  etc." 
c 


1 8  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

said  gospel  is  now  practised  amongst  us,  as  also  in 
our  Civell  Affaires  to  be  guided  and  governed 
according  to  such  Lawes,  Rules,  Orders  and  de- 
crees as  shall  be  made,  ordered  and  decreed,  as 
followeth."! 

In  Rhode  Island  there  were  many  similar  con- 
tracts made,  as,  for  instance,  the  agreement  at 
Providence  in  1636,  and  at  Portsmouth  in  1638.  In 
the  latter  the  form  of  the  covenant  was  as  follows : 
"  We  whose  names  are  underwritten  do  here 
solemnly  in  the  presence  of  Jehovah  incorporate 
ourselves  into  a  Bodie  Politick  and  as  He  shall 
help,  will  submit  our  persons,  lives  and  estates 
unto  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ."  ^ 

It  is  now  necessary  to  inquire  into  the  theory 
on  which  these  contracts  rested.  The  discussion 
of  this  question,  however,  involves  an  examination 
of  the  theory  on  which  the  New  England  churches 
were  constructed.  These  ecclesiastical  organiza- 
tions, it  appears,  were  formed  on  what  is  known 

^  Connecticut  Records,  I,  20. 

2  R.  I.  Records,  I,  52.  In  the  Newport  Declaration  of  1641  is 
found  one  of  the  boldest  of  democratic  assertions.  It  is  here  pro- 
claimed that  "The  Government  which  this  Bodie  Politick  doth  attend 
unto  in  this  Island  and  the  Jurisdiction  thereof,  in  favour  of  our 
Prince  is  a  Democracie  or  Popular  Government ;  that  is  to  say  it 
is  in  the  power  of  the  Body  of  Freemen  orderly  assembled  or  the 
major  part  of  them,  to  make  or  constitute  just  Lawes,  by  which  they 
will  be  regulated,  and  to  depute  from  among  themselves  such  min- 
isters as  shall  see  them  faithfully  executed  between  man  and  man." 
Ibid.  I,  112. 


POLITICAL    THEORY  OF  THE    COLONISTS      ig 

as  the  "Separatist"  plan;  namely,  by  voluntary 
agreement  between  a  number  of  individuals  to 
constitute  themselves  as  a  church.  This  was  the 
method  followed  by  the  Separatists  in  England, 
who  beheved  that  the  church  is  not  formed  by 
action  of  the  state,  or  by  virtue  of  apostoHc  suc- 
cession, but  is  merely  a  number  of  believers  under 
a  covenant  with  God.  Although  the  New  England 
Puritans  were  not  all  Separatists  while  in  England,  / 
they  became  so  almost  as  soon  as  they  reached 
this  country,^  and  proceeded  to  adopt  the  cove- 
nant as  the  proper  method  of  forming  a  church. 
Official  recognition  of  this  idea  was  given  in  the 
Cambridge  Platform  adopted  in  1648,  when  refer- 
ence was  here  made  to  the  "  visible  Covenant, 
Agreement  or  Consent,  whereby  they  give  them- 
selves unto  the  Lord,  to  the  observing  of  the  ordi- 
nances of  Christ  together  in  the  same  society, 
which  is  usually  called  the  Church  Covenant."^ 
This  covenant  was  described  as  the  same  as  that 
which  made  Abraham  and  the  Children  of  Israel 
the  people  of  God,  and  was  declared  to  have 
the  force  of  constituting  societies  of  believers  as 
churches. 


^  See  the  case  of  the  Salem  church,  1629. 

2  Chap.  IV,  §  3.  For  a  full  discussion  of  these  church  cove- 
nants, see  Williston  Walker,  The  Creeds  and  Platforms  of  Congre- 
gationalism (1893);  see  also  the  classic  work  by  II.  M.  Dexter, 
Congregationalism  as  seen  in  its  Literature.  The  Cambridge 
Platform  is  given  in  Walker,  pp.  194-237. 


20  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

A  remarkably  clear  and  definite  statement  ol 
the  contract  idea  was  made  in  a  work  by  the 
famous  Connecticut  divine,  Thomas  Hooker, — 
A  Survey  of  the  Summe  of  Church  Disciplme 
(1648).  The  reasoning  of  Hooker,  to  which 
almost  no  attention  has  been  given,  is  notable  for 
its  early  exposition  of  the  contract  theory  and  the 
way  in  which  it  anticipates  such  classic  writers  as 
John  Locke.  Hooker  urges  that  all  men  are  ec- 
clesiastically equal,  and  where  every  man  remains 
uncontrolled  there  must  follow  the  "  distraction  and 
desolation  of  the  whole."  "  In  the  building,"  said 
he,  "  if  the  parts  be  neither  mortised  nor  brased, 
as  there  will  be  little  beauty,  so  there  can  be  no 
strength.  Its  so  in  setting  up  the  frames  of 
societies  among  men,  when  their  minds  and 
hearts  are  not  mortised  by  mutuall  consent  of  sub- 
jection one  to  another,  there  is  no  expectation  of 
any  successful  proceeding  with  the  advantage  to 
the  public."  ^  "  Mutual  subjection,"  he  declares, 
"is  as  it  were,  the  sinewes  of  society,  by  which  it 
is  sustained  and  supported."  ^  He  calls  attention 
to  two  classes  of  covenant,  the  explicit  and  the 
implicit,  and  indicates  a  preference  for  the  explicit 
agreement.^  The  effect  of  this  contract  is  to 
make  every  part  subject  to  the  whole  and  bound 
by  its  orders.  Nevertheless,  the  people  still  re- 
tain "the  power  of  Judgment  over  each  other" 
and  hence  they  proceed  against  any  officer  "  that 
1  Snrvey,  p.  188.  *  Ibid.     Cf.  p.  50.  3  md,  47. 


POLITICAL    THEORY  OF  THE    COLONISTS        21 

goes  aside."  This  they  do,  "though  not  by  any 
power  of  office,  for  they  are  not  officers,  but  by 
power  of  judgment  which  they  do  possess."  ^ 
This  is  a  striking  anticipation  of  the  theory  of 
revolution,  later  developed  by  John  Locke.^  In 
the  one  case  the  theory  is  applied  to  the  church, 
however,  and  in  the  other  to  the  state. 

The  idea  of  the  contract  as  the  basis  of  associ- 
ations was  not  peculiar  to  Hooker,  but  was  com- 
mon to  the  New  England  Puritans  of  his  day.  In 
defence  of  their  form  of  church  organization,  gov- 
ernment, and  disciphne,  they  asserted  again  and 
again  that  the  contract  is  the  method  by  which  all 
associations  are  formed.  "  All  voluntary  relations," 
it  was  said  in  the  Apologie^  "  all  relations  which  are 
neither  natural  nor  violent  are  entered  into  by  way 
of  covenant."  Hooker  stated  the  idea  with  great 
clearness  and  force,  but  he  spoke  only  as  a  repre- 
sentative of  the  general  opinion  in  New  England.* 
In  the  face  of  strong  opposition  from  England, 
the  Puritans  defended  the  formation  of  churches 
through    contract,    the     election    of    pastors    and 

1  Idle/.  192.  The  Cambridge  Platform  declares  that  "  If  the 
Church  have  power  to  chuse  their  officers  and  ministers,  then  in 
case  of  manifest  unworthiness  and  delinquency  they  have  power 
also  to  depose  them." 

2  In  the  second  of  his  Two  Treatises  of  Government. 

^  An  Apologie  of  the  Churches  in  New  England  for  Church 
Covenant  (1639),  by  Richard  Mather. 

*  On  this  subject  see  John  Cotton,  The  Way  of  the  Churches  of 
Christ  in  New  England  (1645);    The    Way  of  CongreqationaH 


22  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

teachers  by  the  people,  the  rule  of  the  majority  in 
church  affairs,  the  right  of  the  congregation  to  dis- 
cipline or  dismiss  their  ecclesiastical  head.^  Fre- 
quent reference  was  made  to  the  contracts  of  Old 
Testament  days;  for  example,  "Jehoiada  made  a 
covenant  between  the  Lord  and  the  king  and  the 
people;  that  they  should  be  the  Lord's  people; 
between  the  king  also  and  the  people"  (II  Kings 
xi:  17).  Another  similar  precedent  was  found  in 
Deuteronomy  xxix :  "  Ye  stand  this  day  all  of  you 
before  the  Lord  your  God  .  .  .  that  thou  should- 
est  enter  into  covenant  with  the  Lord  thy  God  .  .  . 
that  he  may  establish  thee  to-day  for  a  people  unto 
himself  and  that  he  may  be  unto  thee  a  God."  It 
seems  to  have  been  the  prevailing  idea  that  a  con- 

Churches  Cleared  (1648).  Also  Richard  Mather,  Church  Govern- 
ment and  Church  Coveftant  Discussed  (1643);  Model  of  Church 
and  Civil  Power  (quoted  by  Osgood,  op.  cit.);  John  Davenport, 
A  Discourse  about  Civil  Government  (1663).  A  later  exposition 
is  that  of  John  Wise,  A  Vindication  of  the  Government  of  New 
England  Churches  (1772). 

^  Mather's  explanation  of  majority  rule  is  suggestive.  It  seems 
that  a  vote  was  first  taken  and  an  effort  made  to  secure  unanimity. 
But  if  the  minority  "  still  continue  obstinate,  they  are  admonished, 
and  so  standing  under  censure,  their  vote  is  nulUfied."  Church 
Government  and  Church  Covenant  Discussed,  p.  61. 

It  was  explicitly  denied  that  the  form  of  church  government  was 
purely  democratic.  Mather  said,  "  our  answer  is  neither  thus  nor 
so,  neither  all  to  the  People  excluding  the  Presbytery,  nor  all  to  the 
Presbytery  excluding  the  People.  For  this  were  to  make  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  Church  either  meerly  democratical,  or  meerly 
aristocratical,  neither  of  which  we  believe  it  ought  to  be." 
Ibid,  57. 


POLITICAL    THEORY  OF  THE   COLONISTS      23 

tract  was  the  necessary  basis  for  both  the  church  .' 
and  the  state.^  These  two  classes  of  covenants  were 
known  respectively  as  the  "church  covenant"  and 
the  "plantation  covenant  "  ;  and  there  was  an  inti- 
mate relation  between  the  democratic  method  of 
forming  a  church  and  the  democratic  method  of 
forming  a  state. 

Let  us  now  consider  briefly  the  Puritan  ideas 
of  liberty  and  equality  from  the  political  side. 
First,  then,  what  was  the  Puritan  conception  of 
liberty?  The  common  idea  that  the  Puritans 
were  enthusiasts  for  political  freedom  can  hardly 
be  sustained.  What  they  were  chiefly  concerned 
about  was  moral  rather  than  political  liberty. 
This  was  shown  by  Winthrop  when  he  divided 
liberty  into  two  classes:  natural  liberty  and  civil 
or  federal  liberty.  The  first  kind,  natural  lib- 
erty, is  absolute  and  unlimited ;  it  cannot  be  sub- 
jected to  any  restraint  whatever  from  the  side  of 
authority.  Civil  or  federal  liberty,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  constituted  by  the  covenant  between  God  ' 
and  man,  and  by  the  political  covenant.  This  lib- 
erty is  freedom  to  do  that  which  is  "  good,  just,  and 

1  This  idea  of  the  contract  had  been  worked  out  by  the  contro- 
versialists of  the  sixteenth  century.  See  the  Vindicia  contra  Tyran- 
nos,  1579,  by  an  unknown  author.  This  work  contains  a  curious 
blending  of  arguments  derived  from  the  Bible,  Roman  law,  and 
feudal  custom.  The  rights,  obligations,  and  other  incidents  of  the 
contractual  relation  are  taken  from  the  Roman  law.  The  contract 
theory  was  clearly  stated  by  Richard  Hooker  in  his  famous  work 
on  The  Laws  of  Ecclesiastical  Polity,  i^circa)  1594. 


24  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

honest."  ^  "  It  is,"  says  Winthrop,  "  the  same  kind 
of  hberty  wherewith  Christ  hath  made  us  free," 
that  is  to  say,  freedom  from  the  bondage  of  sin, 
and  the  restraints  it  involves.  Liberty  was  not 
conceived  as  absohite  and  unqiiahfied  lack  of  re- 
straint, but  as  freedom  of  motion  in  that  particular 
direction  in  which  one  should  go  in  accordance 
with  the  covenant  made  with  God.  The  Puritans 
brought  with  them  the  undoubted  liberties  of  Eng- 
lishmen, and  these  they  were  careful  to  preserve. 
The  political  liberty,  however,  about  which  they 
were  most  anxious  was  the  independence  of  their 
corporation  or  society.  This  they  were  always 
ready  to  defend  against  any  other  authority,  espe- 
cially the  rule  or  attempted  rule  of  the  home  gov- 
ernment in  England.  But  they  were  not  so  eager 
in  behalf  of  the  individual  within  the  corporation. 
The  corporate  conscience  and  the  corporate  conduct 
must  be  free  and  untrammelled,  but  not  necessarily 
the  conduct  and  conscience  of  the  individual.  The 
Puritans  did  not  preach  or  practice  religious  toler- 
ation, nor  did  they  become  enthusiastic  about  the 
inherent  rights  of  man.  They  jealously  guarded 
their  traditional  English  liberties,  they  were  ear- 
nestly desirous  of  moral  and  spiritual  freedom,  but 
their  great  end  and  aim  politically  was  to  secure  a 
kind  of  civil  government  under  which  their  reli- 
gious system  could  best  be  maintained. 

Nor  were  the  Puritans  given  to  assertions  about 

^  History  of  New  England,  II,  280-81. 


POLITICAL    THEORY  OF  THE   COLONISTS      25 

the  innate  equality  of  all  men.  Particularly  in 
Massachusetts  Bay,  there  were  manifest  in  the 
early  period  decidedly  aristocratic  tendencies.  The 
equality  upon  which  the  Puritans  laid  greatest 
stress,  and  which  was  to  them  most  significant,  was  ^ 
the  equality  of  all  men  before  God.  Before  Him, 
all  men  were  regarded  as  sinners,  hopelessly  lost, 
so  far  as  their  own  efforts  could  avail,  and  no  one 
more  worthy  than  another.  In  the  doctrine  of 
the  Fall  there  is  no  room  for  rank  or  preeminence, 
but  all  are  reduced  to  one  common  level.  Thus 
it  appears  that  the  Puritans  were  believers  in  what 
is  sometimes  termed  "  spiritual  equality,"  as  distin- 
guished from  other  types ;  and  even  in  this  con- 
nection, as  has  been  suggested,  they  held  to 
"democracy  in  the  Fall,  but  aristocracy  in  the 
Redemption,"  for  only  the  elect  were  regarded  as 
saved. 

Nor  did  they  grant  religious  equality  to  all,  for, 
as  already  indicated,  they  were  intolerant  of  other 
religions  than  their  own.  The  idea  of  full  and 
complete  freedom  to  choose  whatever  religion  the 
individual  might  prefer,  they  were  not  prepared 
to  accept,  as  the  controversy  between  WilUams  and 
Cotton  indicates.  They  did  not  entertain  doctri- 
naire ideas  about  equality  of  any  kind.  They  granted 
equality  in  civil  rights,  but  did  not  include  equality  , 
of  political  rights  even  among  the  adult  males. 
This  was  true  not  only  of  the  earlier  period  of  the 
Puritan  age,  but  of  the  later  as  well ;  for  the  reli- 


26  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

gious  requirements  at  first  exacted  were  succeeded 
in  the  latter  part  of  the  seventeenth    century  by  t 
property  qualifications    for    office-holding  and  for 
suffrage.     The  conclusion  must  be,  then,  that  for 
political  equality  as  such  there  was  no  great  enthu-  \ 
siasm  among  the  Puritans. 

From  this  discussion  it  is  evident  that  Puritanism 
in  New  England,  and  particularly  in  Massachusetts 
Bay,  may  fairly  be  characterized  as  theocratic. 
The  dominant  class  was  the  clergy ;  church-mem- 
bership was  a  prerequisite  to  full  citizenship  ;  the 
civil  power  was  invoked  to  insure  to  the  church 
financial  support,  to  enforce  church  discipline,  to 
suppress  and  root  out  heresy. 

From   a   consideration    of   these   tendencies   of 
Puritanism  it  might  perhaps  be  assumed  that  there 
was  no  democratic  element  in   the  system  worth 
considering.      It  would,    however,   be  just  as  far 
from  the  truth  to  conclude  that  there  was  no  demo- 
cratic element  in  Puritanism,  as  to  assume  that  its 
adherents  came  to  the  New  World  for  the  express 
purpose  of  establishing  political  and  religious  lib- 
erty for  all  men.     Neither  claim  is  borne  out  by 
a  consideration  of  the  Puritan  theory  and  practice. 
I  Of   greatest    significance    from    the  standpoint  of 
j  democratic  political  theory  is  the  Puritan  idea  of 
I  the  contract.      Primarily  applied  to  ecclesiastical ' 
relations,  to  the  formation  of  a  congregation  through 
the  instrumentality  of  a  church  covenant,  the  same 


POLITICAL    THEORY  OF  THE    COLONISTS     27 

theory  of  the  contract  was  carried  over  into  politi- 
cal relations.  The  church  covenant  and  the  plan- 
tation covenant  went  hand  in  hand.  This  theory 
of  contract  necessarily  emphasized  the  importance 
of  the  individual  as  the  unit  in  both  the  ecclesiasti- 
cal and  the  political  society,  for  it  was  voluntary 
consent  and  not  divine  right  or  long-established 
r.custom  that  was  the  basis  of  both  church  and  state^, 
This  individualistic  idea  contained  a  germ  of 
democracy  which  could  not  fail  to  develop  under 
favorable  conditions.  In  New  England  the  early 
tendencies  toward  aristocracy  or  theocracy  soon 
began  to  disappear,  and  the  process  of  democratiz- 
ing social  and  political  institutions  began  a  course 
which  is  not  yet  completed. 

This  result  cannot  all  be  attributed  to  Puritanism 
as  such,  however.  The  Puritans  inherited  from 
EngUsh  ancestors  and  brought  with  them  to  the 
New  World  the  political  capacity  characteristic  of  a 
highly  developed  political  people.  There  was  also 
a  highly  favorable  environment,  inviting  if  not  com- 
pelling the  growth  of  a  democratic  society  and  state. 
In  estimating  the  democratic  value  of  Puritanism 
these  facts  cannot  be  ignored. 

Next  in  importance  and  interest  to  the  politi- 
cal ideas  of  the  Puritans  were  those  of  the 
Friends  in  Pennsylvania.  Here  was  worked  out  a 
system  differing  from  that  of  the  Puritans  in  re- 
spect to  religious  tenets  and  upon  many  political 


28  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

principles.^  In  the  religious  teachings  of  the 
Friends,  the  sternness  and  severity  of  the  Puritan 
theology  was  in  many  ways  modified.  In  place  of 
the  doctrine  of  election,  it  was  taught  that  the 
grace  of  God  is  universal  in  its  application,  and 
that  there  is  an  immediate  revelation  of  the  spirit 
of  God  to  each  individual  soul  in  the  form  of  an 
"  inner  Hght."  ^  In  this  respect  the  doctrine  of  the 
Friends  was  the  antithesis  of  Puritanism.  In  other 
ways,  however,  the  Friends  were  more  Puritan  than 
the  Puritans  themselves.  They  not  only  denounced 
ceremonialism  as  fiercely  as  did  the  Puritans,  but 
further  abandoned  all  sacraments,  denied  the  ne- 
cessity for  any  special  priesthood,  denounced  church 
tithes,  and  refused  to  take  an  oath  or  have  any- 
thing to  do  with  war.  They  emphasized  plainness 
of  dress,  and  directness  of  speech,  and  refused 
to  uncover  the  head  or  bow  to  any  man.  But 
at  the  same  time  the  Quakers  possessed  practi- 
cal characteristics  that  enabled  them  to  achieve 
great  worldly  success.  Of  this  the  establishment 
of  the  colony  of  Pennsylvania  was  a  signal  proof. 
The  government  of  Pennsylvania  was  on  the 
whole  about  as  democratic  as  that  of  the  Puritan 
colonies.     The  emphasis  on  the  contract  was  lack- 

^  A.  C.  and  R.  M.  Thomas,  A  History  of  the  Society  of  Friends 
in  America  ;  Isaac  Sharpless,  A  Quaker  Experiment  in  Govern- 
ment, 1902. 

2  See  William  Penn,  The  Rise  and  Progress  of  the  People  called 
Quakers  (1695);  Robert  Barclay,  Theologies  vera  Christiana 
Apologia  (1676). 


POLITICAL    THEORY  OF  THE    COLONISTS      29 

ing,  but  the  theocratic  element  found  in  New  Eng- 
land was  also  wanting.  Religious  toleration  was 
granted  to  all  deists,  and  there  was  no  religious 
qualification  for  office  except  the  belief  in  Chris-  ' 
tianity.i  The  ecclesiastical  organization  of  the 
,  Friends  was  more  democratic  than  that  of  the 
'^^Puritans.  There  was  no  special  body  of  ministers 
exercising  authority  over  the  people,  women  were 
granted  equal  rights  with  men,  and  the  meetings 
whether  for  business  or  worship  were  conducted 
with  the  greatest  informality,  not  even  a  presiding 
officer  being  regarded  as  necessary. 

An  interesting  fragment  of  Quaker  theory  is 
contained  in  the  Frame  of  Government  drawn  up 
by  Penn  for  the  colony .^  In  this  document  atten- 
tion is  called  to  the  great  ends  of  government,  which 
are  said  to  be  two,  namely,  to  terrify  evil-doers 
and  to  cherish  those  that  do  well.  Particular  em' 
phasis  is  laid  on  this  double  character  of  govern- 
mental activity.  "  They  weakly  err,"  it  is  said,  "  that 
think  there  is  no  other  use  of  government  than 
correction,  which  is  the  coarsest  part  of  it."  Of 
the  forms  of  government  three  are  suggested  as  be- 
ing most  commonly  discussed,  but  the  conclusion 
is  drawn  that,  "  any  government  is  free  to  the 
people  under  it  .  .  .  where  the  laws  rule  and  the 

^  After  1705,  Roman  Catholics  were  disqualified  from  holding 
office. 

2  Poore's  Constitutions,  Vol.  II,  p.  1518.  Compare  with  this  The 
Fundamental  Constitutions  of  Carolina,  1669,  Ibid.  II,  1397. 


30  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

people  are  a  party  to  those  laws."  Any  govern- 
ment will  work  in  the  proper  hands;  for  like  clock? 
they  go  from  the  motion  communicated  to  them, 
and  in  general  depend  on  men  rather  than  men  on 
governments.  Good  men  will  always  have  good 
laws,  whereas  good  laws  may  lack  good  men  for 
their  enforcement.  The  great  end  of  the  Frame 
of  Government  was  declared  to  be  "  to  support 
power  in  reverence  with  the  people  and  to  secure 
the  people  from  the  abuse  of  power." 

The  opposition  of  the  Quakers  to  taking  the 
oath  and  to  participation  in  war  involved  them 
at  times  in  difficult  situations.  It  was  charged 
by  their  enemies  that  their  unwillingness  to  take 
an  oath  frequently  resulted  in  failure  to  convict 
criminals,  since  in  some  communities  no  sworn 
jury  could  be  secured.  This  seems,  however,  to 
have  occasioned  no  serious  difficulty,  and  the 
matter  was  finally  settled  by  granting  the  Quakers 
the  privilege  of  affirming  instead  of  taking  the 
oath.i 

The  refusal  of  the  Friends  to  take  up  arms  was 
a  matter  of  greater  importance.  During  the  inter- 
colonial wars,  frequent  requisitions  were  made  upon 
them  for  a  quota  of  troops.  All  such  requests  were 
refused,  however,  even  when  the  colony  was  itself 
threatened  with  invasion  by  the  enemy.  They 
steadfastly  declined  to  send  any  soldiers,  or  to  grant 
any  money  for  the  conduct  of  the  military  opera- 
1  Cf.  Sharpless,  op.  cit.,  Chap.  V. 


POLITICAL    THEORY  OF  THE   COLONISTS       31 

tions.  It  was  urged  that  if  they  could  maintain  a 
local  police  force  and  take  human  life  in  punish- 
ment for  crime,  they  might  properly  take  up  arms, 
at  least  in  self-defence.  But  the  Quakers  main- 
tained that  a  distinction  must  be  drawn  here.  It 
was  one  thing,  they  said,  to  kill  a  soldier  fighting  in 
obedience  to  the  commands  of  his  sovereign,  and 
another  to  kill  a  burglar  who  maliciously  steals 
one's  goods  in  wilful  violation  of  laws  human  and 
divine.^  Although  they  declined  to  send  troops 
or  vote  money  for  the  war,  the  Quakers  did  not 
put  themselves  in  the  position  of  absolutely  refusing 
assistance  to  the  government  to  which  they  owed 
allegiance.  They  were  willing  to  contribute  money 
to  the  home  government,  provided  it  was  not  used 
for  military  purposes,  but  for  other  governmental 
needs.  For  example,  in  1709  the  Assembly  voted 
;^50o,  "as  a  present  for  the  Queen." ^  In  1745 
they  voted  ;!^4000  for  "bread,  beef,  pork,  flour, 
wheat,  and  other  grain."  "We  have  ever  held  it 
our  duty,"  they  said,  "  to  render  tribute  to  Cassar,"  ^ 
and  therefore  made  the  contribution.  Their  attitude 
occasioned  earnest  remonstrance  and  bitter  criti- 
cism, but  the  Quakers  remained  unmoved,  and  uni- 
formly refused  to  appropriate  men  or  money  for 
the  war,  except  in  the  indirect  way  just  described. 
When  no  other  alternative    seemed  possible,  the 

1  Minutes  of  the  Provincial  Council,  IV,  371  (1739). 

2  Ibid.  II,  466. 
8  Ibid.  IV,  769. 


32  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

strict  Quakers  refused  to  try  for  seats  in  the  As- 
sembly, and  allowed  that  body  to  pass  under  the 
control  of  those  who  had  no  scruples  against  mili- 
tary operations. 

The  rapid  growth  of  the  democratic  spirit  was 
not  peculiar,  however,  to  the  Puritan  and  Quaker 
colonies.  The  conditions  did  not  favor  aristocracy,  ^ 
and  the  experiments  made  in  that  direction  showed 
conclusively  that  its  establishment  was  impracti- 
cable. The  resources  of  the  colonies  would  not 
support  the  necessary  expenditure,  nor  was  the 
temper  of  the  people  favorable  in  any  greater 
degree.  Something  in  the  environment  seemed  to 
arouse  the  spirit  of  liberty  and  inspire  the  assertion  ^ 
of  individual  and  colonial  rights  in  the  most  ag- 
gressive fashion. 

To  this  there  are  many  witnesses  whose  testi- 
mony, biased  though  it  was,  shows  unmistakably 
the  nature  of  the  new  movement.  Take,  for  ex- 
ample, the  indignant  references  of  Governor  Spots- 
wood  of  Virginia  to  the  election  of  "  representatives, 
persons  of  narrow  fortunes  and  mean  understand- 
ings," and  to  the  general  opinion  "that  he  is  the 
best  patriot  that  most  violently  opposes  all  over- 
tures for  raising  money,  let  the  occasion  be  what  it 
will"  and  to  the  " mobish  candidates  "  who  " always 
outbid  the  Gentlemen  of  sence  and  principles,  for 
they  stick  not  to  vow  to  their  electors  that  no  con- 
sideration whatever  shall   engage  them   to   raise 


POLITICAL    THEORY  OF  THE    COLONISTS      33 

money."  ^  He  was  particularly  aggrieved  because 
"  some  of  them  have  so  little  shame,  as  publicly 
to  declare  that  if,  in  Assembly,  anything  should  be 
proposed  which  they  judged  might  be  disagree- 
able to  their  constituents,  they  would  oppose  it, 
though  they  knew  in  their  conscience,  it  would  be 
for  the  good  of  the  country."  ^  He  denounced 
those  who  "  inflame  the  common  people  with 
notions  of  the  ruin  of  their  Libertys,"  and  charged 
that  "  the  liberty  of  doing  wrong  is  none  of  ye 
least  contended  for  here." 

In  Pennsylvania  the  same  leaven  was  at  work, 
even  under  the  proprietorship  of  one  so  little 
disposed  to  arbitrary  rule  as  was  William  Penn. 
In  1704  it  was  said  that  the  people  think  "all 
that  can  be  grasped  to  be  their  native  right." 
It  was  alleged  that  "some  people's  brains  are 
as  soon  intoxicated  with  power  as  the  natives 
are  with  their  beloved  liquor,  and  as  little  to 
be  trusted  with  it."  ^  Significant  was  the  de- 
nunciation of  one  Guest,  because  "  a  desire  to 
be  somebody,  and  an  unjust  method  of  craving 
and  getting,  seems  to  be  the  rule  of  his  life." 
Penn  himself  observed  this  "  excess  of  vanity " 
on   the   part   of   the    Americans.      "  Having    got 

^  Spotswood  Letters,  in  Virginia  Historical  Collections,  New 
Series,  Vol.  II,  134  (1715). 

2  Ibid. 

8  Penn-Logan  Correspondence,  in   Memoirs   of  the  Historical 
Society  of  Pennsylvania,  Vol.  IX,  299. 
D 


34  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

out  of  the  crowd  in  which  they  were  lost  here," 
said  he,  "  upon  every  little  eminencey  there,  (they) 
think  nothing  taller  than  themselves  but  the 
trees."  ^ 

What  the  governors  or  royal  agents  character- 
ized as  stubbornness  or  stinginess,  or  quibbling 
over  technicalities,  or  playing  into  the  hands  of 
upstarts  and  demagogues  was,  however,  merely 
the  expression,  often  indeed  very  crude,  of  the 
widespread  democratic  sentiment  slowly  gaining 
strength  for  the  outburst  in  the  Revolution. 

The  storm  centre  of  the  democratic  movement 
during  the  colonial  period  was  the  conflict  be- 
tween the  governors  and  the  colonial  legislatures  or 
assemblies.^  For  this  contest  there  was  English 
precedent  in  the  action  of  Parliament  during  the 
seventeenth  century,  and  local  reason  in  the  colo- 
nial desire  to  escape  administrative  control  by 
the  home  government.  Especially  in  Massachu- 
setts and  New  York  the  conflict  was  hard-fought, 
bitter,  and  long  protracted,  but  the  difficulty  was 
by  no  means  confined  to  these  provinces.  In  the 
course  of  this  battle,  the  assembly  constantly 
gained   on   the   governor,    and   steadily   enlarged 

^  Penn-Logan  Correspondence,  in  Memoirs  of  the  Historical 
Society  of  Pennsylvania^  o\.  IX,  374.  Cf.  Maryland  Archives,  IX, 
177-178  (1758);  CzxioW,  Historical  Collections  of  South  Carolina, 
II,  164. 

2  On  this  point  see  E.  B.  Green,  The  Provincial  Governor,  in  the 
Harvard  Historical  Studies,  Vol.  VII,  1898.  In  this  connection 
see  Jeremiah  Dummer,  Defence  of  the  New  England  Charters,  1745. 


POLITICAL    THEORY  OF  THE   COLONISTS       35 

its  power  at  the  expense  of  his.  The  control  of 
the  finances,  especially,  gave  them  the  opportunity 
to  direct  or  influence  the  governor's  activity  in 
many  ways.  Appropriations  might  be  withheld 
to  the  embarrassment  of  the  administration,  or, 
if  granted,  might  be  made  for  specific  and  de- 
tailed purposes.  The  salary  of  the  governor  was 
determined  by  the  assembly,  and  voted  by  that 
body  at  its  pleasure,  thus  making  it  master 
of  the  governor's  financial  situation, — an  advan- 
tage more  than  once  used  to  extort  his  assent  to 
measures  favored  by  the  assembly.  The  appoint- 
ing power  was  also  in  many  cases  wrested  from 
the  governor  and  assumed  by  the  representatives 
of  the  people.  This  was  especially  true  as  to  the 
treasurer,  who,  as  financial  agent  of  the  colony, 
was  exposed  to  attack.  The  movement  was  not 
confined,  however,  to  this  officer,  but  the  assembly 
appointed  in  some  cases  nearly  all  of  the  agents 
of  administration,  as  in  Pennsylvania  and  South 
Carolina. 

In  other  ways  the  assembly  asserted  its 
power  by  assuming  the  direction  of  matters  of 
public  policy  which  had  generally  been  consid- 
ered a  part  of  the  prerogative  of  the  executive. 
Indian  affairs,  for  example,  it  sometimes  man- 
aged by  means  of  commissions  appointed  for  that 
purpose ;  intercolonial  relations  were  also  treated 
in  the  same  fashion ;  military  affairs  the  legis- 
lature sometimes  controlled  by  granting  supplies. 


36  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

prescribing  the  operations  to  be  undertaken,  ap- 
pointing and  removing  officers,  and  even  interfer- 
ing with  the  discipline  of  the  troops.  So  far  had 
these  encroachments  gone,  that  in  1757  it  could 
be  said  of  Massachusetts  that  "  almost  every  act 
of  executive  and  legislative  power,  whether  it  be 
political,  judicial  or  military,  is  ordered  and  di- 
rected by  the  votes  and  resolves  of  the  General 
Court,  in  most  cases  originating  in  the  House  of 
Representatives."  ^  More  than  anything  else,  this 
conflict  served  to  bring  out  the  spirit  of  democracy 
which  was  everywhere  ready  for  action.  It  was 
a  rallying  point  around  which  tendencies  favorable 
to  independence  and  popular  government  could 
gather,  and  as  the  intercolonial  wars  helped  to 
teach  the  colonists  military  science,  so  these  politi- 
cal battles  afforded  them  indispensable  training  in 
the  art  of  statecraft. 

On  the  whole,  it  may  be  said  that  during  the 
colonial  period  the  democratic  spirit  made  remark- 
able progress.  The  colonies  passed  out  of  the 
stage  in  which  they  were  religious  experiments  or 
industrial  ventures  of  a  rather  hazardous  character, 
and  became  prosperous  communities  eager  for 
governmental  autonomy.  The  individuals  within 
these  colonies  were  filled  with  a  democratic  en- 
thusiasm, and  ready  for  an  advance  in  the  direc- 
tion of   popular   government.     Until   the   decade 

1  Board  of  Trade  to  Governor  Pownall,  cited  by  Green,  op.  cit. 
194. 


POLITICAL    THEORY  OF  THE    COLONISTS        37 

preceding  the  Revolution  there  was,  however,  little 
systematic  discussion  of  the  problems  of  political 
theory,  with  the  exception  of  the  indirect  contribu- 
tion made  by  the  Puritans.  A  steady  democratizing 
process  was  going  on  under  the  influence  of  the 
new  conditions,  but  there  was  little  conscious  re- 
flection accompanying  this  process.  With  the  agi- 
tation preHminary  to  the  Revolution  came  a  group 
of  leaders  who  sought  a  philosophical  basis  for 
their  policies,  and  accordingly  made  frequent  use 
of  the  formulae  of  political  theory  in  their  great 
struggle  for  independence. 


CHAPTER   II 

THE   POLITICAL    THEORY    OF    THE    REVOLUTIONARY 
PERIOD 

The  most  important  and  significant  statement  of 
American  political  theory  is  that  made  at  the  time 
when  the  United  States  asserted  the  right  to  an 
independent  existence.  The  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence has  been  generally  regarded  as  the 
corner-stone  of  the  American  political  system,  and 
the  ideas  of  the  "Fathers"  of  1776  as  a  correct 
statement  of  the  typical  American  political  phi- 
losophy. These  doctrines  have  undoubtedly  ex- 
erted a  profound  influence  in  determining  the 
course  of  American  political  thought.  Even  down 
to  the  present  day,  they  are  the  standards  by 
which  must  be  measured  all  that  is  attempted  in 
the  world  of  politics.  No  study  of  American  polit- 
ical ideas,  or  of  American  political  institutions, 
would  be  complete  without  a  careful  analysis  of 
the  characteristic  doctrines  of  1776. 

It  is,  then,  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  to  exam- 
ine carefully  the  nature  and  origin  of  the  political 
ideas  prevalent  during  the  score  of  years  covering 
the  Revolutionary  period  ;  that  is,  from  about  1763 
to  about  1783.  The  exposition  of  the  doctrines  of 
38 


THEORY   OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD        39 

this  period  is  rendered  somewhat  difficult  by  the 
fact  that  there  was  no  systematic  presentation  of 
political  theory  made  during  this  time.  There  was 
an  unlimited  amount  of  discussion  from  platform 
and  pulpit,  in  pamphlets,  resolutions,  addresses, 
and  newspapers,  but  a  scientific  statement  of  the 
popular  beliefs  was  not  made.  It  was  natural  that 
under  the  conditions  no  scientific  shape  could  be 
given  to  any  body  of  doctrine.  Men  wrote  and 
spoke  with  eloquence  and  force,  and  they  were 
men  of  intellectual  keenness  and  power;  they  v" 
spoke,  however,  not  as  philosophers,  but  as  parti- 
sans and  promoters  of  a  concrete  revolutionary 
program. 

Among  the  most  important  sources  of  informa- 
tion for  this  period,  despite  their  unsystematic  form, 
are  the  speeches  and  writings  of  such  men  as  Otis, 
John  and  Samuel  Adams,  Dickinson,  Paine,  Jeffer- 
son, and  Hamilton.  Many  indications  of  the  Patriot 
theory  are  also  found  in  the  various  declarations  of 
colonial  rights  that  were  made  on  numerous  occa- 
sions by  legislatures  or  other  less  formal  public 
assemblages.  Finally,  in  the  Revolutionary  state 
constitutions  are  expressed,  in  legal  form,  the  prin- 
ciples that  were  dominant  among  the  people. 
From  this  material  the  ideas  of  this  time  may  be 
reconstructed,  and  a  fairly  adequate  and  compre- 
hensive view  of  its  political  theory  obtained. 

At  the  outset  a  few  words  may  be  said  in  re- 
gard to  the  historical  situation  under  which  was 


40  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

developed  the  theory  to  be  considered.  The  result 
of  the  French  and  Indian  wars  removed  a  great 
obstacle  to  American  independence,  and  from 
1763  on  the  drift  of  political  conditions  was 
steadily  in  the  direction  of  separation  from  the 
mother  country.  The  long  experience  of  the 
colonies  in  the  art  of  self-government,  their  re- 
moteness from  England,  and  the  difficulties  of 
successful  administration  from  so  distant  a  base, 
theclashof  colonial  interest  with  Britain's  nationalist 
policy, —  all  were  conditions  likely  to  find  expression 
at  a  favorable  opportunity,  in  terms  of  political 
independence.  The  crisis  came  when  the  home 
government  in  England  endeavored  to  tighten  the 
long-relaxed  bonds  of  union  and  to  establish  over 
the  colonies  a  more  complete  administrative  con- 
trol.i 

The  immediate  occasion  of  the  conflict  was  a 
question  of  colonial  taxation.  In  1764  came  the 
Declaratory  Resolves,  indicating  the  intention  of 
the  ministry  to  levy  a  tax  on  America.  This  was 
followed  in  1765  by  the  famous  Stamp  Act,  which 
aroused  the  opposition  that  found  best  expression 
in  the  Stamp  Act  Congress.      This  act  was  re- 


*  The  following  works  are  especially  useful  in  the  study  of  this 
period :  Richard  Frothingham,  Rise  of  the  Republic  of  the  United 
States;  George  Bancroft,  U^iited  States,  Vols.  Ill  and  IV ;  W.  E. 
H.  Lecky,  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century;  M.  C.  Tyler,  Lit- 
erary History  of  the  American  Revolution ;  W.  M.  Sloane,  Tht 
French  War  and  the  Revolution. 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD        41 

pealed  the  next  year,  but  at  the  same  time  the 
significant  declaration  was  made  that  Parliament 
possessed  the  undoubted  power  to  bind  the  colonies 
"in  all  cases  whatsoever."  The  excitement  over 
this  assertion  of  Parliamentary  authority  had  not 
died  away  before  the  Townsend  Act  was  passed 
(1767),  imposing  taxes  on  such  commodities  as  glass 
and  tea,  and  providing  means  for  the  enforcement 
of  the  same.  Though  this  act  also  was  repealed 
(1770),  with  the  exception  of  the  duty  on  tea, 
the  resistance  continued  to  be  as  bitter  as  before. 
In  1773  the  colonists  instituted  what  proved  to 
be  a  powerful  agency  in  the  development  of  their 
organization,  namely,  the  Committees  of  Corre- 
spondence between  the  colonies.  In  the  meantime 
fuel  was  added  to  the  flames  of  colonial  discon- 
tent by  the  instructions  sent  to  the  royal  govern- 
ors and  by  the  Regulating  Act  for  Massachusetts. 
The  Boston  Port  Bill,  passed  in  1774,  aroused  uni- 
versal indignation  and  sympathy,  and  led  up  to  the 
first  Continental  Congress  of  1774.  In  the  follow- 
ing spring  came  the  clash  of  arms  at  Lexington ; 
in  May,  1775,  the  Continental  Congress  made 
its  declaration  on  taking  up  arms  against  Great 
Britain ;  and  finally,  all  hope  of  reconciliation  hav- 
ing been  destroyed,  the  Declaration  of  Indepen- 
dence was  issued.  During  this  period  of  thirteen 
years  there  was  incessant  debate  upon  questions 
of  colonial  policy,  of  constitutional  law,  and  of 
political  theory.     These  were  topics  of  absorbing 


42 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 


interest  among  the  colonists,  and  occupied  the 
minds  of  the  ablest  thinkers  of  that  day.  In  1776 
began  the  work  of  constitution-making  in  the  various 
states,  and  opportunity  was  given  for  the  develop- 
ment or  application  of  constructive  theory.  This 
process  was  completed  by  1784,  and  with  this  date 
the  epoch  of  the  Revolutionary  theory  may  be  said 
to  have  closed. 

The  argument  with  which  the  colonists  began 
their  resistance  was  constitutional  in  nature,  in- 
volving the  legal  relations  between  the  home 
government  and  the  colonies.  To  this  doctrine 
brief  notice  must  now  be  given,  in  order  that 
the  full  significance  of  the  Revolutionary  politi- 
cal theory  may  appear.  The  contention  of  the 
Patriots  was  that  the  course  of  the  British  Parlia- 
ment, in  taxing  the  American  colonies,  was  not 
merely  inexpedient  and  unjust,  but  actually  con- 
trary to  the  principles  of  the  British  Constitution. 
Consequently  they  affirmed  that  the  government, 
in  attempting  to  enforce  such  legislation,  was 
wholly  outside  of  legal  and  constitutional  right. 
The  basis  for  this  claim  was  not  always  clearly 
stated,  and  was  sometimes  shifted,  but  the  main 
features  of  it  may  be  noted  here. 

It  was  asserted,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  colo- 
nists owed  their  allegiance,  not  to  Parliament,  but 
to  the  king.  From  him  they  had  received  their 
charters,  and  to  him,  and  not  to  Parliament,  they 
were  accountable.    Britain  and  the  colonies,  it  was 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD       43 

said,  are  distinct  states,  as  were  England  and  Scot- 
land before  the  union  ;  they  are  bound  together 
only  by  their  common  allegiance  to  a  common 
king.  "  The  fealty  and  allegiance  of  the  Ameri- 
cans," said  John  Adams,  "is  undoubtedly  due  to 
the  person  of  the  King  George  III,  whom  God 
long  preserve  and  prosper."  ^  In  accordance  with 
the  charters  received  from  him  and  of  other  ex- 
press or  implied  contracts,  the  colonists  owe  obe- 
dience to  the  king,  although  not  to  Parliament. 
This  body  has  no  authority  to  tax,  it  was  urged, 
except  for  the  regulation  of  colonial  trade,  and 
this  is  not  strictly  a  right,  but  exists  "  merely  by 
the  consent  of  the  colonies,  founded  on  the  obvious 
necessity  of  a  case  which  was  never  in  contempla- 
tion of  that  law,  nor  provided  for  by  it."  ^  The 
various  Acts  of  Trade  were  even  compared  to 
commercial  treaties  between  the  colonies  and 
Great  Britain. 

By  some  of  the  Patriots  a  distinction  was  drawn 
between  acts  of  Parliament  levying  external  taxes 

*  See  John  Adams,  Works,  IV,  146;  Answer  of  the  Massachusetts 
House  of  Representatives  to  the  Speech  of  the  Governor,  1773, 
in  Niles,  Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution  in  America,  287-294; 
Stephen  Hopkins,  The  Rights  of  the  Colonies  Examined  (1764),  re- 
printed in  R,  I.  Records,  VI,  416;  Richard  Bland,  An  Inquiry  into 
the  Rights  of  the  British  Colonies  (I'jdb');  JeKerson,  Summary  View 
of  the  Rights  of  the  Colonists  (1774).  See  Adams's  reply  to  the 
argument  that  the  king  owed  his  position  to  an  act  of  Parliament, 
IVorks,  IV,  1 14. 

2  Adams,  IV,  2,2,'    Cf.  Hopkins,  R.  I.  Records,  VI,  420. 


44  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

for  the  purpose  of  general  regulation  of  the  trade 
of  the  kingdom,  and  on  the  other  hand  acts  levy- 
ing internal  taxes  on  the  colonies.^  The  authority 
of  Parliament  to  levy  the  former  was  conceded  on 
the  ground  of  necessity  for  the  general  interest, 
but  it  was  denied  that  the  imposition  of  an  in- 
ternal tax  was  a  constitutional  exercise  of  power. 

Another  line  of  reasoning  was  that  by  the  terras 
of  the  charters  the  colonists  were  entitled  to  all  the 
rights  and  privileges  of  native-born  English  citi- 
zens. They  were  to  be  as  free  in  America  as  if 
they  had  remained  in  England.  As  Hopkins  said, 
"  There  would  be  found  very  few  people  in  the 
world,  willing  to  leave  their  native  country  and 
go  through  the  fatigue  and  hardship  of  planting 
in  a  new  and  uncultivated  one  for  the  sake  of 
losing  their  freedom."  On  this  basis  the  asser- 
tion was  made  that  the  colonists  possessed  the 
right  of  Englishmen  to  be  taxed  only  in  case  they 
were  represented.  This,  they  held,  was  the  most 
fundamental  of  all  the  rights  of  Englishmen,  and 
one  of  which  they  could  not  be  deprived  by  any 
act  of  Parliament.  Inasmuch  as  the  colonists  were 
not  represented  in  Parliament,  it  followed  they  were 
not  liable  to  internal  taxation  by  that  body. 

It  was  also  argued  that,  owing  to  the  local  condi- 
tions, American  representation  was  impracticable 
or  impossible,  and  consequently  that   such   taxes 

^  This  idea  was  developed  most  clearly  by  Pitt  in  the  House  of 
Commons. 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD        45 

must  be  levied  through  the  colonial  legislatures,  — 
the  only  channel  through  which  consent  could 
legitimately  be  given.^  Formal  recognition  of  this 
doctrine  was  embodied  in  the  resolutions  of  the 
Stamp  Act  Congress  in  1765,  which  declared  that 
"it  is  inseparably  essential  to  the  freedom  of  a 
people  and  the  undoubted  right  of  Englishmen, 
that  no  taxes  be  imposed  on  them  without  their  con- 
sent, given  personally  or  through  their  representa- 
tives." Later  this  doctrine  assumed  a  still  bolder 
form  in  the  Declaration  of  the  Congress  of  1774, 
to  the  effect  that  the  colonists  "  are  entitled  to 
life,  liberty  and  property,  and  they  have  never 
ceded  to  any  sovereign  power  whatever  a  right  to 
dispose  of  either  without  their  consent." 

Such  was  the  constitutional  argument  upon 
which  resistance  was  at  first  based.  This  line  of 
attack  proved  to  be  vulnerable,  however,  in  at  least 
two  points.  First,  the  contention  that  the  colonies 
were  dependent  upon  the  crown  alone  and  inde- 
pendent of  Parliament,  so  far  as  internal  taxation 
was  concerned,  was  not  in  harmony  with  the 
opinion  of  the  ablest  jurists  of  the  time,  notably 
Mansfield.  Again,  the  doctrine  that  no  English- 
man could  be  taxed  when  unrepresented  in  Parlia- 
ment was  not  in  accord  with  the  system  of  that 
day,  which  left  totally  unrepresented  such  popu- 

^  John  Adams  enumerated  the  objections  to  colonial  representa- 
tion, Works,  IV,  1 39.  Cf.  Samuel  Adams,  Natural  Rights  of  the 
Colonists,  Wells,  I,  507  ;  also  Bland,  op.  cit. 


46  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

lous  and  important  communities  as  Sheffield,  Bir- 
mingham, and  Leeds.  From  this  point  of  view  it 
appears  that  the  colonists  were  advocating  a  new 
theory  and  practice  of  representation,  and  not  de- 
fending an  old  and  well-established  one.^  They 
had  in  short  an  antiquated  theory  as  to  the  position 
and  power  of  Parliament,  and  a  premature  theory 
of  Parliamentary  representation.  Doubtless  the 
colonists  were  influenced  by  certain  seventeenth 
century  opinions  that  the  courts  had  the  power  to 
declare  void  an  act  of  Parhament  contrary  to  the 
common  law.^  But  in  the  eighteenth  century,  the 
opinion  of  crown  lawyers  was  undoubtedly  to 
the  effect  that  Parliament  did  have  the  power  to 
bind  the  colonies  "in  all  cases  whatsoever."  The 
earlier  idea  crept  into  the  law  books,  however,  and 
hence  came  to  be  used  for  political  purposes,  after 
it  had  ceased  to  have  any  real  value  as  a  legal 
principle. 

Such  was  the  nature  of  the  constitutional  argu- 
ment which  gave  legal  color  and  character  to  the 
first  resistance  against  the  British  government.^ 
Concurrently  with  this  reasoning  appeared  much 

^  Mansfield's  argument  in  favor  of  Parliamentary  supremacy  is 
sketched  by  Bancroft,  Vol.  Ill,  190  ff.  (last  revision,  1891). 

2  See  Bonham's  Case,  8  Rep.  118  a. 

3  On  this  subject  see  an  article  by  H.  L.  Osgood,  "England  and 
the  Colonies,"  in  the  Political  Science  Quarterly,  II,  440-69 ;  also 
Sir  Frederick  Pollock  on  "  Sovereignty  in  English  Law,"  in  the 
Harvard  Law  Review,  Vol.  VIII,  243  ff. 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD        47 

that  was  based  on  more  abstract  doctrines.  The 
fundamental  principles  of  the  political  theory  of 
the  "Fath'ers  "  were  similar  to  those  of  the  English 
revolutionists  in  the  seventeenth  century.  The 
leading  propositions  in  this  philosophy  were  these. 
Before  the  establishment  of  civil  government,  men 
exist  in  a  "  state  of  nature,"  are  subject  only  to  the  ^ 
"  law  of  nature,"  and  possess  a  number  of  so-called  | 
"natural  rights."  How  far  these  rights  extend 
every  man  determines  for  himself,  and  each  en- 
forces his  own  judgment.  Government  is  created 
by  means  of  a  contract  in  which  every  one  sur-  j 
renders  enough  of  his  natural  rights  to  permit  the 
establishment  of  an  organized  authority,  —  "a 
common  umpire."  But  in  case  the  government 
becomes  oppressive,  the  people  may  then  exercise 
the  reserved  right  of  resistance  and  overthrow  the 
established  authority. 

The  colonists  believed,  then,  in  a  pre-govern- 
mental  state  of  nature.  In  this  condition  no  man 
is  subject  to  another,  but  each  protects  and  defends 
himself  —  is  perfectly  free  and  independent.  In 
the  state  of  nature,  moreover,  all  men  are  equal, 
not  in  the  physical  or  intellectual  sense,  but  so  far 
>|  as  concerns  jurisdiction  or  authority.  No  man  is 
born  ruler  or  governor  of  others,  but  all  are  created 
free  to  rule  themselves,  and  equal  in  the  right  to 
rule  themselves. 

All  men   possess,  it  was  further  maintained,  a 
group  of  what  were  called  "natural  rights."     No 


48  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

subject  was  more  frequently  a  topic  of  discussion 
than  the  rights  of  the  colonists.  These  were  to  a 
great  extent  regarded  as  legal  or  constitutional 
rights  against  Parliament  or  against  the  crown,  and 
elaborate  arguments  were  made  from  this  point  of 
view.  The  colonists  were  not  content,  however,  to 
stop  with  this  kind  of  reasoning,  but  carried  the 
discussion  beyond  the  boundary  line  of  public  law. 
They  declared  that  there  exists  a  body  of  natural 
rights  antedating  the  existence  of  government  and 
superior  to  it  in  authority.  These  natural  rights,  it 
was  held,  are  the  real  basis  of  political  rights,  and 
hence  the  action  of  the  Britis  i  government,  even 
if  strictly  legal,  was  still  regarded  as  contrary  to 
the  inherent  rights  of  man.  This  idea  was  boldly 
and  forcibly  expressed  by  many  of  the  Patriot 
leaders.  Dickinson  declared  that  "  our  liberties  do 
not  come  from  charters ;  for  these  are  only  the 
declaration  of  preexisting  rights.  They  do  not 
depend  on  parchments  or  seals ;  but  come  from 
the  King  of  Kings  and  Lord  of  all  the  earth." 
John  Adams  said  that  rights  do  not  come  from 
princes  or  parliaments ;  but  are  coaeval  with  these. 
They  are  founded  "  in  the  frame  of  human  nature, 
rooted  in  the  constitution  of  the  intellectual  and 
moral  world,"  derived  from  "the  Great  Legislator 
of  the  universe."  Even  more  vividly  the  youth- 
ful Hamilton  asserted  that  "the  sacred  rights  of 
mankind  are  not  to  be  rummaged  for  among 
old    parchments    or    musty   records.      They   are 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD        49 

written  as  with  a  sunbeam  in  the  whole  volume  of 
human  nature,  by  the  hand  of  the  Divinity  itself 
and  can  never  be  erased  or  obscured  by  mortal 
power." 

What  constitutes  these  rights  was  best  stated  in 
the  Declaration  of  Independence,  where  it  was 
asserted  that  all  men  are  "  endowed  with  certain 
inalienable  rights ;  among  these  are  life,  liberty, 
and  the  pursuit  of  happiness."  In  the  state  con- 
stitutions the  same  idea  appeared,  clothed  in  differ- 
ent phraseology.  For  example  New  Hampshire 
stated  that  there  are  "  certain  natural,  essential, 
and  inherent  rights,  among  which  are  the  enjoying 
and  defending  life  and  liberty ;  acquiring,  possess- 
ing and  protecting  property  ;  and  in  a  word,  of  seek- 
ing and  obtaining  happiness."  These  are  rights 
which  belong  to  every  man  by  virtue  of  his  exist- 
ence. They  are  antecedent  to  the  formation  of 
political  society,  and  the  necessary  basis  of  all  just 
government.  The  colonists  proposed,  therefore,  to 
base  their  claim  on  the  rights  of  British  subjects, 
but  if  these  were  not  recognized,  then  they  would 
go  deeper  down  and  rest  their  contention  on  the 
natural  rights  of  man. 

The  behef  in  the  state  of  nature,  and  in  the 
freedom,  equality,  and  natural  rights  of  man,  was 
accompanied  by  the  theory  of  contract  as  the 
necessary  basis  of  all  legitimate  government.  If 
men  are  born  free  and  equal,  then  no  government 
can  claim  allegiance   and   obedience   from   them, 


50  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

unless  they  agree  to  it.  It  appeared  to  the  men 
of  this  time  as  indisputably  true  that  a  just  and 
free  political  society  could  rest  on  no  other  basis 
than  the  consent  of  the  individuals  to  be  ruled. 
This  seemed  the  only  rational  way  to  explain  the  , 
existence  of  government  with  coercive  power  over 
individuals  who  might  otherwise  live  as  independent 
sovereigns.  Hence  some  form  of  contract  was  re- 
garded as  a  necessary  step  in  the  establishment  of  . 
all  legitimate  government.  This  idea  was  taken 
up  the  more  readily  by  Americans,  because  of  the 
prominence  it  had  enjoyed  when  the  early  New 
England  settlements  were  formed.  Hence  it  is  not 
surprising  to  find  in  the  Declaration  of  Indepen- 
dence the  statement  that  "  governments  derive  their  v 
just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed  "  ;  or 
in  the  Massachusetts  Bill  of  Rights  that,  "  the  body 
politic  is  formed  by  a  voluntary  association  of  in- 
dividuals; it  is  a  social  compact  by  which  the 
whole  people  covenants  with  each  citizen  and 
each  citizen  with  the  whole  people,  that  all  shall 
be  governed  by  certain  laws  for  the  common 
good." 

The  exact  nature  of  this  contract  was  little  dis- 
cussed. Thomas  Paine  in  his  Common  Sense  gave 
a  fanciful  sketch  of  early  patriarchs  assembling 
to  form  a  government.  Another  authority  agreed 
with  Locke  that  the  contract  dates  back  so  far  that 
we  have  no  record  of  it.  "What  eye,"  he  said, 
"  could  penetrate  through  gothic  night  and  barba- 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD       51 

rous  fable  to  that  remote  period  ?  "  ^  In  general, 
however,  there  was  a  wise  indifference  to  the  *. 
details  of  the  original  contract.  The  Patriots  were 
content  with  the  understanding  that  governments 
derive  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed,  as  a  working  hypothesis.  This  was 
accepted  as  one  of  the  axioms  in  political  philoso- 
phy, which  no  one  in  his  political  senses  would 
question. 

Closely  connected  with  the  theory  of  the  social 
contract,  was  the  proposition  of  the  Americans,  , 
that  "  taxation  without  representation  is  tyranny," 
and  the  more  general  idea  into  which  this  was' 
often  merged ;  namely,  that  all  legitimate  legisla- 
tion must  rest  upon  representation  or  consent. 
This  was  discussed  from  the  point  of  view  of  Par- 
liamentary authority  and  the  rights  of  Englishmen  ; 
but  this  was  not  the  only  angle  from  which  the  ques- 
tion was  approached.  The  right  to  be  represented 
was  regarded  not  only  as  the  right  of  Englishmen, 
but  as  the  right  of  all  men  existing  under  a  free 
government ;  ^  indeed  it  seemed  to  be  considered 
\  as  the  most  fundamental  of  all  rights,  the  sine  qua 
\\non  of  political  liberty.  The  principle  was  looked' 
upon  as  one  of  general  application,  and  not  peculiar 

^  Boston  Orations,  inNiles's  Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution 
in  America,  pp.  51-52.  Cf.  Samuel  Adams,  in  Wells,  I,  429;  Hop- 
kins, in  R.  I.  Records,  VI,  416.  Otis's  idea  of  the  contract  was 
somewhat  different. 

2  Adams  said  that  "  English  liberties  are  but  certain  rights  of 
nature  reserved  to  the  citizen  by  the  English  constitution."    IV,  124. 


52  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

to  English  constitutional  law.  John  Adams  main- 
tained that  "  the  very  definition  of  a  freeman  is  one 
who  is  bound  by  no  law  to  which  he  has  not  con- 
sented." ^  Dickinson  repudiated  in  strong  terms 
the  right  to  levy  taxes,  where  the  taxpayers  are 
not  represented.  "  Craft  and  cruelty,"  he  said, 
"  are  striving  to  brand  us  with  marks  infamously 
denoting  us  to  be  their  property  as  absolutely  as 
their  cattle."  ^  In  accordance  with  this  line  of 
argument  was  Hamilton's  assertion  that  "civil 
liberty  cannot  possibly  have  any  existence,  where 
the  society  for  whom  laws  are  made  have  no  share 
in  making  them." 

The  principle  of  consent  to  taxation  and  law- 
making in  general  was  the  strategic  point,  which 
the  Patriots  defended  with  all  the  resources  of  con- 
stitutional law  and  political  theory  at  their  com- 
mand. If  natural  rights  and  the  social  contract 
have  any  vital  force  at  all,  they  reasoned,  they 
must  be  capable  of  use  in  the  defence  of  a  man's 
own  property.  If  all  that  one  has  can  be  taken 
away  by  laws  passed  by  a  distant  legislature  in 
which  one  has  no  voice,  then  there  is  an  end  of 
natural  right  and  the  subversion  of  the  social  con- 
tract. This  question  of  taxation  appeared  to  the 
Patriots  as  the  central  point  in  the  whole  contro- 
versy, theoretically  as  well  as  practically.  It 
mattered  not  what  the  amount  of  the  tax  was,  nor 

1  Works,  IV,  28. 

« Ibid.,  XIV,  495.     Cf.  S.  Adams,  in  Wells,  I,  154  ff. 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD        53 

how  easily  it  might  be  paid ;  the  principle  was 
essentially  the  same.  Hopkins  declared^  that 
"  one  who  is  bound  to  obey  the  will  of  another  is 
as  really  a  slave,  though  he  have  a  good  master, 
as  if  he  had  a  bad  one."  The  men  of  the  Revo- 
lution saw  only  the  two  alternatives :  freedom  or 
.,  slavery;  taxation  and  representation,  or  taxation 
\  without  representation.^  They  recognized  no  mid- 
dle ground  either  in  constitutional  law  or  in 
political  theory :  they  must  be  either  wholly  slave 
or  wholly  free,  and  the  test  of  this  was  whether 
they  were  or  were  not  afforded  an  opportunity 
to  consent  to  taxes  levied  upon  them.  This  was 
the  theoretical  point  upon  which  the  Revolution 
turned. 

Related  to  the  theory  of  natural  rights  and  the 
"consent  of  the  governed,"  was  the  doctrine  of 
popular  sovereignty.  That  the  people  are  the  basis 
of  all  legitimate  political  authority  was  a  proposi- 

1  R.  I.  Records,  VI,  423.     Cf.  Dickinson,  XIV,  356  ff. 

2  Dickinson  evolved  an  elaborate  syllogism  to  prove  that  taxation 
without  representation  is  tyranny. 

(i)  God  gave  no  one  a  right  to  make  others  miserable  ;  hence 
the  right  to  be  happy. 

(2)  There  can  be  no  happiness  without  freedom ;  hence  the 
right  to  freedom. 

(3)  There  can  be  no  freedom  without  security  of  property; 
hence  the  right  to  such  security. 

(4)  Property  is  not  secure  if  it  can  be  taken  without  one's  con- 
sent ;  hence  the  right  to  be  taxed  only  when  consenting,  personally 
or  through  representatives.  Memoirs  of  the  Historical  Society  oj 
Pennsylvania,  Vol.  XIV,  262. 


54  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

tion  which  was  little  disputed  at  this  time.  Since 
all  men  are  born  with  the  same  natural  rights, 
and  inasmuch  as  all  legitimate  government  must 
be  based  upon  the  consent  of  these  individuals, 
it  is  evident  that  the  great  mass  of  the  people 
are  the  foundation  of  the  state.  No  sovereignty 
can  come  into  existence  or  continue  to  exist,  unless 
the  people  consent  to  and  authorize  it.  The  in- 
herent and  inalienable  sovereignty  of  the  people 
was  therefore  assumed  as  a  political  principle  of 
\  incontestable  validity,  —  a  premise  which  could  not 
be  assailed.  Although  frequent  reference  was 
made  to  this  doctrine,  there  was  little  attempt  at 
scientific  discussion  of  the  idea  :  it  seemed,  indeed, 
to  be  so  generally  recognized  that  elaborate  argu- 
ment upon  the  question  was  superfluous. 

In  the  Declaration  of  Independence  the  doctrine 
was  stated  in  the  familiar  form,  "  governments  de- 
rive their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  gov- 
erned." A  more  explicit  statement  was  that  con- 
tained in  the  Massachusetts  Proclamation  ( 1 776),^ 
to  the  effect  that  the  sovereign  power  "  resides, 
always,  in  the  body  of  the  people ;  and  it  never  was, 
or  can  be,  delegated  to  one  man  or  a  few,  the  great 
Creator  having  never  given  to  men  a  right  to  vest 
others  with  authority  over  them,  unHmited  either 
in  duration  or  degree."  Similar  declarations  found 
their  way  into  the  state  constitutions.  Thus  North 
Carolina  said  that  "  all  political  power  is  vested  in 

1  Force's  American  Archives^  Fourth  Series,  Vol.  IV,  p.  834- 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD        55 

and  derived  from  the  people  only";  New  Hamp- 
shire, that  "  all  government  of  right  originates  from 
the  people";  and  the  same  sentiment  was  expressed 
elsewhere  with  slight  variation  in  the  phraseology. 
The  constructive  applications  of  this  doctrine  will 
be  considered  later.  The  destructive  application 
of  the  doctrine  took  the  form  of  the  right  of  resist-  ^ 
ance,  —  naturally  one  of  the  most  conspicuous  of 
the  doctrines  of  1776.  The  Revolutionary  move- 
ment rested  upon  a  theoretical  basis  which  served 
as  a  justification  for  the  necessarily  illegal  conduct 
of  the  Patriots.  In  the  preceding  century  two 
revolutions  had  occurred  in  England,  and  the 
theory  of  revolution  had  received  classic  formu-  ( 
t/  lation  in  the  treatise  of  John  Locke.  The  Ameri- ' 
cans  were  thus  supplied  with  ample  precedent  from 
England  in  both  historical  events  and  philosophic 
formulae. 

Even  before  the  conflict  with  England  had  be- 
gun, a  decidedly  independent  spirit  had  been  mani- 
fested in  many  of  the  colonies,  and  there  were  not 
lacking  corresponding  expressions  of  opinion.  A 
bold  statement  of  the  right  of  resistance  was  made 
by  Rev.  Jonathan  Mayhew  on  the  anniversary  of 
the  execution  of  King  Charles  (1749).  Mayhew 
referred  to  the  experience  of  England  and  to  the 
theory  of  Locke.  He  denounced  unjust  and  tyran- 
nical magistrates  in  the  most  unsparing  terms,  de- 
claring that  when  they  cease  to  perform  their 
functions  properly,  they  "  cease  to  be  the  ordinance 


56  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

and  ministers  of  God,  and  no  more  deserve  that 
glorious  character  than  common  pirates  and  high- 
way-men." ^  Mayhew  admitted  that  this  principle 
might  be  perverted  to  bad  ends,  but  maintained 
that  this  is  true  of  all  principles,  including  that  of 
passive  obedience. 

When  the  opposition  to  the  English  policy 
became  widespread,  and  it  seemed  that  open  re- 
sistance must  be  made,  arguments  in  favor  of  the 
right  of  revolution  appeared  upon  every  hand.  A 
general  belief  in  such  a  right  was  vital  to  the  suc- 
cess of  the  Revolutionary  movement,  for  nothing 
could  be  done  if  it  was  believed  that  government 
was  something  too  sacred  to  be  touched.  History 
and  philosophy  were  therefore  drawn  upon,  to 
support  the  justice  of  resistance  to  government  in 
extreme  cases.  All  of  the  Patriot  leaders  defended 
the  right  of  revolution  with  earnestness  and  vigor. 
Samuel  Adams  turned  the  argument  against  rulers, 
by  asserting  that  kings  and  magistrates  may  also 
be  guilty  of  treason  and  rebellion,  and  on  the  whole 
have  been  guilty  more  often  than  their  subjects.^ 
Dickinson  took  strong  ground  against  the  doctrine 
of  passive  obedience,  urging  that  Parliament  might 
sometimes  do  wrong,  and  in  such  cases  resistance 
was  advisable.  Although  praising  the  king  and  the 
royal  line,  he  showed  that  even  a  father  may  do 

1  Sermon  at  the  West  Meeting  House  in  Boston,  1 749-1 750,  con- 
tained in  The  Pulpit  of  ike  American  Revolution,  by  J.  W.  Thornton. 

2  Wells,  I,  433  (1771). 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD        57 

injury  to  his  child  :  —  "If  my  father,  deceived  and 
urged  on  by  bad  or  weak  men,  said  he,  should  offer 
me  a  draught  of  poison  and  tell  me  it  would  be  of 
service  to  me,  should  I  be  undutiful,  if,  knowing 
what  it  is,  I  refuse  to  drink  it  ? "  ^  Samuel  Langdon, 
President  of  Harvard,  declared  before  the  Congress 
of  Massachusetts  (1775)  that  if  magistrates  forget 
their  duty,  "reason  and  justice  require  that  they 
should  be  discarded  and  others  appointed  in  their 
room,  without  any  regard  to  formal  resignations 
of  their  forfeited  power."  ^  Seldom  was  there  dis- 
pute as  to  the  right  of  revolution  ;  the  greatest  dif- 
ference was  in  the  form  of  statement,  or,  on  the 
part  of  others,  in  regard  to  the  expediency  of  re- 
sort to  it  at  that  particular  time. 

As  might  be  expected,  the  Revolutionary  idea 
found  at  times  rather  radical  expression.  An  ex- 
ample of  this  type  is  the  following  statement  made 
in  one  of  the  annual  Boston  orations.  The  speaker 
here  defined  civil  liberty  as  "a  power  existing  in 
the  people  at  large,  at  any  time,  for  any  cause,  or 
for  no  cause  but  their  sovereign  pleasure,  to  alter 
or  annihilate  both  the  mode  and  essence  of  any 
former  government  and  adopt  a  new  one  in  its 
stead."  Benjamin  Church  declared  that  "where 
a  degrading  servitude  is  the  detestable  alternative, 
who  can  shudder  at  the  reluctant  poignard  of  a 
Brutus,  the  crimsoned  axe  of  a  Cromwell,  or  the 

1  Cf.  Hamilton,  Works,  edited  by  J.  C.  Hamilton,  H,  95. 
*  Thornton,  op.  cit,,  250. 


58  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

reeking  dagger  of  a  Ravillac  ? "  ^  The  more 
moderate  form  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
is  familiar  to  all :  "  Whenever  any  form  of  govern- 
ment becomes  destructive  of  these  ends,  it  is  the 
right  of  the  people  to  alter  or  to  aboUsh  it,  and  to 
institute  new  government,  laying  its  foundations  on 
such  principles  and  organizing  its  powers  in  such 
form,  as  shall  seem  most  hkely  to  effect  their  safety 
and  happiness." 

Frequently  this  philosophy  found  a  channel  of 
expression  in  the  constitutions  of  the  states.  New 
Hampshire  asserted  that  the  doctrine  of  non-re- 
sistance is  "  slavish,  absurd,  and  destructive  of  the 
good  and  happiness  of  mankind."  Pennsylvania 
said  that  "the  community  hath  an  indubitable,  in- 
alienable and  indefeasible  right  to  alter,  reform  or 
abolish  government  in  such  manner  as  shall  by 
that  community  be  judged  most  conducive  to  the 
common  weal."  Delaware  stated  that  "persons 
entrusted  with  the  Legislative  and  Executive  power 
are  the  trustees  and  servants  of  the  publick,  and  as 
such  are  accountable  for  their  conduct ;  wherefore, 
whenever  the  ends  of  Government  are  perverted 
and  publick  liberty  manifestly  endangered  by  the 
Legislative  singly  or  a  treacherous  combination  of 
both,  the  people  may  and  of  right  ought  to  estab- 
lish a  new  or  reform  the  old  Government." 

The  theory  of  the  state  of  nature,  natural  rights, 
and  the  contract  were  all  steps  leading  up  to  the 
1  Niles,  op.  cit.,  lo. 


THEORY   OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD        59 

right  of  revolution.  If  all  these  premises  were 
accepted,  as  they  generally  were,  the  conclusion 
was  easy.  One  might  doubt  the  expediency  or 
advantage  of  revolution ;  but  that  it  was  logically 
V  justifiable  in  theory  was  hardly  questioned.  The 
right  of  resistance  was  one  of  the  "fundamentals" 
over  which  there  was  but  little  dispute.  The  colo- 
nists firmly  beheved  that  their  natural  rights  had 
been  violated,  and  that  they  were  wholly  justified 
in  the  best  self-defence  possible.  These  rights 
were  not  to  be  infringed  by  the  government,  but 
to  be  protected  ;  if,  on  the  contrary,  these  inherent 
and  inalienable  rights  were  attacked  and  abused 
by  government,  then  there  was  undoubted  justifi- 
cation for  armed  defence  of  them.  Such  defence 
was  not  only  a  right,  but  even  a  duty  for  all  free 
men  or  those  who  loved  freedom. 

This  argument  was  of  course  closely  related  to 
the  constitutional  plea  made  in  behalf  of  the  Patri- 
ots. There  was  thus  a  twofold  justification  for  their 
resistance ;  first,  that  the  action  of  Parliament  in 
regard  to  the  colonies  was  unconstitutional ;  and 
second,  that  even  if  constitutional,  this  action  was 
in  violation  of  the  natural  rights  of  the  colonists. 
In  the  early  period  of  the  struggle  the  constitu- 
tional defence  was  most  conspicuous ;  in  the  later 
period  the  plea  of  natural  rights  was  more  promi- 
nent. If  their  rights  as  British  subjects  could  not 
be  maintained,  they  could  at  least  defend  their 
rights  as  men.     The  argument  from  the  constitu- 


6o  AMERICA r^  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

tion  was  not  abandoned,  but  the  doctrine  of  natural 
right  was  less  open  to  attack  and  was  consequently 
more  effective.  Hence  the  increasing  complaints 
of  the  colonists  that  their  inalienable  rights  as 
men  were  being  attacked,  and  that  they  were  in 
danger  of  being  reduced  to  abject  slavery.  In 
some  cases  it  was  claimed,  following  the  prece- 
dent set  by  the  House  of  Commons  in  1689, 
that  the  king  had  broken  the  contract  with  the 
people.^  In  others  it  was  asserted  that  the 
social  contract  had  been  broken,  and  the  state 
of  nature  restored.^  To  all,  however,  it  was  plain 
that  their  sacred  rights  were  being  assailed,  and 
that  they  had  a  counter-right  to  resist  to  the  last 
extremity. 

In  an  examination  of  the  revolutionary  theory, 
some  attention  must  be  given  to  the  prevailing 

^  Judge  Drayton's  charge  to  the  grand  jury  (Charleston,  S.C.), 
in  Niles,  75  ;  James  Wilson  in  the  Philadelphia  Convention  of  1775. 

2  Thacher,  in  Boston  Orations,  Niles,  23.  In  the  first  Congress, 
the  theory  was  advanced  that  after  the  disavowal  of  allegiance  to 
Great  Britain,  in  1776,  the  people  were  reduced  to  a  state  of  nature 
and  formed  an  entirely  new  social  compact.  The  seat  of  one  Smith, 
of  South  Carolina,  who  was  abroad  at  that  time,  1776,  was  con- 
tested on  the  ground  that  he  had  not  taken  part  in  their  compact 
and  hence  was  not  a  citizen.  Mr.  Jackson  said  that  "many  of  the 
states  were  a  considerable  period  without  establishing  constitutions 
of  government,  and  during  that  period  we  were  in  a  little  better 
state  than  that  of  nature  ;  and  then  it  was  that  every  man  made  his 
election  for  an  original  compact,  or  tie,  which  by  his  own  act,  or 
that  of  his  father  for  him,  he  became  bound  to  submit  to."  Annals 
of  Congress,  1, 407.    See  Madison's  argument  to  the  contrary,  1, 404. 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD        6 1 

conception  as  to  the  purpose  of  government. 
There  is  not  to  be  discerned,  however,  any  careful 
analysis  of  this  idea,  for  the  men  of  this  day  were 
concerned  with  the  purpose  of  government  only  in 
so  far  as  they  could  use  it  to  show  that  England 
was  perverting  this  purpose.  So  far  as  they  rea- 
soned at  all  about  the  function  of  government  in 
general,  their  theory  was  in  line  with  the  individu- 
alistic and  democratic  character  of  their  other 
philosophy. 

The  chief  end  of  government  was  considered  to 
be  the  welfare  of  the  people,  by  whom  and  for 
whom  it  is  instituted  and  maintained.  Massachu- 
setts said  that  "the  end  of  the  institution,  main- 
tenance, and  administration  of  government,  is  to 
secure  the  existence  of  the  body  poHtic,  to  protect 
and  furnish  the  individuals  who  compose  it  with 
the  power  of  enjoying  in  safety  and  tranquillity 
their  natural  rights  and  the  blessings  of  hfe." 
Again,  the  function  of  the  government  as  the 
guardian  of  the  general  interest  is  contrasted  with 
the  "  special  privilege  "  idea.  Thus  it  was  urged 
in  the  constitution  of  Vermont  that  "the  common 
benefit,  protection,  and  security  of  the  people, 
nation,  or  community,  and  not  the  particular  emolu- 
ment or  advantage  of  any  single  man,  family,  or 
set  of  men  who  are  a  part  only  of  that  community," 
is  the  proper  end  of  government. 

The  "good  of  the  people,"  if  more  closely  ex- 
amined, was  found  to  consist  in  the  protection  of 


62  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

person  and  property.  The  prevalent  idea  was 
forcibly  expressed  by  John  Hancock  when  he  said : 
"  Security  to  the  persons  and  properties  of  the 
governed  is  so  obviously  the  design  and  end  of 
civil  government,  that  to  attempt  a  logical  proof  of 
it,  would  be  like  burning  tapers  at  noonday  to  assist 
the  sun  in  enlightening  the  world."  ^  Samuel 
Adams  asserted  that  "  the  security  of  right  and 
property  is  the  great  end  of  government.  .  .  . 
Such  measures  as  tend  to  render  right  and  prop- 
erty precarious  tend  to  destroy  both  property  and 
government.  "2  That  such  were  the  great  purposes 
for  which  government  was  instituted  appeared 
self-evident,  and  extended  defence  of  the  proposi- 
tions was  deemed  unnecessary  and  superfluous. 
Government  must  on  the  one  hand  protect  the  in- 
dividual from  the  danger  of  foreign  attack,  and  on 
the  other  maintain  the  security  of  his  property  and 
the  safety  of  his  person. 

On  the  whole,  there  was  a  much  more  definite 
idea  as  to  what  the  government  should  not  do  than 
as  to  what  it  should  do.  This  is  evident  from  the 
denunciation  of  the  arbitrary  conduct  of  English 
officials  on  certain  occasions,  and  from  the  limita- 
tions placed  upon  the  power  of  the  state  govem- 

^  Niles,  13. 

2  Wells,  I,  154.  In  the  theory  of  Paine,  a  distinction  was  made 
between  society  and  government.  Society  is  regarded  as  a  blessing, 
government  as  an  evil ;  society  is  a  "  patron "  ;  government  a 
"  punisher."      Works,  I,  69. 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD        63 

ments  in  the  state  constitutions.  Interference  with 
freedom  of  person,  security  of  property,  free 
speech,  freedom  of  religion,  equality  before  the 
law,  — these  were  things  which  were  expressly  for- 
bidden to  the  government.  It  was  the  negative 
side  of  government  with  which  the  Patriots  were 
most  concerned.  They  did  not  reason  about  the 
purpose  of  government  further  than  to  assert  that 
whatever  the  state  does,  a  large  measure  of  civil 
liberty  should  be  left  to  the  individual. 

It  is  not  to  be  presumed,  however,  that  there 
was  entire  unanimity  of  opinion  among  the  peo- 
ple upon  these  questions  of  political  science. 
Loyalist  feeling  was  strong  among  the  colonists 
and  with  many  was  predominant.  The  num- 
ber of  Tories  is  of  course  difficult  to  esti- 
mate, but  it  must  have  been  large.  In  some 
localities  the  Tory  element  was  in  the  majority 
and  in  others  constituted  a  strong  minority. 
Many  of  the  Loyalists  were  opposed  to  the  Revo- 
lution on  grounds  of  expediency,  others  from 
personal  reasons,  but  still  others  on  political 
principle.  A  striking  type  of  this  latter  class  was 
Jonathan  Boucher,^  a  clergyman  in  Virginia  and 
Maryland  from  1759  to  1775,  and  finally  driven 
out  for  his  too  decided  expression  of  Loyahst  sen- 
timent.    His  ideas  are  contained  in  a  collection  of 

1  Born  in  England,  1738  ;  removed  to  America,  1759  ;  rector  in 
Virginia  and  Maryland  to  1775  j   died  in  England,  1804. 


64  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

his  addresses  under  the  title,  A   View  of  the  Catise 
and    Consequences    of   the    Atnerican    Revolution 

(1797). 

Boucher's  opposition  to  the  colonial  theory  way 
clear-cut  and  distinct.  There  was  no  attempt  to 
evade  the  issue  or  to  conceal  his  true  sentiments 
on  the  political  questions  of  the  day.  He  was 
squarely  opposed  to  the  doctrines  of  the  Revolu- 
tionary leaders,  and  his  boldly  enunciated  ideas 
stand  in  striking  contrast  to  those  defended  by  the 
Patriots. 

Boucher  had  little  love  for  the  people,  and  saw 
nothing  to  admire  in  the  prevailing  democratic 
tendencies.  Never  was  there  a  time,  he  declared, 
when  there  was  a  greater  lack  of  steady  and  fixed 
principles  than  now.  The  irreverence  of  the  chil- 
dren, the  infidelity  to  the  marriage  relation,  the  at- 
titude of  the  rich  toward  the  poor,  afforded  him 
evidence  of  a  sad  decHne  in  general  virtue. 

The  doctrine  that  government  rests  on  the  con- 
sent of  the  governed,  he  regarded  as  wholly  un- 
founded. If  there  were  such  consent  given,  it 
could  be  withdrawn  at  the  option  of  the  one  who 
had  given  it.  Consent,  therefore,  is  an  utterly  im- 
practicable basis  for  the  existence  and  maintenance 
of  any  settled  government.  If  the  principle  were 
logically  carried  out,  no  authority  of  any  permanent 
character  would  be  possible.  The  contract  theory, 
as  he  saw  it,  involved  assumptions  which  could 
not    legitimately  be    made.     **  The    supposition," 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD       65 

said  he,  "that  a  large  concourse  of  people,  in  a 
rude  and  imperfect  state  of  society,  or  even  a  ma- 
jority of  them,  should  thus  rationally  and  unani- 
mously concur  to  subject  themselves  to  various 
restrictions,  many  of  them  irksome  and  unpleasant 
and  all  of  them  contrary  to  their  former  habits,  is 
to  suppose  them  possessed  of  more  wisdom  and 
virtue  than  multitudes  in  any  instance  in  real  life 
have  shown." 

That  men  are  in  any  sense  equal  he  also  denied. 
Individuals  are  not  equal,  as  is  often  presumed,  but 
differ  from  each  other  in  everything  that  can  be 
supposed  to  lead  to  supremacy  and  subjection  — 
"  as  one  star  differs  from  another  star  in  glory." 
The  foundation  principle  of  government  is  not  any 
such  alleged  natural  equality  of  men,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  the  very  fact  that  there  are  inequalities 
among  them  makes  possible  the  superiorities  and 
inferiorities  impHed  in  any  governmental  system. 

Boucher's  theory  was  that  government  is  from 
God.  "  It  would  be  unreasonable,"  he  said,  "  to 
suppose  that  God,  having  created  men,  should  turn 
them  loose  in  the  world  with  no  other  guide  than 
their  own  passions  ;  that  like  so  many  wild  beasts, 
they  might  tear  and  worry  one  another  in  their 
mad  contest  for  preeminence."  He  therefore 
rejected  emphatically  any  such  theory  of  govern- 
mental genesis,  and  declared  that  the  power  of 
government  was  given  by  God  to  the  first  man. 
The  first  father,  therefore,  was  the  first  king,  and 


66  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

all  kings  and  princes  derive  their  power  from  God, 
the  source  and  centre  of  all  power.  Though  they 
govern  for  the  benefit  of  the  people,  they  are  not 
created  by  the  people.  Their  tenure  of  office  they 
owe  to  God,  and  they  reign  independently  of  the 
people.^  Nor  did  Boucher  agree  that  government 
is  an  evil,  as  alleged  by  some  of  the  democratic 
writers.  Government,  he  declared,  is  no  more  an 
evil  than  is  medicine.  The  evil  is  not  in  the  gov- 
ernment, but  in  the  conditions  which  are  such  as 
to  render  the  coercive  action  of  government  neces- 
sary. To  political  authority,  men  owe  some  of  the 
greatest  blessings  they  enjoy.  It  has  brought 
them  out  of  the  original  state  of  sin,  misery,  and 
barbarity,  and  enabled  them  to  reach  the  high 
position  they  now  occupy.  Lawful  government  is 
the  greatest  blessing  that  mankind  enjoy,  and  is 
the  very  life  and  soul  of  society. 

All  government,  according  to  Boucher,  is  essen- 
tially absolute  and  irresistible.  It  is  not  within  the 
competence  of  the  supreme  power  to  limit  itself ; 
for  such  limitation  must  come,  if  at  all,  from  a 
higher  source,  i.e.,  from  a  superior.  The  govern- 
ment which  ceases  to  be  absolute,  ceases  to  be 
government  by  elimination  of  the  very  element 
upon  which  its  governmental  character  depends. 
This  theory  Boucher  would  apply  to  government 
by  the  many  as  well  as  by  one.     He  does  not  limit 

1  For  the  English  origin  of  Boucher's  theory,  see  Sir  Robert 
Filmer's  Fatriarcha,  the  classic  defence  of  divine  rights  in  England. 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD       67 

the  doctrine  to  any  particular  form  of  rule,  but 
maintains  it  as  true  of  any  and  all  government, 
as  such. 

The  obvious  corollary  of  these  fundamentals 
in  Boucher's  theory  is  the  denial  of  all  right 
of  resistance  to  authority.  Government  being 
based,  not  upon  natural  right,  nor  upon  popular 
consent,  but  upon  the  will  and  the  ordinance  of 
God,  every  man  is  consequently  bound  to  render 
to  the  government  under  which  he  Uves  an  obedi- 
ence either  active  or  passive,  —  active  obedience  in 
all  cases  where  not  forbidden  by  God  and  passive 
wherever  forbidden  by  God's  command ;  for  no 
governmental  order  has  any  force  against  the  ex- 
press word  of  God. 

Resistance  to  government  Boucher  held  in 
the  deepest  abhorrence.  Lucifer,  he  declared, 
was  the  author  and  founder  of  rebellion.  He  con- 
demned in  set  terms  "  the  damnable  doctrine  and 
position  that  any  government,  lawfully  established, 
may  be  denounced  or  resisted  by  any  self-commis- 
sioned persons  invested  with  no  authority  by  law, 
on  any  pretence  whatsoever."  Government  was  to 
him  something  sacred  and  inviolable,  deserving  the 
respect  and  obedience  of  all  citizens.  The  charac- 
ter and  the  acts  of  rulers  should  not  be  defamed 
and  decried,  for  such  conduct  is  unbecoming  toward 
the  divinely  sanctioned  authorities.  Every  citizen 
owes  and  should  pay  strict  obedience,  except  in  the 
case  already  cited.    Kings  are  not  infallible ;  rulers 


68  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

may  on  occasions  do  wrong,  but  even  in  such  rare 
instances,  obedience  is  better  than  revolt  against 
the  law  and  against  the  rulers.  "  A  non-resisting 
spirit,"  he  declared,  '*  never  made  any  man  a  bad 
subject."  For  one  to  rebel  against  an  insignificant, 
unimportant  tax  on  tea,  is  entirely  unjustifiable  on 
legal  grounds  and  on  the  theory  of  the  church,  as 
well  as  on  considerations  of  general  expediency. 

Boucher  could  not  see  that  any  substantial  benefit 
could  arise  from  opposition  to  the  government's 
policy.  He  did  not  even  concede  that  the  oppo- 
sition party  in  Parliament  afforded  any  real  ad- 
vantage to  the  state  as  a  whole.  While  some 
good  might  result  from  this  opposition  in  a  Par- 
liamentary way,  yet,  on  the  whole,  more  evil  than 
good  was  likely  to  issue  from  it.  The  policy  of 
opposition  is  in  general  unwise,  as  it  leads  to  a 
low  opinion  of  government,  and  tends  in  that  way 
to  destroy  the  prestige  and  power  of  the  rulers. 
Moreover,  people  are  seldom  competent  to  criticise 
the  acts  of  those  who  are  over  them.  Even  if 
flaws  are  discovered  in  the  administration's  policy, 
it  is  better  not  to  make  violent  complaint  against 
those  in  authority.^ 

Of  any  popular  participation  in  government  he 
was  profoundly  distrustful.  Democracy  was,  in 
his  eyes,  almost  the  equivalent  of  anarchy.  It 
signified  to  him  a  desire  for  equality  of  possessions, 
a  destruction  of   all  motives  to  industry,  and  an 

1  Cf.  Samuel  Johnson,  Taxation  no  Tyranny  (1775). 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD       69 

end  to  all  security.  His  attitude  toward  the  peo- 
ple is  well  summed  up  in  his  sermon  on  Absalom, 
in  which  he  declared :  "  Mankind  have  seldom 
been  assembled  in  great  numbers  for  any  useful 
purpose.  Whenever  we  see  a  vast  multitude,  we 
may  well  exclaim  with  Jacob,  O  my  soul,  come 
not  thou  into  their  secret;  unto  their  assembly, 
mine  honor,  be  not  thou  united."  ^ 

Further  light  on  the  ideas  of  '"j^  is  given  by 
an  examination  of  the  attitude  of  the  colonists 
toward  monarchy  and  the  hereditary  principle. 
In  the  early  days  of  resistance  there  was  no  show 
of  contempt  for  monarchy  or  for  the  British  con- 
stitution. On  the  contrary,  there  was  frequent 
expression  of  admiration  for  this  type  of  political 
organization.  Otis  accurately  voiced  this  popu- 
lar feeling  when  he  said  that  the  British  constitu- 
tion was  the  best  in  the  world,  its  king  the  best, 
and  his  subjects  the  happiest.  John  Adams 
pointed  out  the  strong  features  of  the  British  con- 
stitution and  praised  its  many  excellencies.  Even 
Samuel  Adams  was  on  record  as  having  strongly 
indorsed  the  English  system :  "  In  none  that  I 
have  ever  met  with  is  the  power  of  the  governors 
and  the  rights  of  the  governed  more  nicely  ad- 

^  In  the  preface  to  his  volume  Boucher  suggested  that  the  people 
of  Great  Britain  remove  to  the  East,  where  "  undisturbed  by  repub- 
lican projects,  so  abhorrent  to  the  genius  of  Asia,"  they  might  liva 
at  peace  with  all  the  world. 


70  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

justed,  or  the  power  which  is  necessary  in  the 
very  nature  of  government  to  be  intrusted  in  the 
hands  of  some,  by  wiser  checks  prevented  from 
growing  exorbitant."  ^  The  colonists  wished  to 
show  that  they  were  not  at  all  in  opposition  to  the 
British  constitution,  but  only  to  its  abuse  by  un- 
scrupulous and  designing  men.  Their  position 
was,  that  if  the  constitution  were  only  properly 
interpreted  and  applied,  there  would  be  no  ground 
for  complaint. 

But  when  once  the  war  had  actually  begun,  the 
latent  democratic  sentiment  appeared,  and  it  then 
became  evident  that  the  British  model  was  no 
longer  to  be  regarded  as  the  most  perfect  instru- 
ment of  government  in  the  world.  By  far  the 
most  striking  expression  of  this  democratic  idea 
was  Thomas  Paine's  remarkable  pamphlet  Common 
Sense,  which  appeared  in  1776.  ^  This  was  a 
bitter  and  violent  criticism  of  the  British  constitu- 
tion, of  monarchy,  and  everything  connected  there- 
with ;  and  it  was  indicative  of  a  striking  change 
of  sentiment  in  America. 

In  the  institution  of  monarchy,  Paine  could 
discern  nothing  whatever  that  was  worthy  of  ap- 
proval, much  less  of  imitation.     Every  king  was 

1  Wells,  I,  21. 

2  See  the  discussion  of  "  Paine's  Political  Theories,"  Political 
Science  Quarterly,  September,  1899.  Cf.  also  Paine's  The  For- 
ester's Letters  (1776),  and  The  American  Crisis  (1776-1783). 
References  are  to  Conway's  edition  of  Paine's  writings. 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD        yi 

to  him  a  George  III  and  a  George  III  at  his 
worst.  The  whole  vocabulary  of  abuse  he  ex- 
hausted in  the  effort  to  render  monarchy  odious 
and  ridiculous.  "  Sceptred  savage,"  "  royal  brute," 
"breathing  automaton,"  are  his  attempts  at  accu- 
rate characterization  of  kings.  Monarchs,  in  his 
estimation,  are  really  only  useless  and  expensive 
figureheads,  the  sooner  dispensed  with  the  better. 
In  an  absolute  monarchy  a  king  may  possibly 
have  some  function  to  perform,  even  though  it  be 
an  odious  one ;  but  in  the  so-called  constitutional 
monarchy  the  king  is  neither  judge  nor  general; 
he  is  only  a  superfluous  figurehead.  His  duties 
consist  in  giving  away  places  for  ;j^8oo,ooo  a  year, 
and  being  worshipped  in  the  bargain.  Paine  ridi- 
culed the  idea  of  the  divine  right  of  kings,  holding 
up,  as  an  example  of  the  absurdity  of  this,  William 
the  Conqueror.  Kings  are  chosen  in  general,  he 
thought,  because  of  their  "ruffianly  preeminence," 
rather  than  by  divine  approval.  Paine's  opinion 
of  monarchy  may  be  summed  up  in  the  one  brief 
statement :  "  Of  more  worth  is  one  honest  man  to 
society,  and  in  the  sight  of  God,  than  all  the 
crowned  ruffians  that  ever  lived."  ^ 

For  the  principle  of  hereditary  succession,  Paine 
had  an  unconquerable  antipathy.  In  Common 
Sense  he  discussed  and  refuted  three  alleged 
methods  of  its  origin,  —  namely,  lot,  election,  and 
usurpation.     If  the  first  ruler  were  chosen  by  lot, 

1  Works,  I,  84. 


72  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

said  Paine,  then  this  establishes  a  precedent  fol 
such  a  method  of  choice,  and  the  next  one  should 
be  chosen  in  the  same  way.  The  fact  that  the 
first  was  chosen  by  lot  is  also  an  argument  that 
the  second  should  also  be  so  selected.  If  by 
election,  then  this  does  not  destroy  the  right  of 
the  succeeding  generation ;  for,  if  the  first  genera- 
tion had  the  right  to  choose,  then  the  second  must 
have  the  same  right.  The  only  parallel  to  the 
doctrine  that  after  the  first  election  the  element 
of  choice  disappears,  is  the  theological  tenet  of 
original  sin :  "  In  Adam  all  sinned,  and  in  the 
first  electors  all  men  obeyed ;  in  the  one  all  man- 
kind were  subjected  to  Satan,  and  in  the  other  to 
sovereignty ;  our  innocence  was  lost  in  the  first 
and  our  authority  in  the  last."  ^  Usurpation,  as  a 
basis  for  hereditary  succession,  he  refused  to  con- 
sider seriously,  declaring  it  beneath  the  dignity  of 
a  refutation. 

Specific  arguments  were  also  made  against  the 
system  in  question.  Such  an  institution  is  unwise, 
it  was  urged,  because  of  the  training  of  the  pro- 
spective ruler  in  idleness  and  luxury ;  because  of 
the  danger  involved  in  the  accession  of  an  infant 
monarch ;  and  again  because  of  the  likelihood  of 
wars  to  determine  who  is  the  proper  heir.  Nor 
was  Paine  able  to  see  any  justification  for  the  sys- 
tem in  utihty.  He  was  blind  to  all  elements  of 
strength  it  might  contain,  and  could  find  scarcely 

1  Works,  I,  8i. 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY   PERIOD       73 

anything  good  in  hereditary  descent ;  it  seemed 
to  him  an  absurd  method  of  selecting  officials. 
The  plan  is  contrary  to  nature  and  reason  ;  and 
it  is,  in  fact,  hardly  conceivable  how  apparently 
sensible  people  ever  came  to  adopt  it.  We  do 
not  think  of  attempting  to  establish  an  hereditary 
wise  man,  or  an  hereditary  mathematician,  or  an 
hereditary  poet.  Why,  then,  an  hereditary  ruler, 
who  is  no  more  certain  of  possessing  the  necessary 
governing  qualities  than  the  hereditary  wise  man 
of  possessing  the  proper  amount  of  knowledge.-' 

Even  the  much  lauded  checks  and  balances  found 
in  the  British  constitution  did  not  elicit  any  praise 
from  Paine.  He  inquired  why  such  a  device  as 
balances  should  be  necessary  at  all.  If  the  king 
is  trustworthy,  why  need  he  be  checked .-'  if  not 
trustworthy,  why  should  he  be  king  at  all .''  In 
any  event  the  heaviest  weight  will  always  be  the 
governing  power,  and  in  the  British  constitution 
this  is  the  crown.  The  other  departments  may 
check  or  retard  its  motion,  but  cannot  prevent  its 
ultimate  action.  The  strongest  power  will  finally 
prevail,  and  what  it  wants  in  speed  is  supplied  by 
time.  Paine  was  therefore  unwilling  to  join  in  the 
general  worship  of  the  English  check  and  balance 
system.  In  fact,  he  maintained  that  the  security 
and  happiness  of  the  Enghsh  are  not  due  to  the 
form  of  the  constitution,  but  to  the  characteristics 
of  the  people.  So  far  as  the  government  alone 
is  concerned,  it  might  be  as  despotic  as  in  Turkey. 


74  AMERICAN  POLITIC  AT.    THEORIES 

The  essential  and  fundamental  fact  is  the  habit 
and  custom  of  the  people,  and  this  it  is  that  makes 
England  a  free  country. 

Paine's  reasoning,  however,  presented  a  style  of 
argument  new  to  the  colonists.  There  was  now 
displayed  no  love  of,  or  even  respect  for  the  king, 
or  for  the  institution  of  monarchy ;  no  praise  was 
bestowed  on  the  English  constitution.  It  was  no 
longer  intimated  that  the  old  institution  with  some 
modification  would  prove  perfectly  acceptable,  but 
there  was  a  bold  demand  for  separation  from  gov- 
ernment by  the  mother  country  and  from  the  form 
of  government  in  the  mother  country.  The  Com- 
inoii  Sense  seemed  to  mark  the  turning-point  in 
American  policy.  From  that  time  on,  the  advo- 
cates of  independence  triumphed  ;  the  "  Fathers  " 
turned  against  George  III,  and  from  the  institution 
of  monarchy  as  well,  and  at  about  the  same  time. 

More  light  on  the  political  ideas  of  the  "  Fathers  " 
is  given  by  a  further  study  of  the  extension  and 
application  of  the  doctrines  already  considered. 
The  fundamentals  of  the  revolutionary  theory 
were  almost  altogether  reproductions  of  the  Eng- 
lish political  philosophy  of  the  preceding  century, 
but  the  founders  of  the  Republic  did  not  halt  at 
the  point  reached  by  their  fore-fathers.  They 
advanced  the  line  of  democratic  theory  and  prac- 
tice in  accordance  with  the  more  democratic  con- 
ditions.   The  English  movement  of  the  seventeenth 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD       75 

century  culminated  in  the  establishment  of  a  con- ; 
stitutional    monarchy ;    the   American    movement  I 
went  far  beyond  this  in    a    democratic    direction.! 
To  these  changes  our  attention  will  now  be  di- 
rected. 

In  the  construction  of  state  constitutions,  the 
monarchic  and  many  of  the  aristocratic  elements 
found  in  the  British  constitution  were  omitted. 
The  frame  of  government  became  more  democratic 
in  nature.  Privileged  aristocracy  had  never  been 
able  to  obtain  a  foothold  in  the  colonies,  and  1776 
was  no  time  to  gain  one.  Monarchy  was  identified 
with  George  III  and  the  English  system  of  admin- 
istration, and  consequently  no  place  was  made  for 
such  a  governmental  feature. 

Many  expressions  of  dislike  for  special  privilege 
and  hereditary  rank  are  found  in  the  first  constitu- 
tions adopted  in  the  states,  and  no  stronger  evi- 
dence as  to  the  nature  of  the  prevailing  sentiment 
could  be  given  than  is  offered  by  these  early 
declarations.  Massachusetts,  for  example,  asserted 
that  government  is  instituted  for  the  common  good 
and  happiness  of  the  whole  people ;  —  "  not  for  the 
profit,  honor  or  private  interest  of  any  one  man,  fam- 
ily or  class  of  men."  Virginia  declared  that  "  no 
man  or  set  of  men,  are  entitled  to  exclusive  or  sepa- 
rate emoluments  or  privileges  from  the  community, 
but  in  consideration  of  public  services;  which,  not 
being  descendible,  neither  ought  the  offices  of  mag- 
istrate, legislator,  or  judge  to  be  hereditary." 


'je  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

The  democratic  environment  had  rendered  special 
privilege  unwelcome,  and  the  legislators  were  anx- 
ious to  give  the  prevailing  sentiment  constitutional 
recognition.  There  still  remained  a  controlling 
class  of  gentry,  but  they  possessed  no  hereditary 
title,  office,  or  privilege.  There  had  never  been 
anything  more  than  a  theory  of  nobility  in  Amer- 
ica; with  the  Revolution,  even  this  was  swept 
away  and  the  overwhelming  sentiment  declared 
against  the  institution.^ 

In  the  formation  of  state  governments,  the 
doctrine  of  delegated  powers  was  everywhere 
prevalent.  Assuming  that  the  people  were,  orig- 
inally, and  continue  to  be  the  only  source  of 
political  power,  it  follows  that  all  governmental 
authority  is  only  delegated  by  the  people  and  is  held 
in  trust  for  them.  Governmental  authority  has  no 
inherent  force  in  itself ;  it  is  not  the  creator,  but  the 
creature  ;  it  is  not  the  master,  nor  even  the  partner 
of  the  people,  but  their  agent  or  servant ;  it  acts  in 
the  name  of  and  in  behalf  of  some  one  else  and 
not  for  itself.  Not  only  is  government  the  ser- 
vant of  the  people,  but  it  is  an  untrustworthy  and 
unreliable  servant.  It  cannot  be  given  a  free  hand 
in  caring  for  the  affairs  of  its  master,  on  the  con- 
trary, it  must  be  limited  in  many  ways ;  it  must  be 
checked  at  every  possible  point ;  it  must  be  at  all 
times  under  suspicion.     Otherwise  it  will  cease  to 

*  Ga.,  N.C.,  S.C.,  Penn.,  declared  against  the  entailment  of 
estates. 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD        J  J 

be  servant  and  take  the  place  of  the  master.  Too 
much  emphasis  cannot  well  be  laid  upon  the  fear 
which  the  "  Fathers "  had  of  government.  To 
them  the  great  lesson  of  history  was,  that  govern- 
ment always  tends  to  become  oppressive,  and  that 
it  is  the  greatest  foe  of  individual  liberty. 

To  the  end  that  government  may  be  properly 
held  in  check,  the  "  Fathers  "  developed  an  elabo- 
rate system  which  it  was  thought  would  adequately 
safeguard  the  rights  of  the  people.  In  the  first 
place,  government  should  not  be  granted  much  \J 
power ;  in  the  next  place,  such  powers  as  were 
given  should  be  balanced  and  played  against  each  ^ 
other ;  and  finally  even  these  powers  should  be 
held  for  short  terms  only.  By  these  means  it  was 
thought  that  political  authority  might  be  kept  close 
to  the  people  from  whom  it  emanates,  and  by  whose 
grace  it  stands. 

More  specifically,  it  was  an  opinion  of  Revo- 
lutionary times  that  government  should  not  be 
too  strongly  organized,  lest  its  strength  be  turned 
against  the  people.  Hence  a  large  military  force 
was  always  under  suspicion.  A  standing  army 
was  looked  upon  as  a  constant  temptation  to  the 
ruler  and  a  perpetual  menace  to  the  citizen.  It  was 
necessary  for  the  government  to  have  at  its  dis- 
posal a  certaiil^amount  of  military  strength,  but 
this  should  be  kept  within  strict  limits,  and  in  sub- 
ordination to  the  civil  power.  Again,  every  kind 
of  centralized  government  was   steadily  opposed.  ^/ 


78  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

It  was  believed  that  liberty  was  safer  in  the  care 
of  the  local  communities,  where  it  could  be  kept 
under  the  eye  of  the  people,  and  any  attempt  at 
usurpation  be  instantly  detected  and  checked. 
The  idea  was  that  the  farther  the  government  is 
removed  from  the  community,  the  more  likely  it 
is  to  tyrannize  over  that  community.  The  classic 
illustration  of  this  would  be,  of  course,  the  conduct 
of  England  toward  the  colonies.  There  was,  con- 
sequently, great  jealousy  of  centralized  govern- 
inent  within  the  states,  especially  in  New  England, 
and  everywhere  there  was  opposition  to  a  strong 
government  over  the  states.  A  perfect  expression 
of  this  latter  feeling  was  the  organization  of  the 
central  government  effected  under  the  Articles  of 
Confederation.  Following  out  the  principle  of 
limiting  the  government  as  much  as  possible,  there 
were  many  restrictions  on  its  action  in  the  state 
constitutions.  In  long  and  eloquent  bills  of  rights 
notice  was  served  on  government  not  to  trespass 
on  certain  fields  of  individual  activity.  Govern- 
ment must  not  interfere  with  freedom  of  speech, 
freedom  of  religion,  freedom  of  assembly  and 
petition,  or  freedom  of  person  and  property,  except 
through  the  recognized  and  prescribed  forms  of 
law. 

In  these  various  ways,  then,  a  strong  effort  was 
made  to  restrict  the  government  to  the  minimum 
of  strength  :  by  the  subordination  of  miUtary  to  civil 
power,  by  the  decentralization  of  political  author- 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD        79 

ity,  and  by  the  enumeration  of  specific  guaranties 
against  invasion  of  personal  liberty  and  property. 

In  the  same  connection  comes  another  theory 
widely  entertained  by  the  "  Fathers,"  namely,  that  of  • 
the  separation  and  balance  of  governmental  powers. 
This  doctrine  had  been  formulated  by  Montesquieu 
in  the  Spirit  of  Lazvs  (1748),^  basing  his  reasoning, 
however,  on  observation  of  English  conditions ; 
both  the  theory,  therefore,  and  the  facts  were  well 
known  among  the  Americans.  They  valued  highly 
the  division  and  balance  of  powers  among  king, 
lords,  and  commons,  and  saw  in  this  piece  of 
mechanism  the  strongest  support  of  English  lib- 
erty. Consequently  they  readily  accepted  and 
acted  upon  Montesquieu's  theory.  They  firmly 
beheved  that  unless  the  three  classes  of  govern- 
mental power  —  the  legislative,  the  executive,  and 
the  judicial  —  were  separated  and  a  distinct  organ 
of  government  provided  for  each  class,  there  could 
be  no  certainty  of  political  liberty. 

In  the  state  constitutions  the  idea  of  the  sepa- 
ration of  powers  found  the  clearest  expression. 
Massachusetts  asserted  that  "  in  the  government 
of  this  commonwealth,  the  legislative  department 
shall  never  exercise  the  executive  and  judicial  powers 
or  either  of  them  ;  the  executive  shall  never  exer- 
cise the  legislative  and  judicial  powers  or  either  of 
them ;  the  judicial  shall  never  exercise  the  legisla- 
tive and  executive  powers  or  either  of  them  —  to 
1  Book  XI. 


8o  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIIlS 

the  end  that  it  may  be  a  government  of  laws  and 
not  of  men."  A  less  doctrinaire  statement  was 
that  of  New  Hampshire,  to  the  effect  that  there 
should  be  such  a  separation  of  powers  "as  the 
nature  of  free  government  will  admit,  or  as  is 
consistent  with  that  chain  of  connection  that  binds 
the  whole  fabric  of  the  constitution  in  an  indissolu- 
ble bond  of  union  and  security." 

Though  the  separation  and  balance  of  govern- 
mental powers,  was  accepted  in  theory  there  was  ^ 
in  practice  no  such  equilibrium  established  as  the 
theory  called  for.^  On  the  contrary,  there  was  an  exw 
altation  of  the  function  and  position  of  the  legisla-|  V 
ture  and  a  corresponding  depression  of  the  others,\ 
particularly  the  executive.  Everywhere  there  was 
manifested  great  jealousy  of  the  state  executive, 
and  numerous  restrictions  were  thrown  around  his 
tenure,  term,  and  prerogatives.  In  many  cases 
the  governor  was  elected  by  the  legislature,^  his 
term  of  office  was  limited  to  one  year,^  restrictions 
were  placed  upon  his  appointing  power,  and  in 
only  a  few  cases  was  the  veto  allowed.*  The 
judiciary  was  declared  independent  by  some  states, 
but  was  generally  dependent  in  respect  to  appoint- 

1  On  the  Revolutionary  State  Constitutions  see  "  The  First  State 
Constitutions,"  by  W.  C.  Morey,  in  A?tnals  of  the  American  Academy 
of  Political  and  Social  Science,  Vol.  IV ;  also,  in  Vol.  IX,  "  Revolu- 
tionary State  Constitutions,"  by  W.  C.  Webster. 

2  N.J.,  Del.,  Md.,  Va.,  N.C.,  S.C,  Penn.,  Ga. 

3  N.H.,  N.C.,  Va.,  Mass.,  N.J.,  Penn.,  Ga.,  Conn.,  R.I.,  Md. 
*  Mass.,  S.C.  (1776),  N.Y.  (with  Council  of  Revision). 


THE  ORY  OF  RE  VOL  UTIONAR  Y  PERIOD         8 1 

meiit  and  salary  upon  the  governor  and  council, 
i)r  even  directly  upon  the  legislature.^  When  it 
is  further  considered  that  in  many  states  almost  all 
of  the  important  officers  were  appointed  by  the 
legislature;  that  in  two  states  there  was  a  uni- 
cameral legislature ;  2  and  that  the  constitution- 
amending  power  was  often  vested  in  the  ordinary 
legislature,^ — it  becomes  evident  that  the  predomi- 
nant position  was  held  by  that  body.  The  strong 
dislike  of  the  English  crown  and  of  the  royal 
governors  had  led  to  a  reaction  against  executive  j 
authority  in  general  that  resulted  in  the  practical  • 
supremacy  of  another  of  the  three  coordinate ' 
branches  of  government,  namely,  the  legislature.  ' 
There  was  naturally  greater  readiness  to  intrust 
the  necessary  governmental  powers  to  this  body, 
inasmuch  as  the  legislators  were  regarded  as  the 
immediate  representatives  of  the  sovereign  people. 
In  the  long  and  bitter  struggles  of  colonial  days, 
the  Americans  had  learned  to  trust  and  rely  upon 
the  legislature,  and  to  suspect  and  antagonize  the 
executive.  They,  therefore,  reduced  to  a  mini- 
mum the  powers  of  the  executive  and  intrusted 
such  authority  as  seemed  necessary  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  government  to  the  legislature.     They 

1  Va.,  N.H.  ('76),  N.C,  S.C,  N.J.,  Del.,  R.I.,  Conn. 

2  Penn.,  Ga.,  Vt. 

8  In  Ga.,  Mass.,  and  Penn.  provision  was  made  for  amendment 
by  a  convention  ;   in  the  other  states  where  mention  was  made  of 
amendment,  the  power  was  vested  in  the  legislature. 
G 


82  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

did  what  the  English  Parliament  had  done  and 
was  yet  to  do  still  more  emphatically,  —  asserted  thei 
superiority  of  the  legislature  over  the  executive. 

In  addition  to  the  separation  of  powers,  another 
method  used  for  the  purpose  of  holding  in  check 
the  government  was  the  grant  of  power  for  a 
short  term  only.  To  guarantee  security,  it  was 
thought  that  power  must  be  kept  close  to  its  true 
basis,  the  people.  In  this  way  the  rise  of  arbi- 
trary rulers  could  be  prevented  and  the  officers 
intrusted  with  power  be  made  responsible  to  the 
people.  As  John  Adams  once  said,  "  where  annual 
elections  end,  there  tyranny  begins."  ^  This  idea 
was  conspicuous  in  the  constitutions  of  the  states, 
where  frequency  of  election  received  both  theo- 
retical and  practical  support.  Maryland  declared 
"  a  long  continuance  in  the  first  executive  depart- 
ments of  power  or  trust  is  dangerous  to  liberty; 
a  rotation,  therefore,  in  those  departments  is  one 
of  the  best  securities  of  permanent  freedom."  Of 
like  import  was  the  statement  of  Massachusetts : 
"  In  order  to  prevent  those  who  are  vested  with 
authority  from  becoming  oppressors,  the  people 
have  a  right  ...  to  cause  their  public  officers  to 
return  to  private  life."  In  general,  officers  were 
allowed  short  terms  only.  Governors  were  in 
many  cases  annually  elected,  legislatures  for  the 
same  period,  and  other  officers,  with  the  exception  of 
judges,  followed  the  same  rule.     This  requirement 

1  Cf.  the  Pennsylvania  Constitution,  Sec.  19. 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD       83 

was  made  still  more  rigid  by  the  provision  in  many 
instances  that  the  office-holder  should  be  ineligible 
to  the  same  office  for  a  certain  period  of  years,  as 
one  in  three,  two  in  four,  or  some  like  ratio.  Thus 
the  officer  was  not  only  limited  to  a  short  term,  but 
was  forbidden  continued  reelection,  and  constitu- 
tionally forced  to  retire,  even  though  his  adminis- 
tration had  been  of  the  ablest  kind.  The  evils  arising 
from  the  existence  of  a  permanent  or  hereditary 
office-holding  class,  it  was  determined  to  prevent 
even  at  the  cost  of  administrative  efficiency. 

In  these  different  ways,  then,  the  attempt  was 
made  to  keep  alive  the  principle  of  popular  sover- 
eignty, and  to  prevent  the  development  of  a  tyran- 
nical government.  What  was  feared  at  that  day  was 
not  the  incapacity  or  inefficiency  of  those  conduct- 
ing the  administration,  but  the  tendency  of  the  rul- 
ing class  to  oppress  in  some  way  or  other  the  class 
to  be  ruled.  To  the  theorist  of  that  time,  every 
officer  appeared  to  be  a  possible  foe  to  the  secu- 
rity of  the  individual  and  his  property.  The  great 
guaranty  of  liberty  was,  therefore,  to  give  the  rulers 
as  little  power  as  possible  and  then  to  surround  them 
with  numerous  restrictions,  to  balance  power  against 
power,  to  compel  a  frequent  return  to  the  people 
for  renewal  of  the  tenure  of  authority.  This  was 
the  mechanism  devised  to  carry  out  the  democratic 
theory,  and  to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  govern- 
mental tyranny. 

It  is  essential  to  notice,  however,  that  while  the 


84  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

revolutionary  theory  was  democratic  on  its  destruc-  / 
tive  side,  and  to  a  certain  extent  on  the  constructive 
side,  there  were  also  present  aristocratic  tendencies 
of  a  pronounced  character.  Democracy  had  by  no 
means  reached  the  degree  of  development  that  was 
attained  in  the  following  century. 

The  most  marked  of  these  aristocratic  features 
in  the  government  of  the  "  Fathers  "  was  the  limi- ,, 
tation  upon  the  suffrage.  In  actual  practice  the 
basis  of  their  democracy  was  not  very  broad,  or, 
at  least,  was  relatively  narrow  when  compared  with 
that  of  the  present  day.  The  principle  was  laid 
down  in  some  of  the  state  constitutions  that  those 
were  entitled  to  the  suffrage  who  showed  "sufficient 
evidence  of  attachment  to  the  community."  This 
evidence,  however,  generally  consisted  in  the  pos- 
session of  a  certain  amount  of  property,  preferably 
real  estate.  In  discussing  the  subject  of  represen- 
tation, Franklin  said  that  "  as  to  those  who  have  no 
landed  property,  .  .  .  the  allowing  them  to  vote  for 
legislators  is  an  impropriety."  ^  Hamilton  consid- 
ered that  those  who  possessed  no  property  could 
not  properly  be  regarded  as  having  a  will  of  their 
own.2 

In  drawing  up  the  state  constitutions  the  prop- 
erty qualification  was  adopted,  as  a  guide  for  de- 
termining who  should  be  entitled  to  participate  in 
the  choice  of  officers.     The  accepted  idea  was  that 

1  Works,  IV,  221,  1766. 

2  Ibid,  II,  62  ff.,  The  Farmer  Refuted. 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD       85 

the  political  people  were  the  land-holding  class. 
The  states  either  required  the  possession  of  a  free- 
hold, or  accepted  a  property  equivalent  of  some 
kind.  All  the  states  agreed  in  requiring  some  evi- 
dence that  the  voter  had  a  financial  interest  in  the( 
community,  —  either  a  free-hold  of  a  certain  value, 
or  other  estate,  or  the  payment  of  some  public 
tax.  The  man  who  was  not  able  to  qualify  in  this  , 
way  could  not  cast  a  vote  under  the  laws  of  any  of 
the  states.  He  was  not  regarded  as  sufficiently 
attached  to  the  community  to  justify  participation 
in  its  political  life.  In  this  way  the  voting  constit- 
uency was  hmited  to  a  fraction  of  the  adult  male 
population,  much  less  than  half. 

The  same  tendency  is  evident  in  the  require-  ^ 
ments  for  office-holding.  Here  also  the  property- 
holding  class  has  the  privileged  position.  It  was 
provided  in  many  states  that  the  governor  must  be 
a  freeholder,  thus  showing  a  preference  not  only 
for  property  in  general,  but  for  landed  property 
in  particular.  In  some  instances  the  value  of  the 
freehold  was  fixed  at  a  very  considerable  figure; 
in  Massachusetts,  for  example,  at  ;;^iooo,  in  Mary- 
land at  ;!^5ooo,  and  in  South  Carolina  at  ;^  10,000. 
High  property  qualifications  were  also  required  for 
many  other  offices,  although  not  for  all.^  Gen- 
erally speaking,  therefore,  participation  in  political 

1  An  interesting  discussion  of  legal  qualifications  for  office  in 
America  is  given  by  F.  H.  Miller  in  the  Annual  Report  of  the 
American  Historical  Associatiott  for  i8gg.  Vol.  I. 


86  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

life  was  limited  to  the  most  prosperous  element  in 
the  population,  and  the  government  of  that  day 
was  a  government  of  and  by  the  propertied  classes. 

In  addition  to  these  limitations  upon  the  political 
people  of  1776,  there  were  also  important  religious  / 
restrictions.  Notwithstanding  the  rationalistic  ten- 
dencies of  such  leaders  as  Benjamin  FrankHn, 
Thomas  Jefferson,  and  Thomas  Paine,  religious 
qualifications  held  a  conspicuous  place  in  the  state 
constitutions.  The  principle  of  toleration  for  all 
sects  was  generally  recognized,  but  the  requirement 
of  some  religious  test  for  public  officers  was  not 
condemned  by  public  sentiment.  In  certain  states 
it  was  necessary  that  the  governor  be  a  Protestant,^ 
in  others  that  he  be  a  Christian.^  It  was  often 
specified  that  a  member  of  the  legislature  must  be 
a  Protestant,^  in  some  cases  he  must  be  a  Christian.* 

Freedom  of  worship  was  recognized  in  strong 
terms,  with  the  qualification  that  the  exercise  of 
the  right  should  not  disturb  the  public  peace.  For 
example,  in  Maryland  freedom  of  worship  was 
granted,  "  unless  under  color  of  religion  any  man 
shall  disturb  the  good  order,  peace  or  safety  of  the 
state,  or  shall  infringe  the  laws  of  morality,  or  injure 
others  in  their  natural,  civil,  or  religious  rights." 

1  N.H.,  N.J.,  N.C.,  S.C.  ('78).  2  Md.,  Mass. 

8  Ga.,  N.H.,  N.C.,  S.C,  N.J. 

*  Mass.,  Md.  Pennsylvania  required  belief  in  God,  future  re- 
wards and  punishments,  inspiration  of  Scriptures.  In  Delaware 
there  was  a  similar  requirement. 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD       8/ 

This  grant  of  general  toleration  was  not  con- 
strued, however,  as  prohibiting  the  financial  assist- 
ance of  the  church  by  the  state.  In  some  cases 
the  legislature  was  allowed  to  levy  a  tax  for  reli- 
gious purposes,  allowing  the  taxpayer  to  designate 
the  rehgion  to  which  he  wished  his  contribution  to 
be  given.i  This  did  not  establish  any  one  religion 
in  preference  to  another,  but  was  a  political  recog- 
nition of  all  the  accepted  religions.  On  the  whole, 
there  were  but  two  states  in  which  no  rehgious 
qualifications  or  tests  of  any  kind  were  required' 
for  office,  namely,  Nevy  York  and  Rhode  Island. 

On  the  other  hand,  however,  there  was  inserted 
in  the  constitution  of  almost  every  state  a  clause 
forbidding  the  clergy  to  hold  office  under  the  state. 
This  disqualification  was  sometimes  absolute,  ex- 
tending to  all  civil  offices,  or  it  was  sometimes 
applicable  only  to  a  seat  in  the  legislature.  The 
limitation  was  imposed  for  the  benefit  of  both 
church  and  state,  that  there  might  arise  no  diffi- 
culties for  either  from  too  intimate  a  union. 

It  appears,  then,  that  despite  the  assertion  that 
all  men  are  equal,  the  "Fathers"  in  framing  their 
constitutions  felt  no  reluctance  about  conditioning 
political  rights  upon  certain  financial  and  religious 
considerations.  These  restrictions  operated  to 
throw  the  control  of  political  affairs  into  the  hands 
of   the  freeholders   who   were  at  the   same  time 

^  Religious  establishments  were  constitutional  in  Conn.,  Mass., 
Md.,  N.H.,  S.C.,  Va.  during  the  Revolutionary  period. 


88  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

Christians  and  preferably  Protestants.  This  was 
the  contemporary  interpretation  of  the  Declaration 
of  Independence.  The  field  of  political  privilege 
appears  narrower  still,  when  it  is  considered  that 
the  negro  element  of  the  population  was  held  in 
slavery  and  had  no  political  recognition  at  all. 
Evidently  the  "  Fathers  "  themselves  did  not  regard 
property,  religious,  or  racial  limitations  as  incon- 
sistent with  the  rights  of  man  or  those  principles 
of  political  philosophy  to  which  such  frequent 
reference  was  made. 

It  is  necessary  to  turn  now  to  a  brief  considera- 
tion of  the  source  of  the  theory  of  this  time.  The 
origin  of  the  dominant  ideas  during  the  Revolution 
is  not  difficult  to  find.  As  the  Patriots  were  guided 
by  the  historical  precedents  established  by  Eng-, 
land  in  the  seventeenth  century,  so  they  followed' 
the  political  theory  developed  at  that  time  by  the 
revolutionary  party.  The  rejection  of  two  kings 
within  half  a  century  was  sufficient  warrant  for 
the  refusal  to  obey  George  III.  The  colonists 
were  not  striking  out  upon  a  new  and  wholly  un- 
tried path,  but  were  following  in  the  way  broken 
by  their  ancestors  of  a  few  generations  before. 
If  revolution  were  wrong,  then  the  House  of 
Hanover  had  no  legitimate  claim  to  rule,  and  re- 
sistance to  its  members  could  not  constitute  rebel- 
lion. The  same  kind  of  reasoning  used  in 
justification  of  the  revolution  that  drove  out  the 
Stuarts,  might  fairly  be  applied  to  the  successors 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD        89 

of  the  Stuarts.  The  jure  diviiio  theory  had  been 
repudiated  in  England,  leaving  only  the  argument 
from  expediency,  as  the  support  of  an  existing 
constitution,  and  in  accordance  with  this  argument 
the  colonists  decided  that  independence  from 
Britain  was  better  than  union  with  her. 

The  advanced  stage  of  development  of  EngHsh 
political  speculation  from  the  democratic  point  of 
view  is  often  overlooked.^  The  doctrines  of  nat- 
ural rights,  the  contract,  popular  sovereignty,  the 
right  of  resistance,  had  been  worked  over  and 
over  by  the  popular  leaders  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury. The  contract  theory  was  advanced  and  de- 
fended by  many  able  writers,  conspicuous  among 
whom  were :  Milton,  in  his  A  reopagitica  ( 1 644), 
Temtre  of  Kings  and  Magisti-ates  (1649),  and  first 
and  second  Defence  of  the  English  people  (1650- 
1654);  Sydney,  Discourses  concerning  Government 
(1698);  and  above  all  John  Locke  in  his  Two 
Treatises  of  Government  (1689).  These  men 
stated  the  revolutionary  doctrines  in  the  boldest 
form. 

The  Patriots  were  familiar  with  this  philosophy 
of  their  English  predecessors  and  they  followed  it 
closely.  They  referred  to  these  writers,  quoted 
from  them,  and  adopted  the  substance  of  their 
argument,  and  in  some  cases   the   form   as  well. 

1  This  theory  is  analyzed  by  G.  P.  Gooch,  in  English  Democratii 
Ideas  in  the  Seventeenth  Century,  in  Cambridge  Historical  St.ics, 
Vol.  X,  1898. 


90  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

Locke,  in  particular,  was  the  authority  to  whom  , 
the  Patriots  paid  greatest  deference.  He  was 
the  most  famous  of  seventeenth  century  demo- 
;ratic  theorists,  and  his  ideas  had  their  due  weight 
with  the  colonists.  Almost  every  writer  seems  to 
have  been  influenced  by  him,  many  quoted  his 
words,  and  the  argument  of  others  shows  the 
unmistakable  imprint  of  his  philosophy.  The 
first  great  speech  of  Otis  was  wholly  based  upon 
Locke's  ideas ;  Samuel  Adams,  on  the  "  Rights 
of  the  Colonists  as  Men  and  as  British  Subjects," 
followed  the  same  model.  Many  of  the  phrases 
of  the  Declaration  of  Independence  may  be  found 
in  Locke's  Treatise  ;^  there  is  hardly  any  impor- 
tant writer  of  this  time  who  does  not  openly 
refer  to  Locke,  or  tacitly  follow  the  lead  he  had 
taken.  The  argument  in  regard  to  the  limitations 
upon  Parliament  was  taken  from  Locke's  reflec- 
tions on  the  "  supreme  legislature  "  and  the  nec- 
essary restrictions  upon  its  authority.^  No  one 
stated  more  strongly  than  did  he  the  basis  for  the 
doctrine  that  "  taxation  without  representation  is 
tyranny."  No  better  epitome  of  the  Revolution- 
ary theory  could  be  found  than  in  John  Locke  on 
civil  government.     The  colonists  claimed  no  origi- 

'  See  Sees.  220,  222,  225,  230. 

^  See  Sec.  1 35  ff.  The  four  limitations  upon  the  legislature,  named 
by  Locke  were:  i.  It  cannot  be  absolutely  arbitrary.  2.  It  must 
rule  by  standing  laws.  3.  "  Cannot  take  from  any  man  part  of 
his  property  without  his  own  consent."  4.  Cannot  transfer  the 
power  of  making  laws. 


THEORY   OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD       91 

/lality  for  the  fundamental  doctrines  they  preached ; 
in  fact  they  declared  that  these  ideas  were  at  least 
as  old  as  the  days  of  Greece  and  Rome.  John 
Adams  said  :  "  These  are  what  are  called  Revolu- 
tion principles.  They  are  the  principles  of  Aris- 
totle and  Plato ;  of  Livy  and  Cicero,  and  Sydney, 
Harrington  and  Locke ;  the  principles  of  nature 
and  eternal  reason ;  the  principles  on  which  the 
whole  government  over  us  now  stands."  ^  The 
Patriots  did  not  profess  to  have  discovered  a 
hitherto  unknown  system  of  political  theory ;  on 
the  contrary,  they  appealed  to  an  old  and  long 
accepted  theory,  —  a  theory  indeed  upon  which 
rested  the  legitimacy  of  the  English  political  sys- 
tem of  that  day. 

The  French  radical  influence  upon  the  Revolution 
was  comparatively  small.  Montesquieu's  Spirit  of 
Laws  (1748)  was  known  to  the  colonists,  and  the 
doctrines  therein  contained  were  frequently  quoted. 
But  many  of  the  features  admired  in  Montesquieu 
were  derived  from  his  study  of  the  English  consti- 
tution and  the  English  political  system.  This  was 
eminently  true  of  his  celebrated  doctrine  of  the 
tripartite  division  of  governmental  powers,  which 
he  had  found  or  thought  he  found  in  the  English 
constitution.  Many  of  the  other  projects  advocated 
by  him  were  also  derived  from  his  study  of  English 
institutions.  The  greatest  of  the  revolutionary 
philosophers  of  France,  Rousseau,  did  not  write 

1  Works,  IV,  15. 


92  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

his  classic  work,  The  Social  Contract,  until  1762, 
whereas  the  revolutionary  doctrines  of  Otis  were 
uttered  in  1761.  The  general  philosophy  of  the 
colonists  shows  little  likeness  to  that  of  Rousseau, 
and  but  infrequent  reference  to  his  theory  is 
made.  Indeed,  the  fundamental  ideas  of  the 
French  writer  were  very  similar  to  those  of 
Locke.^  There  is  little  evidence  to  show  that  the 
bent  of  the  revolutionary  theory  in  America  was 
determined  by  the  great  apostle  of  the  French 
Revolution ;  but  on  the  other  hand  very  much  to 
prove  that  the  theory  of  Locke  and  the  EngHsh 
school  was  predominant. 

On  the  whole,  the  theory  of  the  Revolution  was 
in  direct  line  with  English  political  precedent  and 
philosophy.  In  their  destructive  or  revolutionary 
doctrine  the  "Fathers"  of  1776  simply  followed 
their  "  Fathers  "  of  the  preceding  century.  But  in 
their  constructive  theory,  notably  in  their  substitu- 
tion for  monarchy  and  nobility  of  the  many  demo- 
cratic features  embodied  in  their  state  constitutions, 
they  were  striking  out  on  new  lines  of  political  ex- 
periment. Many  of  these  ideas,  perhaps  all  of 
them,  had  been  already  suggested  in  the  seven- 
teenth century  ;  but  they  had  been  unable  to  win  a 
definite  place  for  themselves  in  the  English  system 

^  Cf.  D.  G.  Ritchie,  "  Contributions  to  the  History  of  the  Social 
Contract  Theory,"  in  Political  Science  Quarterly,  VI,  664.  In 
this  connection  see  Georg  Jellinek,  Die  Erkl'drung  der  Menschtn.' 
und  Biirgerrechte,  Leipzig,  1895. 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD       93 

of  that  day,^  and  were  left  to  be  realized  in  prac- 
tice by  the  American  democracy  of  the  next  cen- 
tury. 

In  conclusion,  then,  it  appears  that  the  funda- 
mental political  ideas  in  vogue  among  the  Patriots 
were  not  the  product  of  American  soil,  and  were 
not  original  with  the  men  of  the  Revolutionary  day, 
but  were  the  inheritance  of  English  political  expe- 
rience and  philosophy  in  the  preceding  century. 
The  form  in  which  they  were  expressed  was  strik- 
ing and  dramatic,  but  the  ideas  themselves  were 
not  new  ;  on  the  contrary  they  were,  from  the  view- 
point of  political  theory,  doctrines  long  familiar. 
The  teaching  that  all  men  are  by  nature  equal  is 
found  in  the  Roman  law,^  while  the  idea  that 
governments  derive  their  just  powers  from  the  con- 
sent of  the  governed,  is  a  long  accepted  maxim. 
Professor  Gierke,  the  distinguished  German  author- 
ity, says  that  "  from  the  end  of  the  thirteenth 
century  it  was  an  axiom  of  political  theory  that 
the  legal  basis  of  all  authority  lay  in  the  voluntary 
subjection  through  contract  of  the  community 
ruled."  ^  The  doctrine  of  the  right  of  resistance 
was  stated  with  greatest  emphasis  by  the  political 
theorists  of  the  revolutionary  type  in  the  sixteenth 

^  Cf.  "The  Agreement  of  the  People,"  1647,  in  Gardiner's  Con- 
stitutional Doctiments  of  the  Puritan  Revolution,  p.  270. 

2  Digest,  L,  17,  32.  Quod  ad  jus  naturalc  attinet,  omnes  homines 
sequales  sunt;   from  Ulpian,  who  died  circa  328  A.D. 

^  Otto  Gierke,  Johannes  Althusiits  und  die  Eniwicklung  del 
naturrechtlichen  Staatstheorien,  Breslau,  1880. 


<S) 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 


and  seventeenth  centuries.^  To  attribute  the  orig 
ination  of  these  ideas  to  the  men  of  1776  is,  there- 
fore, simply  to  ignore  the  historical  development  of 
political  theory.  But  in  respect  to  the  practical 
application  of  these  doctrines,  what  has  just  been 
said  does  not  apply ;  for  a  set  of  principles  hke 
those  involved  in  the  construction  of  state  consti- 
tutions had  never  before  received  such  public  rec- 
ognition. The  destructive  democratic  theory  of 
the  day  was  old,  but  the  constructive  democratic 
theory  as  worked  out  in  the  state  governments 
was  the  product  of  new  conditions. 

By  way  of  summary,  it  may  be  said  that  the 
leading  doctrines  of  the  Revolutionary  period  were 
those  of  what  is  known  as  the  Naturrecht  school 
of  political  theory.  They  included  the  idea  of  an 
original  state  of  nature,  in  which  all  men  are  born 
politically  free  and  equal,  the  contractual  origin 
of  government,  the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  and 
the  right  of  revolution  against  a  government 
regarded  as  oppressive.  The  latter  doctrine,  in 
particular,  was  stated  in  the  boldest  and  most 
uncompromising  form,  since  this  was  the  ultimate 
argument  upon  which  the  Revolution  rested  for  its 
justification. 

On  the  constructive  side,  an  elective  executive 
was  substituted  for  hereditary  monarchy,  and  the 
institution    of    hereditary    aristocracy    abolished. 

^  Cf.  Rudolph  Treumann,  Die  Monarchomachen,  Leipzig,  1895. 


THEORY  OF  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD       95 

The  greatest  danger  feared  was  an  oppressive 
government,  hence  numerous  restrictions  were 
placed  on  the  action  of  its  organs.  Many  rights 
were  expressly  reserved  to  the  people,  the  tripartite 
separation  of  governmental  powers  was  accepted, 
officers  were  made  responsible  to  the  people 
directly  or  through  the  legislature  at  frequent 
intervals,  and  often  constitutionally  disqualified  for 
a  term  of  years.  Distrust  of  centralized  govern- 
ment was  shown  at  every  point,  with  the  exception 
of  the  legislature,  which  escaped  popular  sus- 
picion. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  spirit  of  this  reason- 
ing was  decidedly  individuaHstic.  The  starting- 
point  was  the  independent  and  sovereign  individual, 
endowed  with  a  full  set  of  natural  rights.  He 
consents  to  give  up  a  part  of  these  natural  rights 
to  form  a  government  by  means  of  a  contract.  On 
this  basis,  political  society  and  the  state  are  con- 
structed, and  in  this  spirit  poHtical  institutions  are 
interpreted  throughout.  This  was  the  general 
character  of  the  revolutionary  theories  of  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  and  from 
this  tendency  America  was  no  exception. 


CHAPTER   III 

THE   REACTIONARY    MOVEMENT 

After  independence  from  Great  Britain  had  been 
won  and  formally  recognized,  two  broad  tendencies 
appeared  during  the  formative  period  of  the  Un- 
ion, —  the  reactionary  and  the  radical.  The  theory 
of  the  first  party  is  well  expressed  in  the  Constitu- 
tion itself,  in  the  Federalist,  and  in  the  writings 
of  John  Adams  and  Alexander  Hamilton.  The 
theory  of  the  radical  element  is  best  stated  by 
Thomas  Jefferson,  the  central  figure  in  the  practi- 
cal politics  as  well  as  in  the  political  philosophy  of 
the  democratic  school. 

What  may  be  called  the  reactionary  theory  was 
the  outgrowth  of  certain  conditions  which  must 
now  be  briefly  noticed.  The  eleven  years  that  in- 
tervened between  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
and  the  Constitutional  Convention  witnessed  rapid 
and  extensive  changes  in  the  political  conditions  of 
America.^  The  Declaration  of  Independence  was 
followed  by  seven  years  of  war,  resulting  in  the 
recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  American 
states.      The   common  danger  which  had  bound 

1  On  this  period  see  such  standard  histories  as  Schouler,  Hil- 
dreth,  McMaster,  Curtis. 

96 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  97 

the  colonies  in  a  united  whole  was  thus  removed 
and  the  forces  of  disintegration  and  disunion  began 
their  fatal  work.  The  Articles  of  Confederation, 
adopted  in  1781,  signally  failed  to  express  the  , 
sentiment  of  nationality  evident  at  the  outset  of 
the  war,  and  resulted  in  a  federal  government 
which  was  so  hampered  and  crippled  at  every  turn 
that  its  power  and  prestige  soon  disappeared. 

With  a  constitutional  requirement  of  unanimity 
for  amendment  and  of  an  overwhelming  majority 
for  the  passage  of  any  measure  of  importance,  and 
at  the  same  time  with  the  actual  existence  of  discord 
upon  almost  every  subject  of  common  interest,  the 
Congress  was  soon  reduced  to  a  condition  of  pitiful 
impotence.  Most  of  the  states  refused  to  pay  the 
requisitions  levied  on  them.  There  were  serious 
difficulties  with  foreign  powers,  involving  the  ful- 
filment of  treaty  obligations  to  England,  the  atti- 
tude of  Spain  toward  the  Mississippi,  and  the 
payment  of  the  debt  to  France.  By  1785  the  cen- 
tral government  had  literally  fallen  to  pieces,  shat- 
tered by  the  blows  received  from  the  jealousy  and 
particularism  of  the  individual  states.  Between 
the  states  themselves  there  was  a  feeling  of  hostil- 
ity that  resulted  in  the  restriction  of  trade  by  the 
imposition  of  unfriendly  tariffs. 

Moreover,  there  was  widespread  financial  dis- 
tress throughout  the  various  states  of  the  con- 
federacy. The  long  strain  of  the  eight  years'  war 
had  left  a  large  and  clamorous  debtor  class  ready 


98  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

for  any  measures  to  relieve  their  sufferings, 
while  an  epidemic  of  paper  money  added  to  the 
general  distress.  Massachusetts  had  felt  the  force 
of  social  disorder  in  the  proceedings  of  the  mal- 
contents who  followed  Shays ;  and  in  the  suppres- 
sion of  courts,  plundering  of  towns,  and  armed 
intimidation  of  officers,  the  commonwealth  came 
face  to  face  with  the  problems  of  anarchy  and 
social  revolution.  By  1786  it  was  apparent  that 
the  Articles  of  Confederation,  as  an  instrument  of 
government,  was  utterly  ineffective.  It  was  seen 
that  it  must  be  supplanted  by  some  other  and  more 
effective  form  of  political  organization ;  but  the 
shape  which  the  government  was  to  take  could  be 
foretold  by  none.  The  wisest  statesmen  and  leaders 
feared  for  the  safety  and  security  of  the  country 
and  looked  with  the  very  gravest  fears  upon  the 
impending  crisis.  Under  these  circumstances  the 
movement  for  a  constitutional  convention  forced 
itself  into  acceptance,  and  in  May,  1787,  the 
ablest  political  thinkers  in  America  met  to  amend 
the  old  form  of  government.  The  result  of  their 
deliberations  was  the  Constitution. 

Accompanying  these  changes  in  political  condi- 
tions, there  were  also  pronounced  differences  in  the 
tendency  of  political  thought.  The  period  of  the 
Revolution  had  been  largely  one  of  destruction ; 
the  new  era  was  one  of  constructive  effort.  The 
period  of  1776  required  a  philosophy  of  politics  to 
justify  rebellion  against  the  mother  country ;  that 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  99 

from  1783  on  was  guided  by  the  great  purpose  of 

establishing  a  firm  national  government  on  the  \ 
ruins  of  a  feeble  confederacy.  In  response  to  the 
necessities  of  the  case,  there  were  consequently 
modifications  of  the  old  theory ;  emphasis  on 
points  before  passed  lightly  over ;  failure  to 
emphasize  points  upon  which  the  greatest  stress 
had  been  laid. 

In  the  Constitutional  Convention  there  were 
clear-cut  expressions  of  the  change  in  sentiment 
since  the  days  of  1776.  These  utterances  present 
a  striking  contrast  to  the  democratic  enthusiasm 
of  a  few  years  before.  For  example,  Gerry  as- 
serted that  "  the  evils  we  experience  flow  from  the 
excess  of  democracy,"  ^  and  expressed  a  beHef  that 
the  people  were  the  "dupes  of  pretended  patriots." 
He  confessed  that  "  he  had  been  too  republican 
heretofore ;  he  was  still,  however,  republican,  but 
had  been  taught  by  experience  the  danger  of  the 
levelling  spirit."^  Randolph  said  that  in  tracing 
the  evils  of  the  day  to  their  origin,  every  man  had 
found  it  "  in  the  turbulence  and  follies  of  democ- 
racy."^ Mason  could  only  say  that  "notwith- 
standing the  oppression  and  injustice  experienced 
among  us  from  democracy,  the  genius  of  the  peo- 
ple is  in  favor  of  it,  and  the  genius  of  the  people 
must  be  consulted."*  These  statements  are  sig- 
nificant of  the  change  in  attitude  among  the  promi- 

1  The  Madison  Papers,  II,  753.  2  jbid. 

8  Ibid.  758.  *  Ibid.  788. 


lOO  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

nent  men  of  the  time.     They  had  not  abandoned 
their   belief   in  the   ultimate   sovereignty   of    the  ,/' 
people,  but  their  faith  in  popular   administration 
of  the  government  had  received  a  severe  shock. 

Evidence  of  the  change  of  sentiment  is  given  by 
the  Constitution  itself.  Its  structure  was  in  many 
respects  less  democratic  than  that  of  the  states. 
The  judiciary  received  broader  powers  and  a  Ufei 
tenure  of  office ;  the  executive  was  clothed  with 
far  more  ample  powers  than  those  given  to  the 
state  governor,  was  assured  of  a  four-year  term 
and  made  reeligible  indefinitely  ;  the  senate  was 
based  on  a  six-year  term ;  there  was  not  even  a  bill 
of  rights,  such  as  was  found  in  the  state  constitu- 
tions. Although  there  were  no  religious  or  prop- 
erty qualifications,  the  general  tendency  of  the  new 
instrument  of  government  was  decidedly  conserva-  ./ 
tive,  and  even  reactionary,  in  its  leading  features. 

The  submission  of  the  Constitution  for  ratifica- 
tion or  rejection  was  the  signal  for  a  discussion 
of  the  principles  of  political  theory  and  of  govern- 
ment, in  which  the  ablest  minds  in  the  states 
participated.^  Of  all  the  defences  of  the  proposed 
Constitution,  the  Federalist  is  universally  conceded 
to  be  the  ablest  and  the  most  important.  The 
eighty-five  numbers  of  this  series  were  published 
between  October  27,  1787  and  August  15,  1788, 
above  the  signature  of  "Publius."    The  authorship 

^  Gf.  Pamphlets  on  the  Constitution,  edited  by  P.  L.  Ford. 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  101 

of  the  papers  was  divided  among  Hamilton,  Madi- 
son, and  Jay ;  but  the  number  produced  by  each 
is  still  a  subject  of  some  controversy. 

In  considering  the  political  theory  of  the  Feder- 
alist, allowance  must  be  made  for  the  fact  that  it 
makes  no  pretence  to  the  dignity  of  a  carefully 
developed,  well-matured  treatise  on  the  science  of 
politics.  On  the  contrary,  the  papers  were  pre- 
pared in  haste  and  were  written  in  defence  of  a 
particular  system  of  government  at  that  time 
before  the  people  of  New  York  for  their  consid- 
eration. The  Federalist  was  an  advocate's  plea 
for  the  Constitution,  not  the  dispassionate  system 
wrought  out  by  some  thinker  upon  the  general 
principles  of  politics.  Such  references  as  are 
made  to  political  science  in  the  general  sense, 
are  incidental  to  the  discussion  and  subordinate  to 
the  main  purpose,  which  was  the  persuasion  of  the 
popular  mind  to  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution. 

In  examining  the  Federalist  one  soon  notices 
that  the  revolutionary  tone  of  unrestrained  demo- 
cratic enthusiasm  has  disappeared.  The  dominant 
note  is  that  sounded  by  the  statesman,  not  the 
alarm  bell  of  the  revolutionist.  The  experience  of 
the  past  ten  years  has  taught  that  even  where  it 
is  recognized  that  all  men  are  created  equal,  and 
endowed  with  certain  inalienable  rights,  there  may 
be  difficulties  of  the  most  perplexing  character  in 
actual  administration.  Unmistakable  is  the  mean- 
ing of  the  statement  that  "the  citizens  of  America 


102  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  THEORIES 

have  too  much  discernment  to  be  argued  into 
anarchy ;  .  .  .  experience  has  wrought  a  deep  and 
solemn  conviction  in  the  public  mind  that  greater 
energy  of  government  is  essential  to  the  welfare 
and  prosperity  of  the  community."^  A  govern- 
ment of  law  alone  and  without  any  coercive  power 
would  be  good,  but  such  a  system  has  "  no  place 
but  in  the  reveries  of  those  political  doctors,  whose 
sagacity  disdains  the  admonitions  of  experimental 
science."  2 

'  Proceeding  to  the  more  systematic  doctrines  of 
the  Federalist,  that  of  the  origin  and  basis  of  gov- 
ernment may  be  first  noted.  Here  it  is  discovered 
that  the  Federalist  indorses  the  same  views  as 
were  prevalent  during  the  Revolutionary  times. 
It  suggests  an  original  state  of  nature  in  which 
every  man  is  endowed  with  a  full  equipment  of 
natural  rights ;  and  finds  the  institution  of  govern- 
ment arising  from  the  cession  of  certain  of  these 
natural  rights  through  the  familiar  form  of  the 
social  contract.^ 

The  basis  of  government  is  the  consent  of  the 
people,  "that  pure,  original  fountain  of  all  legiti- 
mate authority."*  The  nature  of  government 
receives  the  same  Revolutionary  characterization 
already  noticed,  especially  in  the  theory  of  Paine. 
Government  is  necessary,  because  the  passions  of 
men  are  so  unruly  as  to  require  restraint.      Pure 

1  No.  26,  Dawson's  edition.  ^  j^o.  28. 

*  Nos.  2,  43,  50.  *  No.  22. 


( 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  lOJ 

reason  must  be  reenforced  by  a  coercive  authority.^ 
And  again  it  is  announced  that  "  government  is  the 
greatest  of  all  reflections  on  human  nature.  If  men 
were  angels,  no  government  would  be  necessary." 

In  short  the  Federalist  accepts  the  fundamentals 
of  contemporary  poHtical  theory  without  much  pro- 
test. The  original  state  of  nature,  the  social  com- 
'pact,  the  necessary-evil  theory  of  government  — 
the  staple  of  eighteenth  century  political  science  — \ 
none  of  these  doctrines  was  openly  called  in  ques-i 
tion.  In  fact  it  could  hardly  have  controverted 
these  ideas,  even  if  so  disposed,  so  deeply  were 
such  notions  impressed  upon  the  public  mind,  and 
so  universally  were  they  recognized  in  the  political 
instruments  of  the  time.  So  far,  however,  as  the 
main  argument  of  the  Federalist  is  concerned,  it 
rests  in  no  way  on  these  ideas,  and  is  but  little 
related  to  the  political  theory  embodied  in  them. 
There  is  not  very  much  said,  after  all,  about  the 
rights  of  man,  the  natural  equality  of  men,  the 
tyranny  of  kings,  and  the  other  doctrines  of 
the  philosophy  that  characterized  the  Revolution. 
The  proportion  of  Revolutionary  theory  has  notice- 
ably declined. 

It  is  now  proposed  to  examine  the  theory  of  the 
Federalist  at  those  points  where  it  showed  more  or 
less  deviation  from  the  Hnes  of  the  revolutionary 
argument.     The  doctrine  first  discussed  concerns 

1  No.  15. 


y 


104  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

the  relation  between  the  territorial  extent  of  a  ' 
country  and  democratic  government.  One  of  the  ' 
most  frequent,  and,  indeed,  one  of  the  most  trouble- 
some, objections,  that  the  supporters  of  the  Constitu- 
tion were  obliged  to  meet,  was  the  contention  that 
a  republican  form  of  government  could  not  be 
successfully  operated  over  so  large  a  territory  as 
would  be  included  in  the  United  States.  The 
only  form  of  government  capable  of  adminis- 
tering the  affairs  of  so  vast  a  country,  would 
necessarily  be  a  despotic  one.  In  support  of 
this  doctrine  the  eminent  authority,  Montesquieu, 
was  quoted  to  the  effect  that  "it  is  the  nature  of 
a  republic  to  have  only  a  small  territory ;  without 
this  it  could  scarcely  exist."  ^  Exceedingly  jealous 
of  their  local  liberties,  many  of  the  citizens  of  the 
various  states  regarded  the  establishment  of  a 
strong  central  government  as  practically  equiv- 
alent to  the  erection  of  a  despotism  over  them. 
To  consent  to  such  a  government  as  that  proposed 
by  the  Philadelphia  convention,  they  considered  as 
simply  fastening  the  chains  of  slavery  around  them. 
Historical  precedent  was  against  the  proposed  gov- 
ernment, for  the  great  democracies  of  the  past  had 
been  confined  to  limited  areas  of  territory.  Greece, 
Rome,  the  Italian  Republics,  so  called,  were  all 
of  small  extent.  It  was  necessary,  therefore, 
for  the  defenders  of  the  Constitution  to  present 

*  Esprit  des  Lois,  Book  VIII,  1 6.     But  he  expressly  indorsed  the 
federation  composed  of  small  republics,  IX,  i. 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  lOj 

an  explanation  and  justification  of   the  new  con- 
ditions. 

-  The  Federalist's  argument  in  defence  of  the 
Constitution  was  directed  along  the  following  lines. 
It  was  urged  that  the  modern  system  of  represen- 
tation enables  government  to  extend  over  far 
wider  Hmits  than  would  otherwise  be  practicable. 
'While  in  ancient  times  it  was  true  that  the  limit 
of  a  democracy  was  that  size  which  would  allow 
all  the  citizens  to  assemble  m  order  to  exercise  the 
necessary  public  functions,  by  the  modern  plan 
the  limit  is  that  extent  which  will  allow  the  repre-  " 
sentatives  of  the  citizens  to  assemble.^  Again,  as 
between  large  and  small  republics,  the  larger  state 
has  the  advantage  in  this  respect,  that  its  officers ' 
are  chosen  from  larger  numbers,  and  hence  the  op- 
portunities are  greater  for  the  selection  of  able  men. 
The  broader  the  field  or  range  of  choice,  the  greater  , 
the  chance  for  a  good  selection,  is  the  argument.^ 
A  third  reason  in  favor  of  a  large  state  is  that  in- 
creased size  will  afford  a  wider  variety  of  interests. 
Now,  the  larger  the  number  of  these,  the  greater 
the  difficulty  of  forming  such  a  combination  as  will 
lead  to  the  tyrannical  rule  of  any  one  faction.^  Hence 
the  greatest  possible  security  for  the  rights  of  the 
individual  is  found  where  there  is  a  large  number 
-of  different  interests  in  the  given  community ; 
and  the  larger  the  number,  the  greater  the  diffi- 
culty of  forming  a  dangerous  combination.  In 
1  Nos.  14,  62.  2  No.  10.  »  No.  50. 


I06  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

Rhode  Island,  for  example,  there  is  only  a  small 
extent  of  territory  to  be  ruled  and  only  a  few 
groups  to  be  considered.  Under  these  conditions 
it  seems  that  any  particular  interest  is  in  the  high- 
est degree  insecure.  But  in  the  United  States, 
with  its  vast  area  and  great  variety  of  occupa- 
tions, there  must  of  necessity  be  such  a  balancing 
of  claims  as  will  render  the  domination  of  any 
one,  or  even  of  a  few  interests,  impossible.^ 

The  Federalist' s  discussion  of  forms  of  govern- 
ment is  interesting  and  suggestive,  particularly  in 
respect  to  the  "Republic."^  This  is  defined  as 
"  a  government  which  derives  all  its  powers, 
directly  or  indirectly,  from  the  great  body  of  the 
people,  and  is  administered  by  persons  holding 
their  offices  during  pleasure,  for  a  limited  period, 
or  during  good  behaviour."  ^  The  essential  fact 
is  that  the  government  derives  its  authority  from  k' 
the  great  body  of  the  society  and  not  from  any 
particular  class.  The  method  of  election  may  be 
indirect,  the  tenure  of  office  may  be  almost  per- 
manent, but  these  facts  do  not  detract  from  the 
republican  character  of  the  government,  provided 
the  ultimate  responsibility  rests  with  the  great 
body  of  the  people.  The  distinction  between  a 
pure  democracy  and  a  "republic  "  consists,  accord-  , 
ing  to  the  Federalist,  mainly  in  two  points :  first,  \ 

^  This  was  a  favorite  idea  of  Madison. 

2  The   discussion  of  the  federal-national  character  of  the  nev) 
Union  is  given  in  Chap.  VII,  infra.  *  No.  38. 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  1 07 

in  the  more  complete  development,  in  the  republic, 
of  the  representative  idea;  and,  secondly,  in  the 
greater  territorial  extent  of  the  republic. 

The  common  division  of  governmental  powers 
into  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  was  adopted 
by  the  Federalist  as  one  of  the  axioms  of  political 
science.^  The  advocates  of  the  pending  constitu- 
tion were  forced  to  meet,  nevertheless,  the  ob- 
jection made  by  certain  jealous  admirers  of  liberty, 
that  the  proposed  plan  of  government  did  not  re- 
spect this  fundamental  principle — that,  on  the  con- 
trary, the  three  classes  of  power  were  dangerously 
confused.  It  was  pointed  out  that  the  legislature 
might  impeach  and  convict  the  executive,  that  the 
executive  would  appoint  the  judiciary,  and  that 
the  senate  would  confirm  appointments  and  ratify 
treaties.  To  these  plausible  arguments  the  Federal- 
ist replied  by  a  closer  examination  of  the  theory  of 
the  tripartite  division  of  powers.  This  doctrine, 
it  was  held,  does  not  imply  or  require  that  each 
of  the  several  departments  is  to  be  absolutely 
and  entirely  isolated  from  the  others ;  or  that  one 
department  is  to  have  no  influence  whatever  on 
the  determinations  of  another.  The  only  danger 
to  be  averted  is  that  the  whole  power  of  any  two 
or  more  departments  might  pass  into  the  same 
hands,  as  would  be  the  case  if  one  governmental 
organ  should  obtain  both  the  law-making  and  the 
law-executing  power,  or  the  executive  and  the 
1  No.  46. 


I08  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

judicial    power.      This,  it  was    claimed,  was    the 
proper  interpretation  of  the  doctrine,  and  the  view 
actually  taken  by  the  states  in  framing  the  Revo- 
lutionary constitutions.     Not  only  was  the  radical 
theory  deemed  incorrect,  but   it  was  regarded  as 
wholly  impracticable  and   even  dangerous.     It  is 
not  possible,  so  argued  the  Federalist,  to  separate 
governmental   organs    in   any   measure   whatever 
unless  they  are  so  connected  and  related  as  to  give 
each  one  a  certain  control  over  the  others.     It  is 
entirely  insufficient  to  delineate  "parchment  bar- 
riers "  against  the  encroachments  of   one  depart- 
ment  upon   another.     There    must    be    provided 
some  constitutional  means  by  which  each  depart- 
ment may  exercise  a  certain  restraint  on  the  en- 
croaching tendencies   of   the   others.     It   is  well 
enough   to   write   down   in    the   Constitution   the 
declaration   that   the   three  sets  of   powers   must 
be  distinct   and   independent,  but   unless  the  de- 
partments are  interrelated  there  will  be  no  separa- 
j_tion  whatever.  ^     In  other  words,  the  greatest  and 
strongest  barrier   against   consolidation  and  con- 
centration  of   power  is  the   mutual    interrelatiorj^' 
and  interdependence  of  the  various  department^' 
The  Federalist  abandoned  the  doctrinaire  theory 
of  the  absolute  separation  of  the  functions  of  gov-  ' 
ernment,  as  it  was  stated,  for  example,  in  the  Mas- 
sachusetts constitution.     In  fact,  it  was  definitely 
admitted  that  it  was  wholly  impossible  accurately  to 

1  Nos.  46-50.     Cf.  James  Wilson,  Works,  I,  368. 


r: 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  1 09 

define  the  boundary  lines  between  the  various  de- 
partments, and  consequently  the  true  policy  was  to 
devise  such  a  balance  of  interests  and  motives  as 
would  insure,  not  an  absolute  separation,  but  a  sub- 
stantial and  enduring  interdependence  of  the  three 
classes  of  powers. 

In  addition  to  the  threefold  division  of  powers, 
the  Federalist  called  attention  to  another  method 
of  securing  a  constitutional  equilibrium.  The 
hew  theory  now  advanced  was  that  the  states 
and  the  Federal  government  would  be  balanced  / 
against  each  other,  while  within  both  state  and 
Federal  governments  there  would  be  a  balance  of 
legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  organs.  The 
different  governments  would  control  each  other, 
and  at  the  same  time  each  would  be  controlled  by 
a  division  of  powers  within  itself.  This  unique 
arrangement,  it  was  urged,  afforded  additional 
guaranty  that  the  government  would  not  easily 
become  an  instrument  of  tyranny.^ 

The  discussion  in  detail  of  each  of  the  three 
classes  of  power — the  legislative,  the  executive,  and 
the  judicial — is  a  masterly  treatment  from  the  side 
of  constitutional  law,  and  also  reveals  many  devia- 
tions from  the  radical  political  theory  of  the  pre- 
ceding decade.  In  the  Revolutionary  constitutions, 
as  already  seen,  the  executive  power  was  in  dis- 
repute, and  the  legislative  the  object  of  popular 
confidence.  The  executive  authority  suggested 
1  No.  50. 


I  10  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

both  the  provincial  governor  and  the  English 
crown,  and  consequently  an  effort  was  made  to 
get  as  far  as  possible  from  the  establishment  of  a 
powerful  head  of  the  administration.  The  legis- 
latures, however,  had  been  left  almost  entirely  free 
from  restraint.  Independence  from  England  hav- 
ing been  gained,  it  appeared  that  the  greatest 
danger  was  not  the  undue  predominance  of  the 
executive,  but  the  aggressive  disposition  of  the 
legislature.  This  view  the  Federalist  adopts  and 
expounds  in  the  discussion  of  the  three  classes  of 
powers. 

It  was  made  clear  that  in  republican  governments 
the  greatest  danger  to  liberty  arises  from  the  ex- 
panding power  of  the  legislative  body.  The 
legislature,  being  chosen  directly  by  the  people, 
seems  to  fancy  itself  the  people,  and  to  consider  '^ 
itself  as  the  superior  of  the  other  branches  of  gov- 
ernment. The  legislators  come  to  believe  that  the 
"  exercise  of  rights  by  either  the  executive  or 
judiciary,  is  a  breach  of  their  prerogative  and  an 
outrage  to  their  dignity."  ^  Hence  it  is  exceedingly 
difficult  for  the  other  powers  to  maintain  the  con- 
stitutional and  governmental  equilibrium  desired. 
Instances  of  this  are  given,  notably  the  case  of 
Pennsylvania.  The  testimony  of  Jefferson  is  cited 
to  the  effect  that  in  Virginia  "  all  the  powers  of  gov- 
ernment result  to  the  legislative  body,"  and  that 
"  173  despots  would  surely  be  as  oppressive  as  one." 

1  No.  70.    Cf.  James  Wilson,  II,  286,  393. 


THE  RE  A  CTIONAR  Y  MO  VEMENT  1 1 1 

This  dangerous  superiority  of  the  legislature  is 
attributed,  first  to  the  fact  that  its  constitutional 
power  is  generally  more  extensive  and  also  is  less 
susceptible  of  precise  limitation  than  that  of  the 
other  departments  ;  secondly,  to  the  fact  that  the 
legislature  has  access  to  the  pockets  of  the  peo-  ^ 
pie,  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  exerts  an 
influence  on  the  pecuniary  rewards  of  the  other 
departments. 

The  Fed&ralisf s  observations  on  some  other 
features  of  the  legislative  power  are  also  worthy 
of  note ;  for  example,  on  the  subject  of  the  bi- 
cameral system.  All  single  legislative  bodies,  it  is  '^ 
said,  are  apt  to  be  impulsive,  passionate,  violent.^ 
They  are  liable  to  be  drawn  by  unscrupulous 
leaders  into  hasty  and  intemperate  measures,  which 
on  more  mature  reflection  would  never  have  been 
indorsed,  and  of  which  they  will  afterward  re- 
pent.^ On  such  occasions  as  this,  when  the 
assembly  is  carried  away  by  its  passions  and  led 
to  the  verge  of  unwise  action,  we  require  the  in- 
fluence of  **  some  temperate  and  respectable  body 
of  citizens  to  check  the  misguided  career  .  .  . 
until  reason,  justice,  and  truth,  can  regain  their 
authority  over  the  public  mind."  ^  Such  a  body 
the  United  States  Senate  was  to  be. 

The  basis  of  representation  in  the  lower  House, 
it  was  said,  is  not  individuals,  or  even  all  interests.* 
The  representation  of  every  class  is  impossible ; 

1  No.  6i.  2  No.  62.  8  Ibid.  *  No.  33. 


112  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

but  that  of  certain  general  interests  is  both  prao 
ticable  and  prudent.  The  Federalist  holds  that 
this  representation  will  be  included  under  three 
classes:  (i)  merchants,  (2)  landed  interests,  (3) 
learned  professions.  The  merchants  will  natu- 
rally represent  the  artisans  and  manufacturers,  as 
their  interests  are  to  a  great  extent  identical.  The 
mercantile  class  will  be  opposed  by  the  landed 
interests,  while  the  learned  professions  will  hold 
the  balance  between  the  two.  Thus  the  Federalist 
outlines  an  equilibrium  of  interests,  on  the  basis  of 
the  natural  antagonism  between  the  mercantile 
and  agrarian  groups,  and  the  assumption  that  the 
learned  and  professional  classes  have  the  power  to 
mediate  between  them. 

Another  interesting  argument  employed  at  this 
time  was  that  in  regard  to  the  proper  size  of  the 
legislature.  It  was  frequently  urged  against  the 
Constitution  that  the  number  of  representatives, 
particularly  in  the  lower  House  of  Congress,  was  by 
far  too  small.  It  was  pointed  out  that  in  a  house 
of  65  members,  33  would  form  a  quorum,  and  17 
might  then  pass  a  bill ;  and  that  in  the  Senate,  8 
rnembers  might  pass  a  bill.  The  constitutional 
provision  was  consequently  denounced  as  utterly 
inadequate  for  the  purposes  of  effective  representa- 
tion of  the  people  and  security  of  their  interests. 
There  was  only  the  shadow  of  representation,  it 
was  said,  not  its  substance. 

The  Federalist  replied  to  this  criticism  by  calling 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  113 

attention  to  the  fact  that  a  large  legislature  may  be 
less  faithfully  representative  of  the  people  than  a 
small  one.  After  reaching  a  certain  number  in 
the  assembly,  — that  is,  a  number  sufficient  "  for  the 
purposes  of  safety,  of  local  information,  and  of 
diffusive  sympathy  with  the  whole  society,"  ^  —  the 
addition  of  other  members  will  defeat  the  attain- 
ment of  the  very  ends  desired.  It  will  be  found 
true  that  the  greater  the  number  of  legislators,  the 
fewer  will  be  the  number  of  those  who  actually 
direct  the  proceedings  ;  and  furthermore  that  the 
greater  will  be  the  ascendency  of  passion  over 
reason.  Or,  as  the  Federalist  sums  up  the  situa- 
tion :  "  The  countenance  of  the  government  may 
become  more  democratic,  but  the  soul  that  ani- 
mates it  will  be  more  oligarchic.  The  machine  will 
be  enlarged,  but  the  fewer,  and  often  the  more 
secret,  will  be  the  springs  by  which  its  motions  are 
directed."  ^ 

Passing  from  the  discussion  of  the  legislature, 
it  is  important  to  observe  the  Federalist' s  theory 
of  the  executive.  While  the  burden  of  suspicion, 
in  the  minds  of  many  leaders  at  least,  had  been 
largely  transferred  from  the  executive  to  the  legis- 
lature, there  was  still  a  lively  anxiety  on  the  part 
of  others  lest  the  President  of  the  Union  might 
acquire  powers  that  would  in  time  become  equiva- 
lent to  those  of  a  monarch.  Both  the  amount 
of  authority  vested  in  the  chief  executive  and  the 

1  No.  57.    Cf.  55,  56.  2  No.  58. 

1 


I  14  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

tenure   upon  which   it  was  held  were   objects  of 
pronounced  hostility.^ 

The  Federalist,  however,  contended  boldly  for 
an  energetic  executive,  maintaining  that  this  is  "^ 
essential  to  any  efficient  government.^  A  vigorous 
executive,  it  was  said,  is  by  no  means  contrary  to 
the  genius  of  republican  government.  There  is 
nothing  in  the  nature  of  free  institutions  making 
it  necessary  that  the  executive  should  be  subject 
to  every  impulse  that  sways  the  popular  mind.^ 
Republican  government,  the  argument  continued, 
does  not  and  should  not  signify  a  political  system 
in  which  the  popular  voice  is  to  be  obeyed  instanter. 
It  is  right  that  the  will  of  the  people  should  pre-  / 
vail,  not  immediately,  however,  but  ultimately ; 
for  while  the  people  are  generally  desirous  of  the 
public  good,  it  is  not  true  that  they  always  reason 

1  This  is  vividly  illustrated  by  a  quotation  from  the  Federalist : 
"The  authorities  of  a  magistrate,  it  is  said,  in  a  few  instances 
greater,  in  some  instances  less,  than  those  of  a  governor  of  New 
York,  have  been  magnified  into  more  than  royal  prerogatives.  He 
has  been  decorated  with  attributes,  superior  in  dignity  and  splendor 
to  those  of  a  king  of  Great  Britain.  He  has  been  shown  to  us  with 
a  diadem  sparkling  on  his  brow  and  the  imperial  purple  flowing  in 
his  train.  He  has  been  seated  on  a  throne  surrounded  with  minions 
and  mistresses,  giving  audience  to  the  envoys  of  foreign  potentates, 
in  all  the  supercilious  pomp  of  majesty.  The  images  of  Asiatic  des- 
potism and  voluptuousness  have  scarcely  been  wanting  to  crown  the 
exaggerated  scene.  V^^e  have  been  taught  to  tremble  at  the  ter- 
rific visages  of  murdering  janizaries,  and  to  blush  at  the  unveiled 
mysteries  of  a  future  seraglio."     No.  66. 

-  No.  70.  3  No.  70. 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  115 

correctly  about  the  means  of  obtaining  that  good.^  \ 
In  the  construction  of  a  governmental  system 
we  ought,  therefore,  so  to  dispose  the  organs  of 
government  as  to  enable  us  to  consult  the  reason 
of  the  people;  not  their  temporary,  transient  emo- 
/tions,  but  their  dehberate  judgment.  And  there 
/  should  be  certain  persons  whose  duty  it  is  to  stem 
the  tide  of  popular  passion,  and  give  cooler  judg- 
ment opportunity  to  assert  itself.  One  of  the  most 
important  organs  for  the  accomplishment  of  this 
purpose  is  the  executive  department  of  the  gov- 
ernment. 

On  the  whole,  the  Federalist s  discussion  of  the 
legislative  and  executive  powers  indicates  a  decided 
change  in  political  theory  since  the  days  when  the 
legislature  had  been  implicitly  trusted  and  the 
executive  degraded  and  despised.  There  is  now 
manifested  a  decided  suspicion  of  the  legislature, 
and  great  anxiety  as  to  the  possible  extent  of 
its  encroachments.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a 
strong  disposition  to  revive  the  executive  depart- 
ment and  intrust  it  with  substantial  powers. 

As  to  the  judicial  department,  the  general  phi- 
losophy of  the  Federalist  was  as  follows;  The 
judiciary  was  regarded  as  always  the  least  dan-  . 
gerous  to  the  liberties  of  the  people.^  This  de- 
partment has  neither  force  nor  will,  as  have  the 
other  two  organs,  but  possesses  the  power  of  judg- 
ment only.  Hence  the  maintenance  of  good  gov- 
1  No.  70.  2  No,  77  fi. 


Il6  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

ernment  has  never  been  much  imperilled  by  the 
courts,  unless  in  combination  with  one  of  the  other 
two  departments.  There  is,  however,  great  need 
that  the  judiciary  be  kept  as  far  as  possible  inde-  / 
pendent  in  its  position.  This  is  particularly  im- 
portant in  a  country  which  is  governed  under  a 
limited  Constitution.  Here  the  function  of  the 
court  is  to  act  as  final  interpreter  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, and  to  decide  upon  the  conformity  of  all  laws 
with  that  instrument.  This  does  not  mean,  ex- 
plains the  Federalist,  that  the  judicial  is  superior 
to  the  legislative  power,  but  that  the  authority  of 
the  people  is  superior  to  both.  For  this  reason, 
then,  and  in  order  to  protect  the  rights  of  individ- 
uals against  governmental  oppression,  the  tenure 
of  the  judges  should  be  permanent,  in  order  that 
they  may  possess  the  proper  independence.  As 
in  a  despotic  country  this  kind  of  a  tenure  serves 
as  a  barrier  against  the  prince,  so  in  a  republic 
it  is  a  useful  protection  against  the  encroachments 
of  a  despotic  legislative  body. 

The  Federalist  recognizes,  as  every  observer  of 
political  phenomena  must,  the  great  difficulty  in 
securing  an  energetic,  stable  government,  and  at 
the  same  time  preserving  the  liberties  of  the  peo- 
ple.^ The  problem  of  the  correct  relation  of  liberty 
and  authority  is  perennial.  If  governmental  power 
is  not  granted  in  large  measure,  the  safety  of  the 
state  is  endangered.     If  such  authority  is  granted, 

1  No.  36. 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  WJ 

there  is  likelihood  of  its  abuse.  The  great  argu- 
ment against  the  Constitution  was,  that  it  would 
endanger  the  liberties  of  the  people. 

Admitting,  however,  that  governmental  power 
is  liable  to  such  abuse,  the  defence  was  made  that 
inasmuch  as  confidence  must  be  placed  somewhere, 
it  was  better  to  risk  its  abuse  by  regularly  constituted 
authorities  than  to  embarrass  the  government  and 
endanger  the  public  safety  by  the  imposition  of 
unwise  restraints  upon  all  authorities.  The  Ameri- 
can people,  said  the  Federalist,  cannot  be  "argued 
into  anarchy  "  by  objections  raised  against  all  ener- 
getic government.  Although  the  necessity  of  popu- 
lar vigilance  over  rights  and  hberties  is  recognized, 
it  must  be  remembered  that,  however  useful  jeal- 
ousy may  be  in  a  repubHc,  "  yet  when,  like  bile  in 
the  natural,  it  abounds  too  much  in  the  body  pohtic, 
the  eyes  of  both  become  very  liable  to  be  deceived 
by  the  delusive  appearances  which  that  malady 
casts  on  surrounding  objects."  ^  Love  of  Uberty, 
then,  does  not  always  require  a  biUous  jealousy  of 
all  government. 

The  Federalist  was  not  an  advocate  of  bills  of 
rights  such  as  were  found  in  the  Revolutionary 
state  declarations.  The  preamble  to  the  Constitu- 
tion, it  was  said,  is  "  a  better  recognition  of  popular 
rights,  than  volumes  of  those  aphorisms,  which 
make  the  principal  figure  in  several  of  our  state 
bills  of  rights,  and  which  would  sound  much  better 
1  No.  63. 


Il8  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

in  a  treatise  of  ethics,  than  in  a  constitution  of 
government."  ^  No  statement  better  expresses  the 
marked  change  of  attitude  since  the  days  of  the 
Revolution.  In  1776,  to  have  referred  to  the  dec- 
larations of  rights  as  "  aphorisms  "  which  properly 
belong  only  to  the  domain  of  ethics,  would  have 
been  almost  equivalent  to  high  treason,  but  in  a 
few  years  the  inalienable  rights  of  man  are  thus 
lightly  passed  over. 

Furthermore,  it  was  argued  that  bills  of  rights 
are  in  general  inapplicable  to  constitutional  gov- 
ernments. They  originated  as  agreements  between 
ruler  and  subjects  — abridgments  of  royal  prerog- 
ative. In  a  popular  government,  however,  "the 
people  surrender  nothing ;  and  as  they  retain  \ 
everything,  they  have  no  need  of  particular  reser- 
vations." 2  Such  specific  restrictions  have  no 
application  to  governments  which  are  founded 
directly  on  the  act  of  the  people  and  "  executed 
by  their  immediate  servants  and  representatives." 
This  is  true  of  all  types  of  popular  government, 
but  is  more  than  ever  applicable  to  a  confederate 
government,  where  the  central  authority  has  no 
power  except  that  conferred  upon  it  by  the  Consti- 
tution.. In  such  a  case  the  Constitution  is  itself 
the  "bill  of  rights  of  the  Union,"  and  a  separate 
declaration  would  be  not  only  unnecessary  but 
dangerous.  "Why  declare  things  should  not  be 
done,  which  there  is  no  power  to  do .-'  "  ^ 
1  No.  84.  2  7^j^.  8  ^Hij, 


THE  RE  A  C  TIONAR  Y  MO  VEMENT  \  \  9 

But  the  Federalist  goes  beyond  this,  maintain- 
ing that  the  whole  scheme  of  securing  liberty  by 
mere  constitutional  restraints  is  a  mistaken  one. 
All  such  precautions  as  these  are  mere  paper  bar- 
riers vainly  raised  up  against  the  spirit  of  en- 
croachment.^ The  true  guaranty  of  liberty  in  a 
republican  government  lies  in  the  fact  that  the 
political  power  belongs  to  the  representatives 
chosen  by  the  people  themselves.^  The  govern- 
ment is  in  the  hands  of  agents  who  derive  their 
power  from  and  are  responsible  to  the  people.  If 
these  chosen  delegates  betray  their  trust,  there  is 
then  no  resource  left  but  the  exertion  of  that 
"  original  right  of  self-defence,  which  is  paramount 
to  all  positive  forms  of  government."  The  guar- 
anty that  free  institutions  will  be  maintained,  rests 
in  the  last  analysis  on  the  "  general  genius  of  the 
government."  This  alone  can  be  relied  upon  for 
enduring  results:  "particular  provisions,  though 
not  altogether  useless,  have  far  less  virtue  and 
efficacy  than  are  commonly  ascribed  to  them."  ^ 
It  is  the  spirit  and  temper  of  the  people  in  which 
confidence  must  be  placed,  rather  than  the  written 
word  embodied  in  an  instrument  of  government. 

In  judging  the  political  theory  of  the  Federalist, 
it  cannot  escape    notice  that  the  "natural-right"    / 
philosophy  lies  at  the  basis  of  its  system.     But 
no  more  can  it  pass  unnoticed,  that  the  doctrines 
of    natural  rights  and  the  social  compact,  while   > 

1  No.  47.  2  No.  28.  8  No.  83. 


120  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

formally  accepted,  are  but  infrequently  employed 
in  the  course  of  argument.  The  truth  is  that 
popular  interest  in  these  doctrines,  so  widely 
proclaimed  during  the  period  of  Revolution,  had 
suffered  a  pronounced  decline.  The  enthusiasm 
of  the  first  resistance,  the  spirit  of  which  was 
so  eloquently  expressed  in  the  Declaration  of 
Independence,  had  died  down.  The  country 
had  passed  through  the  trying  years  of  the 
war  and  the  critical  period,  had  come  close  up 
to  the  edge  of  anarchy,  and  was  now  ready  for 
the  establishment  of  government  and  law  at  any 
cost. 

Nowhere  is  the  change  in  the  dominant  senti- 
ment of  the  people  more  deeply  marked,  nowhere 
more  clearly  expressed,  than  in  the  Federalist,  which 
may  fairly  be  taken  as  representative  of  the  class 
or  classes  of  people  whose  support  secured  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution.  Comparison  of  the 
writings  of  1763- 1776,  and  their  bold  and  sweep- 
ing generalizations  about  the  rights  of  man,  with 
the  conservative  utterances  of  the  Federalist,  re- 
veals an  unmistakable  change  of  feeling  and  opinion. 
The  contrast  is  strongly  marked.  The  Revolu- 
tionary period  emphasized  the  rights  of  man,  the 
Federalist  the  necessity  of  government ;  the  Revo- 
lutionary period  demanded  government  of  a  more 
democratic  character,  the  Federalist  asked  for  a 
government  of  a  less  democratic  nature.  Annual 
elections,  the  feeble  executive,  the  omnipotent  legis- 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  12 1 

lature,  the  absolute  division  of  governmental  powers, 
with  other  planks  in  the  ultra-democratic  platform, 
were  discredited  by  the  leaders  of  the  new  school. 
In  fact,  the  democratic  philosophy  of  the  eighteenth 
century  was  a  perfect  expression  for  the  men  and 
times  of  1776;  for  it  was  essentially  a  philosophy 
of  revolution.  With  the  needs  of  1 787-1 789,  how- 
ever, it  did  not  harmonize  and  could  not  easily  be 
made  to  agree.  The  Declaration  of  Independence 
represented  the  political  theory  of  the  American 
people  when  it  had  "  become  necessary  to  dissolve 
the  political  bands  which  had  connected  them  with 
another."  The  Federalist  represented  the  time 
when  it  had  become  necessary  "  to  form  a  more 
perfect  union."  Its  authors  did  not  reject,  but 
largely  ignored,  the  rights  of  man.  There  was  full 
recognition  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  but  an 
impressive  warning,  reenforced  by  cogent  examples 
from  recent  American  history,  was  sounded  against 
excessive  democracy. 

In  addition  to  this  there  were  substantial  contri- 
butions made  toward  the  solution  of  new  problems  in 
political  science.  The  federal  state  was  discussed 
with  remarkable  acumen,  the  theory  of  the  separa- 
tion of  governmental  powers  was  restated,  the 
possibility  of  extending  republican  government 
over  a  large  area  asserted  and  argued,  the  doc- 
trine of  government  under  a  constitution  developed 
and  applied.  In  all  this  the  authors  of  the  Federal- 
ist were  not  in  advance  of  the  political  facts  of  the 


122  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

time.  The  old  theory  was  outgrown ;  they  were 
formulating  political  theories  adapted  to  the  new 
state  of  things. 

The  Federalist,  however,  was  not  the  only  expres- 
sion of  the  reactionary  tendency  in  the  theory  of  this 
time.  Much  more  suggestive  in  this  respect  was 
the  doctrine  advanced  by  the  great  leader  of  the 
FederaHst  party  —  John  Adams.^  During  the 
earlier  part  of  his  life,  Adams  had  been  one  of 
the  most  outspoken  and  enthusiastic  advocates  of 
the  radical  movement.  In  these  days  he  thought 
that  government  is  "a  plain,  simple,  intelligible 
thing,  founded  in  nature  and  reason,  quite  com- 
prehensible by  common  sense."  He  indorsed  the 
maxim  that  "  where  annual  elections  end,  there 
slavery  begins " ;  favored  stripping  the  governor 
of  the  "  badges  of  slavery  called  prerogatives  "  ; 
and  was  vigorous  in  his  declaration  of  the  rights 
of  man.2 

In  little  more  than  a  decade,  however,  there  was 
evident  a  pronounced  change  in  the  general  char- 
acter of  Adams's  theory.^  Influenced  by  the  turn 
that  events  were  taking  in  America  and  by  the 

1  See  his  life  by  C.  F.  Adams  ;  also  the  essay  by  Mellen  Chamber- 
lain. See  also  "  The  Politics  of  John  Adams,"  by  Anson  D.  Morse, 
in  the  American  Historical  Review,  January,  1899,  and  the  Works 
of  Adams  in  ten  volumes,  edited  by  C.  F.  Adams. 

2  "Thoughts  on  Government,"  1776,  Works,  Vol.  IV. 

8  Some  symptoms  of  a  reaction  appeared  as  early  as  1776.  See 
Adams's  Works,  IX,  410,  435,  451. 


'^ 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  1 23 

fear  that  certain  principles  of  the  French  philoso- 
phy might  obtain  the  ascendency  here,  Adams  was 
led  to  formulate  a  system  of  political  theory  widely 
different  from  that  which  he  held  in  earlier  days. 
In  the  first  period  Adams  was  the  bold  champion 
of  the  Revolution,  in  the  second  period  he  was 
equally  fearless  in  his  advocacy  of  strong  govern- 
ment and  of  aristocratic  principles. 

The  theory  of  Adams  during  this  second  period 
is  contained  in  the  two  once  famous,  but  now  almost 
forgotten  works,  A  Defence  of  the  Constitutions  of 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  America  (1787- 
1788)  and  the  Discourses  oft  Davila  (1790).  The 
Defence  was  written  in  view  of  recent  occurrences  in 
Massachusetts,  and  also  as  a  reply  to  an  attack  on 
the  American  system  made  by  Turgot  in  a  letter 
to  the  famous  English  theorist,  Dr.  Price  (1778).^ 
One  of  the  principal  points  to  which  Turgot  took 
exception  was  the  policy  in  the  state  constitutions 
of  dividing  the  powers  of  government  and  institut- 
ing a  system  of  checks  and  balances,  instead  of 
concentrating  all  governmental  powers  in  a  single 
sovereign  body.  Adams's  reply  was  a  defence 
of  the  American  system  of  balanced  government 
against  the  French  theory  of  centralized  and  un- 

1  Printed  with  Dr.  Price's  Observations  on  the  Importance  of  the 
American  Revolution,  and  the  Means  of  making  it  a  Benefit  to  the 
World.  An  extract  from  Turgot's  letter  is  given  in  Adams's  Works, 
IV,  278-281.  Considerable  attention  was  also  given  in  the  Defence  to 
refutation  of  a  radical  English  work  by  Marchamont  Nedham,  The 
Excellency  of  a  Free  State  (1656),  reprinted  1767. 


124  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

divided  power.  The  first  part  of  this  book  was 
published  in  time  to  find  its  way  into  the  hands  of 
the  members  of  the  Constitutional  Convention,  and 
doubtless  exerted  an  influence  there.  The  work, 
although  hastily  put  together,  was  effective,  and 
was  widely  read.  That  the  author  of  so  conserv- 
ative a  treatise  could  be  elected  Vice-President 
of  the  United  States  shortly  after,  shows  that  its 
principles  were  not  unfavorably  received. 

The  Discourses  on  Davila  ^  was  written  in  reply 
to  the  Fo2ir  Letters  of  a  Citizcti  of  New  Haven 
by  Condorcet.2  These  two  works,  the  Defence  and 
the  Discourses,  though  now  generally  neglected, 
contain  the  substance  of  Adams's  ideas,  and  are 
invaluable  for  an  understanding  of  the  aristocratic 
theory  of  his  time. 

Adams's  treatment  of  political  theory  evidences  a 
wide  acquaintance  with  political  history  and  with 
the  results  reached  by  the  greatest  political  thinkers. 
He  discusses,  in  the  course  of  his  work,  the  his- 
tory of  democratic  governments  in  Greece,  Sparta, 
Carthage,  Rome,  Italy,  Switzerland,  and  the  United 
Provinces.  In  the  field  of  political  theory  he  was 
familiar  with  the  writings  of  Plato,  Machiavelli, 
Harrington,  Montesquieu,  Sidney,  Milton,  and 
Hume.     His  conclusions  were  based  upon  an  ex- 

^  Davila,  DeW  Istoria  delle  Guerre  civile  di  Francia. 

2  Quatre  Lettres  d'un  bourgeois  de  New  Haven  a  un  citoyen 
de  Virginie,  sur  I'inutilite  de  partager  le  pouvoir  legislatif  entre 
plusieurs  corps,  1788. 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  125 

tensive  study  (more  extensive  than  intensive)  of 
the  world's  classics  in  political  theory  and  practice.^ 
This  transition  from  a  philosophy  based  on  the 
"rights  of  man  "  to  one  emphasizing  the  historical 
method  within  little  more  than  one  decade  is 
certainly  impressive  ;  yet  it  was  paralleled  by  the 
change  of  attitude  seen  in  Edmund  Burke  dur- 
ing the  same  time.  Adams's  change  of  opinion 
was  by  no  means  so  radical,  however,  as  that  of 
Burke,  although  it  followed  the  same  direction. 

The  chief  points  of  interest  in  Adams's  theory 
may  be  included  under  three  heads  ;  first,  his  dis- 
trust of  unlimited  democracy ;  second,  his  defence 
of  aristocracy ;  third,  his  system  of  checks  and 
balances.  An  analysis  of  these  three  leading  doc- 
trines will  be  presented  here. 

The  great  wave  of  democratic  sentiment  which 
had  swept  over  the  country  during  the  latter 
part  of  the  eighteenth  century,  the  triumph  of 
this  movement  in  the  Revolution,  Adams's  own 
participation  in  the  struggle,  had  been  by  no 
means  sufficient  to  keep  awake  in  him  the  senti- 
ments of  an  enthusiastic  democrat.  Such  feel- 
ings had  been  excited,  but  they  soon  gave  way 
to  other  and  more  characteristic  tendencies  of 
the  man.  Adams  was  not  wholly  anti-democratic, 
but  he  certainly  did  not  share  in  that  unqualified 
approval  of  democratic  government  which  was 
so  common,  in  theory  at    least,  among   his   con- 

1  See  Defence,  Chaps.  I-IX. 


126  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

temporaries^  His  comparative  study  of  republican 
states  had  inspired  in  him  a  profound  distrust 
for  an  unqualified  democracy,  which  manifested 
itself  throughout  his  later  life.  Some  of  his  criti- 
cisms on  the  general  theory  of  democratic  govern- 
ment may  be  considered  here. ,  In  the  first  place, 
Adams  strongly  objected  to  the  common  assertion 
that  the  people  are  incapable  of  tyrannical  and 
oppressive  conduct.  "  We  may  appeal,"  said  he, 
"  to  every  page  of  history  we  have  hitherto  turned 
over,  for  proofs  irrefragable,  that  the  people,  when 
they  have  been  unchecked,  have  been  as  unjust, 
tyrannical,  brutal,  barbarous  and  cruel  as  any  king 
or  senate  possessed  of  uncontrollable  power.  The 
majority  has  eternally  and  without  one^ exception 
usurped  over  the  rights  of  the  minority."  V 

The  people,  moreover,  are  not  only  prone  to 
tyranny  ;  they  are  jealous,  exacting,  and  suspicious 
to  the  last  degree.  They  not  only  demand  out- 
ward submission  to  their  commands,  but  cannot 
endure  even  a  mental  dissent  from  their  will. 
They  "  will  not  bear  a  contemptuous  look  or  dis- 
respectful word  ;  nay,  if  the  style  of  your  homage, 
flattery,  and  adoration  is  not  as  hyperbolical  as 
the  popular  enthusiasm  dictates,  it  is  construed 
into  disaffection " ;  and  as  a  result  the  popular 
suspicion  is  aroused  and  their  fury  breaks  out  "into 
every  kind  of  insult,  obloquy,  and  outrage."^ 
Again,  the  people  are  no  less  given  to  luxury  than 

^ —  1  Defence,  VI,  la  ^  /j,-^.  yi,  89. 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  1 27 

are  kings  and  nobles,  although  the  latter  are  usually 
charged  with  the  greatest  extravagances.  A  free 
people,  says  Adams,  is  most  addicted  of  all  to  the 
vices  of  luxury.^  The  simple  democracy  is,  of  all 
governments,  most  exposed  to  tumults  and  disorder, 
and  such  disturbances  are  most  likely  to  be  fatal  in 
this  kind  of  a  state.^  In  short,  it  seems  that  no  stable 
government  can  be  built  upon  the  foundation  of  an 
unlimited  democracy.!  "  All  projects  of  govern- 
ment, formed  uporr  a  supposition  of  continual  vigi- 
lance, sagacity,  virtue,  and  firmness  of  the  people, 
when  possessed  of  the  exercise  of  supreme  power, 
are  cheats  and  delusions."^ 

There  is,  says  Adams,  no  such  thing  as  an  ab- 
stract love  of  equality.     There  can  be  no  love  of 
democracy  as  an  abstract  conception,  but  only  in  so 
,    far  as  it  stands  for  a  certain  advancement  of  individ- 
[jall  interest  and  advantage.     Democracy  is  not  de- 
^r  sired  for  itself,  but. for  what  it  brings  with  it,  or  for 
{  what  it  makes  possible  in  the  form  of  personal  wel- 
\jare.     Or  as  Adams  elsewhere  says,  *'  Mankind  in 
general  had  rather  be  rich  under  a  simple  monarchy 
than  poor  under  a  democracy."  *     In  brief,  Adams 
maintains  that  there  never  was  and  never  can  be  a 
pure  democracy.     In  reality,  "  democracy  signifies 
nothing  more  nor  less  than  a  nation  of  people,  with- 
out any  government  at  all  and  before  any  constitu- 
tion is  instituted."  ^ 

'^  Defence,  Yl,%.  ^  Ibid.  l^i.  ^  Ibid.  166. 

*  Ibid.  97.  5  Ibid.  21 1. 


128  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

It  is,  nevertheless,  unfair  to  reckon  Adams 
among  the  opponents  of  free  government.  The 
attacks  which  he  made  were  directed  chiefly 
against  immediate  or  unlimited  democracy,  and  he 
was  far  from  being  hostile  to  popular  government, 
properly  checked  and  restrained.  The  common 
charges  against  him  to  this  effect  were  founded 
upon  a  misapprehension  of  his  true  position.  Al- 
though his  assaults  on  democracy  pure  and  simple 
were  vigorously  sustained,  no  language  could  be 
clearer  than  that  in  which  he  asserts  the  doctrine 
of  popular  sovereignty.  "  The  suprema  potestas," 
he  declares,  "  the  supreme,  sovereign,  absolute,  and 
uncontrollable  power  is  placed  by  God  and  nature 
in  the  people,  and  they  can  never  divest  themselves 
of  it."^  All  government  depends  upon  and  repre- 
sents the  people.  No  government  can  exist  longer 
than  the  people  will  to  support  it;  they  are  the 
fountain  of  political  power,  and  may  vest  authority 
wherever  they  choose.  Adams  held  to  the  theory 
of  popular  sovereignty  as  the  basis  of  government ; 
upon  this  point  he  was  never  uncertain,  but  he 
did  not  favor  democratic  government  of  the  type 
which  the  French  thinkers  desired.  All  free 
government,  he  thought,  ought  to  contain  certain 
limitations  upon  the  direct  action  of  the  people,  in 

^  Works,  469.  Cf.  VI,  113,  to  the  effect  that  there  can  be  no 
constitutional  liberty,  "  where  the  people  have  not  an  independent 
equal  share  with  the  other  two  orders  of  the  state,  and  an  absolute 
control  over  all  laws  and  grants  of  money." 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  1 29 

order  to  render  excesses  on  their  part  difficult,  if 
not  impossible. 

The  charge  that  Adams  was  opposed  to  demo- 
cratic institutions  received  support  from  the  bitter- 
ness of  his  invective  against  unlimited  democracy, 
and  his  not  unfriendly  attitude  toward  monarchy. 
For  example,  he  said  on  one  occasion  that  "  a 
hereditary  first  magistrate  at  once  would  perhaps 
be  preferable  to  elections  by  legislative  representa- 
tives." 1  Yet  this  was  not  the  final  opinion  of 
Adams,  for  he  said  later  of  kings  that  he  would 
"  shut  them  up  like  the  man  in  the  mask,  feed 
them  well,  and  give  them  as  much  finery  as  they 
please,  until  they  could  be  converted  to  right 
reason  and  common  sense."  ^  But  because  of  his 
criticism  of  certain  phases  of  popular  government, 
Adams  was  made  the  object  of  the  bitterest  denun- 
ciation, particularly  by  Jefferson  and  his  associates. 
The  object  of  his  criticism,  however,  was  not 
popular  government  as  such,  but  certain  evils  aris- 
ing from  the  direct  and  unrestrained  rule  of  the 
people.  It  is  quite  Hkely  that  if  obliged  to  choose 
between  this  type  of  popular  government,  and  mon- 
archy, he  would  have  accepted  the  latter  without 
much  hesitation.  This  was  particularly  true  in  the 
days  when  the  Constitution  was  being  formed. 
After  the  Constitution  was  adopted  and  the  gov- 
ernment established,  he  accepted  the  government 

1  Ibid.  122. 

2  X,  409  (1825).    Letter  to  Jefferson. 
K 


I30  AMERICAN  POUTICAL    THEORIES 

fully  and  without  reserve.  It  was  not  a  govern- 
ment of  just  the  kind  that  he  or  Hamilton  would 
have  established,  but  it  was  far  enough  removed 
from  extreme  democracy  to  justify  a  fair  trial. 

The  political  creed  with  which  Adams  is  most 
closely  associated  is  that  of  aristocracy,  and  to  this 
phase  of  his  theory  we  now  turn  attention.  No  one 
better  expressed  than  he  the  theory  of  the  "  well- 
born," and  its  wide  divergence  from  the  canons  of 
political  philosophy  laid  down  in  the  Revolution. 
It  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  the  contem- 
porary interpretation  and  application  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Declaration  offered  many  evidences 
of  departure  from  its  philosophical  spirit.  Adams 
goes  farther  than  this,  however,  and  attacks  certain 
parts  of  the  theory  itself.  He  takes  exception  to 
the  doctrine  that  all  men  are  created  equal.  This, 
Adams  declares,  is  not  in  accord  with  the  facts, 
since  "nature  .  .  .  has  ordained  that  no  two  objects 
shall  be  perfectly  ahke  and  no  two  objects  perfectly 
equal.  .  .  .  No  two  men  are  perfectly  equal  in 
person,  property,  or  understanding,  activity,  and 
virtue."  ^  This  is  a  clear  contradiction  of  the  Dec- 
laration, and  even  of  his  own  earlier  statements 
It  is  to  be  observed,  however,  that  Adams  does  not 
deny  that  all  men  are  born  with  equal  rights ; 
"  every  being,"  said  he,  "  has  a  right  to  his  own,  as 
clear,  as  moral,  as  sacred  as  any  other  being  has."  ^ 

1  Works,  VI,  285-286. 

3  Ibid.  453.     Letter  to  John  Taylor  (1814). 


THE  REA  CTIONAR  V  MO  VEMENT  \  3  I 

This  he  does  not  wish  to  dispute,  confining  his 
protest  to  the  teaching  that  all  men  are  created 
with  equal  powers  or  faculties.  Such  a  doctrine 
seems  to  him  "  as  gross  a  fraud  ...  as  ever  was 
practised  by  Druids,  by  Brahmins,  by  priests  of  the 
immortal  Lama,  or  by  the  self-styled  philosophers 
of  the  French  Revolution."  ^ 

Adams  held  firmly  to  the  idea  that  men  are 
essentially  unequal.  If  we  take  a  hundred  men  at 
random,  he  says,  we  shall  find  among  them,  on  the 
average,  six  wealthy,  six  eloquent,  six  learned,  six 
having  the  gifts  of  eloquence,  learning,  and  fortune, 
and  six  having  art,  cunning,  and  intrigue.^  Thus 
we  have  an  aristocracy  of  thirty  among  the  hun- 
dred,—  thirty  men  gifted  with  certain  extraordi- 
nary qualities  which  enable  them  to  rise  above 
«_their  fellow-men.  The  following  quotation  gives  a 
good  picture  of  Adams's  aristocrat:  "Whenever  I 
use  the  word  aristocrat,"  said  he,  "  I  mean  a  citizen 
who  can  command  or  govern  two  votes  or  more  in 
society,  whether  by  his  virtues,  his  talents,  his  learn- 
ing, his  loquacity,  his  taciturnity,  his  frankness, 
his  reserve,  his  face,  figure,  eloquence,  grace,  air, 
attitude,  movements,  wealth,  birth,  art,  address, 
intrigue,  good-fellowship,  drunkenness,  debauch- 
ery, fraud,  perjury,  violence,  treachery,  pyrrhonism, 
'  Ideism,  or  atheism."  ^ 

The  inequalities  upon  which  Adams  lays  great- 
ly est  stress  in  his  theory  are  those  of  wealth,  birth, 

1  Ibid.  a  Ibid.  456.  8  Ibid.  457. 


132  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

and  education.  These  are  the  criteria  by  which 
the  natural  aristocracy  may  be  most  readily  deter- 
mined. The  people  in  general  may  be  divided  into 
two  groups,  the  gentlemen  and  the  simplemen.^ 
Gentlemen  are  those  who  "  have  received  a  liberal 
education,  an  ordinary  degree  of  erudition  in  lib- 
eral arts  and  sciences,"  and  it  will  usually  be 
found  that  those  so  endowed  are  also  "well-born 
and  wealthy."  The  simplemen,  on  the  other  hand, 
or  the  common  people,  are  "  laborers,  husbandmen, 
mechanics,  and  merchants  in  general,  who  pursue 
their  occupations  and  industry  without  any  knowl- 
edge in  liberal  arts  or  sciences,  or  in  anything  but 
their  own  trades  or  pursuits."  Some  of  these  may 
be  true  aristocrats,  as  some  of  the  first  class  may 
be  in  fact  common  people,  but  in  general  the  two 
classes  may  be  divided  by  the  line  drawn. 

These  two  groups  are  to  be  found  in  every  soci- 
ety, and  inasmuch  as  they  exist  should  be  recog- 
nized in  the  government  of  the  state.  "There  is," 
says  Adams,  "  a  voice  within  us,  which  seems  to  in- 
timate that  real  merit  should  govern  the  world,  and 
that  men  ought  to  be  respected  only  in  proportion 
to  their  talents,  virtues,  and  services."  ^  The  incor- 
poration of  this  aristocracy  into  the  government,  he 
regards  as  one  of  the  greatest  problems  of  political 
organization.  The  policy  of  Europe,  he  suggests, 
has  been  to  connect  " lands,  offices,  and  families" 
and  to  have  them  all  descend  together,  and  along 

1  IHd.  185.  a  Ibid.  249. 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  1 33 

with  them,  "  honor,  piibHc  attention,  consideration, 
and  congratulation."  ^  To  this  policy  Europe  owes 
its  superiority  over  Asia  and  Africa.  Adams  as- 
serts that  no  well-ordered  commonwealth  has  ever 
existed  without  hereditary  nobility,  and  it  is  an  easy 
inference  that  he  considered  such  an  institution 
advisable  for  this  country  as  well,  or  at  least  looked 
with  suspicion  on  the  experiment  of  proceeding 
without  an  order  of  nobility. 

Adams  would  seem,  then,  to  favor  some  system 
of  hereditary  nobility  as  the  surest  way  of  obtain- 
ing recognition  for  the  virtue  and  talent  of  the 
community.  This  disposition  leads  him  naturally 
to  condemn  the  poHcy  of  rotation  in  office.  It 
appears  to  him  that  such  a  requirement  is  really 
"a  violation  of  the  rights  of  mankind."  ^  It  is  a 
violation  at  once  of  the  rights  of  the  candidate  and 
of  the  voter ;  for  one  has  a  right  to  be  chosen  again, 
if  efficient,  and  the  elector  to  choose  the  officer  for 
further  seryice,  if  deemed  advisable.  No  policy 
is  so  disastrous  to  the  public  interest  as  that  of  dis- 
charging, at  fixed  and  arbitrary  intervals,  tried  and 
experienced  servants.  Hereditary  tenure  is  in 
general  not  inadvisable,  and  a  life  term  of  office  is 
certainly  commendable.  The  maxim  "  non  diurnare 
imperia "  does  not,  in  Adams's  opinion,  apply  to 
a  free  government.  Where  there  are  republican 
institutions,  authority  may  be  safely  given  for  a  long 
term  of  years  or  even  for  life,  without  danger  to 

1  Ibid.  251.  2  iiij^  52. 


134 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 


the  liberties  of  the  people.  On  the  contrary,  such 
a  policy  of  intrusting  power  in  the  hands  of  officers 
for  long  terms  would  really  be  one  of  the  guaran- 
ties of  continued  free  government.^ 

For  the  United  States,  Adams  seemed  to  be 
not  averse  to  a  life  tenure  for  the  chief  executive, 
or  even  an  hereditary  tenure.  He  indicated  that 
terms  of  office  may  be  extended  until  they  reach 
the  life  limit,  and  if  this  is  not  found  sufficient, 
they  should  be  made  hereditary.  "  The  delicacy 
or  the  dread  of  unpopularity,"  said  he,  "  that  should 
induce  any  man  to  conceal  this  important  truth 
from  the  full  view  and  contemplation  of  the  people 
would  be  a  weakness  if  not  a  vice."^  The  elective 
method,  wherever  tried,  has  been  found  to  be  a 
failure;  the  system  of  hereditary  tenure  has  the 
sanction  of  history  —  the  prestige  that  comes 
from  years  of  successful  operation.  The  inference 
is  that  Adams  looked  to  see  the  old  system  restored 
in  this  country.^ 

From  these  passages,  then,  it  is  clear  thai:  Adams 
had  no  sympathy  with  the  radical  ideas  of  human 
equality,  rotation  in  office,  and  unlimited  demo- 
cratic government.  He  was  essentially  aristocratic 
in  his  ideas.  Birth,  wealth,  education  —  these 
were  the  points  on  which  his  eye  was  fixed,  these 
were  the  elements  for  which  he  desired  recognition 

1  Ibid.  67. 

2  Cf.  Hamilton's  proposition  in  the  constitutional  convention. 
See  his  Works,  II,  393  ff. 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  135 

and  to  which  he  would  accord  supremacy  in  the 
administration  of  poHtical  affairs.  He  believed 
in  popular  sovereignty  as  the  basis  of  political  insti- 
tutions, and  the  popular  welfare  as  their  goal ;  but 
he  had  very  little  confidence  in  the  ability  of  the 
mass  of  the  people  to  administer  the  government 
successfully,  or  even  to  choose  their  rulers  properly. 

\  The  common  people  are  the  basis  of  the  state,  but 
the  guiding  hand  in  the  affairs  of  government 
j  must  be  that  of  the  gentlemen,  the  "  well-born." 
The  relation  of  John  Adams  to  the  radical  theary 
of  his  day  is  well  illustrated  by  a  correspondence 
upon  this  very  question,  between  him  and  Samuel 
Adams  (1790).^  This  interchange  of  views  was  oc- 
casioned by  recent  events  in  France,  and  it  brings 
out  clearly  the  markedly  aristocratic  tendencies  of 
the  one,  and  the  equally  pronounced  democratic 
opinions  of  the  other.  John  Adams,  in  his  letters, 
defends  the  institution  of  nobility,  upholds  the 
superiority  of  the  well-born,*  hints  at  hereditary 
rather  than  elective  tenure  of  office,  and  betrays 
throughout  a  profound  distrust  of  the  self-govern- 
ing capacity  of  the  people. 

/^  Samuel  Adams,  replying,  upholds  the  doctrine 
of  popular  rule,  and  criticises  John  Adams's  state- 
ment that  the  people  should  have  merely  a  share  in 
the  government.  He  asserts  that  the  selection  of 
rulers  by  frequent  elections  is  superior  to  the  sys- 
tem of  hereditary  tenure  ;  for,  conceding  that  people 

1  Wells,  Samuel  Adams,  III,  297  ff. 


136  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

may  be  occasionally  deceived,  the  evil  is  not  incura- 
ble and  certainly  will  not  long  endure.  The  requi- 
site remedy  will  be  near  at  hand,  whereas  under  an 
aristocratic  system  there  is  no  easy  way  out  of  the 
difficulty. 

John  Adams  suggests  doubts  as  to  the  practicabil- 
ity of  democratic  government,  because  of  the  high 
degree  of  popular  intelligence  and  virtue  required 
for  the  successful  operation  of  such  a  system. 
The  rejoinder  is  that  the  American  people  do 
possess  this  extraordinary  capacity  for  govern- 
ment ;  and  furthermore,  that  these  qualities  may  be 
strengthened  by  means  of  general  education.  The 
theory  of  the  "well-born,"  Samuel  Adams  dissents 
from  emphatically.  The  natural  aristocracy,  he 
maintains,  is  likely  to  be  found  among  men  of  all 
ranks  and  conditions,  regardless  of  birth.  The 
cottager  may  beget  a  wise  man  ;  the  noble  a  fool  ; 
hence  the  boundary  lines  of  natural  aristocracy  are 
exceedingly  difficult  to  draw,  and  cannot  on  the 
whole  be  safely  marked  out. 

Probably  the  most  conspicuous  idea  in  John 
Adams's  theory  is  that  of  an  elaborate  system  of 
checks  and  balances  in  the  organization  and  opera- 
tion of  the  governmental  system.  The  Defence  was 
written,  as  already  pointed  out,  in  reply  to  Turgot's 
attack  on  the  American  plan  and  apology  for  the 
French  idea  of  the  centralization  of  powers,  after- 
ward illustrated  in  the  French  Revolution.  To  re- 
fute this  argument,  Adams  collected  evidence  from 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  137 

the  days  of  the  Grecian  and  Roman  republics  down 
to  modern  times,  and  from  the  opinions  of  eminent 
philosophers  beginning  with  Plato.  He  endeavored 
to  show  that  unlimited  and  unchecked  government 
had  been  everywhere  attended  by  disaster,  particu- 
larly when  such  government  rested  upon  a  popular 
basis.  The  earnestness  of  his  belief  in  the  neces- 
sity of  a  system  of  balances  is  indeed  accountable 
for  what  is  taken  as  dislike  of  democracy.  In 
reality,  his  point  of  attack  was  not  popular  govern- 
ment in  general ;  but  that  particular  type  of  democ- 
racy lacking  the  necessary  restraints. 

The  subject  next  claiming  consideration  is,  then, 
Adams's  system  of  checks  and  balances.  Here  his 
arguments  meet  the  French  theory  advanced  by 
Turgot,  that  an  equilibrium  of  governmental 
powers  is  necessary  only  under  a  monarchical  gov- 
ernment and  not  required  where  republican  insti- 
tutions exist.  In  every  state  there  must  be,  said 
Adams,  a  first  magistracy,  a  senate  or  little  coun- 
cil, and  a  larger  assembly.^  These  three  classes 
represent  respectively  the  monarchical  element  in 
the  government,  the  aristocratic  element,  and 
the  democratic  element.  No  constitution  lacking 
these  three  elements  can  remain  secure.  Their 
existence  and  balance  is  essential  to  the  main- 
tenance of  peace  and  liberty.^  They  have,  he 
declares,  "an  unalterable   foundation  in   nature." 

1  Works,  IV,  379.  Cf.  Harrington,  Oceana  (1656),  (Morley's 
edition),  29  et  seq.  '  Ibid.  579. 


138  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

The  best  expression  of  this  idea  is  found  in 
the  British  Constitution,  which  he  looked  upon 
as  "the  most  stupendous  fabric  of  human  inven- 
tion." 1 

The  people  alone,  as  Adams  reasons,  are  un- 
worthy of  trust,  unless  restrained  by  the  balances 
which  are  advocated,  and  aristocracy  and  the  mon- 
archy alone  are  also  prone  to  abuse  the  power  in- 
trusted to  them.  Adams  takes  particular  pains  to 
combat  any  objection  to  placing  power  in  the  hands 
of  the  monarch.  An  alhance  between  monarchy 
and  democracy,  he  points  out,  has  been  necessary 
in  order  to  make  headway  against  the  encroaching 
tendencies  of  the  aristocracy ;  and  it  is  in  reality 
the  people  themselves  who  have  supported  the 
absolute  king  against  the  petty  lords.  Monarchy 
and  aristocracy  he  considers  as  natural  foes.  It  is, 
therefore,  Adams  suggests,  the  best  policy  on  the 
part  of  the  common  people  to  intrust  the  whole 
executive  power  to  one  man,  so  that  he  may  stand 
out  as  a  distinct  order  in  the  state.  There  will 
then  inevitably  arise  a  jealousy  between  him  and 
the  aristocracy,  and  this  very  jealousy  will  force 
the  monarch  to  ally  himself  closely  with  the  com- 
mon people,  to  become  their  guardian  and  their 
protector,  and  to  keep  in  check  all  who  might 
otherwise  endanger  the  safety  of  the  state.  Adams 
saw  what  few  Americans  of  his  day  perceived, 
namely,  that  absolute  monarchy  had  rested  upon  a 

1  Works,  IV,  358. 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  1 39 

popular  basis  and  had  really  constituted  an  alliance 
between  crown  and  people  against  the  aristocracy. 
^  Adams's  plan  is,  then,  to  provide  for  the  repre- 
sentation of  the  aristocracy  in  one  branch  of  the 
legislature ;  in  another  for  the  representation  of 
the  people  ;  and  finally  to  place  as  an  umpire  and 
arbiter  between  them  a  strong  executive  power. 
This  arrangement  of  governmental  authorities  will 
secure  the  equilibrium  of  forces  necessary  to  the 
welfare  of  the  state.  It  will  obviate  the  grave 
difficulties  presented  by  a  simple  and  wholly  unified 
plan  of  government,  by  preventing  the  extrava- 
gances to  which  any  one  of  these  powers  alone  and 
unchecked  is  prone. 

This,  however,  was  not  the  only  balance  of 
powers  which  Adams  discussed.  In  later  years 
he  called  attention  to  the  organization  of  govern- 
ment under  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
which  presents  a  system  of  checks  and  balances 
even  more  intricate  and  complex  than  the  tripar- 
tite plan  just  examined.  In  the  federal  govern- 
ment Adams  discovers  no  less  than  eight  different 
kinds  of  balances.  These  are  as  follows :  ist, 
the  states  and  territories  against  the  federal  gov- 
ernment ;  2d,  the  House  against  the  Senate ; 
3d,  the  Executive  against  the  Legislature ;  4th, 
the  Judiciary  against  the  House,  the  Senate,  the 
Executive  and  the  state  governments ;  5th,  the 
Senate  against  the  President  in  respect  to  appoint- 
ments and  treaties ;  6th,  the  people  against  their 


140  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

representatives ;  7th,  the  state  legislatures  against 
the  Senate;  8th,  the  electors  against  the  people. 
Here  are  certainly  ample  guaranties  against  hasty 
action  on  the  part  of  any  organ  of  the  federal 
government,  and  it  is  apparent  that  Adams  so 
considered  them.^ 

When  Adams  entered  into  active  political  life 
under  the  new  federal  Constitution,  he  no  longer 
gave  expression  to  sentiments  which  could  so 
easily  be  interpreted  as  unrepublican  in  character. 
It  is  likely  that  he  considered  the  new  government 
as  embodying  in  many  of  its  features  the  prin- 
ciples he  had  laid  down.  The  new  Constitution 
was  certainly  more  in  harmony  with  Adams's  ideas 
than  with  those  of  the  French  theorists  whom 
he  combated.  In  his  inaugural  address  of  1797 
Adams  declared  that  no  change  in  the  existing 
government  was  intended.  He  commented  on  the 
essentially  popular  basis  of  the  government  with 
evident  satisfaction  and  pride.  He  declared  his 
preference  for  free  republican  government,  and 
his  firm  attachment  to  the  United  States  Constitu- 
tion. In  terms  that  suggest  the  inaugural  of  four 
years  later,  he  discoursed  fluently  on  his  regard  for 
virtuous  men  of  all  parties,  and  his  love  for  equal 
laws,  for  justice,  and  for  humanity.^  It  would, 
therefore,  be  unfair  to  maintain  that  after  the  Con- 
stitution was  once  put  in  force,  Adams  demanded 
a  monarchy  and  hereditary  aristocracy. 

1  Works,  VI,  467  (1814).  2 IX,  105  ft 


THE  REACTIONARY  MOVEMENT  141 

He  even  denied  that  any  such  idea  could,  by  fair 
construction,  be  deduced  from  his  writings,  and  as- 
serted that  "  they  were  all  written  to  support  and 
strengthen  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States."  ^ 
He  continued  to  defend  with  unabated  vigor,  how- 
ever, the  doctrine  of  the  inequality  of  men,  and  the 
necessity  of  elaborate  checks  and  balances.  To 
Jefferson  he  wrote  (181 5)  :  "  The  fundamental  prin- 
ciple of  my  political  creed  is,  that  despotism,  or 
unlimited  sovereignty,  or  absolute  power,  is  the 
same  in  a  majority  of  a  popular  assembly,  an 
aristocratical  council,  an  oligarchical  junto,  and  a 
single  emperor."  2  Xhis  was,  in  fact,  the  funda- 
mental proposition  in  Adams's  political  philosophy, 
and  explains  his  frequently  undemocratic  phrases. 
He  feared  the  unlimited  power  of  the  people  as 
well  as  the  unlimited  power  of  either  nobility  or 
king ;  and  was  steadfastly  opposed  to  any  system, 
popular  or  otherwise,  which  was  not  so  constructed 
as  to  limit  and  restrain  the  governing  powers.  In 
America  he  considered  that  the  despotism  imminent 
was  that  of  the  people,  hence  his  criticisms  were 
directed  mainly  against  them. 

Such  was  the  character  of  the  reactionary  theory 
prevalent  during  the  early  years  of  the  republic. 
With  some  modifications  this  doctrine  continued 
to  manifest  its  existence  during  the  first  quarter 

^  X,  54.  Cf.  VI,  463,  stating  that  they  were  written  in  defence 
of  the  Massachusetts  constitution.  *  X,  1 74. 


142  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

of  a  century  of  the  newly  established  Union. 
It  found  expression  in  the  demand  for  a  strong 
central  government,  in  a  pronounced  disHke  for 
the  French  Revolution,  particularly  in  its  later 
phases,  in  a  certain  liking  for  form  and  ceremony. 
It  would  be  wide  of  the  mark  to  say  that  the  Fed- 
eralists accepted  all  of  the  theory  of  Adams  as 
stated  in  the  works  just  analyzed.  This  he  did  not 
do  himself  in  his  later  years.  But  the  spirit  of  this 
work  —  the  distrust  of  democracy  and  the  tender- 
ness for  the  "well-born" —  was  characteristic  of 
them.^ 

1  Cf.  Publicola,  a  series  of  letters  by  John  Quincy  Adams  in  reply 
to  Paine's  Rights  of  Man,  1791. 

A  careful  exposition  of  early  American  principles  is  preserved 
in  the  lectures  given  by  James  Wilson  before  the  Law  School  in 
Philadelphia,  1790-92.  See  Wilson,  Works,  edited  by  J.  D. 
Andrews,  2  vols.,  1896. 

Wilson  laid  great  stress  on  the  theory  that  law  and  political 
obligation  do  not  come  from  a  superior,  but  are  created  by  the  vol- 
untary agreement  of  individuals,  — "  the  consent  of  those  whose 
obedience  the  law  requires"  (I,  88).  He  regarded  even  a  private 
contract  as  really  constituting  a  law.  "  Why  not,"  said  he,  "  if  it 
had  all  its  essential  properties  ? "  He  denied  that  there  was  any 
contract  between  king  and  people  or  between  governor  and  gov- 
erned, maintaining  that  the  agreement  is  one  between  the  individual 
and  the  whole  society. 


CHAPTER   IV 

THE  JEFFERSONIAN  DEMOCRACY 

No  sooner  was  the  new  Constitution  put  into 
actual  operation  than  there  began  a  decided  move- 
ment away  from  strong  government  and  toward 
individual  and  states  rights.  It  seemed  almost 
as  if  the  people  were  alarmed  at  what  they  had 
done,  and  were  anxious  to  neutrahze  its  effect. 
In  addition  to  this  perhaps  natural  reaction  after 
the  violent  agitation  in  favor  of  a  strong  govern- 
ment, there  was  the  powerful  stimulus  given  to 
democracy  by  the  French  Revolution,  especially  in 
its  earlier  years.  This  great  event  aroused  the 
democratic  spirit  throughout  Europe,  and  was  not 
without  its  effect  on  America.^  Nor  should  it  be 
forgotten  that  just  at  this  time  Jefferson  returned 
to  his  native  land,  ready  to  organize  and  give  form 
to  the  scattered  democratic  tendencies.  Under 
these  auspices  the  new  movement  rapidly  gained 
strength,  and  in  little  more  than  a  decade  was  able 
to  triumph  over  the  Adams-Hamilton  party. 

The  most  marked  characteristic  of  this  move- 
ment was  the  antipathy  shown  toward  everything 

^  On  this  subject  see  the  interesting  study  by  Charles  D.  Hazen, 
Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the  French  Revolution  (1897). 

143 


144  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

suggestive  of  monarchy,  hereditary  aristocracy,  or 
strongly  centralized  government.  Objection  was 
made,  for  example,  to  any  exceptional  formality  in 
addressing  the  President,  to  stamping  his  likeness 
on  the  coinage,  to  any  elaborate  ceremony  at  the 
seat  of  government.  Opposition  was  made  to  the 
size  of  the  standing  army,  to  the  establishment  of 
the  United  States  Bank,  to  the  assumption  of  the 
state  debts.  Particularly  was  there  denunciation 
of  the  administration  because  of  its  refusal  to 
take  up  the  defence  of  republican  France  against 
monarchic  England.  To  favor  Britain  or  even  to 
remain  neutral  in  the  contest,  it  was  said,  was  really 
equivalent  to  upholding  the  British  form  of  govern- 
ment against  the  free  institutions  of  the  Revolution. 
The  theory  of  this  movement  is  represented  in 
such  works  as  Thomas  Paine's  Rights  of  Man, 
which  was  used  as  an  answer  to  the  writings  of 
Adams;  in  Tucker's  Commentaries  on  Blackstone^ 
(1803);  in  Taylor's /«^///;7'^(  18 14);  and  the  various 
writings   of  Joel  Barlow.^     But  by  far  the   most 

^  H.  St.  George  Tucker,  Commeniaries  on  Blackstone. 

2  John  Taylor,  Ati  Inquiry  into  the  Principles  and  Policy  of 
the  Govertitnent  of  the  United  States.  A  considerable  part  of  this 
discursive  work  is  taken  up  by  a  criticism  of  Adams's  theory  of 
aristocracy.  By  the  same  author,  Construction  Construed  and  the 
Constitution  Vindicated  (1820);  Tyranny  Unmasked  (1822); 
New  Views  of  the  Cotistitution  (1823). 

^  Advice  to  the  Privileged  Orders  in  the  Several  States  of  Europe 
(1792)  ;  Joel  Barlow  to  his  Fellow  Citizens  in  the  United  States  of 
America  (1801);  and  various  other  letters.  See  Life  and  Letters 
of  Joel  Barlow,  by  Charles  Burr  Todd. 


THE  JEFFERSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  1 45 

influential  of  the  leaders  in  this  group  was  Thomas 
Jefferson,  and  to  a  consideration  of  his  doctrines 
we  now  turn. 

No  name  is  more  often  or  more  intimately 
associated  with  American  democracy  than  that  of 
Thomas  Jefferson.  During  his  lifetime  he  was  the 
American  democrat  par  excellence ;  on  his  death 
he  was  politically  canonized,  and  his  words  are  still 
quoted  with  confidence  and  received  with  respect 
in  the  consideration  of  almost  all  political  questions. 
Brought  into  prominence  as  the  author  of  the 
Declaration  of  Independence,  identified  with  the 
growth  and  triumph  of  the  Republican  party,  in- 
augurated as  its  first  President,  framing  its  policies 
and  providing  its  philosophy,  Jefferson  was  un- 
doubtedly the  central  figure  in  the  early  develop- 
ment of  American  democracy.^ 

Though  regarded  as  the  great  advocate  of  de- 
mocracy, Jefferson  bequeathed  to  posterity  no 
systematic  treatise  on  the  principles  of  poHtics.^ 
His  Siimmary  Viezv  (1774)  and  Notes  on  Virginia 
(17S2)  are  the  nearest  approach  to  this,^  and  they 
can  scarcely  be  considered  an  approximation.  More- 
over, he  was  not  a  great  orator,  and  there  is  no 

1  For  the  life  of  Jefferson,  see  H.  S.  Randall's  work  in  three 
volumes;   also  Morse's  volume  in  the  American  Statesmen  Series. 

2  A  useful  classification  of  Jefferson's  ideas  on  a  great  variety  of 
subjects  is  made  by  J.  P.  Foley,  in  The  Jeff ersonian  Cydopadia. 

3  See  also  his  Autobiography  (to  1790)  and  The  Anas  (1791- 
1806). 

L 


146  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

collection  of  addresses  in  which  his  ideas  are 
embodied.  He  was,  however,  a  great  correspond- 
ent, and  we  have  a  large  collection  of  his  letters, 
written  to  such  persons  as  Madison,  John  Adams, 
Lafayette,  Dupont  de  Nemours,  Taylor,  Kercheval, 
Johnston,  and  others.  From  this  extensive  corre- 
spondence, in  which  topics  of  political  theory 
frequently  appear,  together  with  some  of  his  official 
papers,  it  is  possible  to  reconstruct  the  theory  of 
Jefferson,  if  not  in  minute  detail,  at  least  in  general 
outline.^ 

The  first  important  statement  of  Jefferson's 
political  theory  is  contained  in  the  Declaration  of 
Independence.  Here  are  eloquently  expressed  the 
now  familiar  doctrines  of  human  equality,  of  the 

'  natural  and  inalienable  rights  of  man,  of  the  guar- 
anty of  these  rights  as  the  first  cause  of  govern- 
ment, and  of  the  right  and  duty  of  revolution  when 

i  they  are  subverted.  These  doctrines,  it  is  perhaps 
needless  to  say,  were  not  original  with  the  writer 
of  the  Declaration.  They  were  the  common  prop- 
erty of  his  time,  were  on  the  lips  of  every  patriot 
orator,  and  found  copious  expression  in  resolutions 
throughout  the  colonies.  It  was  later  charged  that 
the  substance  of  the  Declaration  had  been  "  hack- 

^  References  are  to  Ford's  edition  of  Jefferson's  writings  (ten 
volumes),  unless  otherwise  specified.  The  Washington  edition  con- 
tains some  material  not  found  in  Ford,  and  vice  versa.  See  also 
"  The  Jefferson  Papers,"  in  Collections  of  Massachusetts  Historical 
Society f  Seventh  Series,  Vol.  I,  edited  by  J.  Franklin  Jameson. 


THE  JEFFERSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  147 

neyed  in  Congress  for  two  years  before."  ^  Jeffer- 
son himself  was  fully  conscious  that  the  originality 
of  the  statements  lay  in  their  form,  rather  than  in 
their  content,  and  his  own  explanation  of  his  work 
is  excellent :  "  Neither  aiming  at  originality  of  prin- 
ciple or  sentiment,  nor  yet  copied  from  any  particu- 
lar or  previous  writings,  it  was  intended  to  be  an 
expression  of  the  American  mind,  and  to  give  to 
that  expression  the  proper  tone  and  spirit  called 
for  by  the  occasion. "^  Jefferson  crystallized  the 
common  sentiment  into  a  very  effective  form,  but 
he  could  not  and  did  not  claim  for  himself  the 
merit  of  presenting  to  the  world  a  series  of  new  or 
hitherto  undiscovered  truths.  This  is  not  to  say, 
however,  that  the  authorship  of  the  Declaration 
was  not  a  signal  distinction ;  it  merely  changes  the 
category  in  which  the  distinction  lay. 

Inquiring  more  closely  into  Jefferson's  theory  of 
inalienable  rights,  we  find  him  protesting  against 
the  idea  that  we  surrender  any  of  our  natural  rights 
on  entering  into  society.  Jefferson  argues  that 
these  rights  are  not  given  up,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
are   rendered   more   secure.^     He  holds   that  the 

1  Works,  X,  267.  This  was  alleged  by  Pickering  and  Adams,  who 
also  charged  that  "  its  essence  was  contained  in  Otis's  pamphlet." 
R.  H.  Lee  maintained  that  it  was  copied  from  Locke. 

2  Ibid.  X,  343.  Cf.  X,  268 :  "  I  did  not  consider  it  as  any  part 
of  my  charge  to  invent  new  ideas  altogether  and  to  offer  no  senti- 
ment which  had  ever  been  expressed  before."  —  Letter  to  Madison. 

^  Ibid.  X  (1816),  32  ff.  Cf.  Locke,  Two  Treatises  of  Govern- 
ment, 


148  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

state  should  declare  and  enforce  our  rights,  but 
should  take  none  of  them  from  us.  Reasoning  in 
this  way,  it  is  possible,  he  thinks,  to  mark  out  the 
proper  sphere  of  state  activity.  Thus,  as  no  man 
has  a  natural  right  to  interfere  with  the  rights  of 
others,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  law  to  restrain  every  one 
from  such  interference.  Every  man  should  contrib- 
ute to  the  necessities  of  society  ;  therefore  the  law 
should  see  that  he  does  so.  No  man  has  a  natural 
right  to  judge  in  his  own  cause;  therefore  the  law 
must  judge.  Thus  it  appears  that  one  does  not 
lose  his  natural  rights  under  government,  but 
obtains  a  better  guaranty  of  them. 

Government  is  established,  however,  by  the  "  con- 
sent of  the  governed,"  or  at  least  a  just  government 
is  so  supported.  What,  then,  is  the  nature  of  this 
consent,  and  how  is  it  to  be  made  effective  amid 
constantly  changing  conditions  t  Jefferson  was  not 
satisfied  with  a  contract  made  once  and  for  all,  Hke 
that  of  Hobbes,  or  with  a  merely  hypothetical  con- 
tract or  even  with  a  presumption  of  tacit  consent 
from  the  fact  of  residence.  He  looked  upon  the 
contract  as  a  necessary  foundation  for  legitimate 
government,  and  he  considered  that  the  agreement 
should  have  historical  as  well  as  logical  validity. 
The  principle  of  the  social  contract  must  be  sacredly 
preserved  in  the  life  of  the  people,  and  Jefferson 
proposed  two  ways  of  insuring  this  end  :  first,  by 
revolution ;  second,  by  periodical  renewal  of  the 
agreement. 


THE  JEFFERSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  1 49 

Revolution,  Jefferson  did  not  regard  with  great 
horror,  if  principle  were  involved  in  the  process. 
He  did  not  believe  in  government  as  something  so 
sacred  in  nature  as  to  be  above  human  criticism. 
He  did  not  "  look  at  constitutions  with  sanctimo- 
nious reverence  and  deem  them  like  the  ark  of  the 
covenant,  too  sacred  to  be  touched."  ^  Government 
appeared  to  him  as  an  institution  existing  for  the 
governed ;  and  if  it  failed  to  serve  this  purpose, 
then  it  might  be  overthrown  and  another  erected 
on  its  ruins.  So  far  did  he  go  in  this  direction  that 
the  beneiicent  elements  in  government  were  at  times 
almost  lost  to  view.  He  declared  his  dislike  of 
energetic  government  because  it  is  always  oppres- 
sive.2  He  was  on  one  occasion  doubtful  whether 
the  first  state  of  man,  without  government,  as  he 
says,  would  not  be  the  most  desirable,  if  the  society 
were  not  too  large.^  He  thought  that  republics 
should  not  be  too  severe  in  their  treatment  of  rebel- 
lions, lest  the  free  spirit  of  the  people  be  suppressed. 

Rebellion,  he  argued,  is  a  medicine  necessary  to 
the  health  of  government,  and  its  use  must  not 
be  denied.  It  is  wholesome,  though  bitter ;  or, 
using  another  figure,  it  clears  the  air  like  a  thunder- 
storm.* Shays's  Rebellion  in  Massachusetts  Jef- 
ferson regarded  with  great  composure,  even  with 
complaisance.  The  motives  of  the  rebels  were 
good,  he  thought,  though  doubtless  they  were  ill 

1  Works,  X,  42.  2  ji,id,  IV,  479. 

3  Ibid.  IV,  362.  *  Ibid.  IV,  362. 


I50  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

informed  on  the  situation.  Better,  however,  that 
they  should  take  up  arms  than  tamely  submit  to 
what  they  deemed  oppressive  ;  for,  after  all,  it  is 
not  rebellion  that  destroys  a  republic,  but  the  dull 
lethargy  that  creeps  upon  and  paralyzes  the  public 
spirit  —  "  God  forbid,  that  we  should  ever  be  twenty 
years  without  such  a  rebellion."  There  have  been, 
he  continues,  thirteen  states  independent  for  eleven 
years,  and  during  this  time  only  one  rebellion. 
This  amounts  to  one  in  one  hundred  and  forty -three 
years  for  each  state  —  by  no  means  an  excessive 
number.  How  is  it  possible  for  a  country  to  pre- 
serve its  liberties  if  the  rulers  are  not  occasionally 
warned  of  the  existence  of  a  spirit  of  resistance 
among  their  subjects  }  "  What  signify,"  he  asks, 
"  a  few  lives  lost  in  a  century  or  two .''  The  tree 
of  liberty  must  be  refreshed  from  time  to  time  with 
the  blood  of  patriots  and  tyrants."  ^ 

The  idea  of  adherence  to  the  principle  of  the 
social  contract  finds  a  less  violent  expression  in 
Jefferson's  argument  for  periodical  renewals  of  the 
agreement.  Rebellion  or  revolution  serves  to  keep 
alive  the  public  spirit ;  but  it  acts  through  irregu- 
lar and  illegal  channels,  and  hence  is  best  adapted 
to  countries  where  the  government  is  tyrannically 
inclined.  For  a  free  state,  however,  there  are 
other  plans  that  may  be  followed,  without  passing 
outside  the  boundaries  of  the  law.  A  convention, 
reconsidering  the  organic  law  of  the  land  and  sub- 

1  Works,\N  (1789),  467. 


THE  JEFFERSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  151 

mitting  the  result  of  its  deliberations  to  the  people, 
really  constitutes,  he  maintains,  a  renewal  of  the 
fundamental  agreement.  In  this  way  the  "  consent 
of  the  governed  "  may  be  again  invoked  and  the 
government  reestablished  on  a  just  foundation. 
Each  generation,  such  is  the  argument,  has  a  right 
to  estabUsh  its  own  law.  "  The  earth  belongs  in 
usufruct  to  the  living;  the  dead  have  neither 
powers  nor  rights  over  it."  ^  It  follows,  then,  that 
no  generation  of  men  can  pass  any  law  binding  for 
a  period  longer  than  the  lifetime  of  that  generation, 
because  their  law-making  power  ceases  with  their 
existence.  If  one  generation  could  bind  another, 
the  dead  and  not  the  living  would  rule.  Since 
conditions  change  and  men  change,  there  must  be 
opportunity  for  corresponding  change  in  political 
institutions,  and  also  for  a  renewal  of  the  principle 
of  government  by  consent  of  the  governed.^ 

Having  established  this  proposition,  Jefferson 
proceeded  to  determine  the  exact  period  for  which 
a  law  or  a  constitution  might  be  considered  as  an 
expression  of  the  will  of  the  community.  By  the 
use  of  certain  tables  of  M.  de  Buffon,  he  found 
that  in  any  given  society  one-half  of  all  those  over 
twenty-one  years  of  age  will  have  passed  away  in 
eighteen  years  and  eight  months.^     Therefore,  he 

^  Ibid.Y,  116. 

2  Cf.   the   theory   of  Thomas   Paine   as  discussed   in  Political 
Science  Quarterly,  XIV,  389  (September,  1899). 
8  Works,  Y,  I18-I19. 


152  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

reasoned,  no  society  can  make  any  constitution, 
law,  or  contract  of  binding  force  for  any  period 
longer  than  nineteen  years.  Hence,  if  the  society 
is  to  adhere  to  the  principles  upon  which  just  gov- 
ernment is  founded,  there  should  be  a  revision 
of  the  fundamental  law,  or  at  least  an  opportunity 
for  revision,  every  nineteen  years.  This  plan  was 
defended  by  Jefferson  as  a  reasonable  and  practi- 
cable method  of  maintaining  a  free  government  in 
its  integrity.  "At  first  blush,"  said  he,  "it  may 
be  rallied  as  a  theoretical  speculation,  but  examina- 
tion will  prove  it  to  be  solid  and  salutary."  ^  He 
urged  that  the  first  revenue  law  enacted  by  Con- 
gress should  contain  in  its  preamble  a  statement 
of  this  theory,  and  that  the  period  for  the  granting 
of  patents  be  limited  to  nineteen  years ;  and  he 
manifested  much  concern  at  Virginia's  failure  to 
adhere  to  the  policy  of  periodical  constitutional 
revision. 

Such,  then,  were  the  two  methods  by  which  the 
consent  of  the  governed  might  be  made  the  con- 
stant basis  of  government  —  by  periodical  renewal 
of  the  contract,  or,  if  this  were  impossible,  by 
rebellion  or  revolution.  Neither  of  these  methods, 
however,  was  novel  in  political  speculation  when 
Jefferson  propounded  them.     The  idea  of  a  "  fre- 

1  Works,  V,  123.  See  VI  (Washington  edition),  136,  197; 
VII,  15,  359.  Madison,  in  reply  to  Jefferson  (in  Madison's  Writings, 
I,  503-506),  urges  the  debt  owed  by  the  living  to  the  dead  and 
advocates  the  doctrine  of  "  tacit  consent." 


THE  JEFFERSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  1 53 

quent  recurrence  to  fundamental  principles  "  was 
common  to  the  time  and  was  often  expressed  in 
the  Revolutionary  state  constitutions ;  ^  while  the 
plan  for  a  revision  of  the  Constitution  was  not  so 
radical  as  the  provision  actually  made  in  Vermont 
and  Pennsylvania  for  a  council  of  censors  and  a 
septennial  constitutional  revision.^ 

Having  considered  Jefferson's  theory  as  to  the 
basis  of  the  government,  it  is  now  in  order  to  exam- 
ine his  position  as  to  the  various  classes  of  govern- 
ment.^ What,  then,  was  his  opinion  of  monarchy  ? 
The  government  of  a  king  Jefferson  regarded,  at 
least  in  the  earlier  part  of  his  life,  with  utter  abhor- 
rence. Though  not  the  equal  of  Paine  in  the  vigor 
of  his  invective  against  kings,  he  was  but  little 
inferior.  He  declared  that  "  no  race  of  kings  has 
ever  presented  above  one  man  of  common  sense 
in  twenty  generations."^  Again:  "There  is  not 
a  crowned  head  in  Europe  whose  talents  or  merit 
would  entitle  him  to  be  elected  a  vestryman  by  the 
people  of  any  parish  in  America."^  Writing  in 
18 10,  he  stated  that,  to  his  personal  knowledge, 

1  Massachusetts  (1780),  Art.  18;  Pennsylvania  (1776),  Art.  14; 
New  Hampshire,  Art.  38;  North  Carolina,  Art.  21 ;  Vermont, 
Art.  16. 

^  See  Jameson,  Cojistitutional  Conventions  (4th  ed.),  sec.  544. 

3  Works,  IV,  362.  Jefferson  classified  societies  into  three 
groups:  (i)  those  destitute  of  government;  (2)  those  in  whose 
government  the  will  of  every  one  has  a  just  influence;  (3)  those 
whose  governments  rest  on  force.      Letter  to  Madison  (1787). 

*  Ibid.  IV,  426.  5  jbid,  V,  8. 


154  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

Louis  XVI  was  a  fool ;  and  in  the  same  category 
were  included  the  kings  of  Spain,  Naples,  Sardinia, 
and  Denmark,  and  the  queen  of  Portugal ;  while 
the  successor  to  Frederick  the  Great  he  charac- 
terized as  a  mere  hog.^  Moreover,  he  thought 
that  if  there  were  any  efficient  hereditary  monar- 
chies, their  power  would  decay  in  the  course  of  a 
few  generations.  Jefferson's  favorite  and  perhaps 
most  effective  form  of  attack  upon  his  opponents 
was  to  arouse  the  suspicion  that  they  were  at  heart 
monarchists,  longing  for  the  restoration  of  royalty.^ 
In  later  years,  however,  after  the  failure  of  the 
European  revolutions  to  establish  democracy,  he 
was  inclined  to  concede  that  under  certain  condi- 
tions a  monarchy  might  really  be  the  most  desirable 
form  of  government.^ 

The  next  point  of  inquiry  is  Jefferson's  opinion 
of  aristocracy.  Judging  from  his  famous  utter- 
ance, "All  men  are  created  equal,"  he  is  generally 
regarded  as  the  great  champion  of  human  equality. 
Against  this  is  sometimes  urged  the  fact  that  the 
ownership  of  slaves  is  hardly  in  keeping  with  ideas 
of  universal  equality.  It  should  not  be  forgotten, 
however,  that  Jefferson  was  really  opposed  to  the 
institution  of   negro  slavery  and  more  than  once 

1  Works,  V  (Washington),  515. 

2  In  1824  he  said  that  he  had  charged  the  Federalists  with  ad- 
herence to  the  forms,  that  is,  the  ceremonies,  of  the  British  gov- 
ernment, not  with  a  desire  to  introduce  the  British  form,  i.e.  the 
monarchy.      Works,  X,  309-310. 

'  See  letter  to  Lafayette  (1823)  in  Works,  X,  279  ff. 


THE  JEFFERSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  I  55 

went  on  record  against  it,  as  in  his  proposition  for 
a  Virginia  constitution ^  {I'j'j^)  and  in  the  report 
on  the  "  Government  for  the  Western  Territory  " 
(1784).^  Later  in  life  he  was  forced  to  abandon 
his  early  hope  that  slavery  would  soon  cease  to 
flourish  in  America,  yet  he  still  beheved  in  the 
ultimate  extinction  of  slavery  and  declared  (1814) 
that  "the  love  of  justice  and  the  love  of  country 
plead  equally  for  the  cause  of  these  people."^  He 
said  that  the  hour  of  emancipation  was  advancing 
with  the  march  of  time  and  urged  continual  effort, 
"  softly  but  steadily." 

Aside  from  this  point,  however,  it  is  easy  to  show 
that  Jefferson  was  not  at  all  a  beHever  in  the  ab- 
solute equality  of  men.*  In  this  connection  it  is 
interesting  to  examine  his  correspondence  with 
John  Adams  upon  this  very  question  of  aristoc- 
racy. Adams  denounces  in  set  terms  the  theory 
of  the  equality  of  all  men,  declares  that  society  is 
divided  into  two  classes,  "  gentlemen  "  and  "  simple- 
men,"  and  demands  the  legal  recognition  of  this 
difference  in  ability.^    Jefferson  does  not  deny  the 

1  Works,  II,  26. 

2  Ibid.  Ill,  429.  In  this  report  occurs  the  provision  :  "  After 
the  year  1800  of  the  Christian  aera,  there  shall  be  neither  slavery 
nor  involuntary  servitude  in  any  of  the  said  states  otherwise  than 
in  punishment  of  crimes  whereof  the  party  shall  have  been  con- 
victed to  have  been  personally  guilty."  ^  Ibid.  IX,  477  ff. 

*  With  the  Declaration  of  Independence  should  be  read  Jeffer- 
son's proposed  constitution  for  Virginia  (1776),  II,  7  ff.  See  alsa 
the  propositions  of  1783,  1794,  and  i8i6.  '  See  ante. 


11 


156  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

existence  of  an  aristocracy  among  men,  but  dis- 
tinguishes between  the  natural  aristocracy  and  the 
artificial  aristocracy.  One  is  based  upon  virtue 
and  talent,  the  other  upon  wealth  and  birth.  The 
"natural  aristocracy  "  appears  to  him  as  the  "  most 
precious  gift  of  nature,"  and  highly  useful  for  the 
purpose  of  instructing  and  governing  society.  He 
even  goes  so  far  as  to  say,  "  That  form  of  govern- 
ment is  the  best  which  provides  the  most  effec- 
tively for  a  pure  selection  of  these  natural  aristoi 
into  the  offices  of  government."  ^  The  "  artificial 
aristocracy,"  based  on  wealth  and  birth,  is  mischiev- 
ous, even  dangerous,  and  should  not  receive  legal 
recognition.  In  reply  to  Adams's  proposition  that 
the  aristocracy  should  be  represented  in  one  legis- 
lative chamber  and  the  people  in  the  other,^  he 
urges  that  the  separation  of  the  pseudo-aristocracy 
from  the  genuine  should  be  left  to  the  people  them- 
selves. Some  mistakes  will  doubtless  be  made, 
but  the  really  good  and  wise  will  generally  be 
selected.^  Jefferson,  it  may  be  said,  believed  in 
an  aristocracy,  but  only  in  the  sense  that  the  best 
fitted  for  governing  should  rule,  and  that  the  selec- 
tion of  the  aristoi  should  be  made  by  popular  elec- 
tion rather  than  on  a  basis  of  birth  or  wealth.  He 
wanted  aristocratic  rulers  democratically  chosen. 

1  Works,  IX,  425. 

2  Works  of  John  Adams,  IV,  379. 

^  Works,  IX,  426.     See  Jefferson's  explanation  of  the  difference 
in  opinion  between  Adams  and  himself. 


■v/ 


THE  JEFFERSONIAN  DEMO  CRA  CY  1 5  7 

But  in  this  connection  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  democracy  of  his  day  was  not  the  democracy 
of  ours.  As  late  as  1824,  Jefferson  estimated  that 
a  majority  of  the  freemen  in  Virginia  were  excluded 
from  the  franchise,  and  there  were  many  inhabit- 
ants who  were  not  even  freemen.^ 

Having  reviewed  his  ideas  on  monarchy  and 
aristocracy,  it  remains  to  consider  Jefferson's  doc- 
trine of  democracy.  What  was  the  theory  of  "  Jef- 
fersonian  democracy  "  .-'  The  doctrines  of  natural 
rights  and  the  "  consent  of  the  governed  "  have 
already  been  examined;  but,  more  specifically, 
what  was  his  idea  as  to  the  characteristic  features 
of  a  democratic  government .-'  This  is  not  easy  to 
determine  ;  for,  in  the  first  place,  his  notions  were 
never  systematically  and  not  always  clearly  ex- 
pressed ;  and,  in  the  second  place,  there  are  con- 
tradictions between  his  political  theory  and  his 
practical  politics.  The  theory  of  Jefferson,  the 
political  scientist,  and  the  practice  of  Jefferson, 
the  man  of  affairs,  are  not  always  free  from  incon- 
sistency. An  effort  will  be  made  here,  however, 
to  show  as  clearly  as  possible  from  the  scattered 
sources  at  command  what  Jefferson's  theory  of 
democracy  really  was. 

Jefferson  defines  a  republic  as  "a  government 
by  the  [its]  citizens  in  mass,  acting  directly  and 
personally,  according  to  rules  established  by  the 

1  On  Aristocracy,  see  Taylor,  Inquiry,  passim  ;  Tucker's 
Blackstone,  Appendix  to  Vol,  I,  37  ff. 


158  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

majority."  ^  Governments  are  republican  in  pro- 
portion to  the  degree  of  direct  action  on  the  part 
of  the  citizens,^  and  there  are  of  course  many  vary- 
ing degrees.  This  is,  however,  only  a  very  general 
statement  and  lacks  definiteness  of  outline.  One  of 
the  best  supplementary  explanations  is  that  found 
in  Jefferson's  first  inaugural  address.^  Here  are 
laid  down  the  main  principles  which  should  obtain 
within  a  democracy.  They  include,  among  others, 
the  following  propositions:  equal  and  exact  jus- 
tice; jealous  care  of  the  right  of  election  by  the 
people;  the  rule  of  the  majority;^  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  guaranties  of  civil  liberty,  such  as  free- 
dom of  religion,  freedom  of  the  press,  the  habeas 
corpus  and  jury  trial;  the  subordination  of  the 
military  to  the  civil  authority ;  and  economical 
administration.  In  these  phrases  are  summed  up 
his  democratic  program,  and  under  his  type  of 
government  they  would  all  be  found  in  operation. 
Further   evidence   as   to   Jefferson's    notion   of 


*  Letter  to  Taylor,  in  Works,  X,  28.  See  also  letters  to  Dupont 
de  Nemours  X,  22  ff.;  to  Judge  Johnson,  X,  226;  and  to  Gerry, 
VII,  327. 

2  "Action  by  the  citizens  in  person,  in  affairs  within  their  reach 
and  competence;  in  all  others  by  representatives  chosen  immedi- 
ately and  removable  by  themselves,  constitutes  the  essence  of  a 
republic.''  —  Letter  to  Dupont  de  Nemours,  X,  24. 

3  Works,  VIII,  I  ff. 

*  Ibid.  VIII,  4.  "  Absolute  acquiescence  in  the  rule  of  the 
majority,  the  vital  principle  of  republics  from  which  there  is  no 
appeal  but  to  force." 


THE  JEFFERSONIAN  DEM  OCR  A  CY  I  5  9 

democracy  is  given  by  examination  of  what  he 
once  termed  the  "  two  hooks  "  upon  which  repub- 
lican government  depends.^  These  were  an  edu- 
^  cational  system  and  a  scheme  of  local  government. 
Keenly  appreciating  the  necessity  of  popular  in- 
telligence as  a  basis  for  successful  popular  govern- 
ment, Jefferson  was  a  constant  advocate  of  all 
measures  for  the  diffusion  of  knowledge  among 
the  masses.  If  government  rests  upon  public 
opinion,  he  said,  then  our  first  and  foremost  care 
is  to  see  that  this  opinion  is  kept  right.^  Opinion 
that  is  unenhghtened  and  unsound  would  be  the 
death  of  free  government.  He  once  said  that,  if 
forced  to  choose  between  a  government  without 
newspapers  and  newspapers  without  a  government, 
he  would  not  hesitate  to  choose  the  latter  alterna- 
tive, assuming  that  every  man  received  the  papers 
and  were  capable  of  understanding  them.  Jeffer- 
son exerted  himself  in  behalf  of  educational  insti- 
tutions in  his  own  state,  and  to  his  earnest  efforts 
was  largely  due  the  establishment  of  the  Univer- 
sity of  Virginia.^ 

The  second  "  hook  "  was  local  government. 
Referring  to  his  experience  at  the  time  of  the 
Embargo  Act,  Jefferson  said :  "  I  felt  the  founda- 
tions of  the  government  shaken  under  my  feet  by 
the  New  England  townships."*    He  recommended 

1  Ibid.  IX,  453.  Ibid.  IV,  360. 

'  See  Randall's  y<?^(?rjow,  III,  461. 

*  Works,  VI  (Washington  edition),  544. 


l6o  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

for  Virginia  a  system  of  .local  government  mod- 
elled quite  closely  after  the  New  England  type,  to 
take  the  place  of  the  "  large  and  lubberly  divisions 
into  counties."  "Wards"  were  to  take  charge  of 
the  elementary  schools,  to  care  for  the  poor  and 
the  roads,  and  to  have  a  system  of  justices,  con- 
stables, and  police.^  But  the  "ward"  was  merely 
one  step  in  the  scheme  of  governmental  gradation 
which  Jefferson  had  in  mind.  He  conceived  that 
liberty  should  be  secured,  not  only  by  a  tripartite 
division  of  governmental  powers,  but  also  by  a 
further  distribution  among  a  series  of  organizations 
extending  from  ward  to  nation.  First  should  come 
the  elementary  republics  or  wards,  then  the  county 
republics,  then  the  states,  and  finally  the  nation. 
Governmental  powers  should  be  delegated  "by  a 
synthetical  process  to  higher  and  higher  orders  of 
functionaries,  so  as  to  trust  fewer  and  fewer  pow- 
ers in  proportion  as  the  trustees  become  more  and 
more  oligarchical." ^  Local  government  would  thus 
be  made  a  part  of  the  complicated  "check  and  ' 
balance  "  system  in  the  intricacies  of  which  des- 
potism would  be  entangled  and  rendered  powerless. 
Another  feature  in  the  Jeffersonian  program 
should  perhaps  receive  mention  at  this  point; 
namely,  the  plea  for  the  subordination  of  the  mili- 
tary to  the  civil  authority.  He  argued  against  a 
large   standing    army   as   a   likely   instrument   of 

1  Works,  VII  (Washington  edition),  357;   also  V,  524. 

2  Ibid.  VI  (Washington  edition),  543. 


THE  JEFFERSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  l6l 

oppression.  Absolute  governments  must  depend 
upon  force,  but  a  free  state,  he  held,  should  place 
its  confidence  in  the  good-will  of  its  citizens.  So 
far  as  military  power  is  necessary  for  purposes  of 
defence,  the  need  should  be  supplied  by  a  well-dis- 
ciplined militia.  A  standing  army  was  associated 
with  monarchical  power,  and  it  was,  therefore,  a 
part  of  the  republican  policy  to  reduce  the  army  and 
the  navy  to  as  low  a  footing  as  possible.  Under 
Jefferson  this  was  the  line  of  conduct  followed  by 
the  administration.  In  this  way  an  alleged  monar- 
chical tendency  was  checked  and  at  the  same  time 
the  expenses  of  government  were  reduced,  although 
the  Embargo  Act  involved  an  exercise  of  power 
like  that  of  a  "  consolidated  government."  The  sup- 
pression of  the  military  power  was  undoubtedly  one 
of  the  features  in  the  Republican  plan  for  govern- 
mental regeneration — indeed,  it  has  been  urged  that 
this  was  the  real  significance  of  the  transition  in 
1801 '}  but  Jefferson  did  not  present  any  very  elabo- 
rate arguments  upon  the  question,  and  it  did  not  oc- 
cupy a  very  prominent  place  in  his  poHtical  theory. 
Thus  far  this  inquiry  has  extended  into  Jeffer- 
son's definition  of  a  republic  and  an  examination 
of  various  features  included  in  the  program  of 
such  a  government.  Yet  all  these  considerations 
fail  to  show  what  was  the  real  essence  of  Jeffer- 
sonian  democracy.  They  reveal  in  part  his  policy, 
but  his  policy  was  never  complete  either  in  theory 

^  Ford,  The  Rise  and  Growth  of  American  Politics^  131. 
M 


1 62  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

or  in  actual  practice.  That  which  gave  life  and 
color  to  all  these  measures  for  democratic  reform 
was  the  article  in  the  Jeffersonian  political  creed 
which  must  now  be  considered.  The  distinctive 
and  characteristic  feature  of  his  doctrine  is  most 
clearly  expressed  in  his  correspondence  with  John 
Adams  ;  here  may  be  seen  the  real  difference  that 
divided  these  two  great  leaders,  one  the  advocate 
of  the  "well-born,"  the  other  the  apostle  of  democ- 
racy —  their  opinions  characteristic  of  two  great 
parties  and  of  two  great  schools  of  political  thought. 
This  difference  has  already  been  indicated,  but 
may  here  be  better  explained  and  more  appropri- 
ately emphasized. 

It  has  been  shown  that  Adams  was  anxious  for 
a  balanced  government  of  the  most  complex  na- 
ture, including,  as  one  of  its  elements,  a  legal 
recognition  of  the  aristocracy,  and  that  he  ap- 
peared to  doubt  and  distrust  the  capacity  of  the 
people  for  any  high  degree  of  self-government. 

Against  such  a  theory,  Jefferson  maintained  that 
men  are  naturally  divided  into  two  classes:  (i)those 
who  fear  and  distrust  the  people ;  (2)  those  who 
identify  themselves  with  the  people,  have  confi- 
dence in  them,  consider  them  as  the  most  honest 
and  safe,  although  not  always  the  most  wise,  de- 
positories of  public  interests.^ 

1  Works,  VII  (Washington  edition) ,  376.  Cf.  Madison,  Dialogue 
between  a  Republican  and  an  anti- Republican  (1792),  in  Works, 
IV,  483. 


THE  JEFFERSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  1 63 

In  the  opinion  of  the  first  class,  the  masses 
must  be  held  in  check  by  physical  and  moral 
force,  and  can  be  restrained  in  no  other  way ; 
men  are  essentially  incapable  of  ruling  themselves, 
and  must  be  governed  by  authorities  independent 
of  their  will  and  not  subject  to  their  judgment. 
But  the  second  class,  on  the  other  hand,  argues 
Jefferson,  place  their  trust  in  popular  capacity  for 
self-government,  maintaining  that  man  is  a  rational 
animal,  possessing  a  natural  and  innate  sense  of 
justice,  and  that  for  the  preservation  of  peace  and 
order  he  does  not  require  restraint  from  above  or 
outside,  but  is  competent  to  choose  his  own  rulers 
and  hold  them  dependent  on  his  will.  The  same 
idea  as  to  the  two  classes  of  opinions  is  expressed 
in  a  letter  to  Dupont  de  Nemours,  in  which  Jeffer- 
son says :  "We  both  love  the  people,  but  you  love 
them  as  infants  whom  you  are  afraid  to  trust  with- 
out nurses,  and  I  as  adults  whom  I  freely  leave  to 
self-government."  ^ 

The  essence,  then,  of  Jefferson's  democracy  was 
confidence  in  the  self-governing  capacity  of  the 
great  mass  of  the  people  —  a  belief  in  the  ability 
of  the  average  man  or  of  average  men  to  select 
rulers  who  will  conduct  the  administration  in  gen- 
eral accord  with  the  interests  of  the  society.  The 
divergence  of  opinion  just  here  made  Adams  an 
aristocrat   and   Jefferson   a   democrat  —  not    that 

1  Works,  X,  23 ;  one  of  the  best  of  the  statements  of  democratic 
principles. 


1 64  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

Adams  had  no  confidence,  or  that  Jefferson  had 
all  confidence,  in  the  people,  but  the  degrees  of 
confidence  differed  widely.  We  might  say  that 
one  looked  with  suspicion  on  the  people  first  of 
all,  the  other  distrusted  first  the  government  and 
after  that  the  people.  Both  favored  a  balanced 
government ;  but  Adams  desired  primarily  to  pre- 
vent violent  action  on  the  part  of  the  people, 
whereas  Jefferson's  first  aim  was  to  prevent  op- 
pression by  the  government;  one  reasoned  that 
the  people  should  be  watched,  the  other  that  the 
government  should  be  kept  in  constant  view.i 
Confidence  in  the  people  was,  therefore,  the  dis- 
tinguishing characteristic  in  the  theory  of  Jeffer- 
sonian  democracy.  In  practice,  however,  the  early 
"  democracy  "  was  aristocratic  in  the  nature  of  its 
rule  and  continued  to  be  so  until  the  time  of  Jack- 
son, when  the  democratic  theory  found  a  more 
complete  expression  in  political  institutions. 

It  must  further  be  noted  that  Jefferson's  theory 
of  democracy  was  by  no  means  so  doctrinaire  as 
is  often  supposed.  He  did  not  argue  that  democ- 
racy was  equally  adapted  to  all  times,  places, 
conditions,  and  peoples,  as  some  have  assumed. 
Confident  of  the  ultimate  triumph  of  democratic 
principles,  he  was  not  eager  for  their  immediate 

1  Letter  to  Dupont  de  Nemours,  in  Works,  X,  22.  Cf.  also  VIII, 
127 :  "  What  is  practicable  must  often  control  pure  theory,  and  the 
habits  of  the  governed  determine  in  great  degree  what  is  practi- 
cable." 


THE  JEFFERSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  1 6$ 

and  universal  application.  Nothing  could  be 
clearer  than  his  statement  that  "the  excellence 
of  every  government  is  its  adaptation  to  the  state 
of  those  who  are  governed  by  it."  The  Sage  of 
Monticello  was  not  so  blind  a  devotee  of  democ- 
racy as  to  believe  that  civil  and  political  liberty 
need  no  firmer  basis  than  a  paper  constitution. 
To  Lafayette  he  said  that  liberty  becomes,  "  with 
an  unprepared  people,  a  tyranny  still  of  the  many, 
the  few,  or  the  one."  ^  Again,  he  expressed  doubt 
"  whether  the  state  of  society  in  Europe  can  bear 
a  republican  form  of  government,"  and  therefore 
advised  "  a  hereditary  chief  strictly  limited."  ^  The 
cause  for  the  failure  of  the  continental  revolutions 
is  discovered  in  the  fact  that  "the  mob  of  the 
cities,  the  instrument  used  for  their  accomplish- 
ment, debased  by  ignorance,  poverty,  and  vice, 
could  not  be  restrained  to  rational  action."  ^  Dis- 
cussing American  conditions,  he  comes  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  Spanish-American  states  are  not 
ready  for  republican  institutions,  since  their  expe- 
rience "  has  disqualified  them  for  the  maintenance 
or  even  knowledge  of  their  rights."*     Louisiana 

1  Works,  IX  (1815),  505. 

2  Ibid.  X  (1823),  280,  "A  hereditary  chief  strictly  limited,  the 
right  of  war  vested  in  the  legislative  body,  a  rigid  economy  of 
the  public  contributions  and  absolute  interdiction  of  all  useless 
expenses,  will  go  far  toward  keeping  the  government  honest  and 
inoppressive." 

8  Ibid.  VI  (Washington  edition),  227. 

*  Ibid.  IX  (181 1),  322;  also  IX,  430,  435. 


1 66  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

is  not  ready  (1803)  for  the  exercise  of  complete 
political  liberty  and  should  obtain  it  only  "  in  propor- 
tion as  we  find  the  people  there  riper  for  receiving 
the  first  principles  of  freedom."^  Jefferson  points 
out  that  in  America  economic  conditions  favor 
democracy.''^  Here  every  one  owns  property  or/ 
is  at  least  so  well  situated  as  to  be  interested  in' 
the  maintenance  of  law  and  order.  It  seems,  then, 
that  "  such  men  may  safely  and  advantageously 
reserve  to  themselves  a  wholesome  control  over 
their  public  affairs  and  a  degree  of  freedom,  which, 
in  the  hands  of  the  canaille  of  the  cities  of  Europe, 
would  be  instantly  perverted  to  the  demolition  and 
destruction  of  everything  public  and  private."  Else- 
where he  remarks  that  the  Americans  will  continue 
to  be  virtuous  and  retain  their  democratic  form  of 
government  as  long  as  they  remain  an  agricultural 
people  ;  but  "  when  they  get  piled  upon  one  another 
in  large  cities,  as  in  Europe,  they  will  become  cor- 
rupt as  in  Europe."^  In  one  instance  he  even 
goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  people  here  "would 
go  on  as  well  under  an  absolute  monarch  while 
our  present  character  remains  of  order,  industry, 
and  love  of  peace."  * 

Jefferson  believed  fully  in  democracy  and  was 
confident  of  the  ultimate  triumph  of  the  system, 
but  he  was  too  keen  and  careful  an   observer  to 

1  Woj-ks,  VIII,  275.     Cf.  Paine,  to  the  same  effect. 

2  Ibiil  IX,  428;  IV,  479. 

8  Ibid.  IV,  479.  4  Ibid.  X,  31. 


THE  JEFFERSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  1 67 

think  that  all  people  were  capable  of  adopting  the 
American  system  in  his  day.  This  may  not  have 
been  in  harmony  with  his  ideas  on  natural  rights ; 
but  as  he  himself  said,  theory  and  practice  are  not 
always  in  accord,  and  "  the  habits  of  the  governed 
determine  in  great  degree  what  is  practicable." 

Some  interesting  Hght  is  thrown  on  Jefferson's 
philosophy  by  noticing  upon  what  systematic  pohti- 
cal  theorists  he  was  most  dependent,  and  which  of 
them,  in  his  opinion,  best  expressed  the  true  prin- 
ciples of  political  science.  From  the  classical 
writings,  Jefferson  apparently  derived  little  in- 
spiration. Aristotle  he  knew,^  but  thought  of  Httle 
value  ;  and  Plato's  writings  he  considered  as  so 
much  worthless  "  jargon."  ^  The  chief  source  from 
which  Jefferson  drew  his  inspiration  is  commonly 
supposed  to  have  been  the  philosophers  of  the 
eighteenth-century  democracy  in  France.  It  is 
often  said  that  his  head  was  turned  by  French 
ideas,  that  he  was  a  "  Rousseauist,"  and  that  the 
speculative  Jefferson  was  really  a  Frenchman. 
The  extent  of  the  French  influence  upon  Jeffer-  ^ 
son  was,  however,  far  less  than  is  generally  sup- 
posed. Montesquieu  and  Rousseau,  who  might 
be  presumed  to  have  had  a  large  share  in  deter- 
mining his  views,  seem  to  have  affected  him  very 
little.  Montesquieu  he  held  in  no  high  esteem. 
"  I  am  glad,"  he  says,  "  to  hear  of  anything  which 

1  Ibid.  VII  (Washington  edition),  31. 

2  Ibid.  IX,  462. 


1 68  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

reduces  that  author  to  his  just  level,  as  his  predi- 
lection for  monarchy,  and  the  English  monarchy 
in  particular,  has  done  mischief  everywhere,  and 
here  also  to  a  certain  degree."  ^  Rousseau  is  not 
discussed  or  recommended  for  reading  by  Jeffer- 
son ;  nor  do  the  latter's  theories  show  as  much  re- 
semblance to  Rousseau  as  to  other  French  writers. 
Jefferson  recommended  Condorcet's  Esquisse  cTjin 
Tableau  Historiqiie  des  Progrh  de  V Esprit  Huviain, 
and  probably  obtained  from  this  source  his  ideas 
on  human  "  improvability."  The  only  French 
work  cited  with  enthusiasm  is  that  by  Destutt 
de  Tracy,  Commcntaire  sur  V Esprit  des  Lois,  of 
which  Jefferson  had  a  translation  made  into  Eng- 
lish (1811),  so  that  it  might  circulate  freely  in  this 
country.  He  referred  to  Tracy's  work  as  the 
"  most  precious  gift  the  present  age  has  received,"  ^ 
"  giving  the  most  correct  analysis  of  the  principles 
of  government  which  has  yet  been  offered ; "  al- 
though he  did  not  agree  with  all  the  theories 
contained  in  it,  notably  the  doctrine  of  a  plural 
executive.^  But  this  work  did  not  appear  until 
long  after  the  early  and  more  radical  period  in 
Jefferson's  life  was  over.  The  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence antedated  it  by  thirty-five  years,  and 
Tracy  himself  had  been  influenced  in  no  small 
degree  by  American   publicists,  as  appears  from 

1  Works,  V  (Washington  edition),  535.     Cf.  VIII,  24. 

2  Ibid.  IX,  305,  500. 

3  Letter  to  Tracy,  ibid.  IX,  305. 


THE  JEFFERSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  1 69 

his  eulogy  of  our  federal  system  of  government. 
It  is  hence  impossible  to  impute  the  paternity  of 
Jefferson's  ideas  to  this  work.^ 

Indeed,  it  is  unnecessary  to  go  outside  of  the 
English  theory  of  politics  to  find  ample  precedent 
upon  which  Jefferson  might  draw.  In  the  English 
writers,  particularly  of  the  seventeenth  century,  are 
found  revolutionary  and  democratic  principles  of 
the  most  decided  character,^  anticipating  not  only 
Jefferson,  but  in  large  measure  Rousseau  himself. 
As  I  have  indicated  above,  when  Jefferson's  rivals 
wished  to  detract  from  his  fame  as  author  of  the 
Declaration,  they  could  point  to  the  substance  of 
this  instrument  in  the  words  of  Locke :  the  ideas 
were  the  common  property  of  the  time  —  not  bor- 
rowed from  Rousseau  or  Montesquieu.  Jefferson's 
theory  followed  a  line  of  thought  already  marked 
out  during  the  English  revolution  by  Milton,  Syd- 
ney, and  Locke,  and  taken  up  by  colonial  thinkers 
before  Rousseau  had  begun  to  write.^ 

When  called  upon  for  advice  as  to  the  best 
political  Hterature,  Jefferson  recommended  Locke 
and  Sydney  of  the  earlier  writers,  and  of  the  later : 
Priestley's  Essay  on  the  First  Principles  of  Govern- 
ment;  'Bwrgh' 5  Political  Disg7nsitions ;  Chipman's 
Sketches  of  the  Principles  of  Government ;  The  Fed- 

^  The  commentary  appeared  first  in  America,  and  eleven  years 
afterward  in  France  (1822). 

-  See  G.  P.  Gooch,  English  Democratic  Ideas  in  the  Seventeenth 
Century.  ^  See  ante,  Chap.  I. 


I70  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

eralist,  which  he  once  commended  as  "the  best 
commentary  on  the  principles  of  government  which 
was  ever  written,"  and  Tracy's  Commentaries. 
Jefferson  was  also  an  intimate  friend  of  Thomas 
Paine,  and  there  are  many  common  points  in  their 
theories.  In  a  letter  to  Paine  he  assured  him  that 
the  Americans  are  "firm  and  unanimous  in  their 
principles  of  republicanism,  and  there  is  no  better 
proof  of  it  than  that  they  love  what  you  write,  and 
read  it  with  delight.  The  printers  season  every 
newspaper  with  extracts  from  your  last,  just  as 
they  did  before  from  your  first  part  of  the  Rights 
of  Manr^ 

On  the  whole,  it  appears  that,  so  far  as  the  revo- 
lutionary character  of  his  theory  was  concerned, 
Jefferson  was  little  in  advance,  logically,  of  his 
predecessors.  The  difference  between  Jefferson 
and  Locke,  for  example,  was  not  so  much  in  fun- 
damental principles  as  in  the  development  of  and 
deductions  from  these  principles.  Jefferson  and 
Locke  were  both  democratic  and  revolutionary  in 
theory,  but  Jefferson  went  farther  than  Locke  in 
his  advocacy  of  democratization  of  the  government. 
Between  the  Ftmdafnental  Constitutions  of  Locke 
and  the  Jeffersonian  program  there  was  a  wide 
difference.  Locke's  attitude  toward  the  organi- 
zation of  the  government  was  wholly  aristocratic, 
while  that  of  Jefferson  was  essentially  democratic. 
They  agreed  in  their  destructive,  btit  not  in  their 

1  Works,  VI,  87. 


THE  JEFFERSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  171 

constructive,  program.  Both  were  opposed  to 
absolutism;  but  Locke  feared,  while  Jefferson  fa- 
vored, the  erection  of  a  "  numerous  democracy."  ^ 

In  conclusion,  what  should  be  said  of  Jefferson's 
rank  as  a  political  theorist .-'  The  important  service 
rendered  by  the  Sage  of  Monticello  was  not  the 
scientific  elucidation  of  theory.  The  doctrines  he 
advocated  had  all  been  discussed  and  developed 
long  before  his  time,  and  he  did  not  improve  much 
on  the  classic  analysis  of  Aristotle,  the  reasoning 
of  Locke,  or  the  brilliant  logic  of  Rousseau.  He 
cannot  be  classed  as  one  of  the  great  political  ^- 
thinkers.  He  did  not  in"c[uife  deeply  into  the  na- 
ture of  the  state,  its  forms  of  organization,  or  any 
of  the  numerous  problems  arising  out  of  the  com- 
plex relations  of  political  association.  He  did  not 
write  systematically  at  all,  and  what  he  did  write 
was  notable  rather  because  of  its  rhetoric  than 
because  of  its  scientific  depth  or  clearness.  Tested 
by  the  canons  of  the  schools,  Jefferson  falls  far 
short  of  the  stature  of  a  great  political  philosopher. 

What,  then,  shall  be  said  of  this  personality  so 
preeminent  in  the  annals  of  American  democracy  .■* 
What  was  the  source  of  his  power,  and  what  the 
significance  of  his  career .-'  One  great  cause  of  his 
power  was  the  unusual  sagacity  and  astuteness 
that   made   him   a   great   party   leader.     With   a 

1  See,  on  the  source  of  the  ideas  of  colonial  theorists,  Lewis 
Rosenthal,  "  Rousseau  in  Philadelphia,"  Magazine  of  American 
History,  XII,  46. 


172  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

"machine"  that  was  ill  organized,  if  organized  at 
all,  and  with  little  patronage,  Jefferson's  poHtical 
genius  guided  the  Republicans  on  to  the  destruc- 
tion of  their  rivals.  Another  cause  was  his  sin- 
gular gift  for  vivid  statement  of  popular  ideas. 
He  crystallized  the  common  democratic  sentiment, 
giving  it  form  and  power.  He  was  great  in  his 
ability  to  interpret  and  express  popular  feeling. 
And  finally,  he  had  great  confidence  in  the  people. 
He  believed  in  their  capacity  for  self-government, 
had  confidence  in  the  soundness  of  their  judgment, 
and  was  hopeful  of  the  future  of  democratic  insti- 
tutions. In  spite  of  the  many  inconsistencies  in 
his  conduct,  Jefferson  stands  out  as  the  great  apos- 
\K  tie  of  the  democratic  faith  in  his  day.  He  appeared 
as  the  advocate  of  the  "people"  against  the  claims 
of  "monarchists"  and  "aristocrats."  He  not  only 
defended  the  people  on  theoretical  grounds,  but 
he  was  identified  with  a  fairly  definite  program  of 
democratic  reform,  a  part  of  which  he  was  success- 
ful in  carrying  out,  and  much  of  which  was  real- 
ized later  under  the  Jacksonian  democracy.  He 
stood  for  the  extension  of  the  suffrage,  periodical 
revision  of  the  Constitution,  religious  liberty,  sub- 
ordination of  military  to  civil  authority,  the  main- 
tenance of  local  governments  as  a  barrier  against 
excessive  centralization,  and  for  a  certain  demo- 
cratic simplicity  in  place  of  the  elaborate  cere- 
mony of  kings  and  courts.  This  was  the  framework 
of  his  political  system,  while  the  Ufe  and  spirit  of 


THE  JEFFERSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  1 73 

it  was  faith  in  the  self-governing  capacity  of  the 
people. 

What  is  said  of  Jefferson  may  be  taken  as  typi- 
cal of  the  school  with  which  his  name  is  connected. 
He  organized  the  party,  furnished  its  poHcies  and 
its  principles,  and  for  eight  years  offered  a  prac- 
tical illustration  of  the  type  of  thought  for  which 
he  stood.  When  the  political  theory  of  Jefferson 
is  stated,  that  of  the  Jeffersonian  democracy  has 
been  outlined. 

In  conclusion  on  the  theory  of  this  epoch,  it 
may  be  said  to  have  begun  with  a  reaction 
against  democracy  and  to  have  closed  with  the  tri- 
umph of  the  popular  doctrines.  The  great  work 
of  the  reactionary  party  was  the  adoption  of  the 
Constitution  and  the  establishment  of  the  federal 
government  on  a  firm  basis.  Their  chief  concern 
was  with  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order,  and 
they  were  interested  only  secondarily  in  the  guar- 
anty of  human  rights.  This  was  the  secret  of 
their  success  and  the  cause  of  their  failure  as  well. 
In  the  accomplishment  of  their  task  they  necessa- 
rily antagonized  some  of  the  democratic  doctrines 
of  their  time ;  and  certain  of  the  leaders,  such  as 
Adams  and  Hamilton,  developed  and  expressed 
decidedly  aristocratic  ideas.  Notwithstanding  the 
explanations  made  at  a  later  date,  it  is  evident  that 
Adams  and  his  school  leaned  away  from  the  peo- 
ple; or  perhaps  it  would  be  more  accurate  and 


174  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

just  to  say  that  they  favored  strong  and  efficient 
government,  whether  popular  or  not.  If  they  must 
choose  between  strong  government  and  popular 
government,  they  would  stand  for  an  adequate  and 
effective  political  system.  When  once  the  central 
government  was  fairly  established,  the  opposition, 
aided  by  the  movement  in  France,  rapidly  gained 
strength,  and  soon  was  able  to  obtain  control  of 
the  administration.  Their  return  marked  the  re- 
action from  government  to  liberty  again.  Although 
guilty  of  much  misrepresentation  of  their  oppo- 
nents' position,  and  of  many  inconsistencies  in  their 
conduct,  the  Jeffersonian  Democrats  had  greater 
confidence  in  the  masses,  and  were  ready  to  do 
more  for  popular  government  than  was  the  conser- 
vative school.^  They  looked  forward  to  a  contin- 
ued process  of  democratic  development ;  the  other 
school  looked  backward  toward  the  long-tried  re- 
gime of  England,  half  expecting  a  return  to  an 
order  like  that  of  earlier  days,  when  the  demo- 
cratic impulse  had  spent  its  force. 

Notwithstanding  the  democratic  character  of 
the  Jeffersonian  theory,  the  program  involved 
in  this  was  by  no  means  carried  out.     Even  un- 

^  It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  in  1787  Jefferson  himself  enthu- 
siastically endorsed  Adams's  Defence.  "  I  have  read  your  book 
with  infinite  satisfaction  and  improvement,"  he  said.  "  It  will  do 
great  good  in  America.  Its  learning  and  its  good  sense  will,  I 
hope,  make  it  an  institute  for  our  politicians,  old  as  well  as 
young."  —  Letter  to  Adams,  1787.  Works  (Washington  edition), 
II,  128. 


THE  JEFFERSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  1 75 

der  the  democratic  regime,  there  still  remained  a 
strictly  limited  electorate,  property  qualifications, 
long  terms  of  office,  and  little  participation  of  the 
people  in  the  election  of  their  officers.  The  gov- 
ernment was  still  in  the  hands  of  the  freeholders 
and  the  gentry.  The  theory  of  the  Jeffersonians 
was  in  many  respects  an  advance  upon  that  of 
the  government  party,  but  its  practice  was  still  in 
many  ways  aristocratic.  The  development  of  de- 
mocracy was  begun  by  the  Jeffersonian  democracy, 
but  its  full  realization  was  left  for  another  time 
and  another  party. 


CHAPTER   V 

THE   JACKSONIAN    DEMOCRACY 

The  radical  movement  which  was  destined  to 
break  down  the  power  of  the  landed  aristocracy, 
level  the  old  barriers  of  exclusiveness,  and  open 
the  way  for  government  of  a  more  popular  char- 
acter, took  the  form  of  Jacksonian  Democracy. 
Its  leaders  made  few  contributions  to  democratic 
political  theory,  but  they  broadened  the  applica- 
tion of  principles  already  familiar.  By  expanding 
the  electorate,  a  revolution  was  made  in  the  basis 
of  the  democracy,  and  radical  changes  in  the 
superstructure  were  equally  conspicuous.  To  the 
more  important  features  in  this  movement,  atten- 
tion will  now  be  directed.^ 

r" — Two  great  forces  were  back  of  the  Jacksonian 

•  democracy.     These  were,  in    the   first   place,  the 

frontier   conditions   and   ideas   in   the   West   and 

|_^South ;  and,  in  the  second  place,  the  growth  of 

1  On  this  period,  see  J.  B.  McMaster,  United  States,  IV,  V; 
S.  N.  Thorpe,  Constitutional  History  of  the  American  People; 
H.  J.  Ford,  Rise  and  Growth  of  American  Politics;  F.  A.  Cleve- 
land, The  Growth  of  Democracy  in  the  United  States;  James 
Schouler,   Constitutional  Studies. 

176 


THE  JACKSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  1 77 

cities  and  an  industrial  class  J  By  1830  nine  new 
states  had  been  added  to  the  original  thirteen, 
and  by  1850  there  had  been  sixteen  admitted, 
of  which  only  two,  Maine  and  Vermont,  were 
not  on  the  Western  frontier.  In  these  new  states 
the  conditions,  economic  and  social,  were  highly 
favorable  to  the  development  of  the  democratic 
spirit.  Frontier  Hfe  tended  to  produce  self-rehance, 
independence,  and  individuality.  It  developed  a 
sense  of  equality  on  the  part  of  the  members  of 
the  community.  There  was  no  great  wealth,  no 
highly  polished^^ociety,  no  leisure  class,  and  no 
historic  tradition;  the  conditions  were  accordingly 
unfavorable  to  aristocratic  theory  or  practice.  To 
the  hardy  pioneers,  the  idea  of  a  jure  divino  king, 
an  hereditary  nobility,  or  a  specially  privileged 
class  was  ridiculous  in  the  extreme ;  while  reli- 
gious or  property  qualifications,  permanent  or  long 
tenure  of  office,  and  similar  restrictions  were  alto- 
gether unacceptable.  They  firmly  believed  in  the 
sovereignty  of  the  people,  and,  furthermore,  in 
the  necessity  of  giving  to  the  mass  of  the  popu- 
lation, as  far  as  possible,  the  direction  of  public 
affairs.  Anything  in  the  shape  of  special  privi- 
lege or  class  exclusiveness  became  at  once  an  ob- 
ject of  suspicion  and  distrust;  but  confidence  in 
the  people  was  always  met  with  hearty  applause, 
and  was  the  surest  way  to  popular  approval. 

A  second  cause  was  the  increase  of   the  city 
population,   and   the   development  of   other   than 


178  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

agricultural  pursuits.  By  reason  of  this  develop- 
ment there  came  into  existence  a  population  and 
a  set  of  interests  different  from  those  of  the  free- 
holders' aristocracy.  They  demanded  the  right  to 
\\/  share  in  the  active  exercise  of  political  power, 
exerted  pressure  in  this  direction,  and  helped  to 
bring  about  the  same  state  of  affairs  in  the  East 
that  was  being  realized  in  the  Western  and  South- 
ern states.  1 

'  This  democratic  tendency  found  expression  in 
national  politics  through  the  election  to  the  Presi- 
dency of  Andrew  Jackson.  In  his  personality  the 
new  leader  embodied  the  characteristics  of  the  new 
democracy.  His  defeat  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  the 
skilled  and  accomplished  statesman,  marked  the  ad- 
vent of  another  type  of  chief  executive  and  the 
end  of  a  long  line  of  the  old  school  Presidents. 
To  many  grave  thinkers,  the  election  of  Jackson 
seemed  the  triumph  of  "  King  Mob,"  and  portended 
the  ascendency  of  the  worst  elements  of  the  peo- 
ple, the  rule  of  an  ignorant  and  incapable  democ- 
racy. They  thought  that  republican  institutions 
were  threatened  with  the  very  gravest  danger,  and 
would  not  have  been  surprised  to  see  them  wholly 
subverted. 

The  importance  of  the  new  departure  was  soon 
felt  in  the  national  government.  The  President 
regarded  himself  as  the  representative  of  the  peo- 

1  See  on  this  point  the  debates  in  the  Massachusetts  Convention 
of  1820,  and  the  New  York  Convention  of  1821. 


THE  J  A  CKSONIAN  DEMO  CRA  CY  1 79 

,  pie,  and  asserted  the  rights  of  the  executive  against 
the  legislature  and  the  judiciary  as  they  had  never 
been  asserted  before.  In  the  days  when  state  consti- 
tutions had  first  been  formed,  overwhelming  predomi- 
nance had  been  given  to  the  legislative  department ; 
and  in  the  national  government  also,  Congress  had 
occupied  the  most  conspicuous  place  up  to  this  time. 
Congressmen  had  nominated  candidates  for  the 
Presidency  ;  had  already  directly  chosen  two  Presi- 
dents; their  law-making  power  had  seldom  met  with 
executive  check;  they  had  occupied  the  foremost 
place  in  the  direction  of  the  affairs  of  the  nation. 
In  the  days  of  Jackson,  the  rule  of  "King  Caucus" 
was  overthrown  in  favor  of  the  less  aristocratic 
nominating  convention.  The  long  dormant  veto 
power  was  brought  out  and  used  in  a  way  that  had 
never  been  thought  of  in  the  old  regime.  The 
constitutional  strength  of  the  executive  was  for 
the  first  time  revealed,  and  the  legislature  met  its 
first  decisive  check. 

Fear  of  the  executive  was  soon  aroused,  and  the 
most  painful  anticipations  of  presidential  tyranny 
were  expressed.  The  Whig  party  was  organ- 
ized in  opposition  to  what  its  leaders  considered 
the  abuse  of  the  executive  prerogative.  Clay, 
Calhoun,  and  Webster,  the  ablest  intellects  of  the 
time,  struggled  hard  in  defence  of  Congress,  de- 
nouncing the  action  of  the  President  in  the  most 
unsparing  terms.  Webster  said:  "The  contest 
for  ages  has  been  to  rescue  liberty  from  the  grasp 


l80  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

of  executive  power.  ...  To  this  end,  all  that 
could  be  gained  from  the  imprudence,  snatched 
from  the  weakness,  or  wrung  from  the  necessities 
of  crowned  heads,  has  been  carefully  gathered  up, 
secured  and  hoarded,  as  the  rich  treasures,  the 
very  jewels  of  liberty."  ^  The  executive,  he  urged, 
has  always  been  regarded  "  as  a  lion  which  must 
be  caged."  The  executive  power  is  not  the  de- 
fender of  liberty;  but  "our  very  security  depends 
upon  our  watchfulness  of  it."  The  President, 
he  denounced  as  "  a  Briareus  (who)  sits  in  the 
centre  of  our  system,  and  with  his  hundred 
hands  touches  everything,  moves  everything,  con- 
trols everything."  Clay  was  equally  vigorous  in 
his  attacks  on  the  executive.  The  power  of  the 
President,  he  said,  "  is  felt  from  one  extremity 
to  the  other  of  this  vast  republic.  By  means  of 
principles  which  he  has  introduced  and  innova- 
tions which  he  has  made  in  our  institutions,  alas  ! 
but  too  much  countenanced  by  Congress  and  a 
confiding  people,  he  exercises  uncontrolled  the 
power  of  the  State.  In  one  hand  he  holds  the 
purse,  and  in  the  other  brandishes  the  sword  of 
the  country.  Myriads  of  dependants  and  parti- 
sans, scattered  over  the  land,  are  ever  ready  to 
sing  hosannas  to  him,  and  to  laud  to  the  skies 
whatever  he  does.  He  has  swept  over  the  gov- 
ernment during  the  last  eight  years  like  a  tropical 
tornado.     Every  department  exhibits  traces  of  the 

1  Congressional  Debates,  Vol.  X,  Pt.  II,  p.  1681  (1834). 


THE  J  A  CKSONIAN  DEMO  CRA  CY  1 8 1 

ravages  of  the  storm."  ^  To  the  leaders  of  the 
Whigs,  indeed,  it  seemed  that,  as  in  the  seven- 
teenth century  in  England,  the  people  were  threat- 
ened by  the  power  of  the  executive,  and  should 
find^  their  natural  ally  in  the  legislature.  This  was 
clearly  expressed  by  Calhoun  when  he  said,  that 
he  considered  Congress  "the  great  central  point 
where  all  power  must  receive  its  sanction  and 
direction ;  "  and  that  the  large  amount  of  discre- 
tionary authority  which  must  under  every  govern- 
ment be  lodged  somewhere,  should  be  placed  in 
the  hands  of  the  legislature.  Still  more  radically 
this  theory  was  stated  at  times.  For  example, 
it  was  said  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate :  "  The 
executive  power  which  represents  the  common 
force  of  society  is,  in  every  just  theory,  and  in  the 
nature  of  things,  inferior  to  the  legislative  power, 
which  is  the  representative  of  the  common  intelli- 
gence and  the  common  will,  and  that,  too,  pre- 
cisely in  the  degree  to  which  brute  force  is  inferior 
to  reason."  ^  The  essence  of  the  Whig  doctrine 
was  that  the  legislature  is  naturally  the  closest 
representative  of  the  people,  and  that  the  execu- 
I  tive  should  be  an  object  of  constant  suspicion  and 
distrust.  ^ 

1  Ibid.  XIII,  Pt.  I,  p.  438  (1837).  Cf.  X,  Pt.  I,  p.  1314,  on  the 
Whigs  as  opponents  of  executive  prerogative. 

2  Ibid.  Vol.  XIII,  Pt.  I,  469. 

3  A  very  rhetorical  statement  of  the  anti-prerogative  men  was 
that  made  by  Mr.  Sprague  in  the  Senate,  January  29,  1834.  "  I  may 
be  deemed  an  alarmist.     There  is  cause  for  alarm.     When  one 


1 82  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

The  legislature,  however,  had  reached  the  climax 
{     of  its  power  in  the  days  of   the  Revolution,  and 
i     there  was  now  a  pronounced  reaction  against  that 
1     department.     This  was  one  of  the  most  significant 
U  points  in  Andrew  Jackson's   administration.     He 
Unannounced   himself   as  the   representative  of   the 
people  in  as  true  a  sense  as  the  Congress,  and  de- 
clared his  independence  of,  or  better,  his  right  to 
an  equal  rank  with,  the   other   two  departments. 
The  executive,  since  the  time  of   the  Revolution 
shorn  of  power,  again  found  strength  to  assert  him- 
-  self  in  the  affairs  of  state.     It  may  fairly  be  said 
that  one  of  the  first  fruits  of  the  new  democratic 
regime  was  a  decisive  victory  for  the  executive, 
/  representing   the   people,    over  the   congressional 
'  aristocracy  inherited  from  the  Revolution.     It  was 
the  old  story  over  again,  of  a  strong  executive  sup- 
ported by  the  masses  of  the  people  against  a  well- 
intrenched  aristocracy ;  and  the  victory  rested  with 
the  executive.     Jackson  undoubtedly  believed  that 
he  was  the  representative  of   the  people  against 
the  legislative  aristocracy ;  the  people  apparently 

man,  encroaching  upon  Congress,  the  Senate,  and  the  judiciary, 
arrests  and  rolls  back  the  course  of  legislation;  interprets  laws, 
treaties,  and  constitutions;  assumes  the  sole  power  of  appointment, 
—  holding  at  the  same  time  absolute  control  over  the  army,  the 
navy,  the  post-office,  an  affiliated  press,  and  the  whole  swarm  of 
executive  officers,  —  and  now  superadded  to  all  this,  tremendous 
money  power,  the  fiscal  agency  ingrafted  upon  banking  capital, — 
can  liberty  be  safe?  Safe  —  when  a  boa-constrictor  is  closing 
around  her  his  crawling  and  crushing  folds? " 


THE  JACKSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  183 

regarded  him  as  their  champion  in  the  conflict,  and 
were  wilUng  to  trust  him  with  great  powers  in 
order  to  insure  the  victory. 

A  similar  expansion  of  the  executive  power  is 
noticeable  in  the  individual  states.  In  fact,  the 
movement  began  there,  and  not  in  the  national 
government.  The  selection  of  the  governor  was 
'itaken  away  from  the  legislature  and  submitted  to 
the  direct  vote  of  the  people ;  ^  the  term  of  office 
was  materially  lengthened  ;  ^  the  great  weapon  for 
the  defence  of  the  executive  prerogative,  the  veto, 
was  in  general  vested  in  the  governor,^  and  also  a 
larger  share  of  the  appointing  power.  At  the 
same  time,  the  former  high  property  qualifications 
were  removed,  and  the  position  was  made  accessi- 
ble to  all  citizens  so  far  as  wealth  was  concerned. 
In  short,  there  arose  a  new  idea  in  regard  to  the 
executive  and  his  place  in  the  scheme  of  govern- 
ment. This  was  well  expressed  by  one  of  the  dele- 
gates to  the  New  York  Convention  of  1821.  "An 
erroneous  idea,"  said  he,  "  seems  to  have  prevailed 
in  relation  to  the  powers  and  origin  of  the  gov- 
ernor. Who  is  he  .''  and  by  whom  is  he  appointed  .-' 
Does  he  derive  his  authority  from  the  king  of  Great 
Britain  .''     Is  he  an  usurper  .-'     If  so,  let  us  unite  to 

1  Penn.,  1790;  Del.,  1792;  Ga.,  1824;  N.C,  1835;  Md.,  1837; 
N.J.  1844;  Va.,  1850. 

2  Penn.,  1790;  Ga,,  1789;  Va.,  1830;  Del,  1831;  N.C,  1835; 
Md.,  1837;  N.J.,  1844. 

3  Ga.,  1789;  Penn.,  1790;  N,H.,  1792;  Conn.,  i8i8j  N.J.,  1844 


1 84  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

depose  him.  But,  sir,  he  is  the  man  of  the  people 
—  elected  by  their  suffrages  and  identified  with 
their  interests.  He  is  a  watchful  sentinel  to  guard 
us  from  evil  and  a  zealous  friend  to  admonish  us 
of  error." 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  one  pronounced  feature 
of  the  democratic  movement  in  the  first  half  of  the  y 
century  was  the  elevation  of  the  executive  and  the 
degradation  of  the  legislative  power.  The  early 
distrust  of  the  executive,  which  once  took  the  form 
of  a  fear  that  monarchy  might  return,  had  disap- 
peared, and  also  the  early  confidence  in  the  legis- 
lature. Popular  suspicion  seemed  to  be  directed, 
not  so  much  against  a  tyrannical  monarchy,  as 
against  "encroaching  aristocracy."  The  public 
was  willing  to  intrust  large  power's  to  one  man, 
but  was  jealous  of  the  authority  of  a  legislative 
coterie,  or  a  "  banking  aristocracy,"  or  aristocracy 
in  any  shape  or  form.  As  has  often  been  the  case, 
the  instrument  by  which  the  aristocracy  was  over- 
thrown, in  this  instance  also,  was  a  powerful  execu- 
tive. In  the  national  field  this  change  centres 
around  the  career  of  Andrew  Jackson ;  in  the 
states  the  same  tendency  was  at  work,  readjust- 
ing the  balance  between  the  legislative  and  the 
executive  power. 

Another  point  in  national  administration  was  car- 
ried for  the  radical  democracy,  when  the  principle 
of  rotation  in  office  and  the  "spoils  system"  ob- 
tained recognition.     This  was  primarily  a  victory 


THE  J  A  CKSONIAN  DEMO  CRA  CY  1 8  5 

for  party  organization,  but  the  idea  of  rotation  in 

office   was   a   democratic   one.      This   result   had 

already  been  partly  achieved  by  the  provisions  in 

state  constitutions  for  short  terms  of  office,  and  in 

many  instances  by  limitations   upon    reeligibility. 

^  But  now  the  general  principle  was  accepted  that  all 

I     offices  should  be  held  for  short  terms  only,  in  order 

I    that  all  citizens  might  have  better  opportunity  to 

I     secure  a  position.     The  idea  rested  on  the  assump- 

Ttion  that  one  man  is  about  as  well  fitted  for  any 

^  office  as  any  other  man,  and  may,  therefore,    be 

(_safely  intrusted  with  official  responsibiHty.     It  was 

diametrically  opposed  to  the  doctrine  that  office 

should  be  held  on  the  ground  of  special  fitness, 

and  that  long  tenure  of  office  gives  one,  in  a  sense, 

a  vested  right  to  the  position. 

By  no  one  was  the  popular  notion  more  clearly 
stated  than  by  Jackson  himself  in  his  first  annual 
message  to  Congress.,'  Here  are  found  the  two 
ideas  on  which  the  new  system  rested ;  namely, 
that  experience  is  not  very  important  for  a  public 
servant,  and  secondly,  that  a  long  tenure  of  office 
is  actually  detrimental  to  good  pubhc  service. 
"There  are,  perhaps,  few  men,"  said  Jackson,  "  who 
can  for  any  great  length  of  time  enjoy  office  and 
power  without  being  more  or  less  under  the  influ- 
ence of  feelings  unfavorable  to  the  discharge  of 
their  public  duties."  And  again  he  argued  that "  the 
duties  of  all  public  officers  are,  or  at  least  admit  of 
being  made,  so  plain  and  simple  that  men  of  in- 


1 86  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

telligence  may  readily  qualify  themselves  for  their 
performance ;  and  I  cannot  but  believe  that  more 
is  lost  by  long  continuance  of  men  in  office  than  is 
generally  to  be  gained  by  their  experience."  He 
further  urged  that  the  proposed  measure  "would 
destroy  the  idea  of  property  in  office  now  so  gener- 
ally connected  with  official  station ;  and  although 
individual  distress  may  be  sometimes  produced, 
it  would,  by  promoting  that  rotation  which  consti- 
tutes a  leading  principle  in  the  republican  creed, 
give  healthful  action  to  the  system.''  Such  was 
the  doctrine  of  rotation  in  office  as  announced  by 
President  Jackson. 

;^^his  view  seems  to  be  that  experience  had  be- 
fore entering  office  is  unnecessary,  and  experience 
gained  after  entering  office  is  apt  to  make  the 
Lofficer  less  fit  to  serve  the  public.  John  Taylor, 
in  his  Inquiry,  asserted  that  more  talent  is  lost  by 
long  continuance  in  office  than  by  the  system  of 
rotation.  Talents  are  called  out  by  the  prospect 
of  employment,  and  "  smothered  by  the  monopoly 
of  experience."  On  the  floor  of  the  United  States 
Senate  it  was  predicted  that  in  time  opportunities 
will  be  enlarged,  "  till  it  shall  become  a  matter  of 
course  that  each  individual  shall  strive  to  qualify 
himself  to  discharge  the  duties  of  any  office  to 
which  he  may  be  called."  ^  It  was,  in  fact,  gener- 
ally believed  that  no  great  skill  is  necessary  for 
the  work  of  governmental  administration ;  and,  on 
1  Congressional  Globe  (1835),  23d  Congress,  1st  Session,  I,  273. 


THE  J  A  CKSONIAN  DEMOCRA  CY  1 87 

the  other  hand,  that  an  officer  long  in  the  pub- 
lic service  would  lose  sympathy  with  the  people, 
and  become  a  devotee  of  officialism  and  bureau- 
cracy. Life  estate  or  even  long  estate  in  office 
was  attacked  by  the  democracy  of  this  time  in  the 
same  way  that  monarchy  and  aristocratic  privilege 
had  been  at  an  earlier  time.  This  attack  was  one 
part  of  the  great  movement  which  swept  away 
what  was  left  of  privilege,  and  opened  the  way  for 
the  democratization  of  political  institutions.  That 
some  of  the  ideas  accompanying  this  advance 
should  be  crude,  radical,  or  extreme,  was  in  the 
nature  of  things  to  be  expected. 

One  of  the  most  important  measures  of  this 
period  was  the  general  extension  of  the  suffrage 
from  the  " propertyj^  basis  to  a  "manhood"  basis. 
This  change  went  down  to  the  very  roots  of  the 
political  society,  and  for  that  reason  deserves  the 
most  careful  attention.  At  the  time  when  the  re- 
public was  founded  there  were  very  strict  limita- 
tions on  the  electorate.  PoHtical  power  was  kept 
tightly  in  the  hands  of  the  freeholders,  who  were 
to  all  intents  and  purposes  "  the  people."  These 
qualifications  began  to  disappear,  however,  soon 
after  the  establishment  of  the  federal  government.^ 
Few  of  the  new  states  entering  the  Union  adopted 
the  property  requirement,  and  the  old  states  slowly 

1  On  this  point  see  the  authorities  already  cited,  Poore,  Char- 
ters and  Constittitions ;  and  the  debates  in  the  constitutional 
conventions  of  the  various  states. 


1 88  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

abandoned  the  restrictions  found  in  their  constitu- 
tions. Stubborn  resistance  to  the  tendency  was 
often  encountered,  notably  in  the  case  of  Virginia, 
New  York,  Massachusetts,  and  Rhode  Island ;  yet 
the  advance  was  sure,  no  backward  step  was  taken, 
and  by  the  middle  of  the  century  property  qualifi- 
cations for  suffrage  had  been  practically  abolished 
in  all  the  states.  A  few  restrictions  were  still  in 
existence,  but  these  were  not  oppressive  in  charac- 
ter, and  excluded  no  large  section  of  the  com- 
munity. In  the  majority  of  the  states,  however, 
even  these  restrictions  were  omitted,  and  the  broad 
principle  of  manhood  suffrage  (white)  received 
full  recognition.  The  old  property  qualifications 
were  outgrown  and  a  new  democracy  sprang 
up,  based,  not  on  the  freeholders,  but  on  the 
whole  body  of  adult  male  citizens.  The  electo- 
rate was  enormously  expanded,  and  there  came 
into  existence  a  type  of  democracy  which  made 
that  of  Revolutionary  days  seem  like  a  limited 
aristocracy. 

Recognition  was  won  for  this  new  idea  only  after 
a  bitter  and  protracted  struggle.  The  doctrine  that 
suffrage  should  depend  upon  property  was  tena- 
cious of  life,  and  clung  desperately  to  its  hold  on 
the  state  constitutions.  The  property  requirement 
was  supported  by  some  of  the  ablest  men  in  the 
nation,  and  it  is  from  one  point  of  view  surpris- 
ing that  the  opposite  principle  was  able  to  make 
headway  against  such  talented  advocates.     John 


THE  JACKSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  189 

Adams,  Daniel  Webster,  and  Joseph  Story  de- 
fended the  property  qualification  in  Massachu- 
setts. In  New  York  Chancellor  Kent  bitterly 
opposed  the  adoption  of  universal  suffrage ;  in 
Virginia  there  were  arrayed  against  the  exten- 
sion of  the  franchise,  Madison,  Monroe,  Marshall, 
Randolph,  and  Upshur.  The  opposition  to  the 
freehold  principle  could  boast  of  no  such  formid- 
able champions. 

The  earnestness  displayed  in  the  defence  of  prop- 
erty, and  the  abihty  with  which  the  cause  was  con- 
ducted, are  such  as  might  have  been  expected  from 
a  class  long  accustomed  to  the  possession  of  the 
right  to  govern.  To  this  dominant  class,  the  plan 
of  extending  the  suffrage  to  practically  all  male 
adults  appeared  to  be  fraught  with  the  very  grav- 
est danger.  The  project  seemed  to  them  to  be  with- 
out foundation  either  in  reason  or  in  justice,  and 
they  did  not  see  how  it  could  result  in  anything 
but  the  subversion  of  democratic  institutions.  The 
results  of  the  adoption  of  the  principle  of  uni- 
versal suffrage  as  predicted  by  the  famous  jurist, 
Kent,  were  the  abuse  of  Hberty,  the  oppression  of 
minorities,  the  disturbance  of  chartered  privileges, 
the  degradation  of  justice,  unequal  taxation,  crude 
and  unstable  legislation.  "  I  hope,  sir,"  said  the 
venerable  judge,  "we  shall  not  carry  desolation 
through  all  the  departments  of  the  fabric  erected 
by  our  fathers.  I  hope  we  shall  not  put  forward 
to  the  world  a  constitution  such  as  will  merit  the 


190  AMERICAN  POLITICAL   THEORIES 

scorn  of  the  wise  and  the  tears  of  the  patriot."  ^ 
On  every  hand,  it  was  urged  that  the  freeholders 
are  the  safest  and  most  conservative  depository  of 
political  power.  They  were  considered  as  the 
only  class  capable  of  actively  entering  into  politi- 
cal affairs.  Frequent  and  always  unfavorable  con- 
trasts were  drawn  between  the  solid  class  of  landed 
gentry,  and  the  commercial  and  laboring  classes 
found  in  the  cities,  with  the  uniform  conclusion 
that  political  power  might  be  most  safely  intrusted 
to  those  who  held  the  land.  This  idea  was  of 
course  connected  with  the  theory,  sanctioned  by 
Jefferson  himself,  that  a  democracy  thrives  best 
where  it  has  an  agricultural  population  as  its  basis. 
Profound  distrust  of  the  capacity  of  the  urban  popu- 
lation for  the  exercise  of  political  power  helped  ma- 
terially to  stiffen  the  resistance  made  by  the  ruling 
class  to  sharing  its  authority  with  others.^     From 

1  Debates  in  the  New  York  Convention  of  182 1,  219  fF.  In  the 
Virginia  Convention  of  1 829-1 830,  there  was  an  animated  and  ex- 
tended debate  in  which  almost  every  phase  of  political  opinion  was 
represented. 

2  Kent,  op.  cit.,  222.  In  the  New  York  Convention,  one  speaker 
referred  to  "  the  ring-streaked  and  speckled  population  of  our  large 
towns  and  cities,  comprising  people  of  every  kindred  and  tongue." 
p.  253.  Referring  to  the  commercial  classes,  Root  had  said  a  little 
before  this  :  "  Will  not  these  classes  feel  as  strong  an  interest  in  sus- 
taining them  (the  judges)  as  the  farmer  back  in  the  woods  ?  .  .  . 
Have  they  not  more  frequent  occasion  to  resort  to  them  for  the 
protection  of  their  rights?"  p.  223.  In  the  Virginia  Convention  one 
enthusiastic  orator  expressed  the  belief  that  "  if  there  are  any 
chosen  people  of  God,  they  are  the  cultivators  of  the  soil."  p.  366. 


THE  JACKSOXIAN  DEMOCRACY  191 

the  strength  displayed  by  the  old  aristocracy  at  this 
time,  one  may  judge  of  the  importance  and  the 
significance  of  the  new  democratic  movement.^ 

In  behalf  of  an  increase  in  the  electorate,  the 
argument  was  less  brilliantly  conducted,  but  was 
none  the  less  convincing  and  effective.  Sometimes 
the  plea  was  made  in  the  interest  of  the  commercial 
class,  or  the  laboring  men,  or  of  those  who  had 
done  military  duty  for  the  state,  but  were  never- 
theless excluded  from  participation  in  the  suffrage. 
Sometimes  it  was  asserted  that  the  franchise  is  a 
natural  right,  and  that  therefore  men  cannot  be 
justly  deprived  of  it ;  but  this  was  not  always  con- 
tended. ['The  greatest  difficulty  seemed  to  be  that 
of  uprootmg  the  idea  that  only  the  holders  of 
property  have  an  interest  in  government  strong 
enough  to  justify  giving  them  a  voice  in  its  direc- 
tion. The  proposition  that  men  who  own  no  land 
in  the  community  should  have  a  share  in  the  politi- 
cal power  was  contrary  to  long-established  English 
custom,  and  to  the  practice  in  America  since  the 
early  days  of  settlement  here.  The  introduction 
of  any  other  idea  was  necessarily  difficult. 
__  .The  case  of  the  liberals  was  most  clearly  stated 
j  in  the  argument  that  "  our  community  is  an  as- 
\  sociation  of  persons  —  of  human  beings  —  not  a 
j  partnership  founded  on  property."  Thus  the  re- 
sult was  made  to  turn  on  the  question  whether 

^  See  Debates  in  Massachusetts  Convention  of  1820;  New  York 
Convention  of  1821;  Virginia  Convention  of  1829-1830. 


192  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

property  or  human  personality  is  the  more  funda? 
mental  element  in  civil  society,  or  what  their  rela- 
tive importance  is.  One  party  denounced  the  rule 
of  mere  numbers  as  illogical  and  absurd,  and 
showed  that  it  is  wholly  impossible  to  carry  out 
the  principle  fully.^  The  other  party,  with  equal 
logic,  showed  that  if  property  were  the  only  consid- 
eration, voting  power  ought,  then,  to  be  proportioned 
according  to  wealth.  The  suffrage  extensionists,  in 
reply  to  the  property  argument,  laid  great  stress 
on  the  elements  of  virtue  and  intelligence  in  soci- 
ety, and  declared  these  were  as  worthy  of  consid- 
eration as  the  mere  ownership  of  a  tract  of  land. 
As  one  disputant  said,  there  is  nothing  in  property 
that  "  by  enchantment  or  magic  converts  frail,  err- 
ing man  into  an  infallible  and  impeccable  being." 
It  was  shown  that  the  non-freeholders  are  not 
eager  for  an  opportunity  to  plunder  the  rich,  but 
that  they  are  responsible  and  reliable  citizens  who 
may  safely  be  intrusted  with  the  exercise  of  politi- 
cal power.  This  assertion  was  pointed  by  the  fact 
that  many  citizens  who  owned  no  real  estate  were 
so  prosperous  and  wealthy  that  they  could  not 
well  be  looked  upon  as  untrustworthy  individuals 
who  would  use  the  ballot  to  the  perversion  of  the 
state. 

Slowly  the  old   idea   that   the   holders   of  real 

1  Randolph  referred  to  the  rule  of  "  King  Numbers."  The  reply 
was  made  that  "there  is  no  other  monarch  save  King  Cypher, 
King  Blood,  King  Sword,  or  King  Purse."      Virginia  Debates,  389. 


THE  JACKSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  1 93 

estate  are  the  political  people  was  discredited  and 
abandoned,  and  the  way  opened  to  practically  all 

J  citizens  of  mature  years.  The  land-holding  class 
abdicated,  and  the    mass   of   the   people  was  in- 

!  trusted  with  the  power  of  political  control.  This 
was  by  far  the  most  important  change  made  dur- 
ing the  Jacksonian  epoch,  for  it  radically  altered 
the  foundation  of  the  republic. 

At  the  same  time,  the  property  qualifications 
for  office-holding  became  unpopular  and  were  cast 
aside.  When  the  new  states  came  in,  these  re- 
quirements generally  found  no  place,  and  the  old 
states,  one  by  one,  abolished  the  severe  require- 
ments of  colonial  and  Revolutionary  days.^  A 
few  states,  notably  Delaware  and  Massachusetts, 
clung  persistently  to  these  early  provisions  or 
remnants  of  them  almost  down  to  the  end  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  but  they  were  exceptions. 
Generally  speaking,  by  the  middle  of  the  century 
property  qualifications  for  office  in  the  United 
States  were  a  thing  of  the  past.  Office  was  no 
longer  the  monopoly  of  the  few,  but  was  thrown 
open  to  all  so  far  as  wealth  was  concerned. 

With  these  restrictions  on  suffrage  and  office 
went  those  of  a  religious  character.     A  majority  of 
the    original    thirteen    states    disquahfied    Roman ' 
Catholics,  and  all  but  New  York  and  Rhode  Island 

1  Md.,  1810;  Penn.,  1838;  Mass.  (except  for  governor),  1840; 
N.J.,  1844;  Conn.  1845;  N.Y.,  1845;  Ga.,  1847;  Va.,  1850;  N.H, 
1852. 

O 


194  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

imposed  a  religious  test  of  some  kind.  These  re- 
strictions endured  for  only  a  short  time,  however, 
and  very  early  began  to  drop  out  of  the  state  con^ 
stitutions.  The  Protestant  clause  was  first  aban- 
doned, and  finally  the  religious  tests  were  omitted 
altogether ;  Protestant,  Roman  Cathohc,  Jew,  Uni- 
tarian, and  those  of  no  religious  profession  were 
placed  on  the  same  footing  in  the  political  world. 
The  tendency  of  the  time  was  wholly  opposed  to 
conditioning  political  rights  on  religious  considera- 
tions, and  although  the  case  was  ably  argued  by 
those  who  defended  such  restrictions,  they  were 
unable  to  make  effectual  resistance  to  the  demand 
that  religious  belief  and  political  capacity  should 
not  be  connected  by  the  law  of  the  land.^ 

With  the  abolition  of  these  tests  disappeared 
the  provisions  for  public  taxation  in  support  of 
churches  in  the  states  which  had  inherited  religious 
establishments  from  the  Revolution,  The  estab- 
lishment of  religion  had  been  forbidden  the  national 
government  in  the  Constitution,  and  the  same  pro- 
vision was  adopted  by  the  states  a  little  later.^  By 
1833  the  provisions  for  taxation  in  support  of  eccle- 
siastical organizations  had  been  abolished,  except 

^  See  the  argument  in  the  Massachusetts  Convention  of  1 820-1 821 
passim;  also  the  North  Carolina  Debates  (1835),  especially  the 
speech  of  Judge  Gaston  in  favor  of  religious  toleration,  264-305. 
Consult  in  this  connection  Phillip  Schaff,  Chu7-ch  atid  State  in  the 
United  States,  and  Sanford  H.  Cobb,  The  Rise  of  Religious  Liberty 
in  Atnerica. 

2  Va.,  1785;  S.C.,  1790;  Md.,  1810;  Conn.,  1818;  Mass.,  1833. 


THE  JACKSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  1 95 

in    New    Hampshire,    where    the    Revolutionary 
clause  is  still  found  in  the  constitution. 

Thus  was  completed  that  separation  of  church 
and  state,  which  has  since  been  a  characteristic 
feature  of  American  institutions.  The  idea  was 
early  stated  by  Jefferson,  but  was  not  at  that  time 
able  to  win  a  place  for  itself.  The  line  of  reason- 
ing, however,  was  substantially  that  which  was 
later  followed.  He  urged  that  rights  of  conscience 
were  not  surrendered  in  the  original  contract,  but 
were  retained  by  the  individual,  and  that  govern- 
ment has,  therefore,  no  jurisdiction  over  that  field. 
Government,  said  he,  can  interfere  only  in  respect 
to  such  acts  as  are  injurious  to  others;  but  "it 
does  me  no  injury  for  my  neighbors  to  say  there 
are  twenty  gods  or  no  god.  It  neither  picks  my 
pocket,  nor  breaks  my  leg."  He  denied  that  uni- 
formity of  belief  was  desirable,  pointing  out  the  ad- 
vantages arising  from  variety.  But  even  if  desir- 
able, such  uniformity  was  not  attainable  by  the  use 
of  coercion.  The  only  effect  of  the  use  of  force, 
he  maintained,  was  "  to  make  one  half  of  the  world 
fools,  and  the  other  half  hypocrites."  ^ 
^^ — -The  same  principle  was  strongly  stated  by  Mad- 
\  ison.  He  argued  that  state  support  of  religion  is 
/  unjustifiable  because,  in  the  first  place,  the  right  to 
.'  religion  is  inalienable.  It  is  a  duty  to  the  Creator, 
•  and  is  a  reserved  right  in  the  social  contract.  In- 
terference in  this  matter  violates  the  principle  of 

1  Notes  on  Virginia  (1784),  III,  261-266. 


196  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

equality  by  allowing  some  men  the  free  exercise  of 
religion,  and  forbidding  it  to  others.  It  gives  the 
legislature  unwarranted  jurisdiction,  and  confers 
power  on  civil  magistrates  to  act  as  judges  of  re- 
ligious truth  —  a  capacity  in  which  they  are  not 
fitted  to  serve.  Such  measures,  he  urges,  are  not 
needed  for  the  advancement  of  the  Christian  re- 
ligion, nor  do  they  tend  to  strengthen  the  civil 
government.  The  effect  of  an  attempt  to  enforce 
such  laws  is  simply  "to  enervate  the  law-s  in 
general  and  to  slacken  the  bands  of  society."^ 

The  abolition  of  religious  tests  and  church  e-stab- 
lishment  during  this  period  was  a  recognition  of 
these  ideas.  In  general  the  line  of  reasoning  fol- 
lowed was  about  that  indicated  by  Jefferson  and 
Madison.  The  underlying  cause  seems  to  have 
been  the  multiplicity  of  sects,  which  was  highly 
favorable  to  mutual  toleration,  rather  than  antip- 
athy to  religion  as  such. 

Another  feature  of  the  democratic  movement 
during  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  was 
the  increasing  participation  of  the  people  in  the 
election  of  their  officers.  In  the  earlier  period 
this  power  had  been  largely  in  the  hands  of  the 
legislature,  and  hence  the  choice  of  officers  was, 
to  that  extent,  indirect.  With  the  increasing  em- 
phasis on  the  people,  however,  and  the  reaction 
from  the  early  confidence  in  the  legislatures,  there 

1  "  Remonstrance  to  the  General  Assembly  of  Virginia  on  the  sup- 
port of  religious  teachers"  (1785).      Works,  I,  162-169. 


THE  JACKSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  1 97 

came  a  decided  change.  Elections  were  taken  out 
of  the  hands  of  the  legislative  bodies,  and  officers 
were  chosen  directly  by  the  popular  vote.  In  the 
national  government,  popular  voting  under  the  dis- 
trict system  took  the  place  of  election  by  the  legis- 
lature in  the  choice  of  representatives  in  the  House, 
and  the  choice  of  presidential  electors  was  also 
taken  away  from  the  legislature.  In  the  states  a 
tendency  in  the  same  direction  was  clearly  evi- 
dent. The  choice  of  governor  was  taken  away 
from  the  legislature  and  conferred  upon  the  people, 
thus  rendering  him  less  dependent  upon  the  legis- 
lative branch  of  government.  Other  officers,  such 
as  the  treasurer  and  the  auditor,  were  given  over 
to  popular  election  in  place  of  choice  through  the 
legislature.  Many  minor  officers  were  also  made 
directly  elective,  such  as  clerks  of  court,  sheriffs, 
and  justices  of  the  peace.  The  theory  upon  which 
this  action  rested  was  that  the  legislature  is  a 
more  or  less  aristocratic  body,  and  that  the  people 
should  participate  directly  in  the  choice  of  their 
officers. 

In  this  same  connection  should  be  noticed  the 
popular  opposition  to  certain  elements  in  the  judi- 
cial system,  which  were  considered  as  aristocratic. 
The  courts,  state  as  well  as  national,  were  objects 
of   suspicion  and    often  of   open    hostility.^     The 

1  See  McMaster,  Vol.  Ill,  153  ff.,  for  account  of  "judge-break- 
ing" in  Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  and  New  Hampshire;  Burgess, 
Middle  Period,  195  ff. 


198  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

Federal  Supreme  Court  was  feared  because  of  its 
alleged  encroachment  upon  the  rights  of  the  indi- 
vidual states,  but  the  commonwealth  courts  also 
met  with  opposition  from  the  newly  awakened 
democratic  sentiment.  This  desire  to  put  a  check 
on  the  judiciary  was  expressed  in  two  ways; 
.,  namely,  by  an  abbreviation  of  the  judicial  term  of 
\  office,  and  by  constitutional  provision  for  the  elec- 
tion of  the  judges  by  the  people.  In  the  early  days 
of  the  Republic,  the  tenure  of  the  judges  had  gen- 
erally been  during  good  behavior.  Life  tenure, 
however,  was  obnoxious  to  the  new  democracy,  and 
was  repudiated  as  occasion  offered,  particularly  in 
the  South  and  West,  and  also  in  some  of  the 
Eastern  states.^  The  tenure  for  life  was  replaced 
by  a  shorter  term  of  from  five  to  fifteen  years,  six, 
seven,  and  eight  years  being  the  most  common 
periods  allotted.  Popular  election  of  the  judges 
was  less  easily  carried  through  than  the  shortening 
of  the  term.  At  first,  provision  was  made  for  the 
election  of  justices  of  the  peace  and  minor  officers, 
but  toward  the  middle  of  the  century  popular  elec- 
tion of  the  higher  courts  began  to  find  general 
favor.  This  movement  was  looked  upon  with 
alarm  by  the  conservative  class,  but  the  idea  made 
rapid  progress  as  constitutions  were  constructed 
and  reconstructed,  and  soon  won  a  general  victory. 
In  the  period  from  1846  to  1853,  no  fewer  than 

1  Of  the  old  states,  Penn.,  1838;  N.J.,  1844;  N.Y.,  1846;  Va., 
1850;   Md.,  185 1. 


THE  JACKSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  1 99 

thirteen  states  recognized  the  elective  principle 
in  the  choice  of  judicial  officers  of  the  highest 
grades.!  Thus,  with  the  abandonment  of  life 
tenure  of  office  and  the  adoption  of  a  popular  sys- 
tem of  judicial  election,  the  democracy  triumphed 

A  in  the   third    great   branch  of   government  —  the 

(J  judiciary. 

Another  evidence  of  the  democratic  tendencies 
of  this  period  is  the  method  in  which  changes  in 
the  fundamental  law  were  made.  Of  the  Revolu- 
tionary constitutions,  only  two  were  submitted  to 
the  people,  the  others  being  adopted  by  conven- 
tion alone.  By  1830  the  practice  of  submitting 
constitutions  to  a  popular  vote  for  ratification  had 
become  frequent;  and  in  the  period  from  1830  to 
1850  only  two  constitutions  went  into  operation 
without  having  received  popular  sanction  at  the 
polls.2 

Summing  up  the  democratic  movement  of  this 
period,  we  have  the  following  results.  The  elec- 
torate was  largely  increased  by  the  abolition  of 
property  qualifications.  Religious  and  property 
requirements  for  office-holding  were  abandoned, 
terms  of  office  were  shortened,  the  principle  of 
"rotation  in  office"  was  accepted,  provision  was 

1  Cal.,  la.,  Ky.,  La.,  Md.,  Mich.,  Mo.,  N.Y.,  Ohio,  Penn.,  Tenn., 
Va.,  Wis. 

-  Del.,  1831;  Ark.,  1836.  Cf.  Cleveland,  op.  cit.,  113;  Jameson, 
Constitutional  Conventions. 


200  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

made  for  popular  election  of  ofificers,  the  legislative 
department  of  government  became  an  object  of 
suspicion,  and  the  executive  was  correspondingly 
advanced  in  popular  favor.  These  numerous  and 
important  changes  marked  the  rise  of  a  new 
democracy,  widely  different  from  that  of  Revolu- 
tionary times,  or  the  early  days  of  the  Republic. 
The  new  type  of  government  was  as  much  an 
advance  on  that  of  the  Revolutionary  period,  as 
that  of  those  days  was  upon  the  contemporary 
government  in  England.  The  only  exception  to 
the  democratic  movement  was  the  position  in  re- 
gard to  slavery.  In  the  Southern  states,  accom- 
panying the  democratic  changes  in  government, 
there  were  laws  of  increasing  severity  in  respect 
to  those  held  in  bondage.  With  this  exception, 
the  new  democracy  had  taken  the  country  by 
storm. 

In  spite  of  these  marked  democratic    changes, 
there  was  little  advance  in  the  fundamental  princi- 
ples of  political  theory.     The  Jacksonian  democ- 
racy carried  out  in  large  measure  the  ideas  which 
,  the  Jeffersonian  democracy  either  had  not  thought 
of  carrying  out,  or  was  unable  to  carry  out.     The 
j  theory  was  not  new,  but  such  a  wide   application 
Lof  these  ideas  was  a  decided  innovation.     In  fact, 
there  was  on  some  points   a   perceptible  reaction 
from  the  principles  of  1776.     This  was  notable  in 
the  case  of  the  contract  theory,  A!^ch  was  sub- 
jected to  important   modifications.     Story,  for  ex- 


THE  JACKSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  20I 

ample,  held  that  the  doctrine  of  the  contract 
"  requires  many  limitations  and  qualifications  when 
applied  to  the  actual  condition  of  nations,  even 
of  those  which  are  most  free  in  their  organization. 
Every  state,  however  organized,  embraces  many 
persons  in  it  who  have  never  assented  to  its  form 
of  government,  and  many  who  are  deemed  in- 
capable of  such  assent,  and  yet  who  are  held  bound 
by  its  fundamental  institutions  and  laws."  ^  On 
the  other  hand,  Calhoun  and  his  associates,  who 
upheld  the  cause  of  slavery,  repudiated  altogether 
the  "  natural  right "  theory  of  politics  and  came  out 
boldly  with  another  doctrine.  With  these  two  ten- 
dencies coincided  that  of  the  German  refugee, 
Lieber.  Thus  the  Revolutionary  theory,  although 
still  widely  accepted  and  defended  by  many  writers 
and  thinkers,^  was  already  seriously  undermined. 
Although  the  organization  of  the  government  and 
the  spirit  of  social  institutions  was  more  demo- 
cratic than  before,  there  were  strong  evidences  of 
a  change  in  the  character  of  the  political  theory. 
This  movement  was  in  the  direction  of  a  new 
basis  for  democracy  —  a  new  theory  of  republican 
institutions,  fundamentally  different  from  that  of 
the  founders  of  the  Republic.     The  nature  of  this 

^  Commenlaries,  sec.  327. 

2  See  Considerations  upon  the  Nature  and  Tendency  of  Free  In- 
stitutions (1848),  by  Frederick  Grimke  —  a  diffuse  work  covering 
the  entire  field  of  politics;  Nathaniel  Chipman,  Principles  of  Politics 
(1833;,  I  St  edition,  1793. 


202  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

new  philosophy  will  be  considered  in  a  subsequent 
chapter  on  modern  tendencies.^ 

1  Attention  may  be  called  at  this  point  to  a  change  in  the  preva- 
lent theory  as  to  the  form  of  the  contract  upon  which  society  rests. 
In  Revolutionary  times  it  was  a  common  opinion  that  the  parties  to 
the  agreement  were  the  king,  or  government,  and  the  people.  The 
later  thinkers  distinctly  repudiated  any  contract  between  governor 
,and  governed,  and  held  that  the  agreement  was  one  between  indi- 
viduals. The  governors,  it  was  held,  were  not  parties  to  a  contract, 
but  the  mere  agents  or  servants  of  the  people.  Cf.  Madison,  Works, 
IV,  63J   John  Taylor,  Inquiry,  424;   James  Wilson,  Works,  I,  272. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF  THE  SLAVERY 
CONTROVERSY 

One  of  the  most  interesting  developments  of 
political  theory  in  the  United  States  is  that  which 
arose  out  of  the  controversy  over  slavery  in  the 
years  between  1830  and  i860.  During  the  period 
of  the  Revolution  and  the  early  days  of  the  Re- 
public the  general  sentiment  was  unfriendly  to  slav- 
ery. ^  The  existence  of  the  custom  was  lamented 
by  such  men  as  Washington,  Jefferson,  Monroe, 
and  Adams.  There  was  general  regret  that  the 
institution  had  ever  been  planted  in  America,  and 
it  was  hoped  that  it  would  in  time  be  abandoned. 
In  the  Northwest  Ordinance  of  1787  the  anti- 
slavery  principle  was  recognized,  and  later  in  the 
aboUtion  of  the  slave  trade.  Slavery  was  gradually 
abolished  in  the  Northern  states,  and  the  Coloniza- 
tion Society  represented  the  desire  to  put  an  end 
to  it  in  the  South.  No  effort  was  made  to  defend 
the  institution  or  to  present  it  as  an  ideal  basis  for 

1  William  Poole,  Anti-Slavery  Opinions  before  1800;  S.  B. 
Weeks,  "  Anti-Slavery  Sentiment  in  the  South,"  in  Pttblications  oj 
the  Southern  History  Association  (i{ 

203 


204  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

the  political  and  economic  structure  of  a  society. 
At  best,  slavery  was  regarded  as  a  necessary 
evil. 

Certain  influences  were  at  work,  however,  that 
tended  to  bring  the  question  of  slavery  into  greater 
and  greater  prominence.  On  the  economic  side, 
there  was  the  invention  of  the  cotton  gin  and  other 
contrivances  which  made  possible  the  rapid  ex- 
pansion of  the  cotton  industry,  and  thus  offered 
new  fields  for  the  employment  of  slave  labor.  On 
the  political  side,  the  territorial  expansion  of  the 
United  States  precipitated  a  bitter  struggle  as  to 
the  status  of  the  new  acquisitions,  and  gave  rise 
to  problems  of  the  gravest  character.  And, 
finally,  like  oil  on  the  flames,  came  the  agitation 
of  the  Abolitionists.  The  beginning  of  the  period 
of  controversy  may  be  placed  at  1830.  In  that 
year  occurred  the  July  Revolution  in  France; 
Q  in  1831  the  Southampton  massacre  in  Virginia; 
I  and  in  the  same  year  the  foundation  of  the  Bostofi 
1  Liberator.  During  the  thirty  years  following  this 
time,  while  the  conflict  between  slavery  and  anti- 
slavery  was  at  its  height,  the  doctrines  of  both  sides 
were  fully  stated,  and  the  philosophy  of  slavery 
discussed  in  all  its  aspects. 

In  the  course  of  this  discussion  many  different 
sides  of  the  question  were  considered.  From  the 
economic  point  of  view  inquiry  was  made  as  to 
whether  slavery  was  or  was  not  a  profitable  insti- 
tution, and  how  it  compared  with  the  system  of 


THE  SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  20$ 

free  labor.^  From  the  constitutional  point  of  view, 
questions  of  profound  importance  were  discussed, 
involving  the  power  of  Congress  in  the  territories, 
the  admission  of  new  states,  the  concept  of  United 
States  citizenship.  From  the  ethical  side,  inquiry 
was  made  to  determine  whether  the  relations  of 
slave  and  master  rested  on  a  proper  moral  basis. 
There  was  also  discussion  from  the  standpoint  of 
rehgion  as  to  whether  slavery  was  contrary  to  the 
principles  of  Christianity,  and  particularly  as  to 
whether  slavery  was  sustained  by  the  Scriptures. 
And  finally,  there  was  an  animated  controversy  as 
to  whether  the  status  of  slavery  is  consistent  with 
the  principles  of  political  science.  This  is  the 
inquiry  which  forms  the  subject  of  this  chapter. 
Upon  what  theory  was  the  practice  of  slavery 
defended,  upon  what  principles  was  the  attack 
upon  it  conducted .''  What  was  the  political  theory 
of  the  anti-slavery  forces  .-"  What  was  the  political 
theory  of  the  pro-slavery  party  .-•  How  were  they 
related  to  each  other  t 

The  bitterest  attacks  on  slavery  were  made  by 
the  Abolitionists,  but  they  were  not  the  only  or 
perhaps  the  typical  opponents  of  the  system.  The 
forms  which  the  anti-slavery  theory  took  were 
many  and  various,  ranging  from  the  statesmanlike 
views  of  such  men  as  Lincoln  to  the  radical  utter- 

1  On  this  point  see  H.  R.  Helper's  work,  The  Impending  Crisis 
of  the  South  (1859).  With  this  compare  Southern  Institutes,  by 
G.  S.  Sawyer,  a  member  of  the  Louisiana  Bar  (1859). 


206  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

ances  of   the  extreme  Abolitionists  of   the  Garri- 
sonian  type.^ 

In  this  discussion  an  analysis  will  be  made  of 
three  forms  of  the  anti-slavery  theory  :  first,  the  / 
theory  of  the  radical  Abolitionists;  second,  the 
philosophic  argument;  and  third,  the  doctrine  of 
the  statesmen.  These  theories  are  not  very  much 
different  in  final  analysis,  but  in  form  they  show 
divergences  which  should  be  noted.  This  method 
of  classification  is,  no  doubt,  open  to  certain  objec- 
tions, but  is  perhaps  useful  in  distinguishing  the 
various  shades  of  political  thought. 

The  impulse  to  the  anti-slavery  crusade  was 
given  by  the  radical  Abolitionists,  and  their  doc- 
trines and  tendencies  may  therefore  be  first  con- 
sidered. This  group  of  agitators  differed  from  the 
conservative  class  in  that  they  demanded  the  im- 

^  On  this  period,  see  James  Schouler,  History  of  the  United- 
States ;  Hermann  von  Hoist,  The  Constitutional  History  of  the 
United  States ;  J.  W.  Burgess,  The  Middle  Period;  Henry  Wilson, 
History  of  the  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Slave  Power ;  J.  F.  Rhodes, 
History  of  the  United  States  ;  J.  C.  Hurd,  The  Law  of  Freedom  and 
Bondage.  For  statements  of  the  anti-slavery  theory,  see  William 
Jay,  Miscellaneous  Writings  on  Slavery  (1853);  William  Goodell, 
Slavery  and  Anti- Slavery  (1852);  Richard  HWdreXh,  Despotism  in 
America  (1854);  Wendell  Phillips,  Works;  Daniel  R.  Goodwin, 
Southern  Slavery  in  its  Present  Aspects  ( 1 864) ;  Albert  Barnes,  The 
Church  and  Slavery  (1857),  Scriptural  Views  of  Slavery  (1856); 
T.  S.  Goodwin,  The  Natural  History  of  Secession  (1865);  Debates 
in  Congress,  especially  Sumner  on  the  crime  against  Kansas,  1856, 
1st  Session,  34th  Congress,  Appendix.  An  excellent  summary  of  the 
situation  is  given  by  J.  E.  Cairnes  in  The  Slave  Power  (1862). 


THE   SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  207 

mediate  and  unconditional  abolition  of  slavery  with- 
out concession  or  compromise.  They  differed 
from  the  philosophic  group  in  that  they  reasoned 
in  general  less  strictly  and  carefully,  being  given 
to  action  rather  than  to  reflection.  The  funda- 
mental premise  of  the  Abolitionists  was  about  the  / 
same  as  that  expressed  in  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence ;  namely,  that  all  men  are  created  equal 
and  are  endowed  with  a  number  of  inalienable 
rights,  which  are  independent  of  all  government, 
and  cannot  justly  be  taken  away  by  any  govern- 
ment. They  regarded  liberty  as  a  birthright  of 
man,  and  not  as  a  privilege  to  be  enjoyed  under  cer- 
tain conditions.  Consequently,  they  looked  upon 
slavery  as  a  piece  of  monstrous  injustice  to  those 
deprived  of  their  natural  liberty. 

In  the  platform  of  the  National  Anti-Slavery 
Society  (1833)  the  following  declaration  was  made  : 
"The  right  to  enjoy  liberty  is  inalienable.  To 
invade  it,  is  to  usurp  the  prerogative  of  Jehovah. 
Every  man  has  a  right  to  his  own  body,  to  the 
products  of  his  own  labor,  to  the  protection  of 
the  law,  and  to  the  common  advantages  of  society." 
With  this  general  statement  of  principle  perhaps 
all  the  opponents  of  slavery  could  agree ;  but  with 
the  violent  conclusion  drawn,  not  all  were  in  har- 
mony. This  conclusion  was  that  "  all  those  laws 
which  are  now  in  force,  admitting  the  right  of 
slavery,  are,  therefore,  before  God,  utterly  null  and 
void."     It  was  characteristic  of  the  Abolitionists, 


208  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

however,  to  be  intolerant  of  delay,  and  to  demand 
immediate  emancipation.  They  did  not  believe 
in  postponing  the  day  of  liberation,  because  they 
could  not  see  the  necessity  for  any  long  period  of 
preparation.  They  considered  that  liberty  is  an 
innate  faculty  of  man,  and  that  he  requires  no 
special  training  for  its  effective  exercise.  "Lib- 
erty," said  one,  "being  the  birthright  of  every 
man,  the  natural  and  normal  condition  of  his 
existence,  all  the  preparation  he  needs  for  its  en- 
joyment is  born  with  him.  He  gets  his  fitness  for 
liberty  as  he  gets  his  hands  and  feet — not  by  edu- 
cation, but  by  inheritance."  It  was  expressly  de- 
nied that  a  good  government  is  fit  only  for  the 
best  of  people,  that  is,  "the  most  wise,  virtuous, 
and  intelligent."  If  this  were  true,  it  was  said, 
then  one  might,  with  equal  logic,  maintain  that 
"bad  children  should  have  bad  parents,  or  that 
sick  people  should  have  worse  treatment  than 
those  in  health."  ^ 

To  those  holding  such  views,  the  argument  for 
the  postponement  of  emancipation  because  of  the 
unfitness  of  the  negro  was  looked  upon  as  fallacious 
and  dangerous.  "  Gradualism,"  as  it  was  termed, 
was  repudiated  at  every  point.  "  Has  not  the 
experience  of  centuries  shown,"  said  Garrison,  "that 
U  gradualism  in  theory  is  perpetuity  in  practice  ? " 
Acting  on  this  principle,  they  attacked  and  over- 

1  William    Hosmer,    The   Higher   Law   (1852);    see  especially 
Chap.  XIII,  on  the  Capacity  of  Slaves  for  Civil  Government. 


THE   SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  2Qi^ 

threw  the  Colonization  Society,  denounced  slavery 
as  a  "  combination  of  death  and  hell,"  branded  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  as  a  "  covenant 
with  death  and  an  agreement  with  hell,"  and 
declared  for  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  Inability 
to  see  any  possible  justification  for  the  institution 
of  slavery  led  them  to  say  of  slaveholders:  "They 
ought  not  to  be  allowed  seats  in  Congress.  No 
political,  no  religious  copartnership  should  be  had 
with  them,  for  they  are  the  meanest  of  thieves  and 
the  worst  of  robbers.  We  should  as  soon  think 
of  entering  into  a  compact  with  the  convicts  at 
Botany  Bay  and  New  Zealand.  .  .  .  We  do  not 
acknowledge  them  to  be  within  the  pale  of  Chris- 
tianity, of  republicanism,  of  humanity."  ^ 

The  ultra-radical  wing  of  the  Abolitionists  did 
not  stop  at  denunciation  of  slavery  and  of  the 
United  States  government  for  failing  to  put  an  end 
to  it.  They  went  on  to  denounce  all  systems  of 
government  as  such..  This  doctrine  took  the  form  ^ 
of  the  "  non-resistance  "  or  "  no-government  theory,"  ""^ 
of  which  Garrison  and  Noyes  were  the  great 
champions,  and  of  which  the  New  England  Non- 
Resistance  Society  was  an  organized  expression. 
This  body  declared  in  1838  that  its  members  could 

1  Boston  Liberator  (1841).  Garrison  said  on  one  occasion,  that 
his  manner  of  expressing  himself  was  unpleasant  because  of  its 
plainness  and  directness.  He  could,  he  said,  "  be  as  smooth  and 
politic  as  any  one,  but  I  do  not  so  choose,  and  much  prefer  nature 
to  art."  Life  of  Garrison,  by  W.  P.  and  F.  J.  Garrison. 
P 


2IO  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

not  "acknowledge  allegiance  to  any  human  govern- 
ment," nor  would  they  oppose  any  such  government 
by  resort  to  physical  force.  In  accordance  with 
this  principle  they  disclaimed  any  particular  love 
for  the  United  States.  "  We  love  the  land  of  our 
nativity,  it  was  said,  only  as  we  love  all  other  lands. 
The  interests,  rights,  liberties  of  American  citizens 
are  no  more  dear  to  us  than  those  of  the  whole 
human  race."  They  recommended  that  no  physi- 
cal force  be  employed  either  for  or  against  their 
fellow-men  ;  that  all  should  refuse  to  hold  office  or 
to  vote,  and  none  should  invoke  the  aid  of  the 
courts.! 

The  principle  on  which  this  action  or  inaction 
was  based  was  that  of  opposition  to  coercion  as  a 
means  of  securing  obedience.  The  use  of  violence 
they  looked  upon  as  a  wholly  irrational  and  un- 
-Christian  way  of  maintaining  order.  Since  all 
governments  are  based  on  this  principle,  it  follows 
that  they  are,  "  in  their  essential  elements  and  as  at 
present  administered,  all  anti-Christ ;  that  they  can 
never  by  human  wisdom  be  brought  into  conformity 
with  the  will  of  God."^  If  this  is  true,  then  all 
Christians  are  obHgated  "  to  come  out  now  and  be 
separated  from  the  kingdoms  of  this  world."     All 

1  This  idea  had  also  a  religious  basis  in  the  "  holiness  "  or  per- 
fectionist movement.  The  non-resistance  idea  was  also  adopted  by 
various  socialistic  organizations.  See  J.  H.  Noyes,  History  of 
American  Socialism, 

2  Garrison's  Life,  II,  202. 


I( 


THE   SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  211 

governments,  whether  despotic,  monarchical,  or 
republican,  are  to  be  supplanted  by  the  "  King  of 
Kings  and  Lord  of  Lords,  who  is  to  rule  in  righteous- 
ness." ^  The  laws  of  this  kingdom  are  written 
upon  the  hearts  of  men,  not  upon  parchment ;  they 
depend  not  on  human,  but  on  divine  wisdom ;  the 
weapons  of  this  kingdom  are  not  carnal,  but  spiritual. 
It  was,  therefore,  urged  upon  all  Christians  to  with- 
draw their  allegiance  from  any  human  government, 
and  regard  themselves  as  subjects  of  the  kingdom 
of  God  only. 

The  following  statement  gives  an  adequate  sum> 
mary  of  the  views  of  this  party  :  "As  every  human 
government  is  upheld  by  physical  strength,  and 
its  laws  are  virtually  enforced  at  the  point  of  the 
bayonet,  we  cannot  hold  any  office  which  imposes 
upon  its  incumbents  the  obligation  to  compel  men 
to  do  right  on  pain  of  imprisonment  or  death.  We 
therefore  voluntarily  exclude  ourselves  from  every 
legislative  and  judicial  body  and  repudiate  all  human 
poUtics,  worldly  honors,  and  stations  of  authority. 
...  \i  we  cannot  occupy  a  seat  in  the  legislature 
or  on  the  bench,  neither  can  we  elect  otJters  to  act 
as  our  substitutes  in  any  such  capacity.  It  follows 
that  we  cannot  sue  any  man  at  law  to  compel  him 
by  force  to  restore  anything  which  he  may  have 
wrongfully  taken  from  us  or  others ;  but  if  he  has 

1  See  the  letter  of  Noyesto  Garrison  (March,  \%yf),Life,\\,  145- 
148.  In  1837  Noyes  nominated  Jesus  Christ  for  President  of  the 
United  Statej. 


212  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

seized  our  coat,  we  shall  surrender  up  our  cloak 
rather  than  subject  him  to  punishment."  ^ 

The  capture  and  return  of  fugitive  slaves  in 
the  midst  of  free  communities  occasioned  fre- 
quent expressions  of  the  right  of  resistance  to 
government,  and  in  some  cases  of  even  more  radi- 
cal sentiments.  In  his  famous  nth  of  March 
speech,  Seward  declared  that  "there  is  a  higher 
law  than  the  Constitution,"  and  maintained  that 
slavery  was  contrary  to  the  laws  of  God.  ^  In  the 
famous  Van  Zandt  case,  Chase  argued  that  the  fu- 
gitive slave  law  was  unconstitutional,  Decause  the 
Constitution  is  a  "free  constitution."^  It  was  de- 
signed, he  said,  "  to  estabhsh  as  written  law  cer- 
tain great  principles  of  natural  right  and  justice, 
which  exist  independently  of  all  such  sanction." 
Slavery,  he  declared,  was  contrary  to  natural  right, 
and  "  no  legislature  can  make  right  wrong,  or  wrong 
right."  Even  if  there  are  no  express  restrictions 
in  the  Constitution,  "there  are  certain  vital  prin- 
ciples in  our  national  government  which  will  as- 
certain and  overrule  an  apparent  and  flagrant  abuse 

1  Declaration  of  sentiments  adopted  at  the  Peace  Convention 
held  in  Boston,  September  18-19,  1838. 

2  Congressional  Globe,  31st  Congress,  ist  Session,  Appendix. 
Cf.  Frederick  Bancroft,  The  Life  of  Seward,  I,  242  ff.  Seward 
refused  to  explain  what  he  meant  by  "  higher  law,"  or  what  its 
practical  application  would  be. 

■^  An  argument  for  the  defendant,  submitted  to  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  at  the  December  term,  1846,  in  the  case 
of  Whartor  Jones  v,  John  Van  Zandt,  93. 


THE  SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  213 

of  legislative  power."  He  further  declared  that 
no  court  was  bound  to  regard  an  unjust  law,  but  on 
the  contrary  was  obligated  to  refrain  from  enforc- 
ing the  provisions  of  any  such  act. 

In  a  time  when  statesmen  like  Seward  and  Chase 
could  speak  like  this,  it  was  to  be  expected  that 
more  radical  men  would  go  much  farther  in  this 
direction.^  A  striking  example  of  this  was  the 
treatise  on  Civil  Disobedience  by  the  famous 
author,  Thoreau  (1849).  Evidently  exasperated 
beyond  all  bounds  by  the  attitude  of  the  govern- 
ment, state  as  well  as  national,  Thoreau  expressed 
his  opinion  of  government  in  general,  in  terms  by 
no  means  flattering.  He  declared  that  the  best 
government  is  no  government  at  all,  and  that 
when  ipen  are  fully  developed,  they  will  have 
none.  The  value  of  government,  he  did  not 
estimate  very  highly.  It  is  at  best  an  expedi- 
ent, said  he,  but  "  most  governments  are  usually, 
and  all  governments  are  sometimes,  inexpedient."^ 
Even  in  America  government  accomplishes  but 
little,  for  what  has  been  done  here  is  due  largely 
to  the  character  inherent  in  the  American  people, 
and  this  would  have  accomplished  even  more,  "  if 

1  Cf.  The  Higher  Law  in  its  Relation  to  Civil  Government  with 
Particular  Reference  to  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law,  by  William  Hosmer, 
1852;  C.  K. \\Tiipple,  The  Non- Resistance  Principle,  with  PartictP- 
lar  Application  to  the  Help  of  Slaves  by  Abolitionists  (i860). 

2  Cf.  Slavery  in  Massachusetts  (1854).  With  Thoreau  compare 
Emerson's  individualistic  theories,  contained  in  the  essays  on  Self- 
Reliance  and  Politics. 


214  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

the  government  had  not  sometimes  got  in  its  way." 
Government  is,  indeed,  very  often  a  hindrance  to 
human  activity.  "  Trade  and  commerce,"  said 
Thoreau,  "  if  they  were  not  made  of  india-rubber, 
would  never  manage  to  bounce  over  the  obstacles 
which  legislators  are  continually  placing  in  their 
way."  Whenever  government  comes  into  conflict 
with  conscience,  the  former  must  yield.  One  must 
be,  said  he,  in  his  expressive  phrase,  a  man  first  and 
a  subject  afterward.  In  view  of  the  attitude  of  our 
government  toward  slavery,  he  maintained  that  no 
one  could  conscientiously  associate  himself  with  the 
-American  political  system,  but  must  withdraw  the 
support  given  to  it,  whether  in  the  shape  of  per- 
sonal service  or  of  a  contribution  of  property  as 
taxes.  If  a  few  men  would  adopt  this  policy  and 
adhere  to  it  for  a  time,  he  felt  confident  that  both 
war  and  slavery  would  soon  be  given  up.  Doubt- 
less this  might  involve  the  imprisonment  of  the 
person  offending ;  but  in  this  case  the  prison  is  the 
"  only  home  in  a  slave  state  in  which  a  free  man 
can  abide  with  honor.  "  ^  It  is  true  that  one  who 
resists  the  government  may  find  it  difficult  to  live 
in  as  great  comfort  as  he  might  otherwise  enjoy. 

1  Thoreau  himself  acted  on  this  principle  and  spent  one  night  in 
jail  as  a  consequence  —  a  punishment  he  was  disposed  to  ridicule, 
however.  "  I  saw,"  said  he,  "  that  the  state  was  half  witted,  that  it 
was  as  timid  as  a  lone  woman  with  her  silver  spoons,  and  that  it  did 
not  know  its  friends  from  its  foes,  and  I  lost  all  my  remaining  re- 
spect for  it  and  pitied  it." 


THE  SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  215 

"You  must  hire  or  squat  somewhere,  and  raise  but 
a  small  crop  and  eat  that  soon,"  but  this  may  well 
be  done  for  the  sake  of  a  clear  conscience.  It  was 
ingeniously  suggested,  however,  that  one  is  not 
obligated  to  forego  any  advantage  offered  him  by 
the  state,  since  he  is  really  at  war  with  the  common- 
wealth, and  on  this  basis  is  entitled  to  take  from 
the  enemy  whatever  he  can  get. 

No  government,  said  Thoreau  (and  this  is  the 
beginning  and  the  end  of  his  theory),  can  have  any 
/  "  pure  right  over  my  person  and  property  but  what 
/  I  concede  to  it."  We  have  progressed  from  abso- 
lute to  limited  monarchy,  thence  to  democracy ; 
but  it  is  possible  to  take  one  step  more  in  organiz- 
ing the  rights  of  man.  The  ideal  state  must  regard 
the  individual  as  "  a  higher  and  independent  power," 
from  which  its  own  authority  is  derived,  and  must 
treat  him  accordingly. 

Such  was  the  theory  of  the  radical  Abolitionists, 
and  this  is  the  direction  in  which  it  led.  It  has 
already  been  stated  that  the  fundamental  premise 
in  the  political  philosophy  of  this  school  was  the 
original  and  inalienable  liberty  of  all  men.  Starting 
from  this  highly  individuahstic  premise,  it  is  easy 
to  see  how  the  most  radical  conclusions  were 
reached,  even  the  abolition  of  government,  or 
refusal  to  take  any  part  in  it,  and  in  other  cases  re- 
fusal to  affiliate  with  any  of  the  churches.^     To  such 

1  For  an  exposition  of  the  tendencies  of  ultra-radical  Abolitionism, 
see  the  Life  of  William  Lloyd  Garrison,  by  W.  P.  and  F.  J.  Garrison. 


2l6  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

men  as  Garrison,  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves 
was  only  a  small  part  of  the  program.  They 
believed  in  the  broader  idea  of  "  universal  emancipa- 
tion," by  which  they  understood  "the  emancipation 
of  our  whole  race  from  the  dominion  of  man,  from 
the  thraldom  of  self,  from  the  government  of  brute 
force,  from  the  bondage  of  sin.  This  was  emanci- 
pation evolved  into  a  mystical  and  transcendental 
sort  of  "  Perfectionism,"  marked  by  a  coming-out 
from  the  church  and  the  state.^  It  would  of  course 
be  unfair  to  suggest  that  all  Abolitionists  indorsed 
such  doctrines  as  these,  but  to  the  radical  wing  they 
were  acceptable,  and  the  tendency  of  Abolitionism 
was  necessarily  radical. 

Radical  Abolitionism  was  in  fact  only  a  part  of 
a  larger  movement  which  swept  over  the  North. 
t '  Transcendentalism,  idealism,  humanitarianism,  were 
dominant  in  the  philosophy  of  the  time  during 
which  the  anti-slavery  crusade  was  at  its  height. 
Religious  and  social  reforms  of  every  description, 
genuine  and  sham,  were  eagerly  taken  up  and  were 
propagated  with  the  greatest  enthusiasm.  In  the 
religious  world  these  tendencies  found  expression 
in  a  decided  liberal  movement  which  sometimes 
took  the  form  of  a  demand  for  no  rehgion  at  all. 
New  sects  arose  with  strange  doctrines ;  the 
Mormons,  for  example,  made  many  converts  at  this 

1  The  "  come-outers "  believed  in  coming  out  of  the  churches 
on  account  of  their  failure  to  take  a  proper  stand  on  the  slavery 
question. 


THE  SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  21/ 

time,  while  the  Millerites  proclaimed  and  awaited 
confidently  the  advent  of  the  millennium.  Social- 
istic ideas  flourished,  and  experiments  such  as  those 
of  Brook  Farm  and  Icaria  were  undertaken.  A 
vigorous  assault  was  made  upon  Masonry  and  a 
powerful  political  party  formed  on  the  basis  of 
this  idea  alone.  The  temperance  movement  was 
actively  carried  on  and  won  notable  victories. 
The  agitation  for  women's  rights  was  begun,  and 
able  champions  of  the  cause  appeared.  The 
environment  was  favorable  to  the  rapid  and 
rank  growth  of  reforms  and  crusades,  many  of 
them  utterly  impracticable,  but  all  of  them 
pushed  on  with  the  greatest  devotion  and  en- 
thusiasm. Abolitionism  was  only  one  part  of  a 
/great  current  of  liberal  and  humanitarian  senti- 
l  ment  that  was  sweeping  over  the  country.  The 
frequent  blending  of  the  anti-slavery  movement 
with  these  other  tendencies  made  it  still  more 
difficult  for  the  South  to  understand  or  to  value 
properly  the  real  significance  of  the  anti-slavery 
agitation. 

A  more  philosophic  presentation  of  the  anti- 
slavery  theory  was  that  made  by  a  certain  group 
of  thinkers  of  which  William  E.  Channing  ^  and 
Francis  Wayland  ^  were  the  ablest  representatives. 

— '    ^  Essays  on  Slavery  (1835). 

2  The  Elements  of  Moral  Science,  by  Francis  Wayland,  president 
of  Brown  University  (1835),  0°^  ^^  ^^  strongest  works  on  the  anti- 
slavery  side. 


2l8  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

The  method  of  these  men  presents  a  decided  con- 
trast to  the  simple  style  and  language  of  Lincoln, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  to  the  fiery  utterance^s^  of 
the  Garrisonian  Abolitionists  on  the  other.  ^  The 
starting-point  in  this  theory  was  the  proposition 
that  every  man  is  a  rational  and  moral  being.  As 
such,  he  must  be  recognized  by  all  as  a  person, 
and  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  thing  merely.  He  is 
an  end  and  purpose  in  himself  and  cannot  be 
a  mere  instrurnent  to  accomplish  the  ends  or 
purposes  of  others.  He  is  a  person,  and  cannot, 
philosophically,  ethically,  or  politically,  be  justly 
deprived  of  all  the  prerogatives  of  personality. 
..All  men,  it  was  asserted,  are  equal  in  the  essential 
and  fundamental  elements  of  their  humanity.  All 
men  are  endowed  with  a  rational  nature  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  animals ;  all  men  are  gifted 
with  the  faculty  termed  conscience ;  all  men  have 
the  capacity  for  development.  These  attributes  are 
common  to  humanity,  the  universal  characteristics 
of  rational  beings;  in  these  respects  all  men  are 
equal. 

Endowed  with  these  high  characteristics,  all 
moral  beings  possess  certain  rights,  which  may  be 
summed  up  as  the  right  to  exercise  one's  powers 
and  to  promote  the  happiness  and  virtue  of  one's 
self  and  others,  as  one  sees  fit,  and  so  far  as  one 
does  not  interfere  with  the  equal  rights  of  others. 
A  more  specific  enumeration  is  found  to  include 
the  following.    All  men  as  rational  and  moral  beings 


THE   SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  219 

have  a  right  to  exercise  and  develop  their  intellect ; 
they  have  a  right  to  inquire  into  their  duty  ;  to  be 
respected  by  others  in  accordance  with  their  moral 
worth ;  to  receive  a  fair  equivalent  for  their  labor ; 
to  sustain  domestic  relations;  and  other  such  funda- 
mental rights  arising  from  the  fact  that  man  is  a 
moral  personality.  These  rights  are  the  preroga- 
tives of  every  individual.  He  cannot  give  them  up 
if  he  would  ;  they  are  inherent  and  inalienable,  an 
essential  part  of  his  nature,  indispensable  to  the 
proper  performance  of  his  function  in  the  world. 
These  rights  must  not  only  be  regarded  by  other 
individuals,  but  they  must  be  respected  and  main- 
tained by  the  government.  "  Right,"  says  Chan- 
ning,  "is  older  than  human  law.  Law  ought  to  be 
its^  voice."  Considerations  of  expediency  should 
not  be  allowed  to  weigh  against  these  rights,  for  the 
good  of  the  individual  is  really  of  more  importance 
than  the  welfare  of  the  state.  It  is  a  more  sacred, 
exalted,  enduring  interest  than  any  accessions  of 
wealth  or  power  to  the  body  politic.^  It  was  con- 
ceded, however,  that  there  are  extreme  cases  in 
which  these  rights  may  be  suspended  for  their  ulti- 
mate and  permanent  security,  and  in  the  interest  of 
the  community  at  large. 

The  conclusion  was,  then,  that  slavery,  which  is 
subversive  of  all  these  rights,  must  be  regarded  as 
fundamentally  unjust —  a  usurpation  of  the  sacred 
prerogatives  of  humanity.     Slavery  makes  of  man 

^  Channing,  op.  cit.,  47. 


220  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

a  thing,  a  piece  of  property,  whereas  he  is  essen- 
tially  and  primarily  a  person.  It  constitutes  a 
system  that  cannot  possibly  be  justified  on  any 
rational  basis. 

Furthermore,  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  influ- 
ence of  slavery  was  unfavorable  to  the  growth  of 
democracy.  The  spirit  of  liberty,  it  was  said,  can- 
not liy^  and  flourish  in  an  atmosphere  of  human 
slavery.  Free  institutions  rest  upon  the  basis  of  a 
love  of  liberty,  but  this  is  destroyed  or  impaired  by 
the  practice  of  slavery.  The  contempt  for  human 
rights  as  manifested  in  the  treatment  of  the  slave 
leads  to  a  universal  contempt  for  all  the  rights  of 
men,  and  must  bring  on  a  general  decline  of  the 
spirit  of  liberty.  Democracy,^  it  was  said,  implies 
that  one  has  learned  to  obey  as  well  as  to  com- 
mand. In  a  slaveholding  community  the  habit  of 
command  is  acquired,  but  that  of  obedience  is  little 
cultivated,  except  by  the  slaves.  Hence  the  ten- 
dency is  to  make  men  arrogant  and  imperious, 
and  consequently  ill-adapted  for  democracy.  The 
claim  was  made,  therefore,  that  the  influence  of 
slavery  is  ultimately  fatal  to  the  liberty-loving  spirit 
upon  which  free  government  rests.  Democracy  can- 
not exist  with  slavery  as  its  basis.  If,  as  some  say, 
democracy  is  dependent  upon  a  slave  system,  then 
such  a  government  is  scarcely  worthy  of  perpetu- 
ation. "  Those  who  tell  us,"  said  Channing,  "  that 
slavery  is  a  necessary  condition  of  a  republic,  do 
1  Channing,  loo. 


THE  SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  221 

not  justify  the  former,  but  pronounce  a  sentence  of 
reprobation  on  the  latter."  ^ 

In  brief,  then,  what  we  have  called  the  philo- 
sophical argument  against  slavery  was,  that  every 
rational  moral  being  has  the  right  to  develop  his 
own  powers,  is  an  end  or  purpose  in  himself,  and 
cannot  justly  be  held  as  property  by  any  other  man. 
Slavery  was  therefore  regarded  as  a  status  con- 
trary to  the  rights  of  every  or  any  human  being. 
rlt  was  conceded  that  the  community  is  justified 
,  in  imposing  a  certain  degree  of  restraint  upon  its 
members,  but  emphatically  denied  that  slavery  is  a 
proper  means  for  this,  since  it  amounts  to  the  per- 
manent subversion  of  all  rights.  The  tendency 
"with  this  school  was  altogether  toward  the  consid- 
eration of  the  rights  of  the  individual  in  contrast  to 
t^ose  of  the  community.  What  they  were  endeav- 
oring to  do,  was  to  show  that  in  every  political 
system  a  large  field  of  autonomy  should  be  left  to 
the  individual,  and  that  only  under  exceptional 
circumstances  should  he  be  reduced  to  a  condition 
where  he  would  enjoy  no  rights  at  all. 

One  of  the  ablest  and  certainly  the  most  repre- 
sentative statement  of  the  anti-slavery  theory  was 
that  made  by  the  great  leader  of  the  conservative 
emancipation  party  —  Abraham  Lincoln.  His  rea- 
soning was  not  that  of  an  agitator  or  of  a  philoso- 
pher ;  yet  it  was  profound,  it  was  stimulating,  and  it 

1  Ibid.,  103.  Cf.  Richard  Hildreth,  Theory  of  Politics  (1853). 
also  Despotism  in  America  (1854). 


222  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

was  politically  masterful.  Since  it  represented  the 
rbpinion  of  a  large  group  of  men  who  were  neither 
radical  Abolitionists  nor  acute  philosophers,  the  the- 
ory he  advanced  is  worthy  of  careful  examination. 
As  Lincoln  viewed  the  situation,  there  should  be 
no  repudiation  of  the  teaching  of  the  Declaration 
that  all  men  are  created  equal.  He  firmly  believed 
\  that  that  doctrine,  properly  understood  and  applied, 
I  should  still  be  regarded  as  a  foundation  principle 
/_  of  free  government.  He  would  not  admit  that 
the  Declaration  was  intended  to  apply  only  to  the 
British  colonists,  or  to  the  whites  alone,  or  to  any 
class  or  caste  of  men  ;  but  he  did  not  interpret  this 
statement  to  mean  that  all  men  are  equal  in  all 
respects.  The  Fathers  "did  not  mean  to  say 
all  were  equal  in  color,  size,  intelligence,  moral  de- 
velopment or  social  capacity."  ^  What  they  did 
mean  was  that  "  all  men  are  equal  in  the  possession 
of  certain  inalienable  rights  among  which  are  life, 
liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness."  It  was  not 
understood  that  all  men  are  exactly  equal  in  all  re- 
spects, nor  was  it  intended  to  confer  political  equal- 
ity upon  all  men  alike  and  immediately.  This  was 
not  the  purpose  of  the  founders  of  the  republic. 
They  meant  merely  "to  declare  the  right  so  that 
enforcement  of  it  might  follow  as  soon  as  circum- 
stances should  permit."  The  Declaration  was  in- 
tended to  be,  and  in  fact  is,  a  fundamental  principle 
to  serve  as  an  ideal  for  free  society,  "  constantly 
1  Works,  I,  232. 


THE   SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  223 

looked  to,  constantly  labored  for,  and  even  though 
never  perfectly  attained,  constantly  approximated, 
and  thereby  constantly  spreading  and  deepening  its 
influence,  and  augmenting  the  happiness  and  value 
of  life  to  all  people  of  all  colors  everywhere."^ 
Not  only  is  it  to  serve  as  an  ideal  toward  which 
men  should  struggle,  but  it  is  also  to  prevent  a  re- 
turn to  the  past  —  an  impressive  warning  "  to  all 
those  who  in  after  times  might  seek  to  turn  a  free 
people  back  into  the  hateful  paths  of  despotism." 

To  the  institution  of.,  slavery,  therefore,  Lincoln 
was  wholly  opposed.  He  did  not  demand  for  the 
negro  equal  social  and  political  privilege  with  the 
white,  but  on  the  contrary  expressly  disclaimed 
any  such  desire.  He  did  claim  for  the  black  man 
"  the  right  to  put  into  his  mouth  the  bread  that  his 
own  hands  have  earned,"  and  asserted  that  in  this 
respect  he  is  the  equal  of  every  other  man.  The 
fact  that  others  are  more  highly  endowed  cannot 
be  used  to  justify  them  in  depriving  their  inferior 
of  the  little  that  he  does  have.  The  alleged  right 
of  the  superior  to  enslave  the  inferior  man,  he 
regarded  as  contrary  to  justice  and  the  principles 
of  all  free  government.  "  No  man,"  said  Lincoln, 
"  is  good  enough  to  govern  another  man  without 
that  other's  consent."  ^  "When  the  white  man 
governs  himself,  that  is  self-government ;  but  when 
he  governs  himself  and  also  governs  another  man, 
that  is  more  than  self-government  —  that  is  despot- 

1  Ibid.  2  Jbid,  I,  195. 


224  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

ism."  The  whole  argument  from  the  right  of  the 
superior  to  enslave  and  oppress  the  inferior,  he 
denounced  as  identical  in  object  and  effect  with  the 
old  plea  for  "classification,  caste,  and  legitimacy." 
Whatever  form  this  reasoning  may  assume,  it  is  in 
reality  "  the  same  old  serpent "  ;  it  is  a  principle 
essentially  hostile  to  free  and  popular  government. 

Such  doctrines,  he  argued,  are  "  the  vanguard, 
the  miners  and  sappers,  of  returning  despotism." 
These  ideas  must  be  driven  out  not  only  for  the 
sake  of  the  black  man,  but  in  the  interest  of  the 
white  as  well,  for  they  are  a  menace  to  his  own 
equality  and  freedom.  It  must  not  be  supposed 
that  freedom  and  slavery  can  permanently  endure 
side  by  side.  One  must  overthrow  the  other,  and 
one  principle  be  everywhere  recognized.  "This 
is  a  world  of  compensation,"  said  Lincoln,  "  and  he 
who  would  be  no  slave,  must  consent  to  have  no 
slave.  They  who  deny  freedom  to  others,  deserve 
it  not  for  themselves,  and  under  a  just  God  can- 
not long  retain  it."  Thus  Lincoln  not  only  main- 
tained that  this  nation  could  not  permanently 
endure  half  slave  and  half  free,  but  also  formulated 
the  universal  law  that  freedom  and  slavery  cannot 
permanently  exist  side  by  side. 

Lincoln  believed  that  there  are  two  great  the- 
ories of   society.  -^      According  to  the  "  mud-sill " 

r"- ' 
1  Annual  address  before  the  Wisconsin  Agricultural  Society  at 
Milwaukee  (1859).     Works,  I,  580  ff.     See  also  II,  105.     Annual 
Message  to  Congress  (1861). 


THE  SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  225 

V  theory,  cajDital  always  takes  precedence  of  labor, 
and  must  be  honored  and  rewarded  accordingly. 
'  Capital  employs  either  hired  laborers  or  slaves, 
both  of  which  classes  tend  to  remain  in  their  de- 
'  pendent  position.  Education  and  labor  are  re- 
garded as  incompatible,  while  the  educated  and  the 
laboring  classes  are  separated  by  a  sharp  dividing 
line.  "  A  Yankee  who  could  invent  a  strong- 
handed  man  without  a  head  would,"  said  Lincoln, 
"  receive  the  everlasting  gratitude  of  the  'mud-sill' 
advocates.^ 

According  to  the  other  theory,  labor  is  prior  to 
and  independent  of  capital.     The    laborer  is  not 
■  limited  to  the  so-called  laboring  class ;  for  there  is 
j  a   large  group  of   those  who  "  mingle    their  own 
labor  with  capital."      All   men  are  or  should   be 
educated,  so  that  the  sharp  distinction  between  the 
educated  and  the  laboring  classes  tends  to  disap- 
pear.   This  system,  which  Lincoln  champions,  opens 
i  the  way  to  all,  inspires  all  with  hope,  and  tends  to 
I-  develop  energy  and  to  improve  the  condition  of  all. 
It  is  evident,  then,  that  Lincoln  looked  upon  the 
conflict  between  slavery  and  its  adversaries  as  one 
part  of  the  great  struggle  between  liberty  and  des- 
potism, and  believed  that  American  slavery  could 
not   long   be   tolerated   without   endangering   the 
foundations  of   American  liberty.     In  his  opinion 
slavery    and    despotism    were    inextricably    inter- 
woven.    He  did  not,  however,  demand  the  imme- 
diate emancipation  of  the  slaves,  nor  did  he  ask 
Q 


226  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

or  expect  that  they  be  placed  on  terms  of  entire 
equality  with  the  whites.  Admitting  the  inequality 
of  the  races,  he  did  not  think  it  logical  or  expedient 
to  conclude  that  the  inferior  race  should  be  wholly 
deprived  of  political  rights.  Such  a  course  he 
considered  as  selfish  and  unjust,  and  sure  to  bring 
retribution  upon  those  who  attempted  it. ; 

This  is,  in  general  outline,  the  anti-slavery  theory. 
In  spite  of  the  widely  different  forms  in  which  the 
idea  was  stated  by  agitators,  philosophers,  and 
statesmen,  there  was  a  fundamental  agreement 
underneath  all  this  diversity.  The  point  of  union 
was  the  belief  that  all  men  are  created  equal,  and 
are  endowed  with  certain  natural  rights  which  must 
everywhere  be  respected.  In  every  form  of  theory 
the  very  term  "  slavery  "  was  assumed  to  be  synony- 
mous with  injustice,  and  scarcely  any  argument 
was  needed  to  show  its  enormity.  In  the  Revolu- 
tionary days  the  climax  in  the  denunciation  of 
Great  Britain  had  been  the  charge  that  the  colo- 
nists, taxed  but  not  represented,  were  being  reduced 
to  the  level  of  slaves,  and  no  one  had  thought  of 
saying  that  slavery  might  be  a  benefit  to  both  ruler 
and  ruled.  Slavery  had  been  considered  then,  as 
it  was  later  regarded  by  the  anti-slavery  party,  the 
very  name  for  tyranny  and  oppression  of  the  most 
execrable  kind.  To  justify  slavery  would  be  to 
subvert  the  foundations  of  free  government  —  a 
crime  against  civilization  and  humanity. 


THE  SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  227 

In  respect  to  the  practical  program  most  suitable 
to  the  conditions,  there  was  a  wide  difference  be- 
tween such  men  as  Lincoln  and  those  of  the  Gar- 
risonian  type.  One  party  demanded  the  immediate 
and  unconditional  emancipation  of  the  slaves  as  an 
act  of  simple  justice  to  those  in  bondage,  trusting  to 
the  ability  of  the  newly  made  freemen  to  take  and 
use  their  liberty  without  danger  to  themselves  or 
to  the  nation.  The  other  party,  although  de- 
nouncing slavery  as  an  evil,  and  demanding  its 
ultimate  abolition,  clearly  perceived  the  great  diffi- 
culties involved  in  the  transition  from  bondage  to 
freedom,  for  the  negro  and  for  the  community  in 
general.  They  therefore  counselled  a  policy  of 
moderation  and  conservatism. 

The  pro-slavery  theory  was  almost  wholly  the 
product  of  the  three  decades  preceding  the  out- 
break of  the  Civil  War.  Before  this  time  no 
organized  or  well-sustained  effort  was  made  to 
defend  slavery,  but  it  was  generally  treated  in  an 
apologetic  way.  As  late  as  the  controversy  over 
the  admission  of  Missouri,  it  was  said  that  the 
entrance  of  slavery  into  new  territory  was  not 
expected  to  strengthen  the  institution,  but  to 
weaken  it  by  scattering  the  evil.  In  1832,  in  the 
Virginia  legislature,  the  whole  question  of  slavery 
was  discussed,  and  emancipation  was  openly  and 
strongly  urged  by  many.  The  increasing  bitter- 
ness of  the  attacks  on  slavery,  however,  touched 


228  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

the  pride  of  the  South,  and  aroused  its  leaders  to 
find  a  justification  for  the  institution.  In  the  face 
of  the  furious  arraignment  made  by  the  Abolition- 
ists, it  seemed  necessary  to  assume  some  other 
attitude  than  that  of  indifference  toward  the  ques- 
tion. As  Calhoun  said,  the  discussion  "  has  com- 
pelled us  of  the  South  to  look  into  the  nature  and 
character  of  this  great  institution,  and  to  correct 
any  false  impressions  that  even  we  had  entertained 
in  relation  to  it."  ^  As  a  result  of  this  reinvestiga- 
tion of  the  question,  the  opinion  of  the  Southern 
leaders  was  radically  changed.  They  no  longer 
apologized  for  slavery,  they  defended  it ;  they  not 
only  defended  it  as  a  necessary  evil,  but  upheld  it 
as  a  positive  good." 

The  formulation  of  the  pro-slavery  theory  may 
be  attributed  in  large  measure  to  John  C.  Calhoun, 
assisted  by  such  able  associates  as  Stephens  and 
Davis,  together  with  a  clever  group  of  thinkers, 
including  Bledsoe,^  Simms,^  Sawyer,^  Dew,^  and 
others.^ 

1  Works,  II,  180(1838), 

^  A.  T.  Bledsoe,  Professor  of  Mathematics  in  the  University  of 
Virginia,  An  Essay  on  Liberty  and  Slavery  (1856). 

*  Dr.  W.  G.  Simms  of  South  Carolina,  The  Morals  of  Slavery 
(1837).  This  was  an  answer  to  the  writings  of  Miss  Martineau  and 
other  persons. 

*  George  S.  Sawyer,  Institutes  of  Slavery  (1859). 

5  F.  R.  Dew  (professor  in  William  and  Mary's  QoVi^g€) ,  Review 
of  the  Debates  in  the  Virginia  Legislature  (1833). 

^  See  The  Pro-Slavery  Argument,  containing  "  Memoir  on 
Negro  Slavery,"  by  Chancellor  Harper  ;    "  Letters   on   Slavery " 


THE  SLAVERY   CONTROVERSY  229 

In  order  to  make  an  adequate  defence  of  slavery, 
it  was  found  necessary  to  abandon  certain  ideas 
that  had  been  conspicuous  during  the  Revolution- 
ary period.  The  Declaration  of  Independence, 
with  its  assertion  that  all  men  are  created  equal 
and  are  endowed  with  certain  inalienable  rights, 
was  not  in  harmony  with  the  practice  of  slavery, 
and  must  be  repudiated  or  explained  away.  This, 
however,  proved  no  barrier  to  the  new  move- 
ment, for  the  defenders  of  slavery  rejected  the 
principles  of  the  natural-right  school  of  political 
theory,  and  constructed  their  political  system  on 
another  basis. 

In  the  first  place,  the  proposition  that  all  men 
are  created  equal  was  subjected  to  the  most  severe 
criticism  on  the  part  of  the  pro-slavery  school.  It 
was  maintained  that  unless  taken  in  some  very 
qualified  sense,  such  an  assertion  was  incapable  of 
proof.  Calhoun  declared  that :  "  Taking  the  prop- 
osition literally,  there  is  not  a  word  of  truth  in  it. 
It  begins  with,  '  all  men  are  born,'  which  is  utterly 

(Letter  to  Thomas  Qarkson),  by  Governor  J.  H.  Hammond  of 
South  Carolina  (1845);  ^^^^  Simms,  op.  cit.  and  Dew,  op  cit. ;  Lec- 
tures on  the  Philosophy  and  Practice  of  Slavery,  by  William  A.  Smith 
(Randolph-Macon  College,  1857);  Studies  on  Slavery,  by  John 
Fletcher  (Louisiana,  1852);  Slavery  in  the  United  States,  by  J.  K. 
Paulding  (1836);  Slavery  ordained  of  God,  by  F.  A.  Ross  (1859); 
American  Slavery,  by  Rev.  Samuel  Seabury  (1861).  Many  interest- 
ing contributions  to  this  subject  are  contained  in  77/1?  Industrial 
Resources  of  the  South,  by  J.  D.  B.  de  Bow  (1853),  a  collection  of 
articles  published  in  De  Bow's  Magazine.  See  also  The  Southern 
Literary  Messenger. 


230  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

untrue.  Men  are  not  born.  Infants  are  born. 
They  grow  to  be  men."  ^  He  found  it  difficult  to 
see  how  so  unreasonable  an  idea  could  ever  have 
become  current  among  reasonable  men.  Governor 
Hammond  alluded  contemptuously  to  the  "  much- 
lauded  but  nowhere  accredited  dogma  of  Mr. 
Jefferson  that  all  men  are  born  equal."  ^  Simms 
said  that  this  phrase  was  "  a  finely  sounding  one, 
significant  of  that  sentimental  French  philosophy 
then  so  current."^  When  the  Fathers  spoke  of 
equality,  what  they  really  had  reference  to,  was 
the  equality  of  the  American  states  among  other 
states  of  the  world,  or  at  the  most  the  equality 
prevailing  among  white  men. 

Not  only  are  men  created  unequal,  such  was 
the  line  of  reasoning,  but  this  very  inequality  must 
be  regarded  as  one  of  the  essential  conditions  of 
human  progress.  Calhoun  did  not  hesitate  to 
assert  that  the  advance  of  human  civilization 
depends  upon  the  inequality  that  exists  among 
men.  There  have  always  been  and  there  must 
always  be,  he  argued,  a  front  and  a  rear  rank  in 
the  onward  march  of  humanity ;  to  reverse  or  con- 
found this  order,  would  check  the  advance  of  the 
race.  This  fundamental  fact  that  individuals  or 
races  are  unequal,  is  not  an  argument  against,  but 
rather  in  favor  of,  social  and  political  advancement.'* 
Others  maintained  that  inequality  is  the  necessary 

1  Works,  IV,  507-512.        3  Ibid.  251.     Cf.  Fletcher,  op.  cit.  399. 

2  Pro-Slavery  Argument,  1 10.  *  Works,  I,  57. 


THE  SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  23  I 

principle  upon  which  all  government  rests;  that 
inequality  is  the  source  of  all  harmony  in  the  uni- 
verse; even  that  the  souls  of  men  in  the  future 
state  must  be  unequal. ^  In  short,  the  doctrine 
that  all  men  are  created  equal  was  wholly  repudi- 
ated as  a  basis  for  political  theory.  Emphatic 
denial  was  entered  on  grounds  of  both  fact  and 
philosophy.  From  either  point  of  view,  it  was  re- 
garded as  untenable  and  absurd. 

Again,  the  doctrine  of  natural  rights — that  every 
individual  possesses  certain  rights  which  are  not 
derived  from  government,  and  of  which  he  cannot 
justly  be  deprived  by  government — was  either  aban- 
doned entirely  or  interpreted  in  such  a  way  as  to 
lose  all  application  to  the  institution  of  slavery. 
The  repudiation  of  this  theory  of  natural  rights 
was  most  emphatically  made  by  the  famous  Dr. 
Cooper  of  South  Carolina.^  He  attempted  to 
show  that  even  on  the  hypothesis  of  an  original  state 
of  nature  it  could  not  be  assumed  that  all  men 
are  endowed  with  the  same  rights.  Force,  either 
of  body  or  of  mind  is,  said  he,  the  basis  of  all 
rights.  "  The  universal  law  of  nature  is  force.  By 
this  law  the  lower  animals  are  subdued  to  man,  and 
the  same  law  governs  the  relations  between  men."^ 
In  fact,  there  is  no  law  of  nature  of  the  character 

^  Fletcher,  op.  cit.  407. 

2  Lectures  on  the  Elements  of  Political  Economy  (1826).  With 
this  compare  his  Essay  on  the  Eoundaiion  of  Civil  Government, 
(1787);   reprinted  1826.  ^  Ibid.  <,6. 


232  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

conceived  by  such  thinkers  as  Grotius,  Pufendorf, 
and  Vattel.  The  so-called  law  of  nature,  and  with 
it  the  natural  rights  claimed  under  such  a  law,  con- 
sist merely  of  "  systems  fabricated  by  theoretical 
writers  on  a  contemplation  of  what  might  usefully 
be  acknowledged  among  men  as  binding  on  each 
other."  1  What  is  right,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the 
term,  is  only  that  which  is  granted  and  protected 
by  society.  That  which  society  refuses  to  acknowl- 
edge is  not  a  right  and  has  no  character  of  a  right. 
In  other  words,  there  is  no  body  of  natural  rights 
obtained  independently  of  all  government,  but  only 
those  rights  which  the  society  considers  it  expedi- 
ent to  grant, 

Calhoun,  also,  scouted  the  idea  of  a  state  of 
nature,  natural  rights,  and  a  social  contract.  He 
believed  that  the  "  state  of  nature  "  is  purely  hypo- 
thetical and  fictitious,  and  he  placed  no  confidence 
in  the  conclusions  drawn  from  such  an  hypothesis.^ 
In  his  opinion,  government  is  not  to  be  regarded 
as  a  mere  matter  of  choice,  but  must  be  considered, 
on  the  contrary,  as  a  fundamental  necessity,  organ- 
ized and  maintained  in  obedience  to  a  purely  nat- 
ural instinct  of  man.  There  is  consequently  no 
need  to  presume  a  state  of  nature,  and  reason  from 
this  to  the  formation  of  poHtical  institutions.  The 
whole  structure  erected  on  the  foundation  of  the 
natural-right  theory  seemed  to  him  to  be  worth- 

1  Lectures  on  the  Elements  of  Political  Economy,  54. 
*  See  on  this  point  Chap.  VI. 


THE  SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  233 

less  speculation,  unnecessary  to  consider  when  once 
the  weakness  and  imperfection  of  the  corner-stone 
is  discovered.  For  his  part,  he  was  determined  to 
disregard  the  individualistic  political  theory  of  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  and  to  con- 
struct his  political  science  upon  another  founda- 
tion. There  was  no  hesitation  or  uncertainty  in 
his  attitude  :  he  did  not  attempt  to  reconcile  diver- 
gent views;  he  simply  rejected  outright  the  fun- 
damental tenets  of  the  old  school. 

Not  all  of  the  defenders  of  slavery,  however, 
were  willing  to  part  with  "  the  rights  of  man." 
There  were  many  and  ingenious  interpretations  of 
the  law  of  nature,  intended  to  bring  it  into  accord 
with  the  practice  of  slavery.  Thus  it  was  admitted 
in  one  instance  that  there  are  natural  rights  with 
which  every  human  being  is  endowed;  but  a  closer 
examination  of  these  rights  shows  that  they  con- 
tain nothing  to  interfere  with  the  status  of  slavery. 
Among  these  natural  rights  it  is  found  that  one 
has  in  early  life  "  the  right  of  such  absolute  control 
by  others  as  that  his  will  may  retain  its  self-acting 
power  unimpaired."  It  also  appears  that  an  adult 
is  entitled  to  have  such  a  political  organization  as 
will  afford  "  that  system  of  appliances  which  de- 
velops and  matures  the  self-acting  power  of  his 
will."  Now,  the  negro  in  slavery  is  under  an 
institution  which  will  allow  the  fullest  development 
of  the  "  self-acting  power  of  his  will,  "  and  thus 
may  be   said   to  have  the  full  possession    of   his 


234  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

natural  rights.^  Another  writer  declared  that  there 
are  certain  inherent  and  inalienable  rights,  but  at 
the  same  time  denied  that  liberty  and  property  are 
among  these.  These  rights  are  subject,  he  reasoned, 
to  the  general  good,  and  occasion  may  demand  their 
sacrifice  on  the  part  of  some  members  of  society.^ 

It  is  evident  from  these  authorities  that  the  doc- 
trine of  natural  rights  was  either  wholly  repudiated, 
or  so  interpreted  as  to  obviate  any  objection  to 
slaveholding.  This  did  not  necessarily  mean  that 
the  principles  of  democracy  were  entirely  given  up, 
but  rather  that  the  principles  on  which  the  Fathers 
had  thought  democracy  must  be  based,  were  falla- 
cious and  inadequate.  It  was  believed  that  such 
doctrines  were  not  essential  to  the  existence  of 
republican  government,  and  that  they  might  better 
be  made  less  prominent  in  the  new  political  science. 

Having  rejected  the  idea  that  all  men  are 
created  equal,  and  possess  from  the  hour  of  their 
birth  certain  inalienable  rights,  it  was  asserted  that 
the  status  of  the  individual  should  be  determined 
by  his  ability  or  capacity.  John  C.  Calhoun  main- 
tained that  the  theory  of  the  equal  right  of  all  men 
to  the  same  degree  of  freedom  is  contradicted  by 
the  most  evident  and  unmistakable  facts.  Liberty, 
he  reasoned,  is  not  inborn  in  men ;  it  is  not  a  natu- 
ral inheritance,  given  to  every  man,  but  a  condition 
dependent  upon  a  high  degree  of  human  develop- 

1  Wm,  A.  Smith,  Philosophy  and  Practice  of  Slavery  (1857). 
'  A,  T.  Bledsoe,  An  Essay  on  Liberty  and  Slavery  (1856). 


THE  SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  235 

ment.  Liberty  is  the  "  highest  reward  bestowed 
on  mental  and  moral  development,  combined  with 
favorable  circumstances."  ^  It  is  not  a  status  into 
which  men  are  born,  but  one  for  which  they  must 
struggle,  and  which  can  be  reached  only  by  those 
who  are  most  highly  endowed.  Liberty  is  not 
given  to  man  at  the  beginning  of  his  career,  but  is 
the  distant  goal  which  he  reaches  at  the  end.  The 
same  idea  was  clearly  stated  by  Bledsoe  in  his  Es- 
say on  Liberty  and  Slavery,  where  he  urged  that 
there  is  no  natural  and  inherent  right  to  political 
power  or  privilege,  except  that  arising  from 
superior  fitness  or  capacity.  He  denounced  the 
"  French  idea"  that  liberty  may  be  obtained  through 
formal  equality,  and  held  that,  on  the  contrary, 
liberty  depends  on  equality  of  intelligence  and 
virtue.  "The  most  illiterate  peasant,"  said  he,  "may 
at  a  glance  grasp  the  idea  of  equality ;  the  most 
profound  statesman  may  not,  without  much  care 
and  thought,  comprehend  the  nature  of  liberty."  ^ 
Particular  emphasis  must  be  placed  on  this  doc- 
trine, for  it  was  just  at  this  point  that  the  pro- 
slavery  and  the  anti-slavery  party  sharply  diverged. 
It  was  a  part  of  the  Abolitionist  argument  that 
freedom  is  inborn  in  all  men,  is  an  essential 
part  of  their  nature,  something  of  which  they  can- 
not justly  be  deprived.  Calhoun  and  his  followers 
maintained,  on  the  contrary,  that  liberty  is  not  born 
with  man,  not  a  natural  and  inherent  right,  but 
1  Works,  511.  '^  Op.  cit.  129. 


236  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

a  privilege,  a  reward  of  which  all  are  not  equally  j 
worthy,  for  which  individuals  or  races  must  dem- 
onstrate their  fitness.  This  fundamental  difference 
between  the  doctrine  of  the  pro-slavery  party  and 
that  of  the  Revolutionary  Fathers  and  the  Aboli- 
tionists, is  deserving  of  careful  attention,  for  it 
is  the  clew  to  the  philosophic  controversy  between 
the  opposing  schools.  It  marks  the  scientific  part- 
ing of  the  ways. 

Assuming,  then,  that  liberty  is  not  a  gift  impar- 
tially bestowed  by  nature  on  all  men,  but  only  upon 
the  few,  the  pro-slavery  party  declared  that  the 
negro  race  is  unworthy  of  liberty  and  incapable 
of  self-government.  The  contrast  between  the 
white  man  and  the  black  man,  in  all  those  points 
that  are  characteristic  of  civiHzation,  was  a  staple 
item  of  argument.  It  was  asserted  that  the  negro 
"stands  at  the  lowest  point  in  the  scale  of  human 
beings."^  If  human  beings  at  all,  they  are 
of  the  most  degraded  species.^  The  negro  is  not 
merely  "  a  lamp-blacked  white  man  debased  by 
slavery,"  but  a  being  essentially  and  fundamen- 
tally inferior  in  mind  and  body.  Contemporary 
authorities  in  the  scientific  world  were  invoked 
to  show  that  the  racial  characteristics  of  the  negro 
stamped   him  as  an  inferior  order  of   man.^      It 

1  "Nature  and  Destiny  of  the  Negro,"  by  J.  C.  Nott  (1850),  in 
De  Bow,  Industrial  Resources,  II,  308. 

2  Ibid.  II,  203. 

3  Ibid.  II,  308. 


THE   SLAVERY   CONTROVERSY  237 

was  even  urged  that  the  negro  could  not  be  a 
descendant  of  Adam,  but  must  be  derived  from 
some  other  distinct  and  inferior  species.^  More 
common  was  the  assertion  that  the  negro  is  de- 
scended from  Ham,  upon  whose  race  both  God 
and  nature  have  set  a  curse,  as  shown  by  the 
concurring  authority  of  the  Scriptures  and  natural 
science.^ 

Not  only  was  it  asserted  that  the  negroes  were 
manifestly  inferior,  but  the  ground  was  also  taken 
that  they  were  incapable  of  ever  becoming,  even  ' 
approximately,  the  equal  of  the  white  race.  It  was 
said  of  the  negro  races  that  "  no  moral  or  physical 
agencies  can  redeem  them  from  their  degrada- 
tion ; "  to  attempt  to  relieve  them  from  their 
natural  inferiority  is  idle  in  itself,  and  may  be  mis- 
chievous in  its  results.  The  negro  must,  there- 
fore, be  regarded  as  an  essentially  inferior  race, 
and,  moreover,  as  incapable  of  rising  very  far  or 
very  soon  from  this  natural  and  divinely  appointed 
status  of  degradation.^ 

It  follows,  then,  that  the  black  man  cannot  be 
considered  as  a  fit  subject  for  the  exercise  of  civil 

1  Ibid.  203,  and  III,  315-329.  Article  on  Negroes,  by  Dr.  Cart- 
wright.  Cf.  Negro-mania,  by  John  Campbell  (1851).  There  was 
at  this  time  considerable  discussion  as  to  the  multiple  origin  of  the 
human  race. 

2  Sawyer,  Institutes  of  Slavery,  1 1 6. 

^  "The  negro  cannot  be  schooled,  nor  argued,  nor  driven  into  k 
love  of  freedom.  His  intellect  cannot  be  schooled,  nor  argued,  not 
driven  into  a  love  of  freedom."     De  Bow,  op.  cit.  II,  204. 


238  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

or  political  rights.  Governor  McDuffie  said  that 
the  negroes  are  "  utterly  unqualified,  not  only  for 
rational  freedom,  but  for  self-government  of  any 
kind,"  and  this  fairly  expressed  the  sentiment  of 
the  slavery  party.  If  the  negro  is  unfit  to  govern 
himself,  there  can  be  no  injustice  in  governing  him 
without  his  consent.  To  do  for  him  what  he  could 
not  do  for  himself,  and  what  must  be  done  by  some 
one,  is  not  to  commit  an  injustice,  but  to  confer  a 
benefit.  Hence,  the  slave  is  not  to  be  regarded 
as  a  hapless  victim  of  oppression ;  he  is  under  no 
despotic  power ;  there  are  laws  which  protect  him, 
in  his  place,  as  inflexible  as  those  which  his  pro- 
prietor is  required  to  obey  in  his  place.  "  Provi- 
dence," said  Hammond,  "  has  placed  him  in  our 
hands  for  his  good,  and  has  paid  us  from  his  labor 
for  our  guardianship."  ^ 

In  brief,  the  contention  was  that  if  there  are 
two  races  existing  side  by  side,  and  the  inferior 
race  is  incapable  of  self-guidance  and  self-govern- 
ment, this  race  must  be  taken  in  hand  and  gov- 
erned by  the  superior.  It  had  also  to  be  shown 
that  the  institution  of  slavery  did  no  more  than 
what  was  necessary  for  the  regulation  of  the  lower 
race  ;  in  other  words,  that  the  relation  between  the 
races  was  that  of  guardian  and  ward,  and  not  that 
of  exploiter  and  victim. 

1  Hammond,  op.  cit.  274.  Cf.  Bledsoe,  op.  cit.  115;  Samuel  Sea- 
bury,  op.  cit.  91.  Others  held  slavery  to  be  the  result  of  sin;  cf. 
Fletcher,  op.  cit. 


THE   SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  239 

Such  reasoning,  however,  was  only  a  defence 
of  slavery,  and  the  advocates  of  the  cause  were 
unwilling  to  rest  their  case  at  this  point.  They 
attempted  to  show,  not  only  that  slavery  was  not 
an  evil,  but  that  it  was  a  positive  good ;  that  it 
was  not  only  tolerable  under  certain  unfortunate 
conditions,  but  essential  to  the  highest  type  of 
society.  Inspired  by  this  motive,  Calhoun  declared 
in  Congress  that  "  there  has  never  yet  existed  a 
wealthy  and  civilized  society  in  which  one  portion 
of  the  community  did  not,  in  point  of  fact,  live  on 
the  labor  of  the  other."  ^  He  maintained  that  the 
performance  of  menial  duties  is  wholly  inconsist- 
ent with  the  life  of  a  freeman.  "  No  Southern 
man,"  said  he,  "  not  even  the  poorest  or  the  low- 
est, will,  under  any  circumstances,  submit  to  per- 
form (either  of)  them.  He  has  too  much  pride  for 
that,  and  I  rejoice  that  he  has."  ^  Fortified  by 
this  belief,  Calhoun  was  ready  to  say  that  the 
institution  of  slavery  "  forms  the  most  solid  and 
durable  foundation  on  which  to  rear  free  institu- 
tions";^ and  Governor  McDuffie  could  declare 
that  "  domestic  slavery,  instead  of  being  a  politi- 
cal evil,  is  the  corner-stone  of  our  republican  edi- 
fice." With  the  same  idea  in  mind,  Alexander  H. 
Stephens,  on  the  verge  of  the  Civil  War,  proclaimed 
that  slavery,  rejected  by  the  Revolutionary  Fathers, 

1  Works,  II,  631  (1837). 

2  Ibid.  IV,  505. 

•  II,  632. 


240  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

"  is  become  the  chief  stone  of  the  corner  in  our  new 
edifice."  ^ 

The  pro-slavery  party  reasoned  that  in  a  society 
where  all  are  equally  free,  and  share  alike  in  political 
privileges,  some  of  the  citizens  must  of  necessity 
be  occupied  with  the  performance  of  menial  duties. 
But  one  who  engages  in  such  labor  has  not  the 
leisure  necessary  for  political  observation  and  reflec- 
tion, and  hence  is  unqualified  for  the  performance 
of  the  duties  that  devolve  upon  him.  Consequently, 
the  average  of  the  political  society  is  greatly  lowered 
by  the  presence  of  this  body  of  citizens,  who  are 
of  necessity  unworthy  and  unfit.  Whenever  any 
considerable  proportion  of  this  element  is  present, 
the  otherwise  pure  republicanism  is  defiled  and  its 
possibilities  of  development  are  seriously  limited. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  a  community  where  the 
drudgery  of  society  is  performed  by  a  particular 
class  devoted  to  that  purpose,  and  excluded  from 
participation  in  political  rights,  the  remaining  part 
of  the  community  may  be  formed  into  a  democracy 
of  the  very  highest  type.  There  will  be  fewer 
members  of  the  democracy,  but  they  will  be  of  a 
superior  grade ;  they  will  enjoy  the  necessary  leisure 
for  the  cultivation  of  political  affairs,  and  so  will  be 
able  to  maintain  a  much  more  perfect  and  efficient 
kind  of  a  democracy  than  would  otherwise  be 
possible.     The  members  of  such  a  democracy  will 

1  Speech  at  Savannah,  Georgia  (March  21,  1861),  in  Moore's 
Rebellion  Record,  I,  D,  44-48. 


THE   SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  24 1 

be  men  of  great  capacity  for  self-government,  and 
among  them  the  principles  of  free  government  can 
be  carried  out  to  an  extent  impossible  among  a 
mixed  population  containing  a  large  element  of 
inferior  stock.  For  example,  where  a  slave  class  is 
found,  there  is  no  necessity  for  the  existence  of  an 
order  of  nobility  or  an  hereditary  monarchy,  since 
the  lower  class  is  wholly  under  the  control  of  the 
higher,  and  in  the  higher  class  itself  such  distinc- 
tions of  rank  are  not  necessary.  In  a  mixed  politi- 
cal society  some  such  device  as  this  is  required  in 
order  to  impress  the  masses  with  the  dignity  and 
majesty  of  the  government.  But  where  all  the 
undesirable  and  unfit  elements  have  been  eliminated 
from  the  poHtical  society,  these  artificial  devices 
are  unnecessary  and  may  be  abohshed.  The  ruling 
class  exists  by  virtue  of  natural  capacity  alone,  and 
within  that  class  there  may  safely  be  established 
the  most  liberal  type  of  a  democracy.  Here  may 
be  seen  "the  perfect  spirit  of  equality  so  prevalent 
among  the  whites  of  all  the  slaveholding  states."  ^ 
This  argument  as  to  the  function  of  a  slave  class 
in  a  democracy  is,  it  will  be  observed,  almost  identi- 
cal with  that  made  by  Aristotle  in  his  Politics ;  and 
it  was  to  his  political  theory  that  the  slavery  apolo- 
gists returned.2     In  proof  of  the  theoretical  justice 

1  Dew,  The  Pro-Slavery  Argument,  461. 

2  Calhoun  recommended  Aristotle  as  among  the  best  writers  on 
government.  Letter  to  A.  D.  Wallace  (1S40),  in  the  Correspvnd- 
ence,  p.  469. 

K 


242  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

of  slavery,  his  reasoning'  was  repeated,  and  the 
example  of  the  Greek  democracies  was  cited  to 
show  the  desirability  of  such  a  social  and  political 
institution. 

In  fact,  the  whole  question  of  the  relative  advan- 
tages of  slave  and  free  society  was  discussed  in  all 
its  different  phases.  The  conditions  in  the  cities  of 
the  North  and  in  England  were  contrasted  with  the 
state  of  affairs  in  the  South,  and  conclusions  drawn 
to  the  decided  advantage  of  the  latter.  The  rule  of 
the  capitalist  and  his  indifference  to  the  poverty 
of  the  masses  was  compared  with  the  benevolent 
paternalism  exercised  over  the  negro  by  his  master; 
and  the  free  laborer  was  said  to  be  in  a  much  more 
miserable  state  than  the  slave.  This  kind  of  argu- 
ment was  reenforced  by  illustrations  drawn  from 
material  afforded  by  the  state  of  the  laboring  classes 
in  England  and  by  the  frequent  denunciations  of 
contemporary  society  by  the  socialists.  It  was 
often  asserted  that,  on  the  whole,  the  condition  of 
^  free  labor  was  inferior  to  that  of  slave  labor,  and  that 
if  anything  needed  reform,  it  was  the  condition  of 
the  white  slaves,  "  tantalized  with  the  name  of  free- 
dom, to  which  their  condition  gives  the  lie."  The 
assertion  was  made  that  in  every  way  —  economi- 
cally, socially,  morally,  and  politically  —  a  slave 
I  society  is  superior  to  a  society  built  on  a  foundation 
of  free  labor.  Apologies  were  no  longer  made  for 
slavery,  but  it  was  pointed  to  with  feelings  of  pride, 
and  was  really  considered  among  intelligent  leaders 


THE  SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  243 

of  opinion  as  the  "  corner-stone  of  our  republican 
edifice,"  the  very  best  foundation  possible  for  a  civil- 
ized society.  Within  four  years  of  the  Thirteenth 
Amendment,  Alexander  H.  Stephens  rejoiced  in  the 
discovery  of  a  new  type  of  organization  —  slavery 
—  and  declared  the  new  government  the  first  in 
the  world  based  upon  "  this  great  physical,  philo- 
sophical, and  moral  truth."  Other  societies  had 
been  built  on  the  slavery  of  the  same  or  similar 
races ;  but  now,  for  the  first  time,  a  foundation  was 
laid,  perfectly  in  accord  with  the  laws  of  nature, 
since  nature,  in  this  instance,  has  fitted  the  enslaved 
race  for  that  particular  condition.  And  he  further 
asked,  "  May  we  not,  therefore,  look  with  confidence 
to  the  ultimate  universal  acknowledgment  of  the 
truths  upon  which  our  system  rests  ?  "  ^ 

The  climax  or  rather  the  anti-climax  of  this  style 
of  reasoning  is  found  in  the  writings  of  the  radical, 
George  Fitz-Hugh.^  His  work  on  Sociology  for  the 
South,  or  the  Failure  of  Free  Society,  1854,  is  con- 
sidered here,  not  because  typical  of  the  thought  of 
the  pro-slavery  school,  but  as  an  illustration  of  the 
extremes  to  which  their  argument  might  be  and  in 
this  case  actually  was  forced. 

Fitz-Hugh  favored  the  abandonment  of  any  sort 
of  philosophy  as  applied  to  government.  "  Philoso- 
phy," he  said,  "  will  blow  up  any  government  that  is 

1  op.  cit. 

"^  By  the  same  author,  Cannibals  All,  or  Slaves  without  Masteri 
(1857).     For  a  sketch  of  his  life,  see  Appleton,  Encyclopedia. 


244  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

founded  on  it.  .  .  .  If  we  would  have  our  people 
normal  and  our  institutions  permanent,  we  should 
repudiate  our  political  abstractions  and  adopt 
religious  truths  in  their  stead."  ^  Notwithstanding 
this  denunciation  of  philosophy,  he  proceeded  to 
develop  a  system  of  his  own.  A  fundamental  part 
of  his  creed  was  the  doctrine  that  liberty  is  not,  as 
generally  supposed,  a  good.  Liberty,  said  he,  is 
an  evil  which  government  is  intended  to  correct. 
This  is  the  object  of  political  society,  and  all  gov- 
ernment is  really  slavery.  "  Sin,"  he  said,  "  began 
with  the  desire  for  liberty  and  the  attempt  to 
attain  it  in  the  person  of  Satan  and  his  fellow- 
angels."  ^  He  declared  that  as  civilization  ad- 
vances, liberty  recedes,  since  "  what  is  needed  is 
good  government  and  a  plenty  of  it —  not  liberty." 
The  idea  that  liberty  is  good  for  men,  he  ridiculed 
as  the  "  most  false  and  foolish  that  ever  entered 
the  human  mind.  The  only  free  people  in  the 
world  are  the  Digger  Indians  of  the  valley  of  the 
Great  Salt  Lake  and  the  Australians  of  New 
Holland.  They  know  nothing  of  government, 
of  society,  of  castes,  classes,  or  of  subordination 
of  rank ;  each  man  digs  for  worms  and  climbs  for 
birds'  eggs  on  his  own  hook :  they  are  perfectly 
free,  famished  and  degraded."  ^ 

Slavery  he  considered  as  the  best  possible  basis 
for  any  society.     Moreover,  Fitz-Hugh  discovered  a 
resemblance  between  the  philosophic  bases  of  slav- 
1  Sociology,  114-115.  2  Ibid.  170.  ^  /^^^ 


THE  SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  245 

ery  and  socialism,  which  the  advocates  of  neither 
of  these  systems  would  be  willing  to  admit.  In 
common  with  the  socialists  he  attacked  the  principle 
of  free  contract,  considering  its  results  as  cruel  as 
the  war  of  the  sword,  or  theft,  robbery,  and  murder. 
A  Southern  plantation  was  an  ideal  type,  he  thought, 
of  a  socialistic  society.  The  feelings  and  interests 
of  the  masters  prevent  undue  pressure  on  the 
laborers ;  they  are  protected  from  the  evils  of 
competition  and  are  assured  employment  and 
support.  His  only  objection  to  socialism  was, 
"  that  it  will  not  honestly  admit  that  it  owes  its 
recent  revival  to  the  failure  of  universal  liberty  and 
is  seeking  to  bring  about  slavery  again  in  some 
form."  ^  No  effective  combination  of  labor  can  be 
made,  said  Fitz-Hugh,  until  men  are  willing  to 
surrender  their  liberty  and  subject  themselves  to  a 
despotic  head  or  ruler  —  "  this  is  slavery,  and 
toward  this  socialism  is  moving."  This  theory  of 
Fitz-Hugh  was  not,  it  may  be  said,  the  philosophy 
of  the  great  body  of  the  pro-slavery  school  and 
cannot  be  taken  as  representative  of  them.  His 
extremely  radical  ideas  illustrate,  nevertheless,  one 

^  Ibid.  Fitz-Hugh  favored  providing  for  a  system  of  entailment 
of  property.  "  We  need  not  fear  the  mad-dog  cry  of  aristoc- 
racy. .  .  .  We  have  the  things,  exclusive  hereditary  property  and 
aristocracy,  in  their  utmost  intensity;  let  us  not  be  frightened  at  the 
names."  Fitz-Hugh  was  not  alone  in  his  radical  theory.  Governor 
Hammond,  in  a  letter  to  Calhoun  (1850),  expressed  the  belief  that 
"  free  government  and  all  that  sort  of  thing  has  been  a  fatal  delu- 
sion and  humbug  from  the  time  of  Moses."    Correspondence,-^.  1212. 


240  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

phase  of  the  intellectual  movement  and  as  such  are 
worthy  of  examination  in  the  same  spirit  in  which 
the  theory  of  the  radical  Abolitionists  is  studied. 

Such,  then,  was  the  character  of  the  theory  by 
which  slavery  was  defended.  The  individualistic 
philosophy  of  the  eighteenth  century  and  of  the 
Revolutionary  period  was  rejected.  The  doctrine 
that  all  men  are  created  equal  was  denied,  and  the 
possession  of  inherent  and  inalienable  "  natural 
rights  "  was  disputed  or  the  force  of  the  doctrine 
weakened  by  interpretation.  It  was  shown  that 
poUtical  rights  and  civil  liberty  cannot  justly  be 
demanded  by  all,  but  belong  only  to  those  who 
possess  intellect,  morality,  and  political  capacity. 
If  this  is  true,  then  an  inferior  race  or  class  unfitted 
for  political  life  may  properly  and  justly  be  held 
in  a  state  of  servitude  by  a  class  or  race  that  is 
politically  capable  ;  and  this  servitude  may  properly 
extend  to  the  entire  abolition  of  civil  and  political 
rights,  even  of  any  legal  status  whatever.  Such  a 
system  is  not  undemocratic,  but  on  the  contrary 
tends  to  foster  the  spirit  of  liberty  and  to  develop 
free  institutions  to  the  highest  degree  of  perfection, 
since  the  lower  classes  are  eliminated  from  politics 
and  the  political  people  are  composed  of  those  of 
the  highest  grade  and  most  capable  of  administer- 
ing democratic  government.  The  complete  servi- 
tude of  a  lower  class  to  a  highly  democratic  ruling 
class  is  not  only  possible,  as  the  ancient  Hellenic 


THE  SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  247 

democracies  conclusively  show,  but  this  is  on  the 
whole  the  most  advantageous  kind  of  a  governmen- 
tal-social structure  that  can  be  devised,  especially 
when  the  slaves  are  taken  from  an  inferior  race, 
naturally  unfitted  for  participation  in  political  life. 

As  the  Abolitionist  crusade  was  a  part  of  a  world-  " 
wide  humanitarian  and  philanthropic  movement,  so 
the  pro-slavery  theory  had  certain  features  in  com- 
mon with  an  intellectual  movement  of  the  time. 
The  characteristics  of  the  slavery  apologists 
were  those  of  the  natural  scientists  rather  than  i 
those  of  the  philanthropists.^  The  leaders  in  the 
defence  of  the  slave  system  regarded  human 
life  as  essentially  a  struggle  in  which  the  fittest  ^ 
survive,  and  thought  that  in  spite  of  certain 
elements  of  cruelty  in  this  process  the  system 
was  on  the  whole  beneficent  in  its  results.  They 
believed  that  they  were  among  the  fittest,  holding 
their  position  by  the  authority  of  the  inexorable 
fiat  of  nature,  and  they  were  not  primarily  inter- 
ested in  the  elevation  of  the  lower  classes,  or  in  the 
amelioration  of  their  condition.  Abolitionism,  they 
regarded  as  sentimental,  ideaUstic,  and  imprac- 
ticable, classing  it  with  socialism,  spiritualism,  free- 
thought,  anti-masonry,  "  teetotalism,"  and  other 
"isms"  of  the  day.  They  justified  themselves  as 
practical  men,  viewing  with  impartial  eye  the  actual 

1  The  method  of  argument  employed  by  the  slavery  apologists 
was  not,  however,  the  same  as  that  of  the  natural  scientists.  The 
pro-slavery  reasoning  was,  to  a  great  extent,  a  priori  and  deductive. 


248  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

and  inevitable  conditions  of  social  life  and  prog- 
ress, perceiving  the  difficulty  of  reversing  the 
operation  of  the  laws  of  nature,  and  little  disposed 
to  tamper  with  movements  in  that  direction.  They 
regarded  slavery  as  a  social  necessity  decreed  by 
the  laws  of  nature,  and  they  looked  upon  any  at- 
tempts to  alter  this  state  as  wholly  idealistic  and 
impractical. 

In  conclusion,  a  few  words  may  be  said  by  way 
of  summarizing  the  discussion.  It  is  clear  that  at 
the  bottom  of  the  controversy  between  the  radical 
Abolitionists  and  the  pro-slavery  party,  there  was  a 
fundamental  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  nature 
of  human  liberty.  The  abolitionists  thought  that 
liberty  is  the  birthright  of  all  men ;  the  defenders 
of  slavery  thought  it  the  possession  of  those  only 
who  are  fit.  The  AboHtionists  thought  that  as  far 
as  rights  are  concerned,  all  men  are  created  and 
should  continue  to  be  equal ;  and  consequently  they 
were  bitter  in  their  denunciation  of  the  denial  of 
these  rights  ;  the  opposite  party  thought  that  rights 
do  not  belong  to  men  simply  as  men,  but  because  of 
the  superior  qualities,  physical,  intellectual,  moral 
or  political,  which  are  characteristic  of  certain  in- 
dividuals or  races.  The  Abolitionists  argued,  in 
accordance  with  their  belief,  that  the  negro  ought  to 
be  put  in  possession  of  the  original  and  natural 
rights  which  are  justly  his,  and  of  which  he  is  wrong- 
fully deprived.     The  slaveholders  contended  that 


THE   SLAVERY    CONTROVERSY  249 

the  negro,  being  an  inferior  order  of  man,  should 
be  kept  in  a  state  of  complete  subjection  for  his  own 
and  for  the  general  good.  Thus  in  both  theory 
and  practice,  there  was  an  almost  irreconcilable 
difference  between  the  two  parties. 

Between  the  conservative    anti-slavery  element 
and   the  slave    party    there    was    a    less  marked 
contrast.     Although  these    opponents   of    slavery 
declared  that  all  men  are  born  with  certain  rights, 
they  did  not   demand   complete   equality  for   the 
races.     It  was  therefore  recognized  that  there  must 
be  a  certain  restraint  of  certain  classes  under  cer- 
tain conditions,  and  no  demand  was  made  for  equal 
liberty  or  for  immediate  liberty  for  all  members 
of  the  community.     Between  this  group  and  the 
slavery  party,  the  question  was  really  one  as  to  how 
far  individual  conduct  may  be  regulated  and  for 
how  long.     The  defenders  of  slavery  insisted  that 
the  negro  is  entitled  to  no  rights  at  all,  politically 
speaking,  and  moreover    that   the   nature  of   the 
black  man  is  such  as  to  make  this  status  permanent 
On  the  contrary,  the   anti-slavery  party  declared^ 
that  a  certain  body  of  rights  should  be  granted  to  / 
every  one  —  not  necessarily  full  participation  in  the/ 
exercise  of  pohtical  functions,  but  at  least  some-/ 
thing  in  advance  of  complete  and  permanent  sub-^^ 
jection  to  the  will  of  a  master.     Upon  this  point 
the  two  parties  differed    sharply.     Had   the  pro- 
slavery  party  been  willing  to  grant  the  negro  even  . 
a  modicum   of   civil   rights,   and  to  concede   and 


250  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

make  provision  for  his  capacity  for  future  exercise 
of  further  rights,  the  gulf  between  these  positions 
might  have  been  spanned. 

A  further  difference  of  opinion  was  that  con- 
cerning the  influence  of  slavery  upon  society  in 
general,  and  democratic  institutions  in  particular. 
The  apologists  for  slavery  believed  that  such  a 
system  was  economically  advantageous,  socially 
elevating,  and  that  poHtically  slavery  made  possi- 
ble the  very  highest  type  of  democratic  govern- 
ment ;  in  brief,  that  a  slave  society  was  superior  at 
almost  every  point  by  which  civilization  may  be 
estimated.  The  opponents  of  slavery  regarded  the 
practice  as  wasteful  from  the  economic  point  of 
view,  demoralizing  socially,  and  with  special  em- 
phasis urged  that  the  existence  of  a  system  of  slav- 
ery is  incompatible  with  the  maintenance  of  demo- 
cratic institutions,  since  the  characteristic  qualities 
which  make  democracy  possible  are  diametrically 
opposite  to  those  fostered  under  slavery.  One  side, 
then,  regarded  democracy  as  properly  applicable 
to  the  whole  society,  the  other  as  a  relation  within 
a  certain  class  not  inclusive  of  the  whole  society. 
This  difference  corresponds  closely  to  that  already 
considered ;  namely,  as  to  whether  liberty  is  the 
birthright  of  all,  or  the  reward  of  the  fittest. 

From  the  standpoint  of  modern  political  science 
the  slaveholders  were  right  in  declaring  that 
liberty  can  be  given  only  to  those  who  have  politi- 
cal capacity  enough  to  use  it,  and  they  were  also 


THE  SLAVERY  CONTROVERSY  25  I 

right  in  maintaining  that  two  greatly  unequal  races 
cannot  exist  side  by  side  on  terms  of  perfect 
equality.  But  the  conclusion  drawn  from  these 
premises  was  by  no  means  a  legitimate  one.  It  did 
not  follow  that  because  the  negro  was  not  the 
equal  of  the  white  man,  and  could  not  well  exercise 
the  same  political  rights,  that  therefore  he  should 
be  deprived  of  all  rights  whatever.  Because  he 
was  not  entitled  to  equal  political  rights,  it  did  not 
follow  that  he  should  not  even  have  a  personality 
in  the  eyes  of  the  law.  This  was  the  fatal  nott 
sequiUir  that  led  to  the  violent  abolition  of  slavery 
in  the  throes  of  a  terrible  civil  war.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  Abolitionists  were  guilty  of  an 
equally  rash  generalization  in  assuming  as  they 
did  at  the  close  of  the  war,  that  because  the  negro 
is  entitled  to  some  rights,  he  should  immediately 
and  without  any  preparation  be  placed  in  full 
possession  of  the  highest  political  rights.  As  the 
slavery  party  blundered  in  giving  the  negro  no 
rights,  the  radical  Abolitionists  blundered  in  giving 
him,  at  one  stroke,  all  rights. 


CHAPTER   VII 

POLITICAL    THEORY   IN    RELATION    TO    THE    NATURE 
OF    THE     UNION 

The  question  of  national  organization  is  the  most 
difficult  problem  that  the  United  States  has  yet 
been  called  upon  to  solve.  Possessing  all  the  char- 
acteristics commonly  attributed  to  nations,  —  com- 
mon race,  language,  religion,  geographical  unity, 
—  the  full  expression  of  this  nationahty  met  with 
stubborn  resistance,  and  was  realized  only  after  the 
bloodiest  war  of  the  century  had  been  fought. 
Even  in  colonial  days  there  was  evident  the 
strongest  reluctance  to  form  any  union  at  all  bind- 
ing in  nature.  During  the  enthusiasm  of  the 
Revolutionary  movement  a  decidedly  national  atti- 
tude was  assumed,  but  in  the  Articles  of  Confeder- 
ation this  was  abandoned.  In  the  formation  and 
adoption  of  the  Constitution  there  was  a  reaction  in 
which  the  national  spirit  was  conspicuous.  From 
the  very  first  days  of  the  Repubhc,  however,  there 
was  marked  divergence  of  opinion  in  regard  to  the 
nature  of  the  new  Union.  The  Eleventh  Amend- 
ment, the  Kentucky  and  Virginia  Resolutions,  the 
Hartford  Convention,  Nullification,  —  all  were  evi- 
dences of  the  general  difference  of  opinion  as  to 

252 


NATURE    OF  THE    UNION  253 

the  character  of  the  federal  Union.  With  the  rise 
of  slavery  to  the  position  of  a  national  issue,  the 
defenders  of  this  institution  made  states-rights  a 
part  of  their  platform.  Thus  the  unnational  doc- 
trine was  associated  with  a  particular  section  of 
the  country  and  with  the  Hfe  of  a  particular  institu- 
tion. It  had  a  local  habitation  and  a  name.  The 
conflict  accordingly  became  more  and  more  des- 
perate, until  the  final  appeal  was  taken  to  the 
arbitrament  of  arms. 

The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  describe  and 
analyze  the  poHtical  theory  underlying  the  various 
doctrines  as  to  the  nature  of  the  Union  developed 
during  this  period.  The  compromise  theory  prev- 
alent at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Con- 
stitution, the  states-rights  theory  developed  by 
Calhoun,  and  the  nationalist  doctrine  in  the  legal 
form  given  it  by  Webster,  and  in  the  more  scien- 
tific shape  later  assumed,  form  the  large  groups 
under  which  these  doctrines  may  be  classified  and 
discussed. 

The  question  as  to  the  nature  of  the  American 
Union  was  an  important  one,  theoretically  and 
practically,  in  the  days  when  the  Constitution  was 
pending.  The  new  government  involved,  it  was 
seen,  a  closer  union  than  that  under  the  old  Con- 
federation, and  yet  it  was  not  desired  to  form  a 
centraHzed  state,  a  "consolidated  republic."  The 
Confederation  was  too  closely  allied  to  anarchy ;  a 
centralized  state,  it  was  feared,  would  be  equiva- 


254  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

lent  to  tyranny.  This  difficulty  was  discussed  by 
the  Federalist  and  was  explained  with  such  con- 
summate skill  as  to  constitute  a  satisfactory 
solution  for  the  political  problem  then  immedi- 
ate and  pressing.  The  United  States  was  the  first 
type  of  the  modern  "  Bundes-Staat,"  and  the  Fed- 
eralist was  breaking  new  ground ;  nevertheless,  the 
theory  then  developed  profoundly  influenced  the 
thought  of  America,  and  also  at  a  later  date  that  of 
Continental  countries.  The  new  Union  was  vari- 
ously termed  a  "  Compound  Republic,"  a  "  Con- 
federate Republic,"  and  a  "Confederacy,"  an 
assemblage  of  societies,  or  an  association  of  two  or 
more  states  into  one  state.  "  The  extent,  modifi- 
cation, and  objects  of  the  federal  authority,"  it  was 
explained,  "  are  mere  matters  of  discretion.  So  long 
as  the  separate  organization  of  the  members  be  not 
abolished  ;  so  long  as  it  exists  by  a  constitutional 
necessity  for  local  purposes,  though  it  be  in  per- 
fect subordination  to  the  general  authority  of  the 
Union,  it  would  still  be  in  fact  and  in  theory  an 
association  of  states  or  a  confederacy."  ^ 

The  nature  of  the  new  Union,  it  was  held,  is 
neither  wholly  national  nor  wholly  federal,  but 
contains  both  national  and  federal  elements  in 
combination.  Considering  the  foundation  of  the 
government,  it  is  federal,  since  the  Constitution 
must  be  ratified  by  the  several  states.  In  regard 
to  the  organization  of   the  legislative  power,  the 

1  Federalist,  No.  9. 


NATURE    OF  THE    UNION  255 

new  Union  is  partly  national  and  partly  federal, 
one  House  resting  on  a  national  and  the  other  on 
a  federal  basis.  The  executive  is  also  constituted 
in  a  mixed  federal  and  national  way,  since  the 
electoral  vote  is  distributed  partly  in  accordance 
with  the  principle  of  state  equality,  and  partly 
according  to  population.  Viewing  the  operation 
of  the  government,  it  is  seen  to  be  national  and 
not  federal,  inasmuch  as  it  acts  directly  on  indi- 
viduals and  not  through  the  states.  In  the  extent 
of  its  powers,  however,  the  Union  is  federal,  be- 
cause its  jurisdiction  is  limited  to  specific  objects, 
and  all  else  is  left  to  the  states.  Lastly,  as  re- 
spects the  amending  power,  it  is  found  that  the 
government  is  partly  federal  and  partly  national, 
since  neither  the  principle  of  unanimity  nor  that 
of  proportionality  obtains  exclusively.  It  thus 
appears  that  the  government,  as  organized  in  the 
Constitution,  must  be  regarded  neither  as  a  pure 
confederacy  nor  yet  as  a  "consolidated  republic"; 
but  should  really  be  placed  in  a  class  by  itself.  It 
is  a  new  type  of  government  pecuHar  to  American 
conditions  —  a  form  at  once  national  and  federal, 
happily  combining  the  characteristics  of  both. 

In  harmony  with  this  idea  of  the  mixed  charac- 
ter of  the  Union,  was  the  theory  that  sovereignty 
is  capable  of  division  and  actually  is  divided  in  the 
United  States.  This  doctrine  was  current  at  the 
time  when  the  Constitution  was  adopted,  Nvas  gen- 
erally accepted  until  the  days  of  Calhoun,  and  stili 


256  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

remains  the  theory  of  the  federal  courts.  In  the 
letter  of  the  Constitutional  Convention  to  Congress, 
it  was  expressly  declared  that  "  all  rights  of  inde- 
pendent sovereignty  "  could  not  be  secured  to  the 
states  under  a  system  of  federal  government.-^  In 
the  Federalist,  also,  the  division  of  sovereign  power 
was  frequently  suggested.  Thus  it  was  said  that 
the  old  Confederation  attempted  to  accomplish 
impossibilities,  "to  reconcile  a  partial  sovereignty 
in  the  Union,  with  complete  sovereignty  in  the 
states  ;  to  subvert  a  mathematical  axiom  by  taking 
away  a  part,  and  letting  the  whole  remain."  ^  It 
was  shown  that  in  Rome  "  the  legislative  power 
in  the  last  resort  resided  for  ages  in  two  different 
bodies,  which  were  distinct  and  independent ;  "  ^ 
that  is,  the  Patricians  and  the  Plebeians.  It  was 
asserted  that  the  new  Constitution  does  not  reduce 
the  states  to  the  rank  of  provinces,  but  leaves  them 
in  possession  of  "certain  exclusive  and  very  impor- 
tant portions  of  sovereign  power."*  The  states 
will  still  hold  "  all  the  rights  of  sovereignty  which 
were  not  by  that  act  exclusively  delegated  to  the 
United  States."^  In  a  consolidated  system  the 
local  authorities  are  wholly  subject  to  the  central 
government ;  but  in  the  proposed  Union  the  "  local 
authorities  form  distinct  and  independent  portions 
of  the  supremacy,  no  more  subject  to  the  general 
authority  than  the  general  authority  is  to  them 

"^Journal  of  Congress,  XII,  165.  '^  No.  4. 

8  No.  32.  *  No.  9.  6  No.  31.     Cf.  No.  82. 


NATURE    OF  THE    UNION  257 

within  its  own  sphere."  ^  The  states  may  not  be 
fully  sovereign,  but  they  have  at  least  a  residuary 
sovereignty.  There  are,  in  fact,  many  sovereignties 
existing  side  by  side.  The  real  sovereignty  rests, 
however,  not  with  state  or  federal  government,  but 
with  the  "people."  "The  ultimate  authority,"  it 
is  said,  "wherever  the  derivative  may  be  found, 
resides  in  the  people  alone."  ^  But  who  the 
"people"  were,  whether  of  the  several  states  or 
of  all  the  states  taken  collectively,  the  Federalist 
was  careful  not  to  answer.  This  was  a  question 
left  for  coming  generations. 

It  is  a  fair  conclusion,  then,  that  at  the  time  when 
the  Constitution  was  adopted,  the  prevalent  opin- 
ion was  that  in  some  way  or  other  sovereignty  was 
being  divided  between  the  states  and  the  Union.^ 
It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  states  thought 
they  were  renouncing  all  of  their  sovereignty,  or 
that  they  thought  they  were  giving  up  none  of 
it.  There  were,  of  course,  some  who  believed 
in  one  or  the  other  of  these  two  ideas ;  but  in  gen- 

1  No.  39.  2  Nos.  33, 45, 82. 

'  See  John  Dickinson,  "  Letters  of  Fabius,"  p.  179;  Noah  Web- 
ster, "An  Examination  into  the  Leading  Principles  of  the  Federal 
Constitution,"  p.  46  (both  the  foregoing  are  in  Ford's  Pamphlets) ; 
Elliot,  Debates,  II,  129,  143,  356.  John  Adams  said  (1790):  "Our 
new  government  is  an  attempt  to  divide  a  sovereignty — a  fresh 
essay  at  imperium  in  imperio.  It  cannot,  therefore,  be  expected 
to  be  very  stable  or  very  firm."  Works,  IX,  564.  In  this  connec- 
tion see  a  discussion  on  "  Social  Compact  and  Constitutional  Con- 
struction," by  A.  C.  McLaughlin,  in  The  American  Historical  Revieio 
(April,  1900). 


258  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

eral  it  was  thought  that  a  compromise  was  being 
made  between  states  and  Union,  and  that  a  divi- 
sion of  sovereignty  was  involved  in  this.  If  the 
question  were  ever  raised  as  to  where  the  ultimate 
controlling  power  in  the  community  is  located,  the 
answer  was,  "with  the  people,"  without  particular 
inquiry  as  to  just  what  was  meant  by  this.^  In 
the  Revolutionary  days  "  people "  had  stood  for 
the  opposition  to  the  king,  and  this  old  idea  was 
used  to  conceal  the  difficulty  involved  in  a  wholly 
different  situation. 

This  idea  of  the  divisibihty  of  sovereignty  was 
early  enunciated  by  the  United  States  courts,  nota- 
bly in  the  case  of  Chisholm  v.  Georgia  (1792).  The 
declaration  was  made  that  "  the  United  States  are 
sovereign  as  to  all  the  powers  of  government  actu- 
ally surrendered.  Each  state  in  the  Union  is  sov- 
ereign as  to  all  the  powers  reserved."  ^  Succeeding 
decisions  gave  expression  to  the  same  theory  that 
sovereignty  is  capable  of  division  and  actually  has 
been  divided  under  the  American  system.  The 
opinions  of  the  courts  were  permeated  with  the  idea 
of  the  division  of  sovereign  powers  between  the 
states  and  the  Union.^ 

1  Cf.  James  Wilson's  argument  in  the  Pennsylvania  Convention 
on  this  point,  Elliot,  Debates,  II,  504. 

2  2  Dallas,  435. 

3  Cf.  Ware  v.  Hylton,  3  Dallas,  232  (1796)  :  "The  several  states 
retained  all  internal  sovereignty  and  .  .  .  Congress  properly  pos- 
sessed the  great  rights  of  external  sovereignty."  Cherokee  Nation 
V.  Georgia,  5  Peters,  26:  "They  have  in  Europe  sovereign  and 


NATURE    OF  THE    UNION  259 

One  of  the  staunchest  champions  of  the  theory 
Pof  divided  sovereignty  was  James  Madison.  He 
;  maintained  that  the  American  government  was 
neither  federal  nor  national;  it  was  siii  generis^ 
federo-republican,  unique  in  the  nature  of  its  con- 
j  struction,  a  "  nondescript  to  be  tested  and  explained 
'J3y  itself  alone,"  ^  an  illustration  of  the  adaptability 
of  republican  institutions  to  new  and  difficult  con- 
ditions.' To  his  mind  nothing  was  clearer  than 
the  propiosition  that  sovereignty  may  be  divided. 
If  it  cannot,  he  urged,  then  "  the  political  system 
of  the  United  States  is  a  chimera,  mocking  the  vain 
pretensions  of  human  wisdom."  ^  Or  again,  "  It 
is  difficult  to  argue  intelligibly  concerning  the  com- 
pound system  of  government  in  the  United  States 
without  admitting  the  divisibility  of  sovereignty."  ^ 
In  this  case  it  is  necessary  "  to  abandon  abstract 
and  technical  modes  of  expounding  and  designat- 
ing its  character,"  and  regard  the  Constitution  as  a 
"system  hitherto  without  a  model." ^  He  found 
that  the  sovereignty  was  divided  Between  the 
states  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Union  on  the 
other,  so  that  the  whole  society,  as  h^  said,  consists 
in  a  number  of  partial  sovereignties.^  ''  Moreover,  he 
charged  that  the  main  pillar  of  nulUfication  was 

demi-sovereign  states,  and  states  of  doubtful  sovereignty.  But 
this  state,  if  it  be  a  state,  must  be  a  grade  above  them  all."  See 
McCulloch  V.  Maryland,  4  Wheaton,  316;  Worcester  v.  Georgia, 
6  Peters,  591-592. 

1  Works,  IV,  420-421.  2  Ibid,  IV,  61. 

8  Ibid.  IV,  394.  *  Ibid.  IV,  420-421.         ^  Ibid.  IV,  393. 


260  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

the  assumption  that  sovereignty  is  a  unit  at  once 
indivisible  and  inalienable.^..; 

Up  to  the  time  when  the  theory  of  Calhoun  be- 
came influential,  the  characteristic  American  doc- 
trine was  that  in  the  United  States,  whatever 
might  elsewhere  obtain,  the  sovereignty  had  been 
divided  into  several  portions  without  the  destruc- 
tion of  its  life  principle.  Replying  to  Calhoun's 
argument  for  unqualified  state  sovereignty,  Sena- 

^  Frederick  Grimke,  Nature  and  Tendency  of  Free  Institutions 
(1848),  argued  that  "  when  we  assert  that  the  sovereignty  is  inalien- 
able or  indivisible,  we,  in  effect,  impose  limitations  upon  the  sov- 
ereignty, which  is  a  contradiction,"  p.  527.  He  held  that  in  the 
United  States  sovereignty  is  divided  between  the  "  states  united  " 
and  the  "  states  severally,"  pp.  519-520.  Nathaniel  Chipman,  Prin- 
ciples of  Government  (1833),  concluded  that  there  is  an  external 
sovereignty  vested  in  the  United  States,  but  no  provision  made  in 
the  Constitution  for  an  internal  sovereignty,  142  ff.  Sovereignty 
is  also  divisible :  "  the  opinion  formerly  entertained  that  the  sov- 
ereignty of  a  state  was  a  sort  of  indivisible  essence,  a  power  abso- 
lute, uncontrolled  and  uncontrollable,  has  been  corrected  in  modern 
times.  Experience  has  shown  it  capable  of  division."  p.  273.  Cf. 
E.  D.  Mansfield,  The  Political  Grammar  of  the  United  States 
(1834),  520-521 ;  John  Taylor,  New  Views  of  the  Constitution 
(1822),  Sec.  13.  Nathan  Dane,  General  Abridgment  and  Digest 
of  American  Law  (1823-1829),  Vol.  IX,  Appendix,  holds  that 
sovereignty  may  be  indivisible  by  "  a  people  standing  alone  as  in 
Russia  or  France,"  but  in  "a  family  political  connection,"  like  the 
United  States,  we  "  give  and  distribute  almost  ad  injinitu77i  dele- 
gated powers,  or  what  is  vaguely  called  sovereignty,"  Sec.  8.  It 
also  appears  that  "  though  the  nation  is  sovereign,  the  power  of  the 
general  government  is  limited,  and  so,  strictly  and  accurately  speak- 
ing, is  no  sovereign,"  Sec.  18.  On  the  omission  of  the  term  "sov- 
ereignty "  in  the  Constitution,  see  Sec.  35. 


NATURE    OF   THE    UNION  26 1 

tor  Rives  of  Virginia,  himself  a  states-rights  man 
of  the  old  school,  said  (1833)  :  "  Sir,  this  is  a  novelty 
unknown  to  the  founders  of  the  Constitution,  and 
has  sprung  up  in  a  hotbed  of  local  politics.  At  the 
period  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  it  was 
distinctly  made  known  and  understood  that  to  the 
extent  to  which  sovereignty  was  vested  in  the 
Union,  that  of  the  states  was  rehnquished  and 
diminished."  If  the  idea  of  a  double  sovereignty 
seemed  to  be  without  adequate  historical  prece- 
dent, so  was  the  whole  American  system  without 
parallel.  As  democracy  seemed  impossible  until 
put  in  practice  in  America,  so  with  the  division  of 
sovereignty.  The  fact  that  such  a  condition  was 
not  elsewhere  to  be  found  did  not  constitute  an 
argument  against  its  acceptance,  but  was  rather  a 
testimony  to  the  "  peculiar  adaptability  of  republican 
institutions." 

As  has  already  been  indicated,  the  progress  of 
this  idea  was  facilitated  by  the  prevalence  of  the 
theory  of  popular  as  opposed  to  governmental  sov- 
ereignty, and  by  the  general  belief  that  the  New 
World  had  really  little  to  do  with  the  Old  World 
conception  of  government  in  general  or  of  sov- 
ereignty in  particular.  The  wide  acceptance  of 
this  idea  throughout  the  United  States  made  it 
for  a  long  time  possible  to  quiet  the  contention 
between  the  states  and  the  Union  by  referring 
them  to  that  authority  above  both ;  namely,  the 
"people."     When  the  contest  between  nationalism 


262  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

and  particularism  entered  the  acute  stage,  how- 
ever, this  doctrine  became  less  easy  to  maintain. 
The  difficulty  long  concealed  behind  the  compli- 
cated governmental  machinery  and  the  ambiguous 
term  "people"  became  evident,  the  compromise 
doctrine  was  rejected  by  both  North  and  South, 
and  the  battle  fought  out  between  the  sovereignty 
of  the  states  and  that  of  the  Union. 

It  should  not  escape  notice,  however,  that  Joseph 
Story  early  distinguished  two  uses  of  the  term 
"sovereignty"  in  such  a  way  as  to  obviate  the  diffi- 
culties inherent  in  the  idea  of  double  supremacy. 
He  observed  that  "  by  sovereignty  in  its  largest 
sense  is  meant  supreme,  absolute,  uncontrollable 
power,  the  jus  S7inimi  imperii,  the  absolute  right  to 
govern."^  But  the  term,  he  showed,  is  also  used 
in  another  and  more  limited  sense,  signifying 
"such  political  powers  as  in  the  actual  organiza- 
tion of  the  particular  state  or  nation  are  to  be 
exclusively  exercised  by  certain  public  function- 
Varies  without  the  control  of  any  superior  authority." 
In  this  sense,  he  continues,  the  sovereignty  "may 
be  of  a  very  limited  nature.  It  may  extend  to  a 
few  or  many  objects.  It  may  be  unlimited  as  to 
some,  it  may  be  restrained  as  to  others."  In  this 
use  of  the  term,  sovereignty  is  not  the  ultimate 
political  power,  but  that  which,  "under  the  given 
form  of  organization,"  is  exercised  "without  the 
control  of  superior  authority."     From  this  point  of 

^  Commentaries,  Sees.  207,  208. 


NATURE    OF   THE    UNION  263 

I  view  it  is  easy  to  regard  sovereignty  as  theoreti- 
cally divisible  and  as  actually  divided  between  the 
states  and  the  Union,  understanding  that  the  "  ab- 
solute right  to  govern  "  still  remains  in  its  original 
unity  and  integrity.  Sovereignty  in  the  hmited 
sense  is  divided ;  in  the  broader  sense  it  remains 
one. 

In  this  connection  attention  should  be  called  to 
an  application  of  the  social-contract  theory  to  the 
nature  of  the  Union.  This  doctrine  of  contract 
:  was  capable  of  different  application,  but  in  the 
'  hands  of  Madison  and  others  was  employed  to 
combat  the  theories  of  the  extreme  states-rights 
party.  It  was  conceded  that  the  Union  was  formed 
by  an  agreement  to  which  states,  and  not  individ- 
uals, were  the  parties,  but  the  binding  force  of  the 
^xj  contract  was  emphasized  in  the  very  strongest 
VT'  *way.  The  fact  that  the  Union  rests  on  a  contract, 
it  was  said,  should  not  be  made  an  excuse  for 
abandoning  it  at  will.  On  the  contrary,  the  very 
fact  that  it  is  a  contract  entitles  it  to  the  highest 
respect.  "It  is,"  said  Madison,  "the  nature  and 
essence  of  a  compact  that  it  is  equally  obligatory 
on  the  parties  to  it,  and  of  course  that  no  one  of 
them  can  be  liberated  therefrom  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  others,  or  such  a  violation  or  abuse  of 
it  by  the  others  as  will  amount  to  a  dissolution  of 
the  compact."  ^  The  states,  then,  may  in  an  ex- 
treme case  exercise  their  revolutionary  right,  but 
~~  1  Works,  IV,  63. 


264  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

fthey  cannot  legally  dissolve  the  Union  at  pleasure. 
They  are  bound  as  states  by  virtue  of  the  contract.^ 
Of  this  nature  was  the  theory  of  the  Union  pro- 
claimed by  Jackson  injiis  message  of  1833  on  the 
nullification  question.!  Hi^.position  was,  that,  with- 
out inquiring  closely\^lfo  the  exact  form  of  the 
national  contract,  "it  is  sufficient  that  it  must  be 
admitted  to  be  a  compact  and  to  possess  the  obli- 
gations incident  to  a  compact."  The  parties  to  the 
agreement  cannot  dissolve  the  association  without 
"acknowledging  the  correlative  right  in  the  re- 
mainder to  decide  whether  that  dissolution  can  be 
permitted  consistently  with  the  general  happiness.^ 
p  Owing  to  the  wide  prevalence  of  the  social-cdn-^ 
'  tract  theory  in  America,  this  appeal  to  the  binding 
force  of  a  contract  was  an  exceedingly  effective 
I  argument  to  use.  It  was  an  easy  step  from  the 
*'~3bctrine  that  governments  derive  their  powers 
from  the  consent  of  the  governed,  to  the  idea  that 
if  the  states  had  consented  or  contracted  to  form  a 
government,  they  were  bound  by  that  agreement. 
The  more  strongly  it  was  believed  that  the  only 
legitimate  basis  of  government  was  consent,  the 
greater  was  the  emphasis  placed  on  the  obligation 
of  a  contract  or  agreement,  whether  between  states 
or  individuals.  And  just  as  it  was  thought  that 
the  social  contract  must  not  be  interpreted  by  any 
one  citizen,  but  by  the  majority,  so  it  was  reasoned 
that  the  agreement  between  the  states  should  be 
^  Compare  Lincoln's  Inaugural  Address. 


NATURE    OF  THE    UNION  265 

interpreted  by  the  majority,  and  not  by  any  one  of 
them  at  pleasure.  The  one-sided  repudiation  of  a 
contract  voluntarily  entered  into  was,  according  to 
this  theory,  wholly  unreasonable,  and  contrary  to  the 
analogy  both  of  private  law  and  of  the  social  contract 
on  which  the  society  rests.  By  this  line  of  reason- 
ing the  conclusion  was  reached  that  the  Union, 
although  created  by  the  voluntary  act  of  the  states 
as  states,  was  not  an  association  from  which  a 
state  could  depart  at  pleasure  without  consulting 
its  fellow-states. 

None  of  these  compromise  ideas,  however,  offered 
a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  problem.  In  the 
course  of  a  generation  after  the  Constitution  was 
adopted,  they  were  supplanted  by  well-defined 
doctrines  of  state  sovereignty  on  the  one  hand, 
and  national  supremacy  on  the  other.  The  conflict 
between  nationalism  and  particularism,  intensified 
by  the  agitation  over  the  slavery  question,  passed 
out  of  the  realm  of  compromise.  Rigid  dogmas 
were  framed  upon  either  side,  their  validity  stub- 
bornly asserted,  and  the  conclusion  found  in  the 
field  of  armed  conflict. 

Definite  form  was  first  given  to  the  particularistic 
theory.  The  feehng  of  state  sovereignty,  strong 
from  the  first,  had  been  aroused  to  vigorous  protest 
by  the  summons  issued  against  the  state  of  Georgia 
from  which  resulted  the  eleventh  Amendment;  by 
the  Alien  and  Sedition  Laws;  again  by  the  war 
with  England;  by  the  tariff  of  1832  ;  finally  by  the 


266  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

fear  that  the  Union  and  slavery  were  incompatible. 
The  outgrowth  of  this  sentiment  was  the  doctrine 
of  NulHfication  and  Secession.  To  the  political 
philosophy  underlying  these  ideas  attention  must 
now  be  given. 

In  its  earhest  form  the  states-rights  idea  was 
based  on  the  current  theory  of  the  social  contract. 
Analogies  were  drawn  between  the  social  contract 
and  the  federal  contract.^  The  formation  of  the 
Union  by  the  states  was  compared  to  that  of  a 
state  by  the  individuals ;  reference  was  made  to 
the  natural  rights  of  states,  and  it  was  suggested 
that  the  states,  like  individuals,  might  abandon  the 
association  of  which  they  were  members,  if  abused 
or  oppressed.  This  analogy  between  social  and 
federal  contract  was  implied  in  the  Kentucky  and 
Virginia  Resolutions. 

The  doctrine  was  exploited  by  the  Virginia  jurist, 
H.  St.  George  Tucker,  in  his  Comjuentarics  on 
Blackstone  (1803).  The  states,  said  Tucker,  are 
united  in  a  confederacy,  but  still  remain  inde- 
pendent and  sovereign.  Each  is  still  a  sovereign 
state,  still  capable,  should  the  occasion  require, 
of  resuming  the  exercise  of  its  functions  to  the 
full  extent.  Whenever  the  common  government 
becomes  subversive  of  the  rights  of  any  state,  it 
may  secede  as  the  states  seceded  from  the  old 
Confederation.     This  is  a  natural  right  of  which 

1  This  argument  had  been  used  by  James  Wilson,  although  not 
in  defence  of  states-rights.     Works,  I,  539. 


NATURE    OF  THE    UNION  26> 

"no  force  or  compact  can  deprive  the  people  of 
any  state,  whenever  they  see  the  necessity  and 
possess  the  power  to  do  it."  i  The  state  has  the 
same  right  to  withdraw  from  or  overthrow  the 
federal  government  as  the  individual  has,  under 
the  Declaration  of  Independence,  to  overthrow  any 
political  system  which  has  become  oppressive.  But 
this,  it  will  be  observed,  gave  the  states  only  a 
revolutionary  right  of  resistance  or  secession,  and  it 
also  involved  the  recognition  of  the  social  contract.^ 
Both  of  these  ideas  were  repudiated  by  the  later 
defenders  of  the  cause  of  the  states. 

The  finally  accepted  statement  of  the  states-rights 
doctrine  was  made  by  the  great  political  philoso- 
pher of  the  South,  John  C.  Calhoun.  The  work  in 
which  his  ideas  are  most  systematically  expressed 
is,  A  Disquisition  on  Government,  accompanied  by 
A  Discourse  on  the  Constitution  and  Government 
of  the  United  States,  one  of  the  ablest  treatises  on 
political  theory  that  appeared  in  the  first  half  of 
the  last  century.^  This,  taken  in  connection  with 
the  numerous  pubHc  utterances  of  Calhoun,  affords 
a  basis  for  the  study  of  his  political  philosophy. 

1  Commentaries,  I,  187. 

2  Tucker  speaks  of  the  contract  as  partly  social  and  partly  fed- 
eral; also  of  a  division  of  sovereignty  between  states  and  the 
government;  but  nevertheless  maintains  that  a  state  may  at  will 
withdraw  from  the  Confederation. 

^  Published  posthumously.  See  Calhoun's  l-Vorks,  edited  by 
Richard  K.  Cralle  ;  Correspondence  of  John  C.  Calhoun,  edited  by 
J.  Franklin  Jameson,  in  Vol.  II,  Annual  Report  of  tlie  American 


268  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

An  analysis  will  first  be  made  of  his  theory  of 
nullification,  and  then  of  the  doctrine  of  secession 
with  which  he  is  associated.  The  inquiry  is  directed 
in  the  first  place,  then,  to  the  general  attitude  of 
Calhoun  toward  the  fundamental  question  of  the 
origin  of  the  political  society. 

Calhoun  condemned  in  no  uncertain  terms  the 
time-honored  hypothesis  of  a  pre-civil  "  state  of 
nature "  and  the  origin  of  government  by  means 
of  a  contract.^  This  had  been  the  theory  of  the 
revolutionists  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries,  and  continued  to  be  the  prevailing  Ameri- 
can doctrine  even  in  the  nineteenth.  In  fact,  this 
hypothesis  of  an  original  "  state  of  nature "  and 
the  contractual  character  of  government  had  been 
one  of  the  leading  principles  of  "  the  Fathers " ; 
the  theory  of  contract  had  even  been  extended  from 
individuals  to  the  relations  between  the  states ;  it 
was  recognized  in  many  of  the  state  constitutions ; 
adopted  by  men  of  all  parties,  aristocrats  as  well 
as  democrats ;  and  was  generally  accepted  as  the 
correct  theory  of  the  origin  of  political  institutions. 
In  the  politics  of  Calhoun,  however,  there  was  no 
place  for  the  assumptions  of  the  Naturrecht  phi- 

Historical  Association  iox  1899.  Of  especial  importance  are  Cal- 
houn's speeches  on  The  South  Carolina  Exposition  (1828),  Vol,  III; 
The  Force  Bill  (1833),  Vol.  II;  Reply  to  Webster  (1833),  Vol.  II; 
Reception  of  Abolition  Petitions  (1837),  Vol.  IV;  Veto  Powef 
(1842),  Vol.  IV,     See  the  Life  of  Calhoun,  by  H.  von  Hoist. 

1  Cf.  '  A  Study  of  Nullification  in  South  Carolina,"  by  D.  F 
Houston,  in  Harvard  Historical  Studies,  Vol.  Ill  (1896). 


NATURE    OF  THE    UNION  269 

losophy,  and  he  had  no  sympathy  with  this  interpre- 
tation of  the  nature  of  government.  The  "state  of 
nature  "  he  regarded  as  a  mere  fiction,  an  unwarrant- 
able hypothesis.  "Instead  of  being  the  natural 
state  of  man,  it  is,  of  all  conceivable  states,  the 
most  opposed  to  his  nature,  most  repugnant  to  his 
feelings,  and  most  incompatible  with  his  wants. 
His  natural  state  is  the  social  and  political." 

Government  is  not  artificial  and  unnatural,  but 
perfectly  natural  in  the  sense  that  it  is  neces- 
sary to  the  development  and  perfection  of  human 
powers.  Government  is  not  a  matter  of  choice, 
depending  for  its  origin  and  continuance  on  the 
caprice  of  the  individual ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is 
a  primary  necessity  of  man,  and, "  like  breathing, 
it  is  not  permitted  to  depend  on  our  vohtion."  ^ 
There  are,  reasons  Calhoun,  two  fundamental  ele- 
ments in  the  constitution  of  man  :  one  the  selfish, 
the  other  the  social  instinct  or  tendency.  Of  these 
two,  however,  the  stronger  is  the  selfish  tendency, 
and  as  a  consequence,  there  arises  conflict  between 
individuals  which  must  be  in  some  way  controlled. 
The  instrument  by  means  of  which  this  control 
is  effected  is  government  —  a  necessity  arising  out 
of  the  essential  nature  of  man.^  Society  is  neces- 
sary to  man ;  government  is  necessary  to  society. 
But  government  itself  contains  the  germ  of  evil, 


1  Ibid.  8. 
ing 


1  Ibid.  8. 

2  Ibid.  1-4.     Calhoun  avoids  using  the  term  "selfish,"  substitut 
\  "  direct "  or  "  individual." 


270  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

and  must  in  its  turn  be  controlled  or  balanced. 
To  this  end  is  erected  a  constitution  intended  to 
hold  in  check  the  destructive  tendencies  found  in 
government.  This  constitution  bears  the  same 
relation  to  government  that  government  bears  to 
society ;  as  government  restrains  the  selfish  ten- 
dencies of  the  individual,  so  the  constitution  checks 
the  selfish  tendencies  of  the  government.  There 
is  this  difference  to  be  noted,  however,  that  gov- 
ernment is  of  divine  origin,  whereas  the  constitu- 
tion is  a  human  device  and  construction.  There 
mnst  be  a  government;  there  may  be  a  consti- 
tution.^ 

The  organization  of  the  constitution  Calhoun  re- 
gards as  one  of  the  greatest  of  political  problems. 
How  can  the  government  be  given  the  powers  nec- 
essary and  yet  be  restrained  from  oppressing  the 
members  of  the  society  ?  Calhoun's  answer  to  this 
perennial  problem  is  that  there  must  be  created 
an  organism  "by  which  resistance  may  be  syste- 
matically and  peaceably  made  on  the  part  of  the 
ruled  to  oppression  and  abuse  of  power  on  the  part 
of  the  rulers."  ^  This  result  may  be  effected  by 
establishing  the  responsibility  of  the  rulers  to  the 
ruled  through  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  suf- 
frage —  the  primary  principle  in  the  establishment 
of  constitutional  government.  Yet  this  alone  is 
inadequate  to  afford  the  necessary  protection  ;  "  it 

i/Wa.  8.  ^Ibid.  12. 


NATURE    OF   THE    UNION  27 1 

only  changes  the  seat  of  authority,  without  coun- 
teracting, in  the  least,  the  tendency  of  the  govern 
ment  to  oppression  and  abuse  of  its  powers."  ^ 
We  are  still  confronted  by  the  imminent  danger 
that  the  majority  of  the  electors  will  prove  to 
be  tyrannical  and  oppress  the  weaker  minority 
as  intolerably  as  the  most  irresponsible  govern- 
ment. 

Calhoun  enters,  therefore,  on  a  vigorous  polemic 
against  the  despotism  of  the  majority.  He  asserts 
that  the  tendency  of  the  majority  is  to  assume  all 
the  rights  belonging  to  the  people.  Although 
only  a  fraction,  they  assume  to  be  and  act  as 
the  whole  people ;  while  on  the  other  hand,  the 
minority  is  treated  as  if  it  were  nothing  at  all. 
Again,  Calhoun  points  out  the  probability  that 
great  poHtical  parties  will  arise,  that  their  organi- 
zation will  become  increasingly  centralized,  and 
that  continually  stricter  party  discipline  will  pre- 
vail. Offices  will  come  to  be  regarded  as  the 
legitimate  reward  of  the  victorious  party,  while 
recognition  of  other  than  partisans  will  be  ex- 
cluded. Party  strife  will  become  fiercer  and  fiercer 
as  it  becomes  more  factional,  and  will  finally  re- 
sult in  an  appeal  to  force  and  the  establishment 
of  absolute  government.^ 

Nor  is  there  any  way  by  which  this  inherent 

1  Ibid.  14. 

2  Ibid.  42.  Calhoun  had  before  him  the  spoils  system  inaugurated 
by  Jackson.     See  Vol.  II,  435. 


272  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

tendency  may  be  effectively  restrained.  It  may  be 
urged  that  a  sufficient  check  is  found  in  the  power 
of  public  opinion  to  keep  party  spirit  within  reason- 
able limits.  But  to  this  Calhoun  is  not  ready  to  as- 
sent. He  concedes  the  great  strength  of  public 
sentiment,  particularly  that  of  modern  times  in  its 
highly  developed  form,  but  does  not  consider  it 
even  yet  as  an  effective  barrier  against  the  ten- 
dencies of  the  majority.  Pubhc  opinion  itself  may 
be  just  as  despotic  as  the  majority  party,  just  as 
radical  and  unreasonable,  and  consequently  just  as 
uncertain  a  defender  of  the  rights  of  the  minority. 
Nor  are  constitutional  restrictions  or  the  separa- 
tion of  powers  of  sufficient  force  against  the  ma- 
jority. All  restrictions  must  be  interpreted,  all 
requirements  carried  out,  by  the  prevailing  party. 
The  minority  is  helpless  and  must  submit  to  any 
adjustment  of  constitutional  balances  that  may 
commend  itself  to  the  majority.^ 

The  "tyranny  of  the  majority  "  is,  then,  one  of  the 
fundamental  propositions  in  the  theory  of  Calhoun. 
Majority  rule  is  always  liable  to  abuse  at  the  hands 
of  a  party,  an  interest,  or  a  section,  which  inter- 
prets constitutional  law,  determines  public  opinion, 
arrogates  to  itself  the  right  and  privilege  prop- 
erly belonging  only  to  the  whole  people.  With 
dramatic  power  Calhoun  pictures  the  inevitable 
advance   of    majority   encroachment   and   aggres- 

1  Disquisition,  22  ff.  See  Madison's  defence  of  majority  rule, 
11,  330- 


NATURE    OF   THE    UNION  2/3 

sion.i  Application  of  this  principle  is  made  in  ref- 
erence to  the  question  of  taxation.  Under  the  opera- 
tion of  the  numerical  majority,  says  Calhoun,  a  party 
or  section  obtaining  power  may  easily  abuse  and  op- 
press another  section  found  in  the  minority.  Taxes 
may  be  levied  by  the  majority  section,  which  bur- 
den chiefly  the  minority  section  ;  not  only  this,  but 
these  taxes  are  actually  returned  by  the  minor- 
ity to  the  majority,  virtually  bounties  paid  by  the 
weaker  to  the  stronger  party.  The  case  in  point 
was  that  of  the  protective  tariff,  which  he  con- 
sidered was  levied  for  the  benefit  of  the  North  at 
the  expense  of  the  South.  It  seemed  to  him, 
therefore,  an  excellent  illustration  of  the  "  major- 
ity tyranny  "  upon  which  so  much  emphasis  had 
been  laid. 

In  place  of  the  dangerous,  "  «?/;«mf^/majority," 
Calhoun  presents  his  doctrine  of  the  *^  conctirrent 
majority."  "  All  constitutional  governments,"  says 
Calhoun,  "  take  the  sense  of  the  community  by  its 
parts,  each  through  its  appropriate  organ."  ^  On 
the  other  hand,  those  governments  in  which  power 
is  centred  in  an  individual  or  a  body  of  individuals, 
even  including  the  majority,  may  be  regarded  as 
absolute  governments.     The  principle  upon  which 

1  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Calhoun  objected  to  party  caucuses 
and  conventions  "  because  they  are  irresponsible  bodies,  not  known 
to  the  Constitution."  The  election  of  the  President,  he  held,  should 
be  left  to  the  electoral  college  as  the  framers  of  the  Constitution 
intended.      IVorks,  Vol.  IV,  394. 

2  Disquisition,  36. 

T 


274  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

they  rest  is,  in  last  analysis,  force,  in  contrast  to 
the  principle  of  constitutional  governments,  which 
is  that  of  compromise.  Under  the  "  concurrent " 
or  "  constitutional  "  majority  system  this  principle 
of  compromise  will  be  made  effective  by  giving 
"  each  interest  or  portion  of  the  community  a 
negative  on  the  others."  ^  Without  a  "concurrent 
majority "  there  can  be  no  negative ;  without  a 
negative  there  can  be  no  constitution.  Calhoun 
declares  that  "it  is  this  negative  power  —  the 
power  of  preventing  or  arresting  the  action  of  the 
government  —  be  it  called  by  what  term  it  may  — 
veto,  interposition,  nulHfication,  check,  or  balance 
of  power  — which,  in  fact,  forms  the  Constitution. "^ 
The  positive  power  makes  the  government,  but 
the  negative  power  makes  the  constitution.  The 
essence  of  the  "concurrent  majority"  is,  then,  the 
veto  power  granted  to  the  various  separate  interests. 
Governmental  action  is  conditioned,  not  upon  the 
consent  of  a  majority  of  individuals,  but  upon  that 
of  various  i?iterests. 

The  advantages  of  such  a  system  are  presented 
with  great  enthusiasm.  With  a  "  concurrent  major- 
ity "  there  will  be  a  greater  degree  of  attachment 
to  the  state  than  is  otherwise  possible.^  Attention 
will  be  attracted  not  so  much  to  party  as  to  country. 
The  government  will  not  discriminate  against  any 
one  interest  or  group,  and  hence  there  will  be  no  vio- 
lent resentments  and  animosities  provoked  as  under 

1  DisquisiHon,  35.  2  /^j^_  s  /3,-^_  ^^^ 


NATURE    OF  THE    UNION  275 

the  rule  of  the  absolute  majority.  Consequently 
there  will  result  a  higher  development  of  "  common 
devotion."  Politically  and  morally  there  must  fol- 
low, according  to  Calhoun,  loftier  standards  of  con- 
duct  under  this  regime  of  compromise  than  under 
that  of  force.  Moreover,  under  this  system  there 
may  be  obtained  a  higher  degree  of  liberty.^  Gov- 
ernment will  be  effectually  restrained  from  arbitrary 
and  oppressive  conduct  by  the  veto  power  of  the 
various  interests,  and  thus  political  freedom  will  be 
guaranteed.  In  any  other  government,  indeed, 
liberty  can  be  little  more  than  a  name ;  the  "  con- 
stitutional majority"  alone  makes  it  a  reality.  By 
the  same  logic,  civilization  and  progress  are  fostered 
by  the  system  of  compromise,  for  under  it  are 
secured  liberty  and  harmony  —  two  great  factors 
in  civilized  development.^  On  the  whole,  Calhoun 
would  conclude  that  the  "organism  "  known  as  the 
"concurrent"  or  "constitutional"  majority  is 
eminently  adapted  to  reahze  the  great  ends  of 
government  included  under  the  protection  and 
perfection  of  society. 

Two  objections  may  be  raised  against  the  pro- 
posed system,  Calhoun  concedes  ;  namely,  its  com- 
plexity and  its  ineffectiveness.  To  the  first  of 
these  he  replies  that  the  simplest  of  all  governments 
are  absolute  and  that  all  free  governments  are  of 
necessity  complex  in  their  structure.  Hence  this 
style  of  argument  applies  to  the  whole  philosophy 

1  IHd.  59.  *  Ibid.  61. 


276  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

and  practice  of  free  governments,  which  he  does 
not  consider  it  necessary  to  defend.  Nor  is  the 
objection  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  proposed 
system  regarded  as  serious.  Calhoun  maintains 
that  in  times  of  real  stress  the  compromise  principle 
is  not  unfavorable  to  the  passage  of  necessary 
measures,  and  that  any  policy  agreed  upon  is  far 
more  enthusiastically  supported  than  if  compelled 
by  force.  Obedience  will  be  rendered,  not  from  a 
selfish  or  sectional  motive,  but  from  a  higher  sense 
of  obligation  to  country.  An  analogy  to  the  com- 
promise principle  is  discovered  in  the  unanimity 
required  of  a  jury  before  decisive  action  can  be 
taken.  As  circumstances  lead  the  jurors  to  a 
unanimous  decision,  so  the  far  more  imperious  ne- 
cessities of  government  will  lead  to  a  compromise 
and  agreement  in  the  affairs  of  state.  Historical 
illustrations  of  the  compromise  are  afforded  by  the 
experience  of  Poland  with  the  libenim  veto,  by  the 
Confederacy  of  the  Six  Nations,  the  Patricians  and 
Plebeians  in  Rome,  the  Lords  and  Commons  in 
England,  and  by  the  United  States,  if  the  original 
intention  of  the  Fathers  were  carried  out. 

It  is  now  evident  that  Calhoun's  argument  all 
leads  up  to  the  defence  of  a  particular  theory  of 
public  law  in  the  United  States.  "  Concurrent  "  or 
"  constitutional "  majority  is  simply  the  prolegomena 
to  nulUfication.  The  individual  states  of  the  Union 
are  to  enjoy  a  veto  on  the  proceedings  of  the  general 
government,  thus  estabUshing  the  principle  of  action 


NATURE   OF  THE    UNION  277 

through  the  concurrent  instead  of  the  numerical 
majority.  A  state  may  reject  any  measure  of  the 
general  government  regarded  as  inconsistent  with 
the  terms  of  the  Constitution  ;  may,  in  other  words, 
nuUify  the  proposed  action  of  the  federal  govern- 
ment. If  three-fourths  of  the  states  support  the 
action  of  the  government,  the  nullifying  state  must 
either  yield  or  withdraw  from  the  Union.^  Thus 
a  constitutional  means  of  defence  is  possessed  by 
each  state ;  there  is  no  possibility  of  tyrannical  con- 
duct on  the  part  of  the  "  numerical  majority  "  ; 
and  the  action  of  the  "  concurrent  majority  "  is 
assured.  Nullification,  in  Calhoun's  eyes,  was  not 
only  a  theory  of  the  relation  of  the  states  to  the 
Union,  but  it  was  a  theory  of  constitutional 
government  in  general ;  founded  not  merely  in 
the  particular  system  of  the  United  States,  but 
equally  essential  in  the  frame-work  of  any  free 
constitution. 

In  South  Carolina  for  example,  he  points  out, 
representation  in  the  legislature  is  distributed  on 
the  basis  of  property,  population,  and  territory. 
Representation  in  the  senate  is  based  on  election 
districts,  and  thus  gives  to  the  southern  part  of  the 
state  the  predominance  in  that  body ;  the  house 
is  based  on  property  and  population,  thus  giving 
the  northern  part  of  the  state  the  majority  there. 
As  the  governor,  the  judges,  and  all  important 
officers  are  elected  by  the  legislature,  there  is 
*  See  Discourse,  297  ff. 


278  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

established  an  equilibrium  between  the  sections. 
"  Party  organization,"  says  Calhoun,  "  party  disci- 
pline, party  proscription,  and  their  offspring,  the 
spoils  principle,  have  been  unknown  to  the  state."  ^ 
The  same  principle  and  similar  methods  might 
well  be  introduced,  he  thinks,  into  other  states 
and  there  be  followed  by  like  beneficent  results. 
As  already  stated,  nullification  as  conceived  by 
Calhoun  was  not  simply  a  theory  of  the  American 
Union,  but  a  fundamental  doctrine  of  free  govern- 
ment. Whether  the  political  theory  of  nuUification 
was  chronologically  or  only  logically  antecedent  to 
the  constitutional  theory  of  nullification,  is  a  matter 
which  need  not  here  be  discussed;  the  important 
fact  is  that  in  the  developed  thought  of  Calhoun, 
the  "concurrent  majority"  was  declared  to  be  a 
V  vital  element  in  constitutional  government.^ 

The  next  object  of  inquiry  is  Calhoun's  state- 
ment of  the  doctrine  of  secession.  The  germ  of 
this  theory  is  found  in  Calhoun's  conception  of  the 
nature  of  sovereignty.  In  the  early  years  of  the 
Republic  it  had  been  generally  believed  that  in 

*  See  Discourse,  405. 

2  Calhoun  favored  a  plural  executive  for  the  United  States, 
This,  he  urged,  was  the  practice  in  Sparta,  Rome,  and  even  England, 
where  the  cabinet  is  the  real  executive.  In  the  United  States  there 
should  be  one  of  the  members  constituting  the  executive  from  each 
of  the  two  great  sections  of  the  country.  Discourse  on  Constitu- 
tion and  Government,  392-395.  Calhoun's  opposition  to  Jackson's 
use  of  the  executive  power  would  also  lead  him  to  favor  a  plural 
executive. 


NATURE    OF  THE    UNION  279 

the  United  States  there  existed  a  divided  sov- 
ereignty. The  states  were  sovereign  in  certain 
iriatters,  the  national  government  sovereign  in  cer- 
tain others,  and  each  was  supreme  in  its  proper 
sphere.  If  any  ultimate  sovereign  was  thought  of, 
it  was  the  people  as  contrasted  with  the  government. 

Calhoun,  however,  was  wholly  intolerant  of  any 
theory  of  divided  sovereignty.  To  him  this  was 
logically  impossible  and  contradictory.  He  rea- 
soned that  in  its  very  nature  sovereignty  must  be 
indivisible.  "  To  divide  is  to  destroy  it ; "  sov- 
ereignty must  be  one,  or  it  is  not  at  all.  There 
can  be  no  state  partly  sovereign  and  partly  non- 
sovereign  ;  there  can  be  no  association  composed 
of  half-sovereign  states  on  the  one  hand,  and  a 
half-sovereign  government  on  the  other.  The 
vital  principle  of  the  state,  its  life  and  spirit,  can- 
not be  sundered  ;  it  must  remain  one  and  indi- 
visible. Thus  in  Calhoun's  doctrine,  all  compromise 
was  rejected,  and  the  doctrine  of  the  indivisibility 
of  sovereignty  presented  in  its  clearest  and  most 
striking  Hght. 

Applying  this  argument  to  the  nature  of  the 
Union,  Calhoun  asserted  that  the  states  were  origi- 
nally sovereign,  and  that  they  had  never  yielded 
up  their  sovereignty.  They  could  not  surrender  a 
part  and  retain  another  part,  but  they  must  either 
have  given  up  all,  or  have  retained  all ;  the  states 
must  be  fully  sovereign  or  fully  subject.  This  was 
the  alternative  which  Calhoun  urged  with  relent- 


280  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

less  logic.  Given  the  original  sovereignty  of  the 
states,  and  the  indivisibility  of  sovereignty,  either 
the  states  must  be  sovereign  communities  and  the 
United  States  a  mere  agent,  or  the  United  States 
must  be  sovereign  and  the  states  wholly  subordi- 
nate. In  Calhoun's  theory  there  was  no  oppor- 
tunity given  for  a  division  of  the  field  between  the 
states  and  the  Union ;  such  a  compromise  was  ex- 
cluded.i  It  is  true,  he  concedes,  that  the  central 
government  enjoys  the  right  to  exercise  sovereign 
powers,  but  it  does  not  have  the  true  sovereignty 
from  which  these  powers  are  only  emanations.  The 
central  government  acts  as  a  sovereign,  but  it  is  not 
a  sovereign.  It  wears  the  robes  of  authority  only 
by  sufferance  of  the  legitimate  owner,  the  states. 

To  the  central  government  there  are  delegated 
by  the  states  certain  attributes  of  sovereignty,  such 
as  the  war  power,  the  taxing  power,  the  power  to 
coin  money  ;  but  these  powers  do  not  constitute 
sovereignty.  In  Calhoun's  theory  these  attributes 
of  sovereignty  may  be  divided,  and  the  supreme 
authority  itself  remain  unimpaired.^  Thus  the 
states  do  not  surrender  the  sovereignty;  they 
merely  forego  the  exercise  of  certain  of  its  attri- 
butes, and  these  are  liable  to  recall  at  any  moment 

1  Cf.  Works^  Vol.  II,  232,  233,  in  reply  to  Cla\'ton  and  Rives. 

2  Discourse,  146.  "There  is  no  difficulty  in  understanding  how 
powers  appertaining  to  sovereignty  may  be  divided,  and  the  exer- 
cise of  one  portion  delegated  to  one  set  of  agents  and  another 
portion  to  another." 


NATURE    OF  THE    UNION  28 1 

by  the  state  from  which  derived.  In  fact,  neither 
federal  nor  state  government  is  supreme,  for  there 
is  a  determining  power  back  of  both.  One  must 
distinguish,  he  maintains,  between  the  constitution- 
making  power  and  the  law-making  power ;  the 
former  alone  is  sovereign,  and  to  its  act  is  due 
the  formation  and  organization  of  the  government.^ 
The  constituent  power  in  any  state  concedes  both 
to  the  state  government  and  to  the  national  gov- 
ernment certain  powers  or  attributes  of  sovereignty ; 
but  as  it  may  recall  the  power  granted  to  the 
state  government,  so  with  equal  right  it  may  recall 
the  authority  delegated  to  the  central  government. 
Throughout  this  process  the  sovereign  power  re- 
mains intact.  The  practical  conclusion  which  he 
draws  is,  naturally,  that  the  states  may  at  any  time 
rightfully  assert  their  sovereign  prerogative  and 
withdraw  from  the  Union. 

It  is  further  important  to  notice  how,  on  Cal-'^ 
noun's  basis,  he  differentiated  the  United  States 
from  a  league  or  confederacy.  What  line  of  de- 
markation  could  he  draw  between  the  political 
organization  under  the  Articles  of  Confederation 
and  that  effected  under  the  Constitution  }  Calhoun 
declared  that  the  main  difference  between  these 
two  types  of  association  consisted  in  the  fact  that 
the  Confederacy  lacked  one  essential  feature  of  the 
"  Republic,"  namely,  a  fixed  and  stable  government. 
The  so-called  "government"  of  a  confederacy  is 

*  Discourse,  191. 


.282  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

"nearly  allied  to  an  assembly  of  diplomats,"  meet- 
ing to  determine  certain  policies,  and  then  leaving 
their  execution  largely  to  the  several  parties  to  the 
agreement.  "  Our  system  is  the  first  that  ever 
substituted  a  goveniment  in  lieu  of  such  bodies. 
This,  in  fact,  constitutes  its  peculiar  characteristic. 
It  is  new,  peculiar,  and  unprecedented."  ^  Among 
the  changes  involved  in  the  passage  from  Con- 
federacy to  "  Republic  "  was,  in  the  first  place,  a 
change  in  the  source  from  which  power  was 
derived.  The  Confederacy  obtained  its  authority 
from  the  state  governments  ;  the  "  Republic  "  from 
the  sovereign  communities  themselves.  The  Con- 
federacy was  a  mere  league  between  governments ; 
the  "  Republic  "  is  a  "  more  perfect  union  "  between 
sovereign  communities.  Another  point  of  differ- 
ence is  that  in  the  "  Republic  "  there  is  needed  a 
much  more  careful  specification  and  enumeration 
of  powers  than  was  required  in  the  Confederacy, 
where  the  states  themselves  were  immediately  con- 
cerned in  the  administration.^  Furthermore,  under 
the  Confederacy  the  state  governments  were  supe- 
rior to  the  central  government,  which  was  merely 
their  agent ;  but  in  the  "  Republic  "  the  federal  and 
the  state  governments  are  equals  and  coordinates.^ 
Both  are  inferior  in  rank  to  the  constitutional  con- 
vention of  the  state  which  gives  them  life.  Lastly, 
there  was  a  change  in  the  method  of  executing  the 
commands  of  the  central  government.       The  Con- 

1  Discourse,  163.  ^  j/,ij_  jg^^  3  ji,ij^  ig^^ 


NATURE   OF   THE    UNION  28 J 

federacy  acted  through  the  states ;  the  "  Republic  " 
is  authorized  to  act  directly  upon  individuals.^ 

The  difference,  then,  between  the  '•  Republic," 
or  a  federal  system,  and  a  "nation"  must  be 
sought,  not  in  the  character  of  the  powers  exer- 
cised, but  in  the  basis  upon  which  they  rest.  It 
matters  not  how  large  the  power  of  the  federal 
government ;  if  that  power  may  be  recalled  by  the 
states,  the  federal  government  is  subordinate  and 
they  are  sovereign.  The  federal  government  may 
have  possession ;  the  states  have  ownership :  and 
they  may  at  any  time  evict  their  tenant,  or  any  one 
of  the  states  may  claim  its  share  of  the  estate.^ 

Of  the  influence  of  Calhoun  there  is  no  question. 
He  was  easily  the  first  in  rank  among  the  theorists 
of  his  school,  and  his  ideas  dominated  the  South. 
His  political  theories  became  the  dogma  of  the 
particularistic  party ;  they  were  pressed  with  the 
most  rigid  and  unyielding  logic,  and  led  straight 
to  the  trial  of  arms  in  the  Civil  War.  After  the 
close  of  this  struggle,  the  theory  of  states-rights 
was  again  stated  by  such  authorities  as  Jefferson 
Davis,^  Alexander  H.  Stephens/  and  Bernard  J. 

1  Ibid.  168, 

2  Calhoun's  theory  found  expression  in  the  constitution  of  the 
Confederate  States. 

8  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government  (1881). 

*  A  Constitutional  View  of  the  Late  War  between  the  States 
(1868),  p.  70.  Cf.  A  Brief  Inquiry  into  the  True  Nature  and 
Character  of  our  Federal  Government,  by  A.  P.  Upshur  (1840),  a 
review  of  Story's  Commentaries. 


284  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

Sage,^  but  little  was  added  to  what  had  already 
been  said  by  Calhoun.  His  doctrines  still  stand  as 
the  most  perfect  formulation  of  the  particularistic 
idea  which  played  so  large  a  part  in  the  first  two 
generations  of  the  life  of  the  Repubhc. 

The  nationalist  theory  of  the  Union,  like  the 
particularistic  doctrine,  did  not  develop  imme- 
diately on  the  establishment  of  the  Constitution. 
The  first  great  champion  of  the  cause  was  Daniel 
Webster,  who  contributed  more  to  the  strengthen- 
ing of  Union  sentiment  than  any  other  one  man. 
Webster's  theory,  however,  was  j;onstitutional  in 
nature,  rather  than  philosophic.  He  attempted  to 
show  from  the  language  of  the  'Constitution  itself, 
without  much  discussion  of  philosophic  or  historic 
considerations,  that  the  Union  was  formed  by  a 
contract  between  individuals  which  resulted  in  the 
estabhshment  of  a  supreme  law  and  government, 
and  that  the  states  as  such  were  not  concerned 
in  this  agreement.  ,  "  The  people  of  the  United 
States"  he  understood  to  mean  the  people  of  the 
whole  Union,  and  not  of  the  several  states.  The 
Union  is  not  merely  a  compact  between  states  to 
form  a  new  Confederacy,  but  an  agreement  be- 
tween individuals  to  form  a  national  government. 
"  It  is  established,"  said  he,  "  by  the  people  of  the 
United  States.  It  does  not  say  by  the  people  of 
the  several  states.     It  is  as  all  the  people  of  the 

^  The  Republic  of  Republics,  or  American  Federal  Liberty,  by 
P.  C.  Centz  (Bernard  J.  Sage),  1865.     See  especially  Chap.  VI. 


NATURE  OF  THE   UNION  285 

United  States  that  they  estabHshed  the  Constitu- 
tion." Thus  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
was  formed  just  as  any  state  constitution  ;  namely, 
by  means  of  an  agreement  between  individuals. 

But  a  state  constitution,  although  created  origi- 
nally by  an  agreement  between  individuals,  was  not 
regarded  as  a  contract,  but  as  a  law.  It  was 
created  by  an  agreement,  but  when  that  agree- 
ment was  once  made,  there  came  into  being  a  law 
proper.  To  use  an  analogy  from  private  law,  the 
agreement  has  become  an  "executed  contract." 
"When  the  people  agree  to  erect  a  government," 
said  Webster,  "  and  actually  erect  it,  the  thing  is 
done,  and  the  agreement  is  at  an  end.  The  com- 
pact is  executed,  and  the  end  designed  by  it  is  at- 
tained.'"^ The  same  argument  was  made  by  Story, 
who  urged'that  a  constitution  falls  under  the  defi- 
nition of  law  as  laid  down  by  the  eminent  authority, 
Blackstone.  "  It  is,"  said  he,  "  a  rule  of  action  pre- 
scribed by  the  supreme  power  in  the  state,  regulat- 
ing the  rights  and  duties  of  the  whole  community. 
It  is  a  rule,  as  distinguished  from,  a  temporary  or 
sudden  order  —  permanent,  uniform,  and  universal. 
It  is  also  called  a  rule  to  distinguish  it  from  a  com- 
pact or  agreement,  for  a  contract  is  a  promise  pro- 
ceeding from  us,  law  is  a  command  directed  to  us."  ^ 

1  Works,  III,  468  (1833).     Reply  to  Calhoun. 

2  Commentaries,  Sec.  339.  Cf.  the  Federalist,  No.  33.  Nathan 
Dane,  General  Abridgement  and  Digest  of  American  Law  (1823- 
1829),  Appendix,  Sec.  14  ff. 


286  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

On  this  basis  it  was  denied  that  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  could  be  regarded  as  a  con- 
tract, and  the  assertion  made  that  it  must  be  con- 
sidered as  a  law  in  the  strict  and  proper  sense  of 
the  term.  It  is,  in  fact,  the  supreme  law  of  the 
land,  and  carries  with  it  the  very  highest  degree  of 
obligation.  The  Union  is  not  a  mere  treaty  relation 
which  may  be  denounced  at  will,  but  an  agreement 
as  obligatory  and  indissoluble  as  the  social  contract 
on  which  the  whole  fabric  of  society  rests.  Hence 
a  state  has  no  more  right  to  question  the  authority 
and  supremacy  of  the  Constitution  than  a  citizen 
of  Massachusetts  has  to  question  the  constitution 
of  that  state  ;  not  even  as  much  right,  for  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  is  the  supreme  law 
of  the  whole  society.  The  individual  may  exert 
the  original  right  of  revolution,  but  he  has  no  legal 
right  to  resist  the  constituted  authorities  of  the 
nation. 

Webster's  doctrine  was,  then,  that  the  Union  is 
not  a  treaty  relation  between  sovereign  states,  as 
Calhoun  argued,  or  a  contract  between  states  by 
which  the  sovereignty  of  the  contracting  parties  is 
diminished,  as  Madison  contended ;  but  it  is  a  law, 
resting  on  a  social  contract  between  individuals, 
and  in  which  the  states  as  such  had  no  part.  The 
Constitution  is  a  government  ordained  and  estab- 
lished by  the  people  of  the  United  States.  In  the 
expressive  language  of  Webster,  the  Union  is,  "  the 
association  of  the  people  under  a  constitution  of 


NATURE   OF  THE    UNION  287 

government,  uniting  their  highest  interests,  cement- 
ing their  present  enjoyments,  and  blending  in  an 
indivisible  mass  all  their  hopes  for  the  future." 

Although  reasoning  with  great  skill  and  elo- 
quence from  the  strict  letter  of  the  Constitution,  it 
is  evident  that  Webster's  real  power  did  not  come 
from  his  constitutional  arguments  as  such.  The 
very  question  over  which  he  and  Calhoun  fought 
was  whether  the  Union  should  be  regarded  and  in- 
terpreted from  the  standpoint  of  constitutional  law 
or  of  international  law.  If  the  states  were  never 
sovereign  or  had  yielded  up  their  sovereignty,  then 
Webster's  contention,  that  secession  is  an  unconsti- 
tutional act,  was  valid.  But  to  Calhoun,  who  looked 
upon  the  Union  as,  in  ultimate  analysis  at  least,  a 
treaty  between  sovereign  states,  secession  could  not 
be  regarded  as  unconstitutional,  but  at  the  worst  as 
a  breach  of  international  law.  The  discussion,  as 
they  carried  it  on,  amounted  to  an  argument  over 
the  legahty  of  an  act,  with  one  of  the  parties  deny- 
ing the  existence  of  the  law  under  which  such 
validity  was  contested.  Webster  wished  to  make  a 
purely  legal  argument  on  the  question  of  legal 
sovereignty.  Calhoun  declined  to  make  it  purely 
a  legal  question,  but  at  the  same  time  disregarded 
the  matter  of  fact. 

When  we  consider  the  social  and  economic 
forces  on  which  political  forms  are  based,  Webster 
had  the  stronger  position,  and  for  this  reason. 
Calhoun  was  continually  looking  backward  to  a 


288  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

state  of  things  that  once  perhaps  may  have  existed, 
and  he  failed  to  observe  that  every  year  was  carry- 
ing him  farther  away  from  his  premise.  The  fatal 
flaw  in  his  argument  was  that,  even  granting  his 
cherished  hypothesis  that  the  states  were  originally 
sovereign,  it  did  not  follow  that  they  would  continue 
to  possess  that  fulness  of  power  forever.^  On  the 
other  hand,  Webster's  hypothesis  was  looking  to 
the  future  tense,  and  every  year  of  nationalizing 
conditions  was  therefore  strengthening  his  conten- 
tion. The  great  weight  of  his  argument  was  due 
to  the  fact  that  even  if  his  interpretation  of  "  We, 
the  people  "  was  denied,  it  did  not  follow  that  his 
conclusions  were  not  sound.  His  power  as  a  con- 
troversialist really  came,  not  from  the  strength  of 
his  constitutional  arguments  as  such,  but  from  the 
fact  that  he  followed  a  great  current  of  public  sen-  j 
timent,  springing  from  the  impulse  of  nationality.  . 
He  had  with  him  the  reasoned  and  unreasoned^ 
forces  of  an  ethnic  and  geographic  unity  strug- 
gling toward  self-expression. 

1  Calhoun  recognized  this  at  times.  In  reply  to  a  suggestion 
that  the  best  policy  for  the  South  would  be  separation,  he  said 
(1838)  :  "That  is  a  natural  and  common  conclusion,  but  those  who 
make  it  up  do  not  think  of  the  difficulty  involved  in  the  word;  how 
many  bleeding  pores  must  be  taken  up  in  passing  the  knife  of  sepa- 
ration through  a  body  politic  (in  order  to  make  two  of  one)  which 
has  been  so  long  bound  together  by  so  many  ties,  political,  social, 
and  commercial.  .  .  .  We  must  remember  it  is  the  most  difficult 
process  in  the  world  to  make  two  people  of  one;  and  that  there  is 
no  example  of  it,  if  we  except  the  Jews."     Correspondence,  391. 


NATURE    OF  THE    UNION  289 

The  political  theory  of  the  nationalist  school 
was  not  fully  stated  until  the  events  of  the  Civil 
War  had  shown  the  strength  of  the  Union  senti- 
ment. In  this  great  struggle  the  latent  force  of 
the  national  spirit  was  at  last  decisively  mani- 
fested, and  the  nature  of  the  American  Union  set- 
tled beyond  question.  At  the  close  of  the  four 
years  of  war  there  could  be  no  uncertainty  whether 
the  United  States  should  be  ranked  as  a  confed- 
eration or  as  a  nation.  There  was,  perhaps,  room 
for  question  as  to  the  exact  powers  possessed  respec- 
tively by  central  and  by  local  governments,  but  the 
great  problem  of  nationality  was  settled  beyond 
dispute. 

This  nationalist  tendency  was  marked  not  only 
in  the  United  States,  but  also  in  European  countries, 
where  similar  unifying  influences  were  at  work. 
The  struggles  of  the  Hungarians,  the  Poles,  the 
Greeks,  the  profound  movements  preceding  the 
establishment  of  German  and  Italian  national 
unity  —  all  gave  evidence  of  the  vitality  of  the 
national  principle  in  world  politics.  The  right  of 
each  nationality  to  organization  as  a  separate  state 
was  strongly  emphasized ;  the  doctrine  of  nation- 
ality was,  indeed,  the  most  conspicuous  political 
dogma  of  the  time.  It  is  a  significant  fact  that, 
within  one  decade,  three  great  peoples  —  the 
United  States,  Germany,  and  Italy  —  established 
by  "blood  and  iron"  the  fact  of  their  national 
unity. 


290  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

The  nationalist  theory  in  its  later  form  differed 
rttaterially  from  that  advanced  by  Webster  and  his 
school.  The  doctrine  was,  in  the  first  place,  less 
strictly  legal  and  constitutional  in  form ;  it  con- 
tained a  larger  element  of  the  philosophy  that  calls 
attention  to  the  organic  elements  in  the  state,  and 
correspondingly  less  of  the  contract  theory  of  the 
eighteenth  century ;  and  finally  it  emphasized  more 
strongly  the  unity  and  indivisibility  of  the  sover- 
eignty, and  consequently  the  wholly  subordinate 
position  of  the  states. 

In  the  first  place,  the  form  of  the  national  argu- 
ment was  radically  changed.  Webster  and  his 
school  had  relied  almost  entirely  upon  legal  and 
constitutional  proofs  that  the  United  States  is  a 
nation  :  "  We,  the  people  of  the  United  States " ; 
"  the  supreme  law  of  the  land  "  ;  the  provisions 
concerning  the  "  general  welfare  "  and  all  "  neces- 
sary and  proper  "  powers  —  these  were  the  foun- 
dations upon  which  the  cause  rested.  The  plain 
language  of  the  Constitution,  it  was  said,  is  amply 
sufficient  to  show  the  national  character  of  that 
instrument.  The  Constitution  was  made  the  cen- 
tral figure  in  the  discussion,  strict  adherence  to  its 
requirements  was  demanded,  and  argument  was 
not  carried  beyond  its  boundaries.  In  the  course 
of  the  war,  however,  the  point  of  view  changed. 
The  stern  necessities  of  that  great  conflict  led  to 
a  certain  disregard  for  strictly  legal  forms,  and 
provoked   the   expression   of   a  determination   to 


NATURE   OF   THE    UNION  29 1 

maintain  the  Union  at  whatever  cost,  while  the 
whole  war  brought  into  view  the  unexpected 
strength  of  the  Union  sentiment.  Although  not 
abandoning  the  claim  that  the  Constitution  is  a 
distinctly  national  instrument,  the  new  school  was 
not  satisfied  to  rest  with  the  literal  and  legal  proof. 
^They  asserted  that  whatever  the  correct  interpre- 
■  tation  of  the  Constitution  may  be,  the  United 
States  is  and  must  be  recognized  as  a  nation.  The 
argument  was  carried  back  of  governmental  forms, 
back  of  the  written  Constitution,  so  long  a  popu- 
lar idol,  to  the  primary  source  of  power,  the  creator 
of  these  forms,  the  American  nation  as  it  exists 
behind  the  Constitution.  This  idea  was  expressed 
by  Lincoln,  when  he  made  the  assertion  that "  meas- 
ures otherwise  unconstitutional  might  become  law- 
ful by  becoming  indispensable  to  the  preservation 
of  the  Constitution,  through  the  preservation  of 
the  Nation."  ^  Evidence  of  the  same  spirit  is  given 
by  the  statement  of  Fisher  that,  "if  the  Union  and 
the  government  cannot  be  saved  out  of  this  terrible 
shock  of  war  constitutionally,  a  Union  and  a  govern- 
ment must  be  saved  unconstitutionally."  ^  The  fact 
that  there  is  an  unwritten  constitution  of  the  nation, 
in  contrast  to  the  written  Constitution  of  the  gov- 
ernment, was  frequently  pointed  out.  Jameson,  for 
example,  distinguished  constitutions  as  "  organic 
growths "  from  constitutions  as  "  instruments  of 
evidence."     The  former  are  the  product  of  various 

1  Works,  II,  508.     2  The  Trial  of  the  Constitution,  199  (1862). 


292  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

social  and  political  forces;  the  latter,  "the  result 
of  an  attempt  to  express  in  technical  language 
some  particular  constitution,  existing  as  an  organic 
growth."^  Brownson  distinguished  between  the 
Constitution  of  the  state  or  nation  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  Constitution  of  the  government  on  the 
other.  The  Constitution  of  the  nation,  the  "  con- 
genital" or  "providential"  Constitution,  as  it  is 
variously  termed,  consists  in  "  the  genius,  the  char- 
acter, the  habits,  customs  and  wants  of  the  people  " ; 
and  upon  this  the  governmental  Constitution  must 
rest  if  it  is  to  operate  successfully. ^  Mulford  dis- 
tinguished between  the  historical  and  the  enacted 
constitution,  one  the  result  of  the  nation's  historical 
development,  the  other  the  formula  prescribed  for 
public  order  at  any  given  time.^  Still  more  strik- 
ing was  the  argument  of  Hurd,  who  took  the 
ground  that  the  effort  to  determine  from  the  Con- 
stitution itself,  whether  the  states  or  the  United 
States  is  sovereign,  is  wholly  futile,  and  must  be 
so  in  the  nature  of  the  case.*  Sovereignty,  said  he, 
does  not  proceed  from  or  depend  upon  constitutign 

^  J.  A.  Jameson,  Constitutional  Conventions,  Sec.  63  (1866). 

^  O.  A.  Brownson,  The  American  Republic,  Chap.  VII  (1866). 

8  Elisha  Mulford,  The  Nation,  Chap.  IX.  (1870).  A  writer  de- 
cidedly under  the  influence  of  the  German  Transcendentalists. 

*  John  C.  Hurd,  The  Law  of  Freedo7rt  and  Bondage  (1858); 
The  Theory  of  our  National  Existence  (1881);  The  Union  State 
(1890).  "Sovereignty  cannot  be  an  attribute  of  law,  because,  by 
the  nature  of  things,  law  must  proceed  from  sovereignty.  By  the 
preexistence  of  a  sovereignty,  law  becomes  possible."  The  Theory 
of  our  National  Existence,  97. 


NATURE    OF  THE    UNION  293 

or  law,  but  itself  makes  constitutions  and  laws. 
It  is  the  creator,  not  the  creature.  Sovereignty  is  a 
matter  of  fact  rather  than  of  law,  and  hence  it  is  to 
the  facts  we  must  look  for  an  answer  to  the  question. 

With  this  group  of  thinkers,  dominated  by  the 
spirit  of  nationality,  and  influenced  by  the  philosophy 
of  such  writers  as  De  Maistre  ^  and  Lieber,  the  ten- 
dency was  to  go  back  to  the  power  that  makes  and 
unmakes  constitutions.  They  were  no  longer  satis- 
fied to  construe  the  language  of  a  written  document, 
but  claimed  the  right  to  make  an  examination  of  the 
political,  social,  and  economic  forces  which  are  the 
life  and  spirit  of  a  state.  They  were  no  longer 
interpreters  of  law,  but  observers  of  the  forces  that 
make  and  unmake  law. 

Among  those  entertaining  such  views  there  was 
little  question  as  to  whether  the  sovereignty  be- 
longed to  the  individual  states  or  to  the  Union. 
Judged  by  all  the  canons  of  distinction,  the  states 
could  not  be  regarded  as  nations ;  this  attribute 
must  be  reserved  for  the  United  States  as  a  whole. 
The  sovereignty  was  unhesitatingly  attributed  to 
the  people  of  the  nation.  "  Back  of  all  the  states," 
said  Jameson,  "and  of  all  forms  of  government 
for  either  the  states  or  the  Union,  we  are  to  con- 
ceive of  the  nation,  a  political  body,  one  and 
indivisible."^      Brownson    thought    that    by    the 

^  A  conspicuous  representative  of  the  reaction  against  the  French 
Revolution.  See  his  Essai  sur  le  principe  generatetir  des  constitu- 
tions poliiiijues,  1807. 

2  Op.  cit.  Sec.  51.     See  Sees.  30-31  on  definition  of  a  nation. 


294  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

unwritten  constitution  the  sovereignty  rests  with 
"the  people  as  a  whole  or  the  collective  body"  in 
the  modified  organic  sense,  although  by  the  written 
constitution  there  is  in  fact  no  sovereignty,  the 
governmental  powers  being  divided  between  the 
local  and  the  general  governments.  Mulford  de- 
nounced the  confederate  principle  in  the  language 
of  German  transcendentalism,  and  declared  that 
the  supreme  power  in  the  United  States  rested 
only  in  the  nation  at  large,  and  not  in  any  common- 
wealth. On  every  hand  the  supremacy  of  the 
Union  was  asserted  in  the  strongest  terms,  and 
the  dignity  of  the  states  disparaged.  This  was  a 
legitimate  conclusion  from  the  great  demonstration 
of  strength  exhibited  in  the  maintenance  of  national 
authority  and  the  preservation  of  the  Union. 

Although  the  defenders  of  the  Union  agreed 
in  vesting  the  sovereignty  in  the  nation  as  con- 
trasted with  the  individual  states,  there  was  not 
entire  harmony  of  opinion  as  to  what  part  the 
states  occupied  in  the  Union.  On  the  one  hand,  it 
was  held  that  the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States 
is  constituted  regardless  of  and  independent  of  the 
states.  Thus  Jameson  maintained  that  the  nation 
is  "  a  political  body,  one  and  indivisible,  made  up 
of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  without  dis- 
tinction of  age,  sex,  color,  or  condition  of  life."  ^ 

^  Cf.  Joel  Tiffany,  A  Treatise  on  Governtnent  and  Constitutional 
Law  (1867);  J.  N.  Pomeroy,  Constitutional  Law  (1868).  For  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  various  theories  as  to  the  status  of  the  commonwealths 


NATURE   OF  THE    UNION  295 

This  is  the  ultimate  source  of  political  power,  out 
of  which  all  governmental  authority  flows.  Gen- 
erally and  regularly  the  sovereignty  is  exercised, 
it  is  true,  through  the  groups  called  states ;  but 
back  of  these  states  there  is  a  power  by  which 
they  may  be  limited  and  restrained ;  namely,  the 
sovereignty  of  the  nation.^ 

On  the  other  hand,  the  necessity  of  recognizing 
the  states  as  integral  parts  of  the  Union  was  not 
less  strongly  urged.  Brownson,  although  defend- 
ing the  sovereignty  of  the  nation,  declared  that  the 
political  or  sovereign  people  of  the  United  States 
existed  as  states  united  and  only  in  this  way.^  The 
sovereign  nation  was,  therefore,  the  people  as  organ- 
ized in  states.  To  the  same  end  Hurd  contended 
for  the  recognition  of  the  "  states  united."  "  The 
people,"  he  declared,  "  or  the  nation  holding  sov- 
ereignty as  distinct  from  the  states,  or  the  politi- 
cally organized  people  of  the  states,  was  not  even 
a  myth  "  (until  the  Civil  War).  The  states  alone 
were  not  sovereign,  the  people  were  not  sovereign, 
but  this  attribute  belonged  exclusively  to  the  states 
in  Union.  This  view  seems  to  have  also  the  sanc- 
tion of  the  Supreme  Court  in  its  declaration  :  "  The 

which  passed  ordinances  of  secession,  see  W.  A.  Dunning,  Essays 
■on  the  Civil  War  and  Reconstructioyi. 

1  Constittitional  Conventions,  Sec.  57;  also  Political  Science 
Quarterly,  V,  193.  In  the  first  edition  of  the  Constitutional  Con' 
ventions,  Jameson  spoke  of  a  "  quasi-sovereignty  "  in  the  states. 
Cf.  Mulford,  Pomeroy,  and  others. 

^  American  Republic,  219. 


296  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

states  disunited  might  exist.  Without  the  states  in 
union,  there  could  be  no  such  poHtical  body  as  the 
United  States."  ^ 

In  this  discussion,  however,  there  is  no  claim 
that  the  individual  states  are  sovereign.    The  issue 
is  one  as  to  how  the  national  sovereignty  is  organ- 
ized, whether  it  rests  with  the  people  of  the  whole 
nation,  or  with  an  association  or  group  of  states. 
The  whole  controversy  really  arises  from  a  failure 
\   to  distinguish  clearly  between  the  legal  and  the 
\   political  side  of  sovereignty  —  a  lesson  which  the 
\  events  of  the  Civil  War  might  have  made  clear.^ 
The  new  view  of  the  Union  differed  in  another 
respect  from  that  of  Webster,  namely,  in  regard  to 
the  genesis  of  the  United  States.    Webster  thought 
of  the  Union  as  formed,  in  accordance  with  the 
political  philosophy  of  the  Revolutionary  era,_^by 
means  of  a  social  contract  between  individuals.'    In 
the  new  national  school,  the  tendency  was  to  disre- 
gard the  doctrine  of  the  social  contract,  and  to 
emphasize   strongly  the   instinctive   forces  whose 
action  and  interaction  produces  a  state.     This  dis- 

1  Lane  County  v.  Oregon,  7  Wallace,  76  (1868).  The  court  still 
continued  to  speak  of  a  divided  sovereignty.  See  United  States  v. 
Cruikshank,  92  U.  S.,  550  (1875);  Ex  parte  Siebold,  100  U.  S.,  384 
(1879).  With  this  some  of  the  commentators  agree.  See  Cooley, 
Constitutional  Limitations  (3d  edition,  1874),  i;  Black,  Con- 
stitutional La'tu,  21. 

2  On  the  question  as  to  just  where  the  sovereignty  in  a  state  is 
located,  see  Woodrow  Wilson,  A}i  Old  Master,  95;  Willoughby, 
T^  Nature  of  the  State,  293-294,  307. 


NATURE   OF   THE    UNION  297 

tinction  was  developed  by  Lieber,  who  held  that  the 
great  difference  between  "people"  and  "nation"  lies 
in  the  fact  that  the  latter  possesses  organic  unity. ^ 
"  People  "  signifies  merely  "  the  aggregate  of  the 
inhabitants  of  a  territory  without  any  additional  idea, 
at  least  favorable  idea."  "  Nation,"  on  the  other 
hand,  impUes  a  homogeneous  population,  inhabiting 
a  coherent  territory  ;  a  population  having  a  common 
language,  literature,  institutions,  and  "  an  organic 
unity  with  one  another,  as  well  as  being  conscious 
of  a  common  destiny."  ^ '  In  general,  the  new 
school  thought  of  the  Union  as  organic  rather 
than  contractual  in  nature.  Though  not  in  all 
cases  clearly  expressed,  it  was  evident,  neverthe- 
less, that  the  contract  philosophy  was  in  general 
disrepute,  and  that  the  overwhelming  tendency 
was  to  look  upon  the  nation  as  an  organic  product, 
the  result  of  an  evolutionary  process.^  It  would, 
of  course,  be  a  gross  exaggeration  to  say  that  all 
those  who  maintained  the  supremacy  of  the  Union 
repudiated  the  social-contract  theory,' but  it  is  nec- 
essary to  recognize  the  fact  that  the  nation  was 
something  different  in  the  popular  mind  and  in 
the  philosophic  mind  from  the  "  people  "  of  earlier 
days.  Nation  carried  with  it  the  idea  of  an  ethnic 
and  geographic  unity,  constituted  without  the  con- 

^  Miscellaneous  Writings,  II,  128. 

2  See  Jameson,  Sees.  66-67;  ^^s°  Brownson,  Hurd,  Mulford, 
Woolsey  to  the  same  effect.  John  Draper,  in  Thoughts  on  i/ie  Future 
Civil  Policy  of  America  (1865),  represents  the  extreme  develop- 
ment of  the  organic  theory. 


298  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

sent  of  any  one  in  particular ;  "  people  "  was  under- 
stood to  be  a  body  formed  by  a  contract  between 
certain  individuals.  The  very  fact  that  the  Union 
was  "  pinned  together  with  bayonets  "  was  enough 
to  show  that  the  doctrine  of  voluritary  contract 
had  faded  into  the  background.  '  The  general 
idea  was  that  the  United  States,  by  virtue  of  the 
community  of  race,  interests,  and  geographical 
location,  ought  to  be  and  is  a  nation ;  and  ought  to 
be  held  together  by  force,  if  no  other  means  would 
avail.  This  was  the  feeling  that  underlay  the 
great  national  movement  of  1 861-1865,  and  it 
could  not  fail  to  be  reflected  in  the  philosophy  of 
that  time  and  in  the  succeeding  interpretations  of 
that  event. 

It  is  also  to  be  observed  that  in  the  new  school 
the  doctrine  of  sovereignty  was  subjected  to  impor- 
tant modifications.  In  the  contest  over  national 
supremacy,  the  idea  of  a  divided  sovereignty  was 
laid  aside,  and  the  unity  and  indivisibiHty  of  the 
supreme  power  strongly  affirmed.^  As  at  an  earlier 
time  Calhoun  rejected  the  compromise  doctrine,  so 
now  the  nationalistic  school  abandoned  the  idea, 
declaring  that  the  sovereignty  is  one  and  indivisi- 
ble, and  at  the  same  time  that  it  belonged  to  the 
nation.  The  idea  of  sovereignty  was  first  strongly 
stated  and  clearly  expounded  by  Lieber,  in  his 
Political  Ethics  and  later  received  general  sup- 
port.  ,  In  the  narrower  and  legal  sense,  the  rights 

^  Webster  spoke  of  the  states  as  partly  sovereign.     Works,  III,  321. 


NATURE    OF  THE    UNION  299 

of  the  States  were  admitted,  but  in  respect  to 
the  ultimate  political  sovereignty  dispute  practi- 
cally came  to  an  end.  The  events  of  the  Civil 
War  firmly  established  the  fact  that  the  one  and 
indivisible  sovereignty  belongs  to  the  nation,  or 
the  Union  as  a  whole. ^  Calhoun's  idea  of  the 
nature  of  sovereignty  was  accepted,  but  it  was 
applied  in  a  manner  wholly  different  from  what 
he  had  expected  or  intended. 

The  nationaUstic  theory  assumes  its  most  com- 
plete and  scientific  form  at  the  hands  of  J.  W. 
Burgess.  The  concepts  of  nation,  sovereignty, 
and  the  theory  of  the  "  federal  state,"  are  in  his 
works  clearly  and  definitely  stated,  for  almost  the 
first  time.  "Nation"  is  defined  as  "a  population 
of  an  ethnic  unity,  inhabiting  a  geographic  unity," 
and  the  application  of  this  is  made  to  various 
nationalities.  The  national  state  is  presented  as 
the  highest  product  of  recent  poHtical  develop- 
ment, and  is  shown  to  be  "  for  the  present  and  dis- 
cernible future,  the  organ  of  interpretation  in  last 
instance  of  the  order  of  life  for  its  subjects."* 

^  See  Jameson,  Brownson,  Hurd,  Woolsey,  Burgess,  in  general 
agreement  on  this  point.  Brownson  insisted  that  by  the  written 
Constitution,  there  is  really  no  sovereignty  in  the  United  States,  0/. 
cit.  Chap.  XI.  Philemon  Bliss,  Of  Sovereignty  (1885),  declared 
that  sovereignty  has  no  application  to  a  federal  state;  in  fact  is 
inapplicable  to  any  constitutional  state.     See  Lectures  VII-XII. 

2  Political  Science  and  Comparative  Constitutional  Law  (1891) ; 
"The  American  Commonwealth"  in  the  Political  Science  Quarterly^ 
Vol.  I;  review  of  Laband's  Staaisrecht,  Ibid.  Vol.  Ill,  123. 


300  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

The  doctrine  of  sovereignty  is  also  strongly  stated. 
It  is  conceived  as  the  "original,  absolute,  unlimited, 
universal  power  over  the  individual  subject,  and  all 
associations  of  subjects; "  ^  an  essential  quality  of  the 
state,  indeed  the  most  indispensable  mark  of  state- 
hood. "Really  the  state  cannot  be  conceived,"  says 
Burgess,  "without  sovereignty,  i.e.  without  unlimited 
power  over  its  subjects  ;  that  is  its  very  essence." 
There  is  no  other  power,  no  association  or  organ- 
ization which  can  be  conceived  as  limiting  the  state 
in  its  control  over  its  subjects,  for  the  authority 
which  could  exercise  such  power  would  itself  be 
sovereign.  It  is  true  that  the  state  may  abuse  its 
unlimited  power,  and  wrong  the  individual  under 
its  control,  but  the  national  state  is  after  all  "  the 
human  organ  least  likely  to  do  wrong."  Moreover, 
this  unlimited  power  on  the  part  of  the  state 
necessitates  no  apology  to  civil  liberty  for  its  exist- 
ence, since  this  very  power  is  the  real  guaranty 
of  and  security  for  individual  liberty ;  and  hence 
the  more  completely  and  really  sovereign  the  state 
is,  the  more  secure  is  the  liberty  of  the  individual.  ^ 

From  the  principle  that  sovereignty  is  a  unit,  it 
follows  that  the  so-called  "  federal  state  "  is  an  im- 
possibility. What  seems  such,  is  either  a  number 
of  sovereign  states,  having  an  equal  number  of 
local  governments  and  a  common  central  govern- 
ment,   or  one  sovereign    state  having   a   central 

^  Political  Science,  I,  52.     Cf.  review  of  Laband, 
2  Ibid.  I,  57. 


NATURE    OF  THE    UNION  301 

government  and  several  local  governments.^  There 
may  be  a  federal  system  of  government  in  which 
the  sovereign  state  allots  certain  powers  to  the 
central  government,  and  others  to  the  local  govern- 
ments. But  in  this  case  the  sovereignty  is  in  no 
way  divided,  and  there  is  no  federal  state.  Sov- 
ereignty, it  is  urged,  "is  entire  or  not  at  all,"  and 
what  remains  to  the  former  states  under  such 
a  system  of  government  is  only  "the  residuary 
powers  of  government,"  which  are  by  no  means 
equivalent  to  sovereignty  or  any  portion  thereof. 
The  sovereignty  remains  with  the  central  state,  un- 
divided and  indivisible. 

Applying  these  principles  to  the  United  States, 
it  is  seen  that  the  characteristics  of  a  nation  have 
been  clearly  evident  here  from  the  beginning, 
although  not  always  accorded  full  recognition. 
The  political  system  of  the  United  States  is  a  dual 
government,  with  the  ultimate  sovereignty  resting 
in  the  nation.^  The  nation  has  organized  the  cen- 
tral government,  indicated  a  sphere  of  individual 
hberty,  and  given  to  the  commonwealth  residuary 
powers  of  government.  The  so-called  "states" 
are  not  sovereign  or  semi-sovereign,  but  merely 
organs  of  government  for  the  nation.  "  It  is  no 
longer  proper,"  says  Burgess,  "to  call  them  states  at 

^Il>id.l,7gf{.;  II,  10  ff. 

2  Cf.  W.  W.  Willoughby,  Tke  Nature  of  the  State,  especially  the 
interesting  discussion  in  Chap.  X  on  the  nature  of  the  composite 
state. 


302  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

all.  It  is  in  fact  only  a  title  of  honor,  without  any 
corresponding  substance."  The  commonwealths 
are,  strictly  speaking,  neither  sovereign  nor  states, 
and  to  call  them  either  is  inaccurate  and  mis- 
leading. Attention  is  called  to  the  diminishing 
importance  of  the  "  states  "  in  our  political  system, 
in  contrast  with  the  rapidly  increasing  power  and 
influence  of  the  modern  city,  and  serious  doubt  is 
raised  as  to  the  ability  of  the  "  state  "  to  hold  its 
place  as  a  unit  of  government  in  our  political  sys- 
tem, if  the  influences  operating  during  the  last 
half  century  continue  uninterrupted.^ 

The  development  of  American  political  theory 
in  relation  to  the  nature  of  the  Union  may  now  be 
summarized  as  follows.  At  the  time  of  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Constitution,  and  for  a  considerable 
period  thereafter,  it  was  believed  that  the  Union 
was  of  a  peculiar  and  anomalous  character,  and 
that  the  sovereignty,  so  far  as  vested  in  govern- 
ment, was  divided  between  the  states  and  the 
United  States.  The  real  sovereign  was  thought 
to  be   the  "  people,"  but  whether  this  meant  the 

1  On  the  real  place  of  the  states  see  Political  Science  Quarterly, 
Vol.  I,  "  The  American  Commonwealth."  On  the  relation  between 
civil  liberty  and  nationality,  see  Political  Science,  I,  224.  Woodrow 
Wilson  maintains  that  the  members  of  the  Union  are  still  genuine 
states,  although  their  "  sphere  is  limited  by  the  presiding  and  sov- 
ereign powers  of  a  State  superordinated  to  them  .  .  .  they  have 
dominion;  it  has  sovereignty."  An  Old  Master  and  other  Political 
Essays  (1893),  94. 


NATURE    OF   THE    UNION  303 

people  of  the  United  States  as  a  whole  or  the 
people  of  the  several  states  was  left  undetermined. 
As  the  contest  between  nationalism  and  states- 
rights  became  more  acute,  this  middle  position  was 
abandoned  by  both  parties.  Calhoun  contended 
that  the  sovereign  people  were  the  people  of  the 
several  states,  and  that  the  sovereignty  was,  more- 
over, essentially  indivisible.  The  states  were  hence 
sovereign  communities,  and  the  general  govern- 
ment had  only  the  powers  delegated  to  it  by  them. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  nationahst  position  was 
defended  by  Webster,  who  declared  that  the  Con- 
stitution was  adopted  by  the  people  of  the  United 
States  as  a  whole,  by  means  of  an  agreement  as 
binding  as  the  social  contract.  After  the  war  had 
settled  the  vexed  question  of  secession,  the  new 
school  of  nationalists  developed  and  strengthened 
the  earlier  doctrine.  The  argument  from  the  let- 
ter of  the  law  was  less  emphasized  and  the  consid- 
eration of  social  and  political  facts  made  more 
conspicuous.  The  nation  was  declared  supreme, 
but  this  differed  from  the  earlier  "  people  "  in  that 
the  contract  idea  was  largely  eliminated,  and  the 
organic  and  evolutionary  character  of  the  nation 
given  greater  attention.  Calhoun's  doctrine  of  the 
indivisibility  of  sovereignty  was  accepted,  but  sover- 
eignty was  claimed  for  the  Union  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  the  states,  which  were  relegated  to  the 
position  of  organs  of  the  nation.  Differences  of 
opinion  appeared  as  to  the  exact  location  of  the 


304  AMERICAN  POLITICAL   THEORIES 

sovereignty,  whether  with  the  nation  as  an  aggre- 
gation of  individuals  or  as  an  aggregation  of  states; 
but  the  sovereignty  of  the  Union  was  undisputed.  ■ 
Looking  back  over  the  development  of  the 
United  States,  a  great  growth  in  national  spirit 
and  sentiment  is  at  once  observed.  In  1787,  the 
general  attitude  toward  the  central  government 
was  that  of  suspicion  and  distrust,  if  not  of  open 
hostility.  Liberty  was  regarded  as  local  in  char- 
acter, and  the  states  as  the  great  champions  of 
the  individual.  The  greater  the  power  of  the  cen- 
tral government,  the  greater  the  danger  to  the 
freedom  of  the  citizen.  "  Consolidated  "  govern- 
ment was  considered  as  equivalent  to  tyranny  and 
oppression.  A  century  of  national  development  has 
reversed  this  attitude.  The  states  are  now  looked 
upon  with  more  suspicion  than  is  the  national  gov- 
ernment, and  it  is  frequently  considered  a  matter 
of  congratulation  when  a  given  subject  falls  under 
federal  administration.  It  is  no  longer  generally 
feared  that  human  liberty  is  menaced  by  the  fed- 
eral government,  and  protected  only  by  the  states. 
Denunciation  of  the  United  States  as  a  "  consoli- 
dated fabric  "  of  "  aristocratical  tyranny  "  is  sel- 
dom heard,  but  certain  states  are  sometimes 
denominated  as  "  rotten  boroughs."  The  state  has 
in  fact  in  many  cases  become  a  less  important  unit, 
economically,  politically,  and  socially  than  the  city, 
and,  on  the  whole,  the  tendency  of  this  time  is  over- 
whelmingly national,  both  in  fact  and  in  theory. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

RECENT    TENDENCIES 

In  the  last  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  there 
appeared  in  the  United  States  a  group  of  pohtical 
theorists  differing  from  the  earUer  thinkers  in  re- 
spect to  method  and  upon  many  important  doc- 
trines of  political  science.  The  new  method  was 
more  systematic  and  scientific  than  that  which 
preceded  it,  while  the  results  reached  showed  a  pro- 
nounced reaction  from  the  individualistic  philoso- 
phy of  the  early  years  of  the  century. ^ 

Much  of  the  credit  for  the  estabhshment  of  this 
new  school  belongs  to  Francis  Lieber,  a  German 
scientist  who  came  to  this  country  in  1827,  and, 
as  an  educator  and  author,  left  a  deep  impress  on 
the  political  thought  of  America.  His  Manual  of 
Political  Ethics  (1838-1835)  and  Civil  Liberty  and 
Self-Government  (iSss^Twere  the  first  systematic 
treatises  on  pohtical  science  that  appeared  in  the 
United  States,  and  their  influence  was  widespread.* 

^  The  discussion  of  the  two  preceding  chapters  has  partly  antici- 
pated the  doctrines  here  considered. 

2  See  also  the  Miscellaneous  IVritings  of  Lieber,  edited  by  D.  C. 
Gilman,  also  Legal  and  Political  Hermeneutics  (1837).  For  an 
account  of  Lieber's  life,  see  The  Life  and  Letters  of  Francis  Lieber^ 
by  T.  S.  Perry;  also  Francis  Lieber,  by  L.  R.  Harley. 

X  305 


306  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

Following  Lieber,  came  a  line  of  American  politi- 
cal scientists,  many  of  whom  were  trained  in 
German  schools,  and  all  of  whom  had  acquired 
a  scientific  method  of  discussing  political  phe- 
nomena. Among  the  most  conspicuous  figures  in 
the  new  school  are  Theodore  Woolsey,  whose 
Political  Science  appeared  in  1877,  and  John  W. 
Burgess,  who  wrote,  in  1890,  Political  Science  and 
Comparative  Constitutional  Law,  and  a  number  of 
others  who  have  contributed  materially  to  the  de- 
velopment of  the  subject.^ 

The  method  of  these  authorities  has  already 
been  indicated,  and  need  not  be  discussed  at 
length.  The  significant  fact  about  it  is  the  change 
from  the  rather  haphazard  style  of  discussing  polit- 
ical theory  in  earlier  days  to  a  more  scientific  way 
of  approaching  the  questions  of  politics.  A  far 
more  thorough  knowledge  of  history  and  a  broader 
comparative  view  of  pohtical  institutions  are  con- 
spicuous in  the  new  system. 

^  Among  these  should  be  mentioned  those  writers  who  were  con- 
spicuous at  the  close  of  the  Civil  War,  such  as  Brownson,  Jameson, 
Mulford,  Hurd,  and  others.  Somewhat  later  come  A.  L.  Lowell, 
Essays  on  Govern'^ren^  (^iSgi) ;  Woodrow  Wilson,  T/ie  State  (1889), 
and  An  Old  Master  and  Other  Political  Essays  (1893);  F.  J. 
Goodnow,  especially  in  Politics  and  Administration  (1900);  W.W. 
Willoughby,  The  Nature  of  the  State  (1896),  and  Social  Justice 
(1900);  see  also  the  works  later  cited.  In  the  Political  Science 
Quarterly,  the  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and 
Social  Science,  the  American  Historical  Review,  the  Yale  Review, 
and  the  American  Journal  of  Sociology  are  found  numerous  con- 
tributions to  the  literature  of  political  science. 


RECENT   TENDENCIES  30; 

The  doctrines  of  these  men  differ  in  many  im- 
portant respects  from  those  earlier  entertained. 
The  individualistic  ideas  of  the  "  natural  right " 
school  of  political  theory,  indorsed  in  the  Revo- 
lution, are  discredited  and  repudiated.  The  notion 
that  political  society  and  government  are  based 
upon  a  contract  between  independent  individuals 
and  that  such  a  contract  is  the  sole  source  of  polit- 
ical obligation,  is  regarded  as  no  longer  tenable. 
Calhoun  and  his  school  had  already  abandoned 
this  doctrine,  while  such  men  as  Story  had  seen  the 
need  of  extensive  qualification  of  it.  Objections 
to  the  social  contract  were  strongly  urged  by  Lie- 
ber,^  and  were  later  more  fully  and  clearly  stated  by 
others.  In  Lieber's  opinion,  the  "  state  of  nature  " 
has  no  basis  in  fact.  Man  is  essentially  a  social 
creature,  and  hence  no  artificial  means  for  bring- 
ing him  into  society  need  be  devised.  Lieber  con- 
demned the  contract  theory  as  generally  held,  on 
the  ground  that  it  was  both  artificial  and  inade- 
quate. Such  an  explanation  of  the  origin  of  the 
state  can  be  regarded  as  true  only  in  the  sense 
that  every  political  society  is  composed  of  indi- 
viduals who  recognize  the  existence  of  mutual 
rights  and  duties.  Only  in  the  sense  that  there 
is  a  general  recognition  of  these  reciprocal  claims 
can  we  say  that  the  state  is  founded  on  contract ; 
and  this,  of  course,  is  far  from  what  the  doctrine 
is  ordinarily  taken  to  mean.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
1  Political  Ethics,  I,  288  ff.  (ad  edition,  1890). 


308  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

.  the  state  may  originate,  and  has  originated,  Lieber 
said,  in  a  variety  of  ways,  as,  for  example,  through 

•  force,  fraud,  consent,  religion. 

Still  more  strongly  is  the  opposition  to  the 
social-contract  theory  stated  by  Burgess.  The 
hypothesis  of  an  original  contract  to  form  the 
state  is,  as  he  reasons,  wholly  contrary  to  our 
knowledge  of  the  historical  development  of  politi- 
cal institutions.  The  social-contract  theory  as- 
sumes that  "  the  idea  of  the  state  with  all  its 
attributes  is  consciously  present  in  the  minds  of  the 
individuals  proposing  to  constitute  the  state,  and 
that  the  disposition  to  obey  law  is  universally  estab- 
lished." ^  These  conditions,  history  shows,  are  not 
present  at  the  beginning  of  the  political  develop- 
ment of  a  people,  but  are  the  result  of  long  growth 
and  experience.  This  theory  therefore  cannot 
account  for  the  origin  of  the  state.  Its  only  pos- 
sible application  is  in  changing  the  form  of  the 
state,  or  in  cases  when  a  state  is  planted  upon 
new  territory  by  a  population  already  politically 
educated. 

In  the  refusal  to  accept  the  contract  theory  as 
the  basis  for  government,  practically  all  the  politi- 
cal scientists  of  note  agree.  The  old  explanation 
no  longer  seems   sufficient,  and  is  with   practical 

1  Political  Science,  I,  62.  With  Burgess  compare  Woolsey, 
Brownson,  Jameson,  Wilson,  Mulford,  Willoughby,  to  the  same 
effect.  See  the  comprehensive  discussion  in  Willoughby,  Tkt 
Nature  of  the  State,  Chaps.  II-VI. 


RECENT   TENDENCIES  309 

unanimity  discarded.^  The  doctrines  of  natural 
law  and  natural  rights  have  met  a  similar  fate. 
In  Lieber's  political  philosophy,  it  is  true,  the  con- 
cept of  natural  law  was  still  defended.  The  law 
of  nature  he  defined  as  "  the  body  of  rights  which 
we  deduce  from  the  essential  nature  of  man."  ^  The 
great  axiom  of  natural  law  is,  "  I  exist  as  a  human 
being  ;  therefore,  I  have  a  right  to  exist  as  a  human 
being."  Under  this  natural  law,  there  are  certain 
natural  rights,  or  as  Lieber  preferred  to  call  them, 
"  primordial  rights,"  ^  which  are  inherent  in  the  in- 
dividual and  inahenable  by  him.  But  even  Lieber, 
with  his  leaning  toward  the  old   theory,  did  not 

1  F.  M.  Taylor,  in  The  Right  of  the  State  /o  ^,?  (1891),  defends 
a  concept  of  natural  law. 

2  Political  Ethics,  I,  68. 

8  Ibid.  I,  177.  Cf.  Woolsey,  Political  Science,  Vol.  I,  Chap.  I. 
In  his  Civil  liberty  and  Self- Government  Lieber  distinguished  be- 
tween what  he  called  "Anglican"  liberty  and  "Galilean"  liberty. 
The  Anglican  idea  of  liberty  is  that  of  a  sphere  of  immunity  from 
interference,  protected  by  guaranties  "at  certain  points  where  the 
experience  of  the  race  has  shown  the  individual  to  be  most  in 
danger  of  attack."  The  Galilean  idea  is  that  all  must  share  equally 
in  voting  power,  and  that  the  authority  of  a  government  based  on 
universal  suffrage  may  be  indefinite  in  extent.  One  idea  is  that 
men  are  free  when  they  are  protected  in  a  certain  sphere  against 
all  encroachment,  private  or  public;  the  other  idea  is  that  freedom 
consists  in  equal  suffrage,  no  matter  what  the  character  of  the  gov- 
ernment so  based  may  be.  This  he  thought  was  the  great  differ- 
ence between  the  English  and  the  French  idea  of  liberty.  It  is 
interesting  to  observe  that  Benj.  Constant,  a  famous  French  publi- 
cist of  the  early  part  of  the  century,  made  the  same  comparison  be- 
tween the  liberty  of  the  ancients  and  that  of  the  moderns,  among 
whom  he  included,  of  course,  the  French. 


310  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

/interpret  the  doctrine  of  natural  rights  as  the  seven- 
teenth and  eighteenth  century  revolutionists  under- 
,  stood  it,  and  this  he  was  very  careful  to  point  out. 
"-  By  the  later  thinkers  the  idea  that  men  possess 
inherent  and  inalienable  rights  of  a  political  or 
quasi-political  character  which  are  independent  of 
the  state,  has  been  generally  given  up.  It  is  held 
that  these  natural  rights  can  have  no  other  than  an 
ethical  value,  and  have  no  proper  place  in  politics. 
"  There  never  was,  and  there  never  can  be,"  says 
Burgess,  "any  liberty  upon  this  earth  and  among 
human  beings,  outside  of  state  organization."  ^ 
In  speaking  of  natural  rights,  therefore,  it  is  essen- 
tial to  remember  that  these  alleged  rights  have  no 
political  force  whatever,  unless  recognized  and  en- 
forced by  the  state.  It  is  asserted  by  Willoughby 
that  "  natural  rights  "  could  not  have  even  a  moral 
value  in  the  supposed  "  state  of  nature " ;  they 
would  really  be  equivalent  to  force  and  hence 
have  no  ethical  significance.^ 

In  this  connection  it  is  interesting  to  notice  the 
restatement  of  the  theory  of  "  natural  rights  "  as 
made  by  Giddings.^  Disclaiming  any  connection 
with  the  earlier  forms  of  this  theory,  he  under- 

1  Political  Science,  I,  88. 

2  See  The  Nature  of  the  State,  109  ;  see  also  Social  Justice, 
Chap.  VIII.  Cf.  C.  G.  Tiedeman,  The  Unwritten  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  Chap.  VI  ;    Lyman  Abbott,  The  Rights  of  Man. 

'  Franklin  H.  Giddings,  Principles  of  Sociology,  418-419  (ist  edi- 
tion, 1896).  Cf.  Spencer,  Principles  of  Sociology  ;  E.  A,  Ross,  Social 
Control,  421. 


RECENT    TENDENCIES  311 

Stands  by  natural  rights  those  which  are  natural 
in  the  scientific  sense  of  the  term.  In  this  field 
"  natural  "  means,  "  that  which  is,  on  the  whole, 
in  harmony  with  the  conditions  of  existence."  On 
this  basis,  Giddings  defines  natural  rights  as,  "  so- 
cially necessary  norms  of  right,  enforced  by  natural 
selection  in  the  sphere  of  social  relations."  Natural 
rights,  as  thus  defined,  are  the  foundation  of  both 
political  and  moral  rights,  and  ultimately  determine 
the  character  of  both.  This  definition,  it  will  Ije  ob- 
served, is  as  destructive  of  natural  rights  in  the  ethi- 
cal sense  as  of  natural  rights  in  the  political  sense. 

The  present  tendency,  then,  in  American  political 
theory  is  to  disregard  the  once  dominant  ideas  of 
natural  rights  and  the  social  contract,  although 
it  must  be  admitted  that  the  political  scientists  are 
more  agreed  upon  this  point  than  is  the  general 
public.  The  origin  of  the  state  is  regarded,  not  as 
the  result  of  a  deliberate  agreement  among  men, 
but  as  the  result  of  historical  development,  instinc- 
tive rather  than  conscious ;  and  rights  arc  consid- 
ered to  have  their  source  not  in  nature,  but  in  law. 
This  new  point  of  view  involves  no  disregard  of 
or  contempt  for  human  liberty,  but  only  a  belief 
that  the  earlier  explanation  and  philosophy  of  the 
state  was  not  only  false  but  dangerous  and  mis- 
leading. 

The  modern  school  has,  indeed,  formulated  a 
new  idea  of  liberty,  widely  different  from  that 
taught  in  the  early  years  of  the  Republic.      The 


312  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

"  Fathers  "  believed  that  in  the  original  state  of 
nature  all  men  enjoy  perfect  liberty,  that  they 
surrender  a  part  of  this  liberty  in  order  that  a 
government  may  be  organized,  and  that  therefore 
the  stronger  the  government,  the  less  the  liberty 
remaining  to  the  individual.  Liberty  is,  in  short, 
the  natural  and  inherent  right  of  all  men ;  gov- 
ernment the  necessary  limitation  of  this  liberty. 
Calhoun  and  his  school,  as  it  has  been  shown,  repu- 
diated this  idea,  and  maintained  that  liberty  is  not 
the  natural  right  of  all  men,  but  only  the  reward 
of  the  races  or  individuals  properly  qualified  for 
its  possession.  Upon  this  basis,  slavery  was  de- 
fended against  the  charge  that  it  was  inconsistent 
with  human  freedom,  and  in  this  sense  and  so 
applied,  the  theory  was  not  accepted  outside  the 
South.  The  mistaken  application  of  the  idea  had 
the  effect  of  delaying  recognition  of  the  truth  in 
what  had  been  said  until  the  controversy  over 
slavery  was  at  an  end. 

The  Revolutionary  idea  of  the  nature  of  liberty 
was  never  realized  in  actual  practice,  and  recent 
political  events  and  political  philosophy  have  com- 
bined to  show  that  another  theory  of  liberty  has 
been  generally  accepted.  The  new  doctrine  is  best 
stated  by  Burgess.  By  liberty  he  understands 
"  a  domain  in  which  the  individual  is  referred  to 
his  own  will,  and  upon  which  government  shall 
neither  encroach  itself  nor  permit  encroachments 
from  any  other  quarter."     Such  a  sphere  of  action 


RECENT   TENDENCIES  313 

is  necessary  for  the  welfare  and  progress  both  of 
state  and  of  individual.  It  is  of  vital  importance 
to  notice,  however,  that  liberty  is  not  a  natural 
right  which  belongs  to  every  human  being  without 
regard  to  the  state  or  society  under  which  he  lives. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  logically  true  and  may  be 
historically  demonstrated  that  "  the  state  is  the 
source  of  individual  liberty."^  It  is  the  state 
that  makes  liberty  possible,  determines  what  its 
limits  shall  be,  guarantees  and  protects  it.  In 
Burgess's  view,  then,  men  do  not  begin  with  com- 
plete liberty  and  organize  government  by  sacrific- 
ing certain  parts  of  this  liberty,  but  on  the  contrary 
they  obtain  liberty  only  through  the  organization 
of  political  institutions.  The  state  does  not  take 
away  from  civil  liberty,  but  is  the  creator  of  liberty 
—  the  power  that  makes  it  possible. 

Liberty,  moreover,  is  not  a  right  equally  enjoyed 
by  all.  It  is  dependent  upon  the  degree  of  civili- 
zation reached  by  the  given  people,  and  increases 
as  this  advances.  The  idea  that  liberty  is  a  natu- 
ral right  is  abandoned,  and  the  inseparable  connec- 
tion between  political  liberty  and  political  capacity 
is  strongly  emphasized.  After  an  examination  of 
the  principle  of  nationality,  and  the  characteristic 
qualities  of  various  nations  or  races,  the  conclusion 
is  drawn  that  the  Teutonic  nations  are  particularly 
endowed  with  political  capacity.  Their  mission  in 
the  world  is  the  political  civilization  of  mankind. 

1  Political  Science,  I,  175. 


314  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

From  this  as  a  premise  are  deduced  further  con- 
clusions of  the  utmost  importance.^  The  first  of 
these  is  that  in  a  state  composed  of  several  nation- 
alities, the  Teutonic  element  should  never  surren- 
der the  balance  of  power  to  the  others.  Another 
is  that  the  Teutonic  race  can  never  regard  the  ex- 
ercise of  political  power  as  a  right  of  man,  but  it 
must  always  be  their  policy  to  condition  the  exer- 
cise of  political  rights  on  the  possession  of  political 
capacity.  A  final  conclusion  is  that  the  Teutonic 
races  must  civilize  the  politically  uncivilized.  They 
must  have  a  colonial  policy.  Barbaric  races,  if 
incapable,  may  be  swept  away ;  and  such  action 
"  violates  no  rights  of  these  populations  which  are 
not  petty  and  trifling  in  comparison  with  its  tran- 
scendent right  and  duty  to  establish  political  and 
legal  order  everywhere."  On  the  same  principle, 
interference  with  the  affairs  of  states  not  wholly 
barbaric,  but  nevertheless  incapable  of  effecting 
political  organization  for  themselves,  is  fully  jus- 
tified. Jurisdiction  may  be  assumed  over  such  a 
state,  and  political  civilization  worked  out  for  those 
who  are  unable  to  accomplish  this  unaided.  This 
propaganda  of  political  civilization,  it  is  asserted, 
is  not  only  the  right  and  privilege,  but  the  mission 
and  duty,  the  very  highest  obligation  incumbent 
on  the  Teutonic  races,  including  the  United  States. 
Such  action  is  not  unwarrantable  or  unjustifiable 
interference  with  the  affairs  of  those  who  should 

^  Political  Science,  I,  44  et  seq. 


RECENT   TENDENCIES  315 

rightly  be  left  unmolested,  but  is  the  performance 
of  the  part  marked  out  for  the  Teutonic  nations 
in  the  world's  development.^ 

Closely  related  to  the  theory  of  liberty  is  the 
doctrine  as  to  the  purpose  or  function  of  the  state. 
In  the  days  of  the  Revolution,  it  was  thought  that 
the  end  of  the  political  society  is  to  protect  the  life, 
liberty,  and  property  of  its  citizens,  and  beyond  this 
nothing  more.  The  duty  of  the  state  was  summed 
up  in  the  protection  of  individual  rights,  in  harmony 
with  the  individualistic  character  of  the  philosophy 
of  that  day.  In  the  theory  of  Lieber,  this  idea  was 
broadened  out,  and,  as  he  phrased  it,  the  duty 
of  the  state  is  to  do  for  man :  first,  what  he 
cannot  do  alone ;  second,  what  he  ought  not  to  do 
alone ;  and  third,  what  he  will  not  do  alone.^  In 
more  recent  times  there  has  been  in  America  a  de- 
cided tendency  to  react  against  the  early  "  protec- 
tion theory "  of  government,  and  to  consider 
that  the  aim  of  the  state  is  not  limited  to  the  main- 
tenance of  law  and  order  in  the  community  and 

1  It  is  a  striking  fact  that  within  less  than  a  decade  the  United 
States  embarked  on  a  colonial  policy,  invoking  in  justification  the 
very  principles  which  have  just  been  analyzed.  In  the  extended 
discussions  of  the  colonial  policy  of  the  United  States  during  the 
past  four  years,  there  has  been  no  clearer  formulation  of  the  domi- 
nant theory  than  this.  Burgess  himself  believes  that  the  United 
States  is  not  yet  ready  for  the  propaganda  of  political  civilization, 
but  should  devote  itself  to  its  own  problems  of  government  and 
liberty.     See  infra,  p.  318. 

2  Political  Ethics,  I,  Chap.  V. 


3l6  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

defence  against  foreign  foes.  In  the  new  view,  the 
state  acts  not  only  for  the  individual  as  such,  but 
in  the  interests  of  the  community  as  a  whole.  It  is 
not  limited  to  the  negative  function  of  preventing 
certain  kinds  of  action,  but  may  positively  advance 
the  general  welfare  by  means  and  measures  ex- 
pressly directed  to  that  end.  This  opinion  is  shared 
by  such  authorities  as  Woolsey,  Burgess,  Wilson, 
Willoughby  and  others.  To  these  thinkers  it  ap- 
pears that  the  duty  of  the  state  is  not  and  cannot 
be  limited  to  the  protection  of  individual  interests, 
but  must  be  regarded  as  extending  to  acts  for  the 
advancement  of  the  general  welfare  in  all  cases 
where  it  can  safely  act,  and  that  the  only  limitations 
on  governmental  action  are  those  dictated  by  ex- 
perience or  the  needs  of  the  time. 

Woolsey  took  the  position  that  the  state  cannot 
be  limited  to  restraining  individuals  from  injuring 
each  other,  but  may  justly  act  positively  for  the 
general  welfare.  "The  sphere  of  the  state,"  he 
said,  "  may  reach  as  far  as  the  nature  and  needs  of 
man  and  of  men  reach  ;  "  and  this  each  people 
decides  for  itself  in  accordance  with  its  own  pecul- 
iar conditions.  In  general  the  action  of  the  state 
falls  under  four  groups  :  i,  the  redress  of  wrongs ; 
2,  the  prevention  of  wrongs  ;  3,  a  degree  of  care 
for  the  outward  welfare  of  the  community,  as  in 
respect  to  industry,  roads,  and  health  ;  4,  the  culti- 
vation of  the  spiritual  nature,  "  by  educating  the 
religious  nature,  the  moral  sense,  the  taste,  the  in- 


RECENT   TENDENCIES  317 

tellect."  ^  The  general  limitation  on  the  power  of 
the  state  is  that  there  shall  be  no  act  in  restraint 
of  the  individual,  except  where  there  is  imperative 
reason  for  such  restriction.  He  also  enumerates 
a  series  of  individual  rights  which  no  just  govern- 
ment ought  to  take  away. 

Woodrow  Wilson  asserts  that  the  objects  of  gov- 
ernment are  the  objects  of  organized  society.  The 
great  end  for  which  society  exists  is  "  mutual  aid 
to  self-development,"  and  this  purpose,  therefore,  is 
the  proper  function  of  government.  With  particu- 
lar reference  to  modern  industrial  conditions,  a 
distinction  is  drawn  between  what  is  termed  "  in- 
terference "  on  the  part  of  the  state,  and  what  is 
called  "regulation,"  by  which  is  meant  an  "  equali- 
zation of  conditions  in  all  branches  of  endeavor." 
The  limit  of  state  activity  is  that  of  "necessary 
cooperation"  —  the  point  at  which  such  enforced 
cooperation  becomes  a  convenience  rather  than  an 
imperative  necessity.  This  line  is  difficult  to 
draw,  but  may  nevertheless  be  drawn.  In  gen- 
eral, we  may  lay  down  the  rule  that  "  the  state 
should  do  nothing  which  is  equally  possible  under 
equitable  conditions  to  optional  associations."  ^ 

A  still  broader  view  is  that  taken  by  Burgess  in 
his  discussion  of  the  ends  of  the  state.  These  may 
be   considered,  he   says,  under   three  heads :  the 

^  Political  Science,  Book  II,  Chap.  IV,  "Sphere  and  Ends  of  the 
State." 

2  The  Sia/e,  Sec.  1273  ff. 


3l8  AMERICAN  POLITICAL   THEORIES 

primary,  the  secondary,  and  the  ultimate.  The 
ultimate  end  of  the  state  is  defined  as  the  "  per- 
fection of  humanity,  the  civilization  of  the  world ; 
the  perfect  development  of  the  human  reason  and 
its  attainment  to  universal  command  over  indi- 
vidualism ;  the  apotheosis  of  man."  ^  This  end  can 
be  realized,  however,  only  when  a  world-state  is  or- 
ganized, and  for  this,  mankind  is  not  yet  ready. 
Men  must  first  be  organized  into  national  states, 
based  on  the  principle  of  nationality.  The  proxi- 
mate ends  of  the  state  are  the  establishment  of 
government  and  liberty.  The  state  must  first  of 
all  establish  peace  and  order ;  and  in  the  next  place 
mark  out  a  sphere  of  liberty  for  the  individual 
and  later  for  associations.  These  are  then  the 
great  ends  of  the  state ;  the  establishment  of  gov- 
ernment and  of  liberty,  so  that  the  national  genius 
may  find  proper  expression ;  and,  finally,  the  per- 
fection of  humanity.  These  objects  must  be 
followed,  moreover,  in  an  historical  order  which 
cannot  be  successfully  reversed.  Government 
must  precede  liberty,  government  and  liberty  must 
precede  the  final  purpose  for  which  the  state  exists. 
In  the  present  stage  of  development,  only  the 
realization  of  government  and  liberty  through  the 
national  state  are  proper  objects  of  state  activity. 
Beyond  this  broad  outline  Burgess  makes  no  other 
attempt  to  mark  out  the  limits  of  the  operation  either 
of  state  or  of  government. 

1  Political  Science,  Vol.  I,  Book  II,  Chap.  IV. 


RECENT   TENDENCIES  319 

An  interesting  study  in  this  direction  has  been 
made  by  Willoughby.^  The  functions  of  the  state 
are  classified  into  three  groups,  of  which  the  first 
contains  those  powers  which  concern  the  life  of  the 
state  and  the  preservation  of  internal  order,  the 
second  those  which  are  concerned  with  human 
liberty,  and  the  third  those  which  have  to  do  with 
the  general  welfare.  A  second  method  of  classify- 
ing the  aims  of  the  state  is  to  divide  them  into  the 
essential  and  the  non-essential  functions.  The 
essential  functions  concern  the  protection  of  the 
state  against  foreign  interference,  the  preservation 
of  the  national  life,  and  the  maintenance  of  internal 
order.  The  non-essential  functions  include  the 
"  economic,  industrial,  and  moral  interests  of  the 
people."  They  are  assumed  by  the  state  not 
because  they  are  necessary  but  because  they  are 
advisable.  The  non-essential  functions  are  sub- 
divided into  the  socialistic  and  the  non-socialistic. 
The  first  class,  the  socialistic,  includes  only  activ- 
ities which  could  be  exercised  by  the  people  if  left 
to  private  initiative,  as  the  ownership  and  operation 
of  railroads,  or  telegraph  and  telephone  systems. 
The  non-socialistic  functions  are  "  those  which,  if 
not  assumed  by  the  state,  would  not  be  exercised 
at  all ; "  as,  for  example,  such  work  as  that  per- 
formed by  educational  and  labor  bureaus.  It  is 
denied  that  any  limit  can  be  set  to  governmental 

1  The  Nature  of  the  State,  Chap.  XII.  See  also  Social  Justice, 
Chap.  IX. 


320  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

activity,  and  the  contention  is  made  that  "each 
function  must  rest  on  its  own  utiUtarian  basis." 
This  specific  determination  belongs  to  the  domain 
of  government  rather  than  of  political  theory,, 
Willoughby  predicts,  however,  that  with  the  de- 
velopment of  civilization  and  the  increasing  com- 
plexity of  industrial  interests,  the  activity  of  the 
state  must  continue  to  expand. 

Among  the  authorities  on  political  economy,  the 
early  idea  of  laissez  faire,  at  least  in  its  extreme 
form,  has  been  subjected  to  severe  criticism,  and 
in  general  has  been  abandoned.  The  new  position 
is  a  mean  between  socialism  and  extreme  individ- 
ualism. Francis  A.  Walker  characterized  the  situa- 
tion when  he  spoke  of  "  those  of  us  who  discerned 
the  coming  of  a  storm  and  removed  ourselves  and 
our  effects  from  the  lower  ground  of  an  uncom- 
promising individualism  to  positions  somewhat 
more  elevated  and  seemingly  secure."  ^  He  de- 
clared, and  this  statement  is  typical  of  the  general 
attitude  of  the  economists,  that  he  believed  "  a 
large  practical  gain  to  the  order  of  society  and  the 
happiness  of  its  constituent  members  would  in 
the  long  result  accrue  from  the  interposition  of 
the  state."  2     Every  proposal,  however,  for  the  ex- 

^  Discussions  in  Economics  and  Statistics  (1899),  I,  344. 

2  Ibid.  II,  271.  In  the  American  Economic  Association  (1885) 
there  was  an  interesting  discussion  on  this  point.  Among  other 
statements,  that  of  Edmund  J.  James  was  significant :  "  We  do  not 
regard  [the  state]  as  a  merely  negative  factor,  the  influence  of  which 
is  most  happy  when  it  is  smallest,  but  we  recognize  that  some  of 


RECENT   TENDENCIES  32 1 

tension  of  the  powers  and  duties  of  the  state  should 
be  subjected  to  careful  scrutiny,  and  the  burden  of 
proof  should  be  thrown  upon  those  who  advocate 
the  innovation.  Furthermore,  no  changes  should 
be  made  in  the  direction  of  state  regulation  for  tran- 
sient causes  or  doubtful  objects.  The  principle  of 
action  would  seem  to  be  to  consider  each  case  on 
its  own  merits,  without  reference  to  the  question  of 
individualism  or  socialism.  In  cases  where  the 
economic  principle  of  competition  appears  to  be 
threatened,  the  interference  of  the  state  seems  to 
be  most  cheerfully  welcomed.^ 

From  a  consideration  of  these  various  opinions, 
it  is  evident  that  the  modern  idea  as  to  what  is  the 
purpose  of  the  state  has  radically  changed  since 

the  most  necessary  functions  of  a  civilized  society  can  be  performed 
only  by  the  state,  and  some  others  most  efficiently  by  the  state;  that 
the  state,  in  a  word,  is  a  permanent  category  of  economic  life,  and  not 
merely  a  temporary  crutch  which  may  be  cast  away  when  society 
becomes  more  perfect."  Publications  of  the  American  Economic 
Association,  Vol.  I,  26. 

An  interesting  attempt  to  lay  down  definite  principles  respecting 
the  function  of  government  has  been  made  by  H.  C.  Adams,  in  The 
delation  of  the  State  to  Industrial  Activity  (1887).  His  funda- 
mental proposition  is  that  neither  the  English  idea  of  the  indi- 
vidual as  supreme,  nor  the  German  idea  of  the  state  as  supreme,  is 
the  correct  one.  Both  state  activity  and  individual  activity  are  in 
reality  functions  of  society  —  the  "living  and  growing  organism  — 
the  ultimate  thing  disclosed  by  analysis  of  human  relations."  The 
point  of  view  in  the  discussions  of  the  sphere  and  duty  of  govern- 
ment should  be  therefore  that  of  the  society,  rather  than  that  of  the 
individual  or  the  state. 

1  See  in  this  connection  Richard  T.  Ely,  Socialism  and  Social 
Reform  (1894). 


322  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

the  days  of  the  "  Fathers."  They  thought  of  the 
function  of  the  state  in  a  purely  individuaHstic 
way;  this  idea  modern  thinkers  have  abandoned, 
and  while  they  have  not  reached  the  paternalistic 
or  sociaUstic  extreme,  have  taken  the  broader  social 
point  of  view.  The  "  protection  "  theory  of  the  state 
is  on  the  decline ;  that  of  the  general  welfare  is  in 
the  ascendant.  The  exigencies  of  modern  indus- 
trial and  urban  life  have  forced  the  state  to  in- 
tervene at  so  many  points  where  an  immediate 
individual  interest  is  difficult  to  show,  that  the  old 
doctrine  has  been  given  up  for  the  theory  that  the 
state  acts  for  the  general  welfare.  It  is  not  admit- 
ted that  there  are  no  limits  to  the  action  of  the 
state,  but  on  the  other  hand  it  is  fully  conceded 
that  there  are  no  "  natural  rights  "  which  bar  the 
way.  The  question  is  now  one  of  expediency 
rather  than  of  principle.  In  general  it  is  believed 
that  the  state  should  not  do  for  the  individual  what 
he  can  do  as  well  for  himself,  but  each  specific 
question  must  be  decided  on  its  own  merits,  and 
each  action  of  the  state  justified,  if  at  all,  by  the 
relative  advantages  of  the  proposed  Hne  of  conduct. 

At  yet  another  point  the  drift  away  from  the 
Revolutionary  theory  is  evident;  namely,  in  rela- 
tion to  the  division  of  governmental  powers.  The 
generally  accepted  theory  since  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury has  been  that  all  governmental  powers  may 
be  divided  into  the  legislative,  the  executive,  and 


RECENT   TENDENCIES  323 

the  judicial;  that  in  every  free  government  these 
powers  should  be  carefully  separated  and  a  dis- 
tinct set  of  officers  should  administer  each  class  of 
them.  This  has  long  been  regarded  as  a  "  funda- 
mental "  of  political  theory  and  of  constitutional 
law  as  well.i  Viewing  the  situation  from  the 
standpoint  of  administrative  law,  however,  a  new 
line  of  division  has  been  recently  drawn  by  Good- 
now.2  In  Politics  and  Administration  Goodnow 
criticises  the  theory  of  the  tripartite  division  of 
governmental  powers  as  an  "  unworkable  and  un- 
applicable  rule  of  law,"  and  proposes  to  substitute 
another  classification  in  its  place.  The  primary 
functions  of  the  state  may  be  divided,  he  maintains, 
into  politics,  "  the  expression  of  the  will  of  the 
state,"  and  administration,  "  the  execution  of  that 
will."  "  Politics "  includes  constitution-making, 
legislation,  selection  of  governmental  officers,  and 
the  control  of  the  function  of  executing  the  will  of 
the  state.  This  function  of  politics  is  discharged  by 
constitutional  conventions,  legislatures,  the  judici- 
ary, and  the  political  parties.  "  Administration," 
on  the  other  hand,  may  be  divided  into  two  classes  : 
the  administration  of  justice,  commonly  called  the 
judicial  authority,  and  the  administration  of  govern- 

1  See  William  Bondy,  "  The  Separation  of  Governmental 
Powers,"  in  Columbia  Studies  in  History,  Economics,  and  Public 
Law,  Vol.  V. 

2  Frank  J.  Goodnow,  Politics  and  Administration  (1900), 
Comparative  Administrative  Law  (1893). 


324  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

ment,  which  includes  what  is  ordinarily  termed  the 
executive  authority,  together  with  other  functions 
of  a  quasi-judicial  or  semi-scientific  or  statistical 
character.^ 

The  method  of  control  over  the  administration 
is  discussed,  and  the  highly  decentralized  system 
adopted  in  Revolutionary  times  is  subjected  to 
severe  criticism.  The  conclusion  drawn  is  that 
the  present  administrative  system  of  the  various 
states  should  be  much  more  centralized  and  consol- 
idated than  at  present;  and  in  the  second  place 
that  the  political  party  should  receive  legal  recog- 
nition as  a  governmental  organ.  The  fear  of  cen- 
tralization which  our  fathers  entertained  is,  he  holds, 
under  modern  conditions  no  longer  reasonable. 
It  is  a  "  battle-cry  suitable  only  to  an  age  that  has 
already  passed  away,"  ^ —  "a  bogie  which  has  been 
conjured  up  by  designing  persons  conscious  that 
a  proper  organization  of  our  administrative  system 
will  work  to  their  disadvantage."  ^  The  party,  fur- 
thermore, must  no  longer  be  regarded  as  a  purely 
voluntary  association  but  as  a  political  body  sub- 
ject to  public  regulation   and  control,  constituting, 

^  Politics  and  Administration,  Chaps.  II,  IV. 

2  Ibid.  261. 

^  Ibid.  130,  Cf.  Ernst  Freund,  "The  Law  of  Administration  in 
America,"  in  the  Political  Science  Quarterly,  Vol.  IX.  See  also 
"  Public  Administration  in  Massachusetts,"  by  Robert  H.  Whitten, 
in  Columbia  University  Studies,  Vol.  VIII,  No.  4;  "The  Central- 
ization of  Administration  in  New  York  State,"  by  John  A.  Fairlie, 
Ibid  Vol.  IX,  No.  3. 


RECENT   TENDENCIES  325 

in  fact,  a  part  of  the  government.  In  this  way 
the  party  may  be  made  responsible,  and  the 
danger,  that  under  a  more  centraHzed  system 
party  bosses  would  wield  still  greater  power,  may 
be  averted.^ 

Another  interesting  phase  of  American  political 
theory  is  the  effort  made  by  numerous  thinkers  to 
distinguish  between  "  state  "  and  "  government." 
From  the  earliest  days  of  the  Repubhc,  the  differ- 
ence between  "  people  "  and  "  government  "  has 
been  emphasized,  and  the  assertion  made  that  sov- 
ereignty rests  with  the  "people"  as  distinguished 
from  the  "government."  This  idea  was  more  sys- 
tematically stated  by  Lieber,  who  made  a  distinc- 
tion between  state  and  government.  The  state  in 
his  opinion  is  the  jural  or  political  society  which 
the  whole  community  constitutes.  The  govern- 
ment is  the  instrument  through  which  the  political 
society  acts,  when  it  does  not  act  directly.^ 

In  the  theory  of  Burgess,  this  distinction  has 
been  made  a  cardinal  principle  of  political  science 
and  of  public  law.  The  state  is  "  a  particular  por- 
tion of  mankind  viewed  as  an  organized  unit."  The 
government  is  a  particular  form  of  organization 
through  which  the  state  acts.  In  early  times,  he 
points  out,  there  was  no  clear  distinction  made  be- 
tween the  state  and  the  government;  they  were, 

1  On  the  function  of  political  parties,  see  H.  J.  Ford,  The  Risi 
and  Growth  of  American  Politics,  Chaps.  XXIII-XXV. 

2  Political  Ethics,  I,  238;  Brownson,  op.  cit.  174-175. 


326  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

in  fact,  blended  in  the  person  of  the  king ;  but  in 
modern  times  the  distinction  has  become  clearly 
evident,  and  the  government  need  not  now  be  con- 
fused with  the  political  society.  In  the  United 
States,  in  particular,  this  has  been  recognized  and 
embodied  in  our  system  of  public  law.  Here  we 
have  a  separate  and  distinct  organization  for  state 
and  government  in  their  several  capacities. 

Burgess  makes  several  important  applications 
of  this  doctrine  to  political  problems.  In  the 
classification  of  political  systems,  for  example,  the 
recognition  of  this  distinction  between  state  and 
government  is  of  great  advantage.  The  difficulty 
involved  in  democratic  Csesarism  is  on  this  basis 
easily  explained,  for  such  a  system  is  really  a 
combination  of  democratic  state  with  monarchic 
government.  In  the  same  way  we  may  have  a 
democratic  state  with  an  aristocratic  government, 
or  an  aristocratic  state  with  a  monarchic  govern- 
ment. Since  the  state  and  the  government  are  dis- 
tinct, any  combination  of  monarchic,  aristocratic, 
and  democratic  elements  is  possible. 

Application  of  this  idea  is  also  made  by  Burgess 
to  the  vexed  question  of  sovereignty.  The  strong- 
est objection  to  the  recognition  of  the  absoluteness 
of  sovereignty  arises,  it  is  pointed  out,  from  the 
general  failure  of  publicists  to  distinguish  clearly 
between  "state"  and  "government."  One  fears 
to  place  unlimited  power  in  the  hands  of  the  ordi- 
nary government,  and  failing  to  distinguish  between 


RECENT   TENDENCIES  327 

this  and  the  state,  declares  against  supreme  power 
in  general.  In  strict  analysis,  however,  the  "  gov- 
ernment is  not  the  sovereign  organization  of  the 
state.  Back  of  the  government  lies  the  constitution 
and  back  of  the  constitution  the  original  sovereign 
state  which  ordains  the  constitution  both  of  govern- 
ment and  liberty."  Recognizing  the  fact  that  the 
sovereignty  belongs  not  with  the  ordinary  govern- 
ment or  administration,  but  with  the  state  in  su- 
preme organization,  the  admission  of  the  character 
of  the  ultimate  power  presents  fewer  and  less  for- 
midable difficulties.  This  double  organization  is  a 
feature  in  which  American  public  law  has  advanced 
beyond  that  of  the  states  of  Europe,  since  here  is 
to  be  found  an  organization  of  the  government  in 
its  local  and  central  branches,  and  then,  above 
these  governments,  the  organization  of  the  state 
in  its  supreme  and  all-controlling  capacity.  Thus, 
in  our  political  system,  government  and  state  are 
distinctly  organized,  and  have  distinct  methods  of 
action.^ 

The  reflection  of  American  political  theorists 
on  the  problems  of  modern  democracy  has  not  up  to 
the  present  time  taken  on  scientific  form.     In  fact, 

^  A  similar  distinction  is  made  by  Woodrow  Wilson,  although  in 
his  theory  the  line  is  drawn  between  "society  "and  "government," 
while  the  terms  "state"  and  "government"  are  used  interchange- 
ably. Society,  in  his  phrase,  is  termed  an  "organism,"  and  gov- 
ernment is  characterized  as  an  "organ."  The  State,  Sees.  1160, 
1 269- 1 273.      Cf,  Willoughby,   The  Nature  of  the  State,  8.     Wil- 


328  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

the  two  great  studies  of  American  democracy  have 
been  made  respectively  by  a  Frenchman  and  an 
Englishman  :  Democracy  in  America  by  De  Tocque- 
ville  and  The  American  Cofmnonwealth  by  James 
Bryce.  There  has  been  no  profound  and  compre- 
hensive study  of  the  facts  and  the  philosophy  of 
modern  democracy  by  an  American  thinker.  In 
recent  years,  however,  considerable  attention  has 
been  given  to  the  nature  and  meaning  of  demo- 
cratic institutions,  and  there  have  been  numerous 
discussions  centering  around  the  problems  of 
democracy.  The  weakness  of  popular  government 
in  our  large  cities  has  been  considered  by  a  num- 
ber of  thinkers ;  among  the  most  conspicuous  is 
Godkin,  in  his  Unforeseen  Tendencies  of  Democracy 
and  Problems  of  Modern  Democracy}  The  relation 
of  democratic  government  to  modern  industrial  com- 
binations has  been  considered  by  Moses  in  his  sug- 
gestive sketch  on  Democracy  and  Social  Growth? 
The  compatibility  between  democracy  and  colonial 
government  has  been  discussed,  among  others,  by 
Giddings  in  Deviocracy  and  Empire.  Eliot  has 
pointed  out  certain  contributions  made  by  Ameri- 

loughby  distinguishes  between  state  and  government  on  the  ground 
that,  strictly  speaking,  state  is  "an  abstract  term,"  whereas  govern- 
ment is  "emphatically  concrete"  —  a  distinction  corresponding,  he 
says,  to  that  between  a  person  and  his  bodily  frame.  For  his  criti- 
cism of  Burgess's  theory,  see  op.  cit.  206,  note. 

IE.  L.  Godkin,   Unforeseen   Tende^icies  of  Democracy  (i5 
Problems  of  Modern  Democracy  (1896). 

*  Bernard  J.  Moses,  Democracy  and  Social  Growth  (1898). 


RECENT   TENDENCIES  329 

can  democracy  to  civilization,^  and  Lowell  has 
shown  the  relation  between  democracy  and  the 
constitution.^  Numerous  other  interesting  and  use- 
ful contributions  have  been  made,  but  in  none  or 
all  of  them  is  there  found  that  complete  study 
of  modern  or  American  democracy  which  it  is 
desirable  to  have. 

Within  the  last  few  decades,  no  little  attention 
has  been  given  in  America  to  the  study  of  social 
forces  in  the  general  sense  of  the  term.  These  in- 
vestigations have  been  directed  primarily  to  the 
observation  and  classification  of  social  facts,  but 
incidentally  contributions  have  been  made  to  the 
solution  of  certain  problems  of  political  theory. 
Attention  has  already  been  called  to  the  restatement 
of  the  doctrine  of  natural  rights  at  the  hands  of 
Giddings.^  In  his  Dynamic  Sociology  {\^^^^,  Lester 
F.  Ward  ^  lays  great  emphasis  on  a  more  scientific 
direction  of  social  forces.  The  science  of  society, 
he  urges,  should  lead  up  to  the  art  of  society, 
which  in  his  terminology  is  known  as  "  collective 
telesis."     There  ought  to  be  a  transformation  of 

1  Charles  William  Eliot,  American  Contributions  to  Civilization 

(1897). 

2  A.  L.  Lowell,  Essays  on  Government  (1892).  See  also  Gama- 
liel Bradford,  The  Lesson  of  Popular  Government  {iZgc));  Jane 
Addams,  Democracy  and  Social  Ethics  (1902);  J.  H.  Hyslop,  De- 
mocracy, A  Study  of  Government  (1899);  David  Starr  Jordan, 
Imperial  Democracy  (1899).  *  See  ante,  p.  310. 

*  See  also  "  Collective  Telesis,"  in  the  American  Journal  oj 
Sociology,  Vol.  II. 


330  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

government  from  its  present  unscientific  and  un- 
progressive  methods  to  "  a  central  academy  of 
science  which  shall  stand  in  the  same  relation  to 
the  control  of  men,  in  which  a  polytechnic  insti- 
tute stands  to  the  control  of  nature."  Government 
would  be  then,  in  truth,  "  the  legislative  application 
of  sociological  principles,"  and  this  is  what  he 
understands  by  "  sociocracy  "  —  "the  scientific 
control  of  social  forces  by  the  collective  mind  of 
society  for   its  advantage." 

Following  the  same  general  method,  John  R. 
Commons  has  worked  out  a  somewhat  elaborate 
account  of  the  sociological  view  of  sovereignty 
which  he  states,  of  course,  in  social  rather  than 
political  terms.  ^  The  most  suggestive  of  these 
contributions,  however,  is  that  made  by  Ross  in  his 
Social  Control,  1901.^  Believing  that  a  study  of 
social  control  should  not  be  limited  to  an  examina- 
tion of  laws  alone,  Ross  has  instituted  a  compre- 
hensive study  of  all  social  forces  that  go  to  make 
up  the  control  of  the  group  over  the  individual. 
To  this  end  the  work  is  divided  into  a  study  of  the 
grounds  of  control,  the  means  of  control,  and  the 
system  of  control.  Under  the  grounds  of  control 
are  discussed  the  role  of  sympathy,  sociability,  the 
sense  of  justice,  and  of  individual  reaction  as  bases 
of  social  order.     Under  the  means  of  control,  there 

^  American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  V. 

2  E.  A.  Ross,  Social  Control,  A  Survey  of  the  Foundations  of 
Order. 


RECENT   TENDENCIES  33  I 

is  given  a  description  and  analysis  of  the  various 
forces,  by  means  of  which  the  society  obtains  social 
obedience  and  effects  social  control.  These  instru- 
mentalities are  partly  legal,  as  law,  belief,  ceremony, 
education,  illusion ;  and  partly  ethical,  as  public 
opinion,  suggestion,  art,  and  social  valuation.  The 
complicated  machinery  for  producing  obedience  on 
the  part  of  the  individual  to  the  will  of  the  group 
is  subjected  to  careful  examination,  with  results 
that  are  at  times  startling.  Ross  maintains,  how- 
ever, that  the  full  understanding  of  these  subtle 
methods  need  not  lead  to  any  such  disastrous 
consequences  as  those  drawn  by  the  Anarchists. 
Simply  because  the  "X-ray  shows  control  in  all 
social  tissues  and  the  spectroscope  reveals  the 
element  of  collective  ascendancy  in  almost  every 
culture  product,"  it  does  not  follow  that  all  these 
tissues  and  products  must  be  destroyed.  A  full 
comprehension  of  the  facts  of  social  control,  while 
not  wholly  quieting  to  the  individual  thus  controlled, 
need  not  lead  to  rebellion  against  this  restraint. 

Under  the  system  of  control  are  examined  such 
topics  as  class  control,  the  vicissitudes  of  social 
control,  the  limits  and  criteria  of  control.  The 
assertion  is  made  that  in  the  future  the  control  of 
society  will  be  secured  largely  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  education  —  the  best  method  of  in- 
surance against  the  spirit  of  disobedience  in  the 
individual.  In  the  same  connection  an  effort  is 
made  to  lay  down  certain  canons  or  principles  of 


332  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

social  interference.  Of  these  the  most  significant 
are  :  "  Social  interference  should  not  be  so  pater- 
nal as  to  check  the  self-extinction  of  the  morally 
ill-constituted  ;  "  and,  "  Social  interference  should 
not  so  limit  the  struggle  for  existence  as  to  nullify 
the  selective  process."  ^ 

In  conclusion,  it  appears  that  recent  political 
theory  in  the  United  States  shows  a  decided  ten- 
dency away  from  many  doctrines  that  were  held  by 
the  men  of  1776.  The  same  forces  that  have  led 
to  the  general  abandonment  of  the  individualistic 
philosophy  of  the  eighteenth  century  by  political 
scientists  elsewhere  have  been  at  work  here  and 
with  the  same  result.  The  Revolutionary  doctrines 
of  an  original  state  of  nature,  natural  rights,  the 
social  contract,  the  idea  that  the  function  of  the 
government  is  limited  to  the  protection  of  person 
and  property,  —  none  of  these  finds  wide  acceptance 
among  the  leaders  in  the  development  of  political 
science.  The  great  service  rendered  by  these  doc- 
trines, under  other  and  earlier  conditions,  is  fully 
recognized,  and  the  presence  of  a  certain  element 
of  truth  in  them  is  freely  admitted,  but  they  are  no 
longer  generally  received  as  the  best  explanation 
for  political  phenomena.  Nevertheless,  it  must  be 
said  that  thus  far  the  rejection  of  these  doctrines 
is  a  scientific  tendency  rather  than  a  popular 
movement.     Probably  these  ideas  continue  to  be 

1  Chap.  XXX. 


RECENT  TENDENCIES  333 

articles  of  the  popular  creed,  although  just  how 
far  they  are  seriously  adhered  to  it  is  difficult  to 
ascertain.  As  far  as  the  theory  of  the  function  of 
government  is  concerned,  it  would  seem  that  the 
public  has  gone  beyond  the  political  scientists,  and 
is  ready  for  assumption  of  extensive  powers  by  the 
political  authorities.  The  public,  or  at  least  a  large 
portion  of  it,  is  ready  for  the  extension  of  the  func- 
tions of  government  in  almost  any  direction  where 
the  general  welfare  may  be  advanced,  regardless  of 
whether  individuals  as  such  are  benefited  thereby 
or  not.  But  in  regard  to  the  conception  of  natural 
right  and  the  social-contract  theory,  the  precise 
condition  of  public  opinion  is,  at  the  present  time, 
not  easy  to  estimate. 


CHAPTER  IX 

CONCLUSION 

In  conclusion  of  this  study,  a  few  words  may  be 
said  upon  the  general  characteristics  of  American 
political  theory.  It  is  evident  from  the  preceding 
chapters  that  thus  far  there  has  been  no  remark- 
able development  of  political  philosophy  in  the 
United  States.  Until  recently,  there  has  been  no 
attempt  at  all  at  systematic  discussion  of  the  prob- 
lems of  politics,  and,  although  the  new  school  has 
accomplished  much,  it  has  not  yet  developed  a 
body  of  typical  American  political  theory.  It 
would  be  putting  it  strongly  to  say  that  there  is  no 
American  political  theory,  but  it  is  certainly  true 
that  very  few  contributions  to  systematic  politics 
have  been  made  by  the  great  republic  of  the  New 
World.  Many  of  the  characteristic  features  even 
of  our  own  political  system  have  received  compara- 
tively little  attention ;  as,  for  example,  democracy 
as  an  all-pervading  influence  in  society  and  state, 
the  rule  of  the  majority,  written  constitutions,  the 
relation  between  church  and  state.  These  ideas 
seem  to  be  so  generally  accepted  that  argument 
or  discussion  is  regarded  as  superfluous.  They 
are  articles  of  political  faith,  received  with  implicit 
confidence  and  trust. 

334         y' 

/ 


CONCLUSION  335 

In  general,  American  political  theory  has  been 
struck  off  in  connection  with  controversies  over 
specific  subjects.  The  rights  of  man,  the  consent 
of  the  governed,  the  right  of  revolution,  were  dis- 
cussed in  relation  to  the  Revolution  of  1776.  The 
question  of  aristocracy,  artificial  and  natural,  was 
associated  with  the  struggle  between  the  Federal- 
ists and  their  opponents ;  the  effort  to  restrict  the 
spread  of  slavery  led  to  the  discussion  of  the  proper 
relation  between  unequal  races  under  conditions 
which  render  coexistence  on  the  same  soil  neces- 
sary. The  great  problem  of  the  character  of  the 
Union  gave  rise  to  the  examination  of  the  nature 
of  federal  government,  the  essential  marks  of  sov- 
ereignty, and  the  elements  of  nationality.  In  re- 
cent days,  the  territorial  expansion  of  the  United 
States  again  raises  the  problem  of  the  consent  of 
the  governed,  and  the  right  relation  between  races 
of  widely  different  capacity.  But  in  all  these  in- 
stances the  constitutional  or  legal  aspects  of  the 
problem  have  been  most  freely  and  most  fully  dis- 
cussed, while  the  principles  of  political  science  have 
been  the  object  of  far  less  attention.  The  nature 
of  the  Union,  for  example,  was  much  more  thor- 
oughly and  ably  treated  from  the  constitutional 
point  of  view  than  from  that  of  poUtical  science ; 
or,  to  take  another  case,  the  constitutional  phases 
of  slavery  extension  were  much  more  carefully 
studied  than  the  question  of  human  rights  or  of 
race  relations. 


336  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

The  causes  of  this  scarcity  of  political  theory 
are  various.  It  may  be  urged  that  the  lack  of 
theory  is  due  to  the  tendency  of  the  American  or 
the  Englishman  toward  action  rather  than  reflec- 
tion—  to  be  practical  rather  than  philosophical. 
In  this  connection  it  is  well  to  remember,  how- 
ever, that  it  was  an  English  thinker,  John  Locke, 
who  worked  out  the  fundamental  principles  of  the 
English,  American,  and  French  revolutions  of  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries.  Another 
Englishman,  Edmund  Burke^  was  the  author  of 
the  most  effective  work  written  against  those  prin- 
ciples, and  yet  another  Englishman,  Thomas 
Hobbes,  framed  one  of  the  strongest  theoretical 
arguments  in  favor  of  absolutism.  A  more  plau- 
sible explanation  than  inability  to  think  abstractly 
is  found  in  the  argument  that  the  tendencies  of 
modern  democracy  are  not  yet  fully  enough  devel- 
oped to  make  possible  the  formulation  of  political 
theory  respecting  these  new  conditions.  From  this 
point  of  view,  the  development  of  a  typical  Ameri- 
can theory  is  yet  to  come. 

It  may  further  be  questioned  how  far  American 
political  theory  is  dependent  upon  foreign  sources 
for  its  inspiration,  and  to  which  of  these  sources 
we  are  especially  indebted.  Some  reference  has 
been  made  to  this  in  the  discussion  of  the  various 
schools,  but  a  summary  of  these  influences  may 
not  be  inappropriate  at  this  point.  The  great 
reservoir  from  which  the  Fathers  drew  was  the 


CONCLUSION  337 

English  political  theory  of  the  preceding  century 
—  the  ideas  of  Sydney,  Locke,  and  the  English 
Whig  revolutionists.  This  was  the  origin  of  the 
fundamental  doctrines  to  which  the  Patriots  ad- 
hered. This  body  of  ideas  has  had  in  the  past, 
and  still  has,  a  great  hold  on  the  political  thought 
of  the  American.  Also  of  great  influence  on  the 
course  of  American  political  speculation  have  been 
the  individualistic  theories  of  Mill  and  Spencer, 
which  have  been  widely  read  and  widely  ac- 
cepted. Among  jurists,  the  theory  of  John  Austin 
and  the  school  of  positive  law  has  been  the  subject 
of  frequent  discussion,  and  has  been  very  influ- 
ential. 

Of  French  thinkers  by  far  the  strongest  in- 
fluence exerted  on  American  theory  was  that  of 
Montesquieu,  through  the  famous  doctrine  of  the 
tripartite  division  of  governmental  powers.  This 
proposition  was  readily  taken  up  from  the  first, 
and  remains  to  this  day  scarcely  contested.  The 
French  Revolution  gave  a  great  impulse  to  the 
democratic  movement  in  America,  as  did  the  revo- 
lutions of  1830  and  1848,  yet  few  of  the  doctrines 
of  that  day  took  deep  root  in  American  soil. 
Destutt  de  Tracy  was  recommended  by  Jefferson, 
but  never  was  highly  influential.  One  of  the 
reactionaries  against  the  French  Revolution,  De 
Maistre,  has  been  sometimes  referred  to  in  the  con- 
troversy over  the  nature  of  the  Union,  because  of 
his  statement  of  the  theory  that  constitutions  can- 


338  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

not  be  made  offhand,  but  are  the  result  of  growth 
through  long  periods.  The  influence  of  Comte 
upon  social  and  political  science  must  be  included 
in  the  summary  of  French  influence  upon  Ameri- 
can thought.  Upon  the  whole,  it  is  evident 
that  American  theory  has  pursued  its  course  with- 
out much  regard  to  the  political  ideas  current 
among  the  French.  Doubtless  the  Revolution  of 
1789  and  the  succeeding  revolutions  helped  to 
strengthen  the  democratic  impulse  and  tendency, 
for  the  influence  of  these  movements  was  world- 
wide. But  the  immediate  and  direct  effect  of 
these  events  on  American  political  thought,  it  is 
not  easy  to  discover.  The  influence  came  in  the 
form  of  a  general  stimulus  rather  than  of  particular 
doctrines  or  principles. 

In  recent  years  the  influence  of  the  German 
political  scientists  has  been  most  pronounced. 
This  influence  began  with  the  work  of  Francis 
Lieber  as  an  instructor  in  American  schools  and 
an  investigator  in  the  field  of  political  science. 
In  the  movement  toward  the  study  of  politics  dur- 
ing the  last  few  decades,  the  leaders,  almost  with- 
out exception,  have  been  men  trained  in  German 
schools,  familiar  with  German  methods,  and  pro- 
foundly influenced  by  German  ideas.  The  work  of 
such  publicists  as  Gneist,  Stein,  Ihering,  Bluntschli, 
Jellinek,  and  Holtzendorff  is  clearly  evident  in 
the  method  and  thought  of  present  day  politi- 
cal scientists.     So  far  as  particular  doctrines  are 


CONCLUSION  339 

concerned,  the  influence  of  the  German  school  is 
most  obvious  in  relation  to  the  contract  theory  of 
the  origin  of  the  state  and  the  idea  of  the  function 
of  the  state.  The  theory  that  the  state  originates 
in  an  agreement  between  men  was  assailed  by  the 
German  thinkers  and  the  historical,  organic,  evo- 
lutionary idea  substituted  for  it.  The  purpose  of 
the  state  they  have  expanded  from  the  "  police 
theory"  to  that  of  general  care  for  the  interests 
of  the  community.  Changes  of  American  theory 
in  this  direction  cannot,  however,  be  attributed 
exclusively  to  the  influence  of  the  German  school, 
for  the  same  tendencies  have  been  conspicuous  in 
English  and  French  theory,  and  in  the  case  of  the 
contract  had  already  been  developed  by  Calhoun 
and  Story.  It  is  interesting  to  observe  at  this  point 
that  as  between  the  idea  of  "  natural  rights  "  —  the 
German  Naturrecht  —  and  the  Austinian  theory, 
the  general  tendency  in  the  United  States  has 
been  to  accept  the  doctrine  that  there  is  a  body  of 
natural  rights  semi-ethical,  semi-political  in  nature. 
The  idea  that  there  are  inalienable  rights  of  man, 
quasi-political  in  character,  has  taken  firm  hold  of 
the  popular  mind,  and  has  not  been  dislodged  by 
any  of  the  numerous  attacks  upon  this  theory 
since  the  French   Revolution. 

The  chief  foreign  influences  at  work  upon  the 
American  theory  have  been  the  EngHsh,  the  French, 
and  the  German.  Of  these  it  may  be  said  that  the 
French  influence  consists  largely  in  the  democratic 


340  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

impulse  given  during  the  days  of  the  Revolution, 
the  German  contribution  is  chiefly  in  the  direction 
of  scientific  method,  and  that  the  fundamental  politi- 
cal ideas  of  the  Ameiicans  have  been  deeply  influ- 
enced only  by  the  English  thinkers,  especially 
those  of  the  seventeenth  century.  The  present 
generation  looks  back  to  the  Fathers  and  the 
Fathers  looked  back  to  the  men  of  the  preceding 
century. 

From  a  consideration  of  outside  influence  upon 
American  ideas,  we  turn  to  an  examination  of  the 
effect  of  American  theory  on  other  peoples.  The 
genera]  influence  of  American  institutions  and 
ideas  has  been  great,  but  examples  of  specific  doc- 
trines or  particular  men  who  have  left  their  im- 
press on  the  political  ideas  of  other  countries  are 
not  easy  to  find.  Such  instances,  although 
infrequent,  are  not,  however,  wholly  wanting. 
Thomas  Paine  in  reply  to  Burke,  Calhoun  on  the 
rights  of  minorities,  Lieber  on  the  idea  of  self-gov- 
ernment, are  cases  in  point.  Of  special  impor- 
tance also  was  the  American  theory  of  a  federal 
union  as  expounded  in  the  Federalist  and  by 
Webster  and  Calhoun.  Particularly  in  connection 
with  the  German  problem  of  national  unity,  these 
ideas  were  widely  discussed.  The  Federalist 
theory  of  a  double  sovereignty  was  predominant 
in  the  school  of  which  Waitz  was  the  chief  expo- 
nent, and  Calhoun's  doctrine  of  the  indivisibility 
of  sovereignty  is  accepted   by    Max   Seydel   and 


CONCLUSION  341 

those  of  his  particularistic  faith.  American  insti- 
tutions and  ideas  as  described  in  the  brilUant  study 
of  De  Tocqueville  (1835)  were  made  famihar  to 
Europeans,  and  in  this  way  left  their  impress 
upon  those  peoples  at  a  critical  period  in  the 
history  of  constitutional  government.  In  more 
recent  times  a  like  service  has  been  rendered  by 
James  Bryce  in  his  classic  work  on  the  American 
Commonwealth. 

It  goes  without  saying,  that  the  mightiest  influ- 
ence exerted  by  the  United  States  in  the  domain 
of  political  science,  has  been  due  to  the  example 
of  a  democracy  successfully  working  on  a  large 
scale.  It  would  be  a  gross  exaggeration  to  say 
without  qualification  that  the  constitutional  re- 
forms of  the  nineteenth  century  were  caused  by 
the  developments  in  America ;  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  is  clearly  evident  that  the  American 
Republic  has  been  a  powerful  factor  in  the 
growth  of  constitutional  democracy  and  of  consti- 
tutional government  in  general.  In  Mexico  and 
the  South  American  republics,  this  influence  is 
seen  in  institutions  framed  obviously  after  the 
American  type.  In  European  countries,  the  in- 
fluence is  far  less  powerful,  but  even  there  it  has 
been  remarkable.  Not  always,  or  even  often,  tak- 
ing the  shape  of  systematic  theory,  the  democratic 
spirit  and  practice  of  the  United  States  have,  never- 
theless, made  themselves  felt  in  the  development 
of  free  institutions.     What  has  been  said  of  demo- 


342  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

cratic  government  might  also  be  said  of  federal 
government,  for  in  this  field  the  practical  influence 
of  the  American  system  has  been  widespread. 
The  systems  of  Germany,  Canada,  Australia, 
Mexico,  and  Brazil  are  sufficient  evidence  of  this. 
In  conclusion,  it  may  be  profitable  to  notice  what 
has  been  the  broad  tendency  of  American  politics, 
including  the  theoretical  and  the  practical.  Dur- 
ing the  early  period  of  our  history  the  movement 
was  steadily  democratic.  Using  the  suffrage  as  a 
standard,  although  this  is  not  the  only  test  that 
might  be  applied,  it  is  evident  that  the  Fathers 
were  more  democratic  than  the  Puritans ;  the  Jeffer- 
sonian  democracy  was  more  liberal  than  that  of 
1776;  the  Jacksonian  democracy  went  far  beyond 
the  Jeffersonian  school;  the  Abolitionists  extended 
the  boundary  lines  farther  yet;  and  the  advo- 
cates of  women's  suffrage  have  even  surpassed 
this  liberal  provision.  The  political  people  were, 
roughly  speaking,  in  the  first  stage  the  church- 
members,  in  the  next  the  freeholders,  in  the  third 
place  the  white  male  citizens,  in  the  fourth  period 
all  adult  males,  and  now  tend  to  include  the 
whole  adult  population.^  Property  qualifications 
have  disappeared,  religious  restrictions  have  fallen 
into  disuse,  popular  election  of  officers  has  dis- 
placed the  system  of  legislative  choice,  constitu- 
tions are  now  usually  adopted  by  popular  vote,  and 

^  The  recent  tendency  to  require  educational  or  property  tests 
is  an  exception  to  this  uniform  advance. 


CONCLUSION  343 

the  referendum  has  been  introduced  upon  many 
state  and  local  issues. 

Certain  events  in  very  recent  times  have  been 
interpreted,  however,  as  indicative  of  a  decline  in 
democratic  faith.  It  is  asserted  that  the  rapid  con- 
centration of  wealth  is  destroying  the  economic 
basis  on  which  democracy  rests,  and  that  the  sub- 
stance of  power  has  passed  or  is  passing  from  the 
masses.  The  forms  of  power,  it  is  said,  cannot 
long  remain  in  conflict  with  the  actual  forces  and 
facts,  and  as  the  organization  of  industry  has 
become  undemocratic,  the  organization  of  govern- 
ment must  soon  follow  in  the  same  direction.  It 
is  further  urged  that  the  United  States  has  ac- 
quired a  vast  domain  lying  outside  of  our  geo- 
graphical group,  containing  a  population  which 
can  never  be  admitted  to  equal  fellowship  in  the 
Union,  but,  if  held  at  all,  must  be  retained  on  terms 
of  political  inequality.  The  conclusion  drawn  is 
that  the  ideals  of  earlier  days  have  been  forgotten, 
and  that  the  present  tendency  is  away  from  demo- 
cratic institutions. 

Without  attempting  to  discuss  the  future,  for 
that  lies  outside  the  scope  of  an  historical  study, 
it  may  be  said  that  down  to  the  present  time,  at 
least,  the  tendency  of  American  political  theory 
and  practice  must  be  regarded  as  essentially  demo- 
cratic. There  is  little  in  either  the  industrial  or 
the  colonial  situation  to  indicate  a  departure 
from  the  line  of  democratic  progress.     It  is  true 


344  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

that  the  concentration  of  wealth  is  increasing  at 
a  very  rapid  rate,  and  that  the  legal  title  to  much 
property  is  passing  into  the  hands  of  a  few.  But 
it  must  be  remembered  that  under  present  condi- 
tions, the  increase  of  private  possessions  does  not 
necessarily  signify  that  power  is  passing  from  the 
hands  of  the  people.  On  the  contrary,  in  many 
industries  the  greater  the  growth  of  individual  or 
corporate  control,  the  nearer  is  that  control  to 
becoming  popular  control.  If,  for  example,  a  rail- 
road combination  should  acquire  all  the  railroad 
systems  of  the  United  States,  it  is  highly  probable 
that  railroad  operation  would  very  soon  become  a 
government  function  or,  at  least,  the  situation  would 
give  rise  to  a  very  large  measure  of  regulation  by 
the  people.  What  seems  like  the  cHmax  of  indi- 
vidual or  corporate  control  is  likely  to  pass  over 
into  governmental  control  or  regulation.  The  idea 
that  property  is  an  absolute  and  unassailable  right 
of  the  individual  and  that  government  exists  chiefly 
for  the  purpose  of  protecting  this  right,  is  no  longer 
accepted  as  in  the  earlier  days.  On  the  contrary, 
the  relation  of  property  to  the  community  is  now 
emphasized,  and  the  right  of  the  state  to  defend 
its  citizens  against  unfair  competition  is  widely 
recognized.  It  is  evident,  then,  that  the  concen- 
tration of  wealth  does  not  signify  under  present 
conditions  the  destruction  of  democratic  govern- 
ment, but,  on  the  contrary,  is  likely  if  continued 
to  call  out  a  greater  extension  of  democratic  activ- 


CONCLUSION 


345 


ity.  In  any  event,  the  permanent  crystallization 
of  enormous  wealth  in  the  hands  of  any  class  is 
not  likely  to  occur,  since  the  transmission  of 
property  from  one  generation  to  another  is  in  the 
hands  of  the  people,  and  may  readily  be  controlled 
by  the  machinery  of  government  if  such  a  ten- 
dency becomes  threatening.  Inheritance  is  gen- 
erally regarded  as  a  social  function,  and  the 
inheritance  tax  is  a  remedy  which  is  capable  of 
indefinite  extension.  This  instrument  may  do  for 
democracy  what  the  law  of  entail  did  for  the  old 
aristocracies.  We  conclude,  therefore,  that  from 
the  industrial  point  of  view  there  is  little  ground 
for  believing  that  the  present  drift  is  away  from 
democracy. 

It  is  further  urged,  however,  that  the  acquisition 
of  territory  unfit  for  admission  into  the  Union,  and 
without  the  consent  of  the  population  annexed,  is  an 
indication  of  a  defection  from  the  principles  of  the 
Fathers  and  the  settled  policy  of  the  United  States. 
Reasoning  from  precedent,  however,  it  appears 
that  the  phrase  "  consent  of  the  governed  "  was 
never  applied  in  the  literal,  or  anything  approx- 
imating the  literal,  sense  of  the  term.  The 
Puritans  disregarded  the  Indians  altogether,  and 
consulted  the  preferences  of  the  church  members, 
who  were  the  political  people.  The  Fathers  disre- 
garded the  negroes  and  consulted  the  freeholders, 
to  the  exclusion  of  a  large  proportion  of  the  male 
adults.     Likewise  the   Jeffersonian  and  the  Jack- 


346  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

sonian  democracy  ignored  the  blacks  as  a  political 
element,  refusing  them  not  only  political  but  even 
the  most  rudimentary  civil  rights.  The  emancipa- 
tion of  the  slaves  was  brought  about  in  the  course 
of  a  war  that  was  fought  in  direct  disregard  of  the 
principle  of  the  consent  of  the  governed.  The 
eleven  seceding  states  were  simply  held  in  the 
Union  by  force  of  arms,  without  their  consent,  and 
despite  their  most  emphatic  protest.  From  the 
point  of  view  of  the  South,  they  were  a  separate 
people,  and  the  war  against  them  was  one  of  con- 
quest and  subjugation. 

Waiving  the  matter  of  precedent  and  considering 
the  question  as  one  of  principle,  it  is  evident  that 
much  depends  on  one's  political  theory.  If  we  be- 
lieve that  government  has  no  jurisdiction  over  men 
unless  they  have  consented  to  it,  and  that  every 
man  is  entitled  to  equal  civil  and  political  rights, 
regardless  of  his  fitness  for  them,  then  it  follows 
that  to  deprive  any  man  of  the  suffrage  for  any 
cause,  or  any  people  of  self-government  for  any 
cause,  is  a  departure  from  democratic  principles. 
On  this  basis  it  would  be  concluded  that  within 
the  last  four  years  democracy  in  the  United  States 
had  received  a  decided  setback.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  is  believed  that  liberty  and  rights  are 
necessarily  conditioned  upon  political  capacity, 
and  that  the  consent  of  the  governed  is  a  principle 
which,  in  the  present  state  of  affairs,  cannot  be 
perfectly  realized,  then   the   situation   is  altered. 


CONCLUSION  347 

From  this  point  of  view,  the  possession  of  full 
political  rights  by  every  man  is  an  ideal  which 
should,  as  far  as  possible,  be  realized.  This  was 
the  contemporary  interpretation  of  the  Fathers 
who  framed  the  Revolutionary  state  constitutions ; 
this  was  the  idea  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  of  Calhoun, 
and  of  Lincoln,  and  it  is  the  view  taken  by  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  modern  political  scien- 
tists. This  position,  it  is  submitted,  is  the  only 
tenable  one  for  modern  democracy.  Doubtless 
this  doctrine  may  be  perverted  to  despotic  uses, 
but  it  is  not  so  near  despotism  as  is  the  opposite 
doctrine  to  anarchy ;  for  the  full  application  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  consent  of  the  governed  and  of  the 
absolute  equality  of  all,  in  political  as  well  as  civil 
rights  at  the  present  day,  would  be  equivalent  to 
the  dissolution  of  every  political  society  now  exist- 
ing. Even  with  civilized  peoples  the  democracy 
of  the  present  day  must  of  necessity  be  imperfect ; 
there  must  be  in  every  community  some  exceptions 
to  the  general  law  of  political  equality. 

It  appears,  then,  that  whatever  may  be  said  of 
the  opportuneness  of  the  new  movement  in  time 
or  place,  the  charge  that  it  is  a  departure  from 
democratic  ideas  has  no  basis  in  the  principles  of 
political  science.  Democracy  does  not  demand 
that  barbarians  be  admitted  to  equal  political  rights 
with  peoples  long  trained  in  the  art  of  self-govern- 
ment, nor,  on  the  other  hand,  does  it  require  that 
democratic  states  leave  the  work  of  political  civil- 


348  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

ization  to  countries  where  constitutional  liberty  is 
unknown,  or  to  states  possessing  a  less  degree  of 
constitutional  liberty  than  their  own.  It  cannot 
be  an  article  of  democratic  faith  that  democratic 
states  must  stand  by  and  allow  the  despotic  states 
of  the  world  to  extend  a  despotic  system  over  the 
weaker  nations  of  the  earth. 

Our  conclusion  is,  then,  that  the  charge  that 
democracy  is  on  the  decline  in  the  United  States 
is  not  proven.  There  are  certain  tendencies, 
which,  if  taken  alone,  might  seem  to  point  in  such 
a  direction ;  but  when  we  consider  as  a  whole  the 
numerous  tendencies  of  which  democracy  is  made 
up,  it  is  found  that  there  are  other  and  counter- 
balancing influences,  equally  important  and  sig- 
nificant. Hence,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  broad 
tendency  of  American  political  life  is  away  from 
democracy. 


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349 


350  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

Bland,  Richard.  An  Enquiry  into  the  Rights  of  the  Britislr 
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Bledsoe,  A.  T.  An  Essay  on  Liberty  and  Slavery.  Phila- 
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Brownson,   O.   a.      Constitutional   Government.      Boston, 
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354  AMERICAN  POLITICAL    THEORIES 

Mather,  Richard.     Church  Government  and  Church  Cove- 
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Moses,  Bernard.     Democracy  and  Social  Growth  in  Amer- 
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Pomeroy,  J.  N.     An  Introduction  to  the  Constitutional  Law 
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United  States   of  America.     Philadelphia,  1825. 

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INDEX 


Abolitionism :  premises  in  theory 
of,  207  ;  typical  platform  of,  207  ; 
attitude  toward  slaveholders,  209 ; 
relation  to  no-government  theory, 
209;  historical  significance  of, 
216. 

Adams,  John :  theory  of,  during  the 
Revolution,  43,  48,  52,  69;  basis 
of  later  theory,  124;  criticism  of 
pure  democracy,  125  seq.;  doc- 
trine of  aristocracy,  130  seq.; 
theory  as  to  balance  of  powers, 
136  seq.;  comparison  of,  with 
Samuel  Adams,  135 ;  fundamental 
principle  in  creed  of,  140;  com- 
parison of,  with  Jefferson,  162. 

Adams,  Samuel :  on  the  right  of 
revolution,  56;  on  purpose  of 
the  state,  62 ;  on  monarchy,  69 ; 
comparison  of,  with  John  Adams, 

135- 

Anti-slavery :  radical  Abolitionist 
theory,  206;  the  philosophical 
argument,  217 ;  Lincoln's  theory, 
221 ;  comparison  with  pro-slavery 
theory,  248.    See  Abolitionism. 

Aristocracy:  denunciation  of,  in 
1776,  75 ;  Adams's  defence  of,  130 
seq.;  principal  features  in  aris- 
tocracy, 131 ;  recognition  of,  in 
government,  132 ;  hereditary  no- 
bility, 133 ;  John  and  Samuel 
Adams  on,  135;  Jefferson  on 
natural  and  artificial  aristocracy, 
15s;  decline  of,  during  Jack- 
sonian  period,  184;  Lincoln's 
criticism  of,  224 ;  pro-slavery 
theory  of,  236. 


Balance  of  powers  :  Paine's  oppo- 
sition to,  73 ;  doctrine  of,  in  1776, 
79;  development  of,  in  Revolu- 
tionary state  constitutions,  80; 
Federalist's  doctrine  of,  107; 
John  Adams's  theory  of,  136;  re- 
adjustment of,  during  Jacksonian 
epoch,  184 ;  criticism  of  tripartite 
division  by  Goodnow,  323. 

Bledsoe,  A.  T. :  on  nature  of  lib- 
erty, 235. 

Boucher,  J. :  on  consent  of  the  gov- 
erned, 64 ;  on  equality,  65 ;  in- 
dorsement of  divine-right  theory 
by,  65 ;  on  absoluteness  of  gov- 
ernment, 66 ;  opposition  to  right 
of  revolution,  67. 

Brownson,  O.  A. :  on  constitution 
of  state  and  of  government,  292  • 
on  location  of  sovereignty  in  the 
United  States,  295. 

Burgess,  J.  W. :  theory  of,  as  to 
national  state,  299 ;  theory  of  sov- 
ereignty, 300 ;  criticism  of  doctrine 
of  federal  state,  300;  criticism  of 
theory  as  to  state  of  nature,  308 ; 
criticism  of  theory  of  natural 
rights,  310;  concept  of  liberty, 
313;  theory  of  relation  of  Teu- 
tonic races  to  political  civiliza- 
tion, 313 ;  doctrine  as  to  function 
of  the  state,  317  ;  distinction  be- 
tween state  and  government,  325; 
application  of  distinction  to  prob- 
lem of  sovereignty,  326. 


Calhoun,  J.  C. :  defence  of  legisla- 
tive power,  181 ;  repudiation  of 


357 


358 


INDEX 


natural-right  theory,  232;  doc- 
trine as  to  nature  of  liberty,  234 ; 
on  relation  between  superior  and 
inferior  races,  239;  criticism  of 
theory  held  by  the  Fathers,  268  ; 
on  government  as  a  social  neces- 
sity, 269;  on  the  function  of  a 
constitution,  270;  on  responsi- 
bility of  government,  270;  doc- 
trine as  to  despotism  of  the 
majority,  271 ;  on  difficulty  of 
restraining  majority,  272 ;  theory 
of  "concurrent  majority,"  273; 
advantages  urged  for  "  concur- 
rent majority,"  274 ;  objections 
against  answered,  275;  constitu- 
tional doctrine  of  nullification, 
276;  doctrine  of  secession,  278 
seq. ;  on  the  indivisibility  of  sov- 
ereigrity,  279 ;  on  original  sover- 
eignty of  states;  on  relation 
between  central  and  state  gov- 
ernments, 280 ;  on  distinction 
between  government  of  United 
States  and  a  league,  281 ;  com- 
parison of,  with  Webster,  287. 

Centz,  P.  C. :  see  Sage. 

Channing,  W.  E.:  anti-slavery 
theory  of,  218  seq.;  on  man  as 
a  person,  218;  on  the  rights  of 
personality,  219;  on  slavery  as 
subversive  of  personal  rights,  219 ; 
on  slavery  and  democracy,  220. 

Chase,  S.  P. :  theory  of  a  free  con- 
stitution, 212. 

Church  and  State:  Puritan  theory 
of  relation  between,  5,  7;  Revo- 
lutionary attitude  toward,  86; 
removal  of  religious  restrictions 
during  Jacksonian  epoch,  193; 
disestablishment  of  churches,  194; 
Jefferson's  theory  as  to  church 
estabhshments,  195 ;  Madison's 
theory  on,  195. 

Clay,  Henry:  criticism  of  Jack- 
son's use  of  prerogative,  180. 


Commons,  John  R. :  sociological 
discussion  of  sovereignty  by, 
330. 

Connecticut,  Fundamental  Orders 
of,  17. 

Contract:  formation  of  contracts 
by  Puritans,  16;  Puritan  theory 
of,  18 ;  T.  Hooker  on,  20 ;  theory 
of,  in  1776,  50 ;  Jefferson  on 
necessity  of  preserving  principle 
of,  148 ;  reactionary  tendency 
regarding,  200;  repudiation  of 
social  contract  by  Cooper,  231 ; 
by  Calhoun,  232 ;  application  of 
theory  of  contract  to  nature  of 
Union  by  Madison,  263;  by 
Jackson,  264;  by  Tucker,  266; 
Webster's  application  of  contract 
idea  to  genesis  of  Union,  284; 
Story's  doctrine  as  to,  285; 
Lieber's  criticism  of  social-con- 
tract theory,  307;  Burgess's 
repudiation  of  doctrine  of, 
308. 

Cooper,  T. :  criticism  of  natural- 
right  theory,  231. 

Cotton,  J. :  on  the  nature  of  the 
church,  8  ;  on  relation  of  church 
to  state,  10;  on  freedom  of  con- 
science, 13 ;  on  democracy,  15. 

Davis,  Jefferson :  on  nature  of  the 
Union,  283. 

Declaration  of  Independence:  con- 
temporary interpretation  of,  88; 
Jefferson's  originality  in  framing, 
146 ;  Lincoln's  interpretation  of, 
222 ;  Calhoun's  interpretation  of, 
229. 

Democracy :  elements  of,  among 
Puritans,  16,  27;  evidences  of, 
among  colonists,  32 ;  Patriot 
theory  of,  47  seq. ;  application  of 
theory  in  formation  of  govern- 
ments, 76 ;  distrust  of,  in  Consti- 
tutional Convention,  99 ;  reaction 


INDEX 


359 


against,  evident  in  Federalist,  103 ; 
J.  Adams's  criticisms  on,  125  seq.  ; 
Jeffersonian  democracy,  1^2 seq.; 
Jacksonian  democracy,  176  seq.  ; 
anti-slavery  theory  of  effect  of 
slavery  on,  220;  pro-slavery 
theory  as  to  effect  of  slavery  on, 
239 ;  recent  studies  in,  327  ;  sum- 
mary of  democratic  development, 
342 ;  whether  the  United  States  is 
drifting  away  from,  343. 

Dickinson,  John  :  on  natural  rights, 
48;  on  taxation  and  representa- 
tion, 52;  on  right  of  revolution, 
56. 

Divine  right :  Boucher's  theory  of, 

65. 

Eliot,  C.  W. :  on  American  con- 
tribution to  civilization,  328. 

Eliot,  John  :  on  Scriptural  basis  for 
Puritan  system,  3. 

English  political  ideas :  influence 
of,  on  Fathers,  47,  89;  on  Ameri- 
can theory  in  general,  337. 

Equality :  Puritan  theory  of,  25 ; 
Revolutionary  theory  of,  47; 
Boucher's  criticism  of,  65 ;  Ad- 
ams's denial  of  abstract  love  of, 
127:  Abolitionist  theory  as  to, 
207 ;  relation  of,  to  personality, 
218 ;  pro-slavery  doctrine  re- 
specting, 230,  248 ;  comparison 
between  pro-  and  anti-slavery 
theories  as  to,  248 ;  Burgess's 
theory  of  political  inequality  of 
races,  314. 

Executive :  conflict  between  colo- 
nial assembly  and,  34;  subordi- 
nate position  taken  in  Revolu- 
tionary state  governments,  80; 
Federalist  theory  regarding  need 
of  energy  in,  113;  Adams's  doc- 
trine as  to  place  of,  138 ;  revival 
of  executive  during  Jacksonian 
epoch,  182  seg. 


Federalist,  The:  historical  basis 
for  theories  of,  loi,  119:  doc- 
trine as  to  relation  betwect 
democracy  and  size  of  state,  104 ; 
definition  of  a  republic,  106; 
theory  of  separation  of  govern- 
mental powers,  107 ;  doctrine  as 
to  legislative  power,  110;  theory 
of  bicameral  legislature,  11 1 ;  on 
basis  of  representation  in  legis- 
lature, 112;  on  size  of  legisla- 
ture, 112;  theory  as  to  energetic 
executive,  113;  theory  as  to 
judiciary,  115;  on  relation  be- 
tween liberty  and  authority,  116; 
on  bills  of  rights,  117;  on  true 
guarantee  of  liberty,  119;  de- 
scription of  federal  Union  by, 
254;  explanation  of  mixed  char- 
acter of  Union,  254 ;  doctrine  of 
divisibility  of  sovereignty,  255. 

Fisher,  S.  G. :  quoted,  291. 

Fitz-Hugh,  George :  on  substitu- 
tion of  religious  truths  for  politi- 
cal theory,  243;  on  undesirabilify 
of  liberty,  244;  on  slavery  as 
best  basis  for  society,  244;  on 
slavery  and  socialism,  245. 

French  political  theory :  influence 
on  Jefferson  overestimated,  91, 
167;  influence  of  Montesquieu, 
91 ;  general  influence  on  Ameri- 
can political  ideas,  337. 

Garrison,  W.  L. :  on  "  gradualism," 
208 ;  no-government  doctrine  of, 
209;  theory  of  emancipation,  215. 

German  political  theory :  influence 
on  new  school  of  political  science 
in  United  States,  306;  nature  of 
influence,  338. 

Giddings,  F.  H. :  restatement  of 
natural-rights  theory  by,  310;  on 
relation  of  democracy  to  colonial 
government,  338. 

Godkin,  £.  L. :  on  democracy,  398. 


36o 


INDEX 


Goodnow,  F.  J. :  theory  of  dual 
division  of  governmental  powers, 
322;  theory  of  administration, 
323 ;  on  place  of  political 
parties  in  governmental  system, 

324- 
Government :  distinction  between 
state  and,  324  seq.;  Lieber  on, 
325;  Burgess  on,  325;  Wilson 
on,  327;  Willoughby  on,  327; 
function  of  government  during 
Revolutionary  period,  61 ;  Lie- 
ber's  doctrine  as  to  function  of 
government,  315;  Woolsey  on, 
316;  Wilson  on,  317;  Burgess 
on,  317;  Willoughby  on,  319; 
attitude  of  economists  toward, 
319 ;  comparison  of  early  with 
later  theory  of  governmental 
functions,  321 ;  Ross  on  limits 
of  state  interference,  331. 

Hamilton,  A.:  on  natural  rights, 
48;  doctrines  developed  in 
Federalist,  103  seq. 

Hammond,  J.  H. :  quoted,  238. 

Hereditary  succession  :  Paine's  op- 
position to,  71;  Revolutionary 
state  constitutions  on,  75 ;  John 
Adams  not  averse  to,  133. 

Hooker,  Thos. :  theory  of  contract 
as  basis  of  religious  and  political 
society,  20. 

Hopkins,  Stephen :  on  rights  of  En- 
glishmen, 44 ;  on  taxation  and 
representation,  53. 

Hosmer,  W. :  on  liberty,  208. 

Hurd,  J.  C:  on  sovereignty  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  292;  on  sover- 
eignty of  "  states  united,"  295. 

Individualism  :  in  political  theory 
of  Revolution,  95 ;  in  Abolitionist 
theory,  215 ;  in  philosophical  ar- 
gument against  slavery,  217 ;  re- 
cent change  in  attitude  toward, 


315    seq.;    summary    of    these 
changes,  321. 
Inequality :  as  a  basis  for  democ- 
racy, 240.     See  Equality. 

Jackson,  Andrew :  significance  of 
election  and  administration  of, 
178,  182;  development  of  execu- 
tive power  by,  178  ;  his  theory  of 
rotation  in  office,  185  ;  theory  as 
to  nature  of  the  Union,  264. 

Jameson,  J.  A. :  on  different  types 
of  constitutions,  291 ;  on  location 
of  sovereignty  in  United  States, 
293  ;  on  sovereignty  of  nation, 
294. 

Jefferson,  Thos. :  general  consider- 
ations respecting,  143 ;  Declara- 
tion of  Independence  and,  146; 
on  natural  rights,  147 ;  on  the 
consent  of  the  governed,  148  ;  on 
principle  of  consent  as  main- 
tained by  revolution,  149;  on 
principle  of  consent  as  main- 
tained by  periodical  revision  of 
constitution,  150;  on  exact  period 
for  revision,  151 ;  theory  as  to 
monarchy,  153 ;  theory  as  to  aris- 
tocracy, 155 ;  on  natural  and 
artificial  aristocracy,  155;  on 
democracy,  157  seq.;  definition  of 
republic  by,  157 ;  democratic 
program  of,  158 ;  on  educa- 
tion and  democracy,  159;  on 
local  government  and  democ- 
racy, 159 ;  on  subordination  of 
military  to  civil  authorities,  160 ; 
essential  principle  in  democratic 
theory  of,  163 ;  comparison  with 
J.  Adams,  164;  application  of 
democratic  principles  by,  164; 
on  agricultural  population  as 
basis  for  democracy,  166; 
sources  of  theory  of,  167 ;  rank 
of,  as  political  theorist,  171 ;  sig- 
nificance of  career  of,  171 ;  aris- 


INDEX 


361 


tocratic  elements  in  democracy 
of,  174;  on  relation  between 
church  and  state,  195. 
Judiciary :  position  accorded  in 
Revolutionary  state  constitutions, 
80 ;  theory  of  Federalist  respect- 
ing, 115 ;  democratization  of,  197. 

Kent,  Chancellor:  argument  of, 
against  universal  suffrage,  189. 

Legislature,  conflict  of,  Vi'h  colo- 
nial governors,  34;  predominant 
position  given  in  Revolutionary 
state  constitutions.  81 ;  Federal- 
ist doctrine  respecting,  no; 
Adams's  theory  of,  138  ;  defence 
of,  against  executive  by  Webster, 
179;  by  Clay,  180;  by  Calhoun, 
181 ;  loss  of  power  during  Jack- 
son ian  epoch,  179  seq. 

Liberty:  Puritan  theory  of,  23; 
Revolutionary  doctrine  as  to,  49 
seq. ;  constitutional  measures  de- 
vised by  Fathers  to  secure,  76; 
Federalist  theory  as  to  guaranty 
of,  119;  anti-slavery  doctrine  re- 
specting nature  of,  206,  218,  222, 
226;  pro-slavery  idea  of,  234,  235; 
comparison  of  pro-  and  anti- 
slavery  theories  respecting,  235, 
248 ;  modern  conception  of,  312 ; 
Burgess's  doctrine  of,  312. 

Lieber,  Francis :  on  difference  be- 
tween "  nation  "  and  "  people," 
296;  influence  of,  on  American 
political  theory,  305  ;  criticism  of 
state  of  nature  by,  307;  doctrine 
of,  as  to  natural  rights,  308 ;  dis- 
tinction drawn  by,  between  Galil- 
ean and  Anglican  liberty,  309. 

Lincoln,  A. :  anti-slavery  theory  of, 
221  seq. ;  interpretation  of  Dec- 
laration of  Independence,  222; 
on  Declaration  of  Independence 
as  an  ideal,  223 ;  on  negro  rights, 


223;  on  danger  in  pro-slavery 
theory,  224 ;  on  capitalistic  theorj 
of  society,  224 ;  theory  as  to  place 
of  laboring  class,  225 ;  on  pres- 
ervation of  the  Union,  291. 

Locke,  John:  influence  of,  on 
American  Revolution,  89;  con- 
trast with  Jefferson,  170. 

Lowell,  A.  L. :  on  democracy  and 
the  constitution,  329. 

Madison,  James:  quoted  in  dis- 
cussions of  Federalist,  103  seq. ; 
theory  of  separation  of  church 
and  state,  195 ;  doctrine  of  di- 
visibility of  sovereignty,  259 ;  on 
Union  as  a  binding  compact, 
263. 

Majority,  rule  of:  Jefferson  on,  158 ; 
tyranny  of,  denounced  by  Cal- 
houn, 271 ;  theory  of  "  concur- 
rent" majority  proposed  by 
Calhoun,  273. 

McDuffie,  Gov.:   on  slavery,  238, 

239- 

Monarchy :  opinion  of,  before 
Revolution,  69;  Paine's  theory 
of,  70;  elimination  of,  from 
American  political  system,  75; 
Adams's  theory  as  to  function 
of,  138;  Jefferson's  criticisms 
on,  153. 

Moses,  B.  J. :  on  democracy  and 
social  growth,  328. 

Mulford,  E. :  on  "historical"  and 
"enacted"  constitutions,  292;  on 
sovereignty  in  United  States,  294. 

Nationalism  :  Webster's  argument 
concerning,  284  seq.;  later  de- 
velopment of  theory  of,  289  seq. ; 
summary  of  American  theory 
regarding,  302.  See  Union,  Se- 
cession, Nullification. 

Nature,  state  of:  Revolutionary 
theory  regarding,  47;  theory  o( 


362 


INDEX 


repudiated  by  Cooper,  231 ;  by 
Calhoun,  232;  by  recent  think- 
ers, 307  seq. 

Negro :  see  Slavery,  Anti-slavery, 
Abolition. 

Non-resistance :  Quaker  practice 
of,  30 ;  Garrison's  theory  of,  209; 
practical  program  of,  211 ;  Tho- 
reau's  discussion  of,  213. 

Nullification  :  Calhoun's  theory  of, 
268  seq.;  philosophical  prole- 
gomena to,  268 ;  despotism  of 
majority,  271 ;  doctrine  of  "  con- 
current majority,"  273;  advan- 
tages of,  274 ;  objections  answered, 
275 ;  constitutional  form  of  doc- 
trine, 276, 

Paine,  Thos. :  theory  of  social  con- 
tract, 50 ;  opinion  of,  as  to  mon- 
archy, 70 ;  on  hereditary  succes- 
sion, 71 ;  on  folly  of  checks  and 
balances,  73;  Jefferson's  opinion 
of,  170. 

Parties,  place  of,  in  American  po- 
litical system,  323. 

Penn,  William  :  theory  of  govern- 
ment, 29;  on  democratic  spirit 
in  America,  33. 

People  :  Puritan  political  people,  5 ; 
political  people  in  1776,  87 ; 
"  people "  in  Jefferson's  day, 
175 ;  expansion  of  concept  of, 
during  Jacksonian  period,  187; 
obscurity  of  term  in  1789,  257; 
Calhoun's  interpretation  of 
"people  of  the  United  States," 
267  seq.  ;  Webster's  interpreta- 
tion, 284  seq. ;  sovereignty  of,  see 
Sovereignty. 

Property :  protection  of,  as  purpose 
of  government,  62 ;  as  qualifica- 
tion for  suffrage,  84 ;  as  qualifica- 
tion for  office,  85 ;  abandonment 
of,  as  qualification  for  suffrage 
and  of&ce,  193. 


Puritans,  The :  basis  of  system  oi, 
2;  theocratic  elements  in,  5; 
theory  of,  concerning  relation 
between  church  and  state,  7; 
democratic  elements  in,  16,  27: 
contracts  made  by,  in  formation 
of  church  and  state,  17 ;  idea  of, 
regarding  liberty,  23;  theory  of 
equality  held  by,  25. 

Quakers :  political  ideas  of,  27. 

Revolution,  right  of:  Mayhew  on, 
55;  S.Adams  on,  56;  Dickinson 
on,  56 ;  state  constitutions  on,  58 ; 
Jefferson's  indorsement  of,  149; 
claimed  for  states,  266. 

Revolution,  period  of:  historical 
considerations  respecting,  38 ; 
constitutional  theory  of  patriots 
during,  42;  doctrine  of  natural 
rights,  47 ;  theory  of  social  con- 
tract, 49 ;  theory  of  popular  sov- 
ereignty, 53;  theory  of  right  of 
revolution,  55  ;  theory  as  to  pur- 
pose of  government,  60 ;  Loyal- 
ist theory,  63 ;  idea  of  monarchy 
and  aristocracy,  70;  doctrine  of 
delegated  powers,  76;  of  weak 
government,  77 ;  of  separation  of 
powers,  79 ;  as  to  short  terms  of 
office,  82 ;  qualifications  for  suf- 
frage during,  84;  qualifications 
for  office  during,  85;  relation 
between  church  and  state,  86; 
source  of  ideas  of,  88. 

Rights,  civil:  demanded  for  negro, 
223 ;  pro-slavery  theory  regard- 
ing, 237. 

Rights,  natural :  theory  of,  in  1776, 
47;  Jefferson  on,  147;  based  on 
human  personality,  218  ;  repudi- 
ated by  Cooper,  232 ;  repudiated 
by  Calhoun,  232;  interpretations 
of,  to  justify  slavery,  233  seq. ; 
Lieber's  theory  of,  309 ;  Burgess's 


INDEX 


363 


criticism  of,  310;  Willoughby's 
criticism  of,  310. 

Rives,  W.  C.  :  on  division  of 
sovereignty  in  United  States, 
261. 

Ross,  E.  A. :  study  of  social  con- 
trol, 330;  on  grounds  of  control, 
330;  on  means  of  control,  330; 
on  limits  of  control,  331. 

Rotation  in  office :  doctrine  of,  in 
1776,  82;  Jackson's  theory  con- 
cerning, 185  ;  Taylor  on,  186. 

Sage,    B.    J. :    on    nature    of  the 

Union,  283. 
Sawyer,  G.  S. :  quoted  on  slavery, 

237- 

Secession  :  Tucker's  theory  of,  266 ; 
Calhoun's  doctrine  of,  278  seq. ; 
Madison's  opinion  regarding, 
263;  Jackson's  attitude  toward, 
264;  Webster's  idea  of,  284; 
recent  theory  respecting,  289. 
See  Calhoun. 

Seward,  W.  H. :  doctrine  of 
"  higher  law,"  212. 

Slavery :  theory  of  radical  Aboli- 
tionists regarding,  205 ;  philo- 
sophic argument  against,  217 ; 
Lincoln's  attack  on,  221 ;  basis 
of  pro-slavery  argument,  227; 
inequality  as  necessitating,  229 ; 
natural  rights  and,  231 ;  theory 
of  liberty  in  relation  to,  234 ;  as 
natural  relation  between  superior 
and  inferior  races,  236;  relation 
of  democracy  to,  239 ;  ultra- 
conservative  defence  of,  243 ; 
comparison  between  pro-  and 
anti-slavery  theories,  248. 

Socialism:  Fitz-Hugh  on  relation 
between  slavery  and,  244;  atti- 
tude of  recent  theorists  toward 
individualism,  315  seq. 

Sovereignty :  of  people  in  1776, 
S3;    Federalist    doctrine   as    to 


divisibility  of,  255;  doctrine  of 
U.  S.  courts  as  to  divisibility  of, 
258;  Madison's  theory  as  to 
division  of,  259;  Rivcs's  state- 
ment as  to  division  of,  261 ;  Cal- 
houn's theory  of  indivisibility  of, 
279;  Calhoun  on  location  of 
sovereignty  in  U.  S.,  279;  Cal- 
houn's distinction  between  sov- 
ereignty and  its  attributes,  280; 
Webster's  doctrine  regarding  lo- 
cation of  sovereignty  in  U.  S., 
284;  location  of  sovereignty  by 
later  Nationalists,  293 ;  doctrine 
of  sovereignty  of  nation,  294; 
doctrine  of  sovereignty  of  "  states 
united,"  295;  Nationalist  theory 
of  indivisibility  of  sovereignty, 
298  ;  Burgess's  theory  as  to,  300; 
application  of  Burgess's  theory  to 
federal  state,  300;  relation  of 
distinction  between  state  and 
government  to  sovereignty,  326; 
sociological  discussion  of  sov- 
ereignty, 330. 

State :  see  Government,  Social 
Contract,  Natural  Rights. 

Stephens,  A.  H. :  on  slavery  as 
proper  basis  for  a  republic,  239 ; 
on  nature  of  Union,  283. 

Story,  Joseph  :  on  contract  theory, 
201 ;  on  double  signification  of 
sovereignty,  262;  on  Constitu- 
tion as  a  law,  285. 

Suffrage :  theory  and  practice  of, 
in  1776,  84 ;  expansion  of,  dur- 
ing Jacksonian  period,  187 
seq. ;  defence  of  property  qualifi- 
cation, 188;  plea  for  universal 
suffrage,  191. 

Taylor,  John :  on  aristocracy,  144 ; 
on  rotation  in  office,  186. 

Taxation :  in  rel.-ition  to  repre- 
sentation, 42;  constitutional 
phase  of  taxation  without  rcprc- 


3^4 


INDEX 


sentation,  43 ;  political  phase  of, 

51- 

Thoreau,  H.  D. :  opinion  of  gov- 
ernment, 213 ,  individualistic  ten- 
dencies of,  214;  theory  of  free 
government,  215. 

Tories :  typical  theory  of,  63.  See 
Boucher. 

Tracy,  Destutt  de :  works  of,  rec- 
ommended by  Jefferson,  168. 

Tucker,  H.  St.  George:  applica- 
tion of  social-contract  theory  to 
nature  of  Union,  266. 

Union,  nature  of:  theory  respect- 
ing, in  1789,  253 ;  Madison's  doc- 
trine of,  259 ;  Jackson's  theory  of, 
264  ;  Tucker's  social-contract 
theory  of,  266;  Calhoun's  doc- 
trine of  nullification,  268;  Cal- 
houn's doctrine  of  secession,  278  ; 
Webster's  nationalist  theory,  284 ; 
later  nationalist  theory,  289 ;  Bur- 
gess's doctrine  of,  299 ;  summary 
of  theories  regarding,  302. 

Van  Zandt,  case  of:  doctrine  of 
Chase  in,  212. 


Walker,  F.  A. :  on  tendency  away 
from  extreme  individualism,  320. 

Ward,  L.  F. :  doctrine  of  socioc- 
racy,  329. 

Wayland,  Francis  :  anti-slavery 
theory  of,  218  seq.;  on  man  as 
a  person,  218 ;  on  rights  of  per- 
sonality, 219 ;  on  slavery  as  sub- 
versive of  personal  rights,  219; 
on  slavery  and  democracy,  220. 

Webster,  Daniel :  theory  of  legis- 
lative power  as  guardian  of  lib- 
erty, 179 ;  theory  as  to  nature  of 
the  Union,  285 ;  on  constitution 
as  a  law,  284 ;  as  representative 
of  national  spirit,  287 ;  compar- 
ison of,  with  Calhoun,  287. 

Williams,  Roger :  on  nature  of  the 
church,  7 ;  on  relation  between 
church  and  state,  9. 

Wiiloughby,  W.  W. :  criticism  of 
natural  rights  by,  310;  doctrine 
as  to  function  of  government,  319 ; 
on  composite  state,  301. 

Wilson,  Woodrow  :  on  function  of 
government,  317. 

Woolsey,  T.  D. :  on  function  of 
government,  316. 


Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America. 


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